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This research determines the fundamental rationales, principles of copyright law and droit
d'auteur, in order to ascertain whether these legal mechanisms or institutions are viable in the
light of information technology. Moreover, the analysis is directed towards the determination
of the emergence of intellectual property rights in their cultural, economic, historical,
political and legal relation to technological change. It is argued that none of the current
intellectual property mechanisms are viable in the light of information technology. Further,
only the fundamental rationales of droit d'auteur would appear to respond adequately to the
challenges of the information age under a new concept of authorship.
The inadequacies of the current intellectual property institutions and information
technology derive from the manner in which intellectual property rights emerge. Legal rights
ought to be the spontaneous product of individual claims and the basis of a system of
voluntary interactions, where legal institutions, such as intellectual property, validate
common practice instead of dictating it. As a result, it is demonstrated that as opposed to
early intellectual property systems which emerge out of individual claims, modern copyright
law dictates the emergence of rights by granting to authors property rights in commodities.
By contrast, droit d'auteur rationally secures property rights in works as a simple recognition
of authors' rights in their work, being thus independent of technologies which the attribution
of copyright revenues.
Following this line of thinking, markets are systems for consensual exchange of
owned goods which are intended to encourage individuals to make productive use of
resources. Since works of the mind produce externalities which prevent markets from
forming efficiently, copyright is sought to provide incentive for the production of the optimal
amount of information. However, it is argued that the current intellectual property
mechanisms which substitute for consensual markets present the major problem of being only
static substitutes for dynamic markets. Such poor market mimics can deal with exchanges of
works in tangible form but are completely inefficient in electronic milieu.
Added to that, current copyright mechanisms are more concerned with trade related
issues than authorship as such. There lies a dilemma between property rights of authors in
their work and property rights of the industry as a form of return in investment. It is also
argued that in essence the digital environment is not the root of the problem but the current
diversion of the purpose of copyright. As such the protection of computer programs by
copyright is a vivid proof of the issue. An economic, social and political analysis of the
effects and needs of an information society shows that intellectual property needs to redefine
its concepts of authorship in approaching problems of technological change. Further, it is
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''The past has revealed to me how the future is built"
- Teilhard de Chardin
The aim of this research is to determine the fundamental rationales of intellectual
property rights, and especially copyright law and droit d'auteur, in order to ascertain
whether these legal institutions are viable in the light of information technology. In
essence, the research is directed towards the determination of the emergence of
intellectual property rights in their cultural, historical, political and legal relation to
technological change. This contribution will argue that neither of the two copyright
paradigms are viable in the light of information technology; however, the fundamental
principles of droit d'auteur would appear to respond adequately to the challenges of
the information age in the form of a new concept of authorship.
Such a contention may appear unduly adventurous to those who would argue
that the intellectual property system has so far responded well to technological
changes. Today, however, information technology is complicating this process and
undermining many of the mechanisms that have governed the system. Moreover, this
trend is likely to continue since today's information technology is not only at its early
development but is also becoming steadily more sophisticated as well as more
powerful. In other words, a new revolution, the information revolution, is at its
beginning whereby many technologies, such as computer facilities, satellite
communications and other devices are playing an essential role. As a result, the
greatest impact will not come from one single technology but rather from the use of a
combination of technologies. This is what represents information technology, a
combination of interrelated technologies as opposed to the single technology, the
printing-press. In this research, I will refer especially to the information infrastructure,
the Internet. Because it represents a high capacity multi-media carrier where
broadcast, messaging and database communication models merge, this infrastructure
will illustrate the current reach of the technology as well as the direction in which it is
likely to grow.
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In looking at how information technology affects the intellectual property
system, it is necessary to conceive of the system as interrelated sets composed of
incentives and rewards designed to influence the creative behaviour of individuals, of
mechanisms to enforce these incentives, and of individual transactions and creative
activities. Therefore, the system is made up of mechanisms and the relationships that
these mechanisms generate between society and the system. As such, the out-puts of
the system provide a feed-back about how well the system works. Moreover, these
sets are governed by the goals towards which the system is directed; as such they
ought to reflect society's goals. Accordingly an intellectual property system evolves
out of a combination of individuals' needs, historical circumstances, and political
compromises. In order to help to reach these goals, the system produces certain
incentives and rewards which are integrated within a system of operating rules
enforced by defined mechanisms. More importantly, social, political and technological
changes may alter intellectual property goals and one may expect that, as the goals
change, other parts of the system ought to change correspondingly. Although national
legislatures have had to reckon with technological change, information technology is
challenging the intellectual property system in a way that may require substantial
changes in the system. Once a relatively slow process, technological change is now
outpacing the legal structure which has governed the system and creating
unprecedented pressures on legislatures to adjust the system in order to accommodate
these changes. The question which remains is what necessary adjustments are required
in order to accommodate information technology.
The intellectual property system regroups a number of different parties who all
express a wide range of concerns. Such concerns reflect opposing claims which put
enormous pressure on the system itself. On the one hand, authors, publishers and
many other copyright holders hold different views on the measures which need to be
taken. However, they are all looking for measures to protect not only their income but
also their intellectual creations. Representing the dilemma of the new technology,
producers of computer programs, databases and other functional works look at the
inadequacies of the current system in protecting their products. To that effect,
conflicts arise between the creative and industrial worlds as to what intellectual
property, and especially copyright institutions, ought to protect. Also, manufacturers
of information technology products have an interest in the future development of
intellectual property since it influences directly the future development of information
technology products. On the other hand, a new sense of privacy as well as a more
liberal approach to access information is advocated by users. The general public is
becoming accustomed to access in the privacy of their homes or offices an increasing
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number of works at the click of a computer mouse. Scholars and scientists express the
need to make intellectual resources and materials as accessible as possible in order to
carry out their work. Also, at a trans-national level, many countries need intellectual
property products and may perceive the new technology as a mixed blessing. Indeed,
the technology facilitates the social, economic and political development but also
offers the prospect of increased centralisation and power of industrialised countries.
As such there are legitimate concerns which need to be weighted against national
intellectual property interests. Above all, information technology brings new parties to
the debate who may not recognise themselves in these two broad categories. These
people may represent a new generation of people who have grown up with the
technology itself and have already been empowered with the many opportunities
which information technology offers. As such, the technology is changing the role of
each party to become an interactive as well as a multiple one. A re-evaluation of
copyright institutions prompts a re-assessment of their purpose in the light of these
concerns.
This research will not use a comparative approach to copyright law and droit
d'auteur, that is, merely comparing the rules that constitute the law of the moment of
each particular system. If one remains at the level of comparing rules, no legal system
is the same to any other, including systems from the same legal tradition. What I will
do in the following thesis is different. I will compare the rationales and principles
under which the rules were created. My opinion is that the existing differences
between copyright institutions in common law and civil law countries should be
sensibly comparable since both intellectual property systems evolve out of identical
social, political and economic constructs. As a result, I will try to ascertain how these
principles, which are further operationalised in the form of legal rules and doctrines,
ultimately shape copyright institutions in order to determine whether copyright law
and droit d'auteur are viable in the light of information technology.
Using the above methodology, Chapter 1 determines how intellectual property
rights emerged before our modern concept of copyright. It is demonstrated that in
Greek and Roman times the concept of intellectual property was the spontaneous
product of individual claims and the basis of a system of voluntary interactions, where
legal institutions validated common practice but did not dictate it. In similar fashion,
the law embraced in medieval and renaissance time the development of new
processes, and in particular the printing Press. From that point, intellectual property
started crystallising itself in a more rigid form. The technology, and especially the
commercial value it involves, influenced the emergence of intellectual property rights
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in such a way that the rights became the creation of the state rather than a matter of
individual claims.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 examine the emergence of copyright rationales in
their modem form where the state takes a preponderant role in attributing rights. It is
established that copyright law, unlike its continental counterpart, grants a temporary
commercial security attributed to authors or their assigns as commodities. An
examination of both systems shows that copyright law is based upon two fundamental
principles: a temporary commercial monopoly balanced by the public domain. By
contrast, droit d'auteur simply secures the right of authors in their own creations
independently from any form of technology. As a result, the system evolves out of
three fundamental principles: authorship, public domain, and temporary commercial
monopoly. U.S. copyright law is considered as an illustration of both systems since it
characterises a hybrid system which is full of teaching and importance in analysing the
viability of copyright institutions.
Chapter 4 is concerned with the emergence of property rights, and especially
market formation in products of the mind. Markets are systems for consensual
exchange of owned goods which is intended to encourage people to make productive
use of resources. Since it is believed that markets in works of the mind do not produce
that optimal amount of information, intellectual property is intended to provide
incentive for the production of the optimal amount of information. However, it is
demonstrated that intellectual property as an intermediary for market formation does
not recognise markets as a dynamic form of exchange. In other words, intellectual
property does not internalise correctly impediments to consensual exchanges, and
even creates some. As a result, since information technology, and especially the
information infrastructure, plays in itself the intermediary in a dynamic fashion, it is
argued that intellectual property should aim not to correct market deficiencies but
rather concentrate on protecting the inherent value of works of the mind produce
optimal.
As a rejoinder to the preceding chapter, Chapter 5 looks more specifically at
the inherent value of works of the mind, and especially at the dilemma between
intellectual creation and commercial value. In order to demonstrate what ought to be
protected by copyright in electronic milieu, this chapter analyses the application of
copyright protection to computer programs. In using that example, it is argued that
only the intellectual value, based on differentiation, ought to be protected by
intellectual property rights in a digital environment; thus works of function such as
computer programs are not fit for copyright protection.
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Finally, Chapter 6 looks at the crucial role of information in the information
age and the competing claims which rise along with new opportunities. It is argued
that the rise of information technology changes society's goals. Since copyright
institutions are directed towards these goals and serve the purpose of balancing
competing claims, the institutions ought to change in response. Above all, it is shown
that intellectual property as the product of certain social interactions is in search for a




"Copyright has always existed, hut it did not enter from the very start into
legislation"
- Eugene Pouillet*
Authors and inventors have always been highly regarded for their contribution to
society. In consequence, concepts of property in products of the intellect have always
existed as far as human memory can recall.
However, it is difficult to find evidence of the concept of intellectual property
during antiquity. Careful choices have to be made as to the relevance of sources
available. In that respect, I have iimited my research to the Greek and Roman times
since it is possible to trace tangible evidence of the importance of intellectual
endeavours as well as the importance of centres duplicating manuscripts for trade. It
should be stressed, however, that intellectual property was not attached solely to
production of manuscript or books. In fact, the concept of intellectual property does
not stem from any material literary production in the Greek or Roman time. As a
result, precise and descriptive sources can be found from Greek and Roman writings
on many aspects of intellectual life and in concepts of property in works of the
intellect developed in that times. Furthermore, the Greeks and the Romans are our
ancestors in many other ways and have influenced deeply our own ways of thinking
Eugene Pouillet, Traite theorique et pratique de la propriete litteraire et artistique (Paris, 1908),
at 2, Hereafter: [Pouillet, 1908]
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and acting, and especially our modern concepts of intellectual property. With the
introduction of printing, the concept evolved in such a way that it created a parallel
concept, a privilege of literary property which in effect narrowed down the concept of
intellectual property. Property in an intellectual creation is derived from property in a
material creation. As a result economic rights were based upon tangible forms of
expression and considered solely as commodities in order to enforce the rights. In
effect, this concept led to a restricted concept of authorship where economic rights are
well asserted and where moral rights are controverted.
This chapter will show how early intellectual property rights emerged as the
spontaneous product of individual claims and the basis of a system of voluntary
interactions, as opposed to the Renaissance period following the invention of the
Press. Beyond utilitarian and historical curiosities, there exists a philosophical and
social order which explains why the early development of intellectual property could
not dictate the emergence of rights but only validate common practice. Creativity is a
complex process influenced by many interactions, which involves creative people,
technical tools and information resources. Careful attention will be given to the
complex interaction which exists between the creative process and society.
Advent of Intellectual Property
For centuries, Greece was supreme in matters of the spirit and the intellect. At the
very beginning of their history, the Greeks already possessed the Iliad and the
Odyssey. Ancient Greek society can be characterised by the predominance of
7
philosophical thought, pure science and literary endeavours.1 They had created tragic
theatre with Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, comic theatre with Aristophanes,
and learned history with Herodotus and Thucydides. Socrates and his disciples, Plato
and Xenophon followed by Aristotle, had given brilliant demonstrations of logic in
the original form of dialogues. From the fourth century B.C. onwards to the Roman
conquest, such great writers and philosophers formed the heyday of hellenism.
Nonetheless there was nothing that could be described as a legal system for the
protection of literary and artistic productions It is essential to realise that intellectual
endeavours which reflected Greek communities' values and goals were not primarily
expressed in writing. Paul Cartledge remarked:
"All literature [...] in the basically oral societies of Greece was typically heard and
not read."
The philosophical and political context was the fundamental principle of freedom of
speech reflected in the capacity of citizens for self-expression or for rational speech.
Moreover, this fundamental principle sustained an organisational system where
citizens wielded the power and constituted both the state and society all in one.
Therefore the number of written copies of any work available for the use of the
general community, if any existed at all, must have been limited even though these
citizen-speakers are well-known. In fact, before the establishment of the great library
of Alexandria as a centre of manuscript production, no such thing as a public library
1
There are problems of generalisation. Classical Greece did not form a single society even though
it was a single culture. The Hellenistic world englobed many cities or human communities called polis.
Among them Athena polarised attention due to its leading cultural, intellectual and political power,




Paul Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American
Revolution, (The University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1992), at 35, Hereafter: [Rahe, 1992]
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can be traced.4 Greek cultural and political life was simply based upon oral
expression.
In Greek time, writers often regarded themselves as teachers like Socrates and
Plato, or as practical philosophers like Euclid. Their perception of literary property
was therefore really different to our modern concepts of intellectual property. The
author's ambitions appears to have been satisfied when his work received in his own
immediate community the honour of dramatic presentation or of public recitation.6
Authors seem to have produced intellectual endeavours without any thought of
material compensation but only as their own duty to their city. Aristotle noted that the
ancient law-giver Hippodamus of Miletus, born around 500 bc, had proposed a law
that any person who discovered something of advantage to the state should "receive
honour",6 But the proposal seems to have never taken shape in law. Moreover, Greek
societies were unlikely to grant any patent monopoly even though no laws could have
prevented it.' Nonetheless, Aristotle himself despised monopolies even as incentives
and considered them as "an art often practiced by cities when they are in want of
money". Plato took the same attitude towards money. Wealth according to Plato "is
but a means to higher things and we should abandon its unlimited and irrational
4
Franck A. Mumby, Publishing and Bookselling, (London. 1930), at 15, Hereafter: [Mumby,
1930]
s
This tradition dominated also the structure of the Roman public and literary life. Ancient
literature had always been intended to be spoken or sung, see Erich Auerbach, Literary Language and
Its Public, in Late Latin Antiquity and in the Middles Ages (London, 1965), at 246, Hereafter'
[Auerbach, 1965]
6
Aristotle, Politico, I, 1268a.
There is a story of the Sybarites who supposedly gave monopolies to those of their cooks who
invented a "peculiar and excellent" dish, Phylarchus about 300 bc, quoted by Athenaeus, Deipn. XII,
521,c,d, cited in Frank D. Prager, The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property, 34 Journal
of the Patent Office Society 1952, at 114, Hereafter [Prager, 1952]
8
Aristotle, Politico, I, 1259.
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pursuit".9 Conceivably money-making is the aim of securing monopolies and would
therefore distract from a vocation, Their attitude can be clearly illustrated by the
nature of Greek societies. The city was a political community constituted by citizen-
men who devoted their time and efforts to speech and public actions.10 As a result:
"all genres of Greek public discourse, whether lyric and elegiac poetry, epinian odes,
tragedy, comedy, history, oratory or political theory, did indeed privilege the public,
communal, political sphere above the private and the personal.""
Dramatic performances and recitations of public reciters, called rhapsodists, were the
principal means of political action which should be free from any pressure.
Plato and Aristotle were not the last to consider music and poetry in such
political fashion. The psychological preparation of a young man needed the study of
12
poetry, music and discourse in the assumption of his duties as a citizen and soldier.
Therefore, free use of the products of the mind in teaching and collection of ideas
needed to be free of any circumvention. Plato, for instance, was opposed to any
promotion of what is considered in our modern times the useful arts or fine arts. In the
Republic the ideal state does not give room for political or industrial development but
13
only for scientific research. Furthermore, Plato had no illusion about perpetual
progress so popular in the laissezfaire period. Fie gave his opinion as follows:
"In short, then, those who keep watch over our common wealth must take the
greatest care not to overlook the least infraction of the rule against any innovation
upon the established system of education either of the body or of the mind. When the
poet says that men care most for "the newest air that hovers on the singer's lips", they
will be afraid lest he be taken not merely to mean new songs, but to be commending
a new style of music. Such innovation is not to be commended, nor should the poet
be so understood. The introduction of novel fashions in music is a thing to be aware
of as endangering the whole fabric of society, whose most important conventions are
unsettled by any revolution in that quarter."'4
9
Plato, Res Rep. IV 424
10
[Rahe, 1992], at 32.
11
[Cartledge, 1993], at 91
12
[Rahe. 1992], at 126.
Plato, Res Rep. IV 421.
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Aristotle, following the same line of thinking, added a more political and economic
approach to the evil of monopoly. Discussing the plans of Hippodamus, he remarked
critically that search for monopoly as a form of recognition may lead to abuses in the
legal and constitutional field, in other words corrupts the political community and
affects its freedom of self-expression. Cautiously, Aristotle preferred stability to any
development in that sense.
Nonetheless, the Hellenistic world was not entirely powerless in repressing
literary piracy. Invited to a contest in Alexandria during the reign of the Ptolemeis,
Aristophane (c. 257 - 180 bc), the grammarian, sitting on the jury of a contest in
Alexandria "when his opinion was asked, voted that the first place should be given to
the candidate who was least liked by the audience".0 Asked to explain the reasons for
his judgement, he demonstrated that the other contestants' contributions were copies
of existing works. The king then ordered them to be brought to trial for theft "and
thrust out of the city".16 Another instance in the Greek literature tells of the
condemnation by several ancient authors of Hermodorus. one of Plato's disciples. It is
reported that Hermodorus, attending his master's lectures, took some notes and
17
brought them to Sicily in order to sell them. This case may be interpreted as the
recognition of the right of divulgation which belongs only to the author or simply the
reproval of Hermodorus's intent to make money at the expense of somebody's work.
13
"Aristophanes vero, cum ab eo sententia rogatur, eum primum renuntiari iussit, qui minime
populo placuisset", Vitruvio, De Achitectura, Book VII Preface.
15
"Itaque rex iussit cum his agi furti condemnatosque cum igniominia dimisit", Vitruvio, De
Achitectura, Book VII Preface.
17
"Die mihi, placetne tibi primum edere iniussu meo? Hoc ne Hermodorus quidem faciebat, is qui
libros solitus est divulgare, ex quo..." (Come now, in the first place do you approve of publishing
without my instruction? Even Hermodorus didn't do that, the man who used to broadcastPlato's
books), Cicero, Letters to Atticus, Book XIII, 21. Arpinum 30 June or 1 July B.C. 45; see also Book XI.
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In my opinion, the lack of clear legal sanction by Attic laws is not a sufficient
objection to the recognition of the notion of property in speech. As a matter of fact,
literary enlightenment by means of written works came only for later generations and
solely in support of speech in its early development. Importance must be given to the
term intellectual property in relation to what is protected. I would argue that
intellectual property serves to denote an object of legal and moral right which is not in
the public domain. In Greek times, intellectual property was not defined as such under
laws; however, in considering the importance of the public domain in Greek
communities, protection of the moral rights of authors were most certainly affirmed as
a fundamental form of freedom of political expression.
The library of Alexandria, which was the first important manuscript or tablet-
producing market of the Hellenistic world, and later of the Roman world, became the
repository of copies of accepted classics, possibly works of authors long since dead
and of great or minor reputation. No evidence remains of any practiced compensating
authors for their speeches or works transcribed in manuscripts. On the one hand, it
was certainly difficult to reward financially authors who were long since dead. Also,
there is no evidence of any rights being passed post-mortem to heirs in order to allow
them to claim any sort of financial compensation. On the other hand, plagiarists of
major writers, as it has been argued, would have most certainly been detected by the
literate society of the time. Furthermore, the case of minor and possibly unknown
writers is difficult to assess.
Nonetheless, evidence involving many aspects of intellectual property can to
be found in Roman writings. Again, the Roman concept of literary property, like the
12
Greek one, evolved from a certain social, political, and technical environment. What
is quite certain is that building from the knowledge accumulated by the Greeks and
the Carthaginians, the Romans were able to evolve the simplest of all written
alphabets. Used at first for archives and for funerary or other inscriptions, it became
under Greek influence the primary vehicle for Roman literature. Many other
civilisations, like the Gauls or the Scandinavians, had various forms of primitive
script. For instance, the Etruscans had a fairly advanced system, used for accounting
18
and for arcane religious rituals. None, however, produced any written literature until
they adopted Roman script, which they used to write down legends previously
transmitted orally. By then Roman writing had become universal in the Mediterranean
world. Added to that, by entering Asia in support of the King of Pergamus, the
Romans discovered a new support which came to replace papyrus and tablets: the
pergamon or parchment 19 History may provide many other instances in explaining
the development of Roman literature; nonetheless, the association of Hellenistic
influence and culture, and new means of expression gave a new impetus to the
dissemination of ideas and therefore to creativity. Undoubtedly this must have had a
profound impact on Roman society.
Nonetheless, there is no trace of legislative texts establishing the protection of
literary property. This lack of legislative texts leads to the common belief that
Romans had no comprehensive ideas of literary ownership. On the contrary, texts and
examples pertaining to certain property and personal rights exist beneath the cloak of
18.
Larissa Bonfante, Etruscan (London, 1990), at 15; Mireck B. Polisensky, The Language and
Origins of the Etruscans (Prague Transal, 1991), at 147.
1'
Skins were used for writing and were known as charta pergamena, see Ester V. Hansen, The
Attalids ofPergamon (Cornell University Press, 1971), at 214-15.
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a different social context. The study of Roman writers suggests that authors drew
some profits from their manuscripts and also they were respected as such. Cicero lets
us presume that agreements on the publication of his works were concluded between
himself and his publisher, Atticus. He wrote,
"You have excellently sold my speech for Ligarius. In the future, I shall entrust you
with publishing whatever I shall write".20
Clearly, Cicero derived some financial interests from the sale of his works. Moreover,
it could be argued that the nature of Cicero's interest was not only financial but also
moral. In Latin, the verb venders suggests not only to sell but also to praise or to
recommend. Atticus had certainly sold Cicero's work at an excellent price and
possibly, as a good salesman, highly praised the work and its author. In another letter
to Atticus, Cicero chose the verb commendare and not vendere. This could suggest
that his work Pro Ligario had received such a good recommendation that Balbus sent
21
it to Caesar himself. In doing so, Balbus had certainly a great esteem for the work
and its author in order to send a copy to the consul; but also Caesar himself regarded
Cicero's endeavours with interest. From all this, it follows that competing claims must
have existed between authors and bibliopolas (book-sellers). For instance, Seneca in
De Beneficius reports on Cicero's relationship with Dorus his bookseller:
"We say that the books belong to Cicero. Dorus, the bookseller, claims to own the
same books, and the truth is on both sides. The one claims them as their author, the
other as the buyer. It is fair to say that they belong to both. Indeed, they belong to
both, but not the same way".22
20
"ligarianam praeciare vendidisti. posthac quidquid scripsero tibi praeconium deferam", Cicero,
Ad Atticus, Book XIII, 12.2, Aprinum 23 June BC 45.
21
"ligariam ut video praeciare autoritas tu commendavit", Cicero, Ad Atticus, Book XIII, 9.2
Seneca, De Beneficius, Book VI, 6 . "Libros dicimus esse Ciceronis; eosdem Dorus librarius
suos uocat, et utrumque verum est : alter illos tamquam auctor sibi. Alter tanquam emptor adserit; ac
recte utriusque enim sunt, sed non eodem modo"
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Both Cicero and Dorus claim concurrent rights on the work but in a consistent
manner. Cicero created the work which entitles him to declare this work his own and
the right of Dorus is based on his capacity as emptor-buyer. Possibly, a contract had
been created between Cicero and Dorus where Dorus acquired certain rights, by sale,
to Cicero's work. In other words, private arrangements made Cicero's works the
property of Dorus. Nonetheless, Cicero as their author was keeping certain rights over
their use. The problem is now to explain the nature of such concurrent rights and how
they were enforced.
Precise evidence in the Roman literature describes the relationship which
existed between writers and publishers. Not only does Suetonius in De Illustribus
Grammaticiis give us proof that authors recovered financial benefits from their works
but he also mentions the amount of sixteen thousand sesterces which were paid to the
23
"poor" Pompilius Andronicus. Further, Pliny the Younger says that his uncle, Pliny
the Elder:
"used himself to tell us that when he was comptroller of the revenue in Spain, he
could have sold these manuscripts to Larcius Licinius for four thousand sesterces and
then there were not many of them".24
Clearly, great writers gained substantial financial benefits from their works. This
brings us to the question whether all authors could or wanted to benefit from their
works. Martial set the tone quite clearly: "Reader, pay up! You pretend you can't
23
"Verum adeo imops atque egens, ut coactus sit praecipuum illud opusculum suum annallum
Ennii elenchorum sedecim milibus cuidam vendere" (Andronicus "was so poor and needy that he was
forced to sell that admirable little work of his Criticism ofthe Annals ofEnnias to someone or other for
sixteen thousand sesterces"), Suetonius, De Illustribus Grammaticiis, Book VIII.
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hear? Good-bye then".25 Nonetheless, opponents of a certain notion of pecuniary
reward may uphold the view of Horace, who, it would seem, did not want to sell his
works."6 In general the poor situation of authors can be explained by the conception
27of the dignity of intellectual labour and the prevailing acceptance of patronage.
Suetonius, speaking about Pompilius Andronicus, sensibly points out that he:
"was so poor and needy that he was forced to sell that admirable little work of his
Criticism of the Annates of Ennius to someone or other for sixteen thousand
sesterces".
The point is not that all authors made their fortune from their work nor even that they
enabled them to live, but to establish that there existed a pecuniary right, whatever
was its commercial value. Incidentally, one must not forget that Pliny the Younger
"could have sold" his manuscripts.
The question remains as to the object of such private agreements between
writers and publishers. Was it only the manuscript which was sold as a material
object? Or did the buyer get something else, such as the right to copy and to reproduce
the text? The obvious purpose for the hibliopolin was to draw a benefit from the
manuscript by turning out copies of it and circulating them among the public. The
original owner certainly knew this purpose, and consequently the parties intended the
contract to cover not only the material ownership of the manuscript but also the right
to publish and reproduce it. Furthermore, books were far from cheap: five dinarii for
28
Martial's Epigrams according to the author's testimony. It would be a mistake to
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"sed Luprus usuram , puerique diaria poscunt. lector, solve : taces, dissimulasque? Vale!",
Martial. Epigrams, Book XI, 108.
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[Auerbach, 1965], at 242.
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think that an author did not seek his own share of such profits by selling his
29
manuscripts. Furthermore, according to Symmachus, at the end of the Roman
imperial period, "when your song has gone out once you have given up all rights; a
30
published work is free".
Nonetheless, distinction between moral rights on manuscript and the exclusive
right of reproduction cannot be found in Roman legal theory. The economic rights of
31
an author resided solely in possession of the manuscript: solo cedit superficies.
Unlike Greece, the emperor Zeno codified in 480 ad strict provisions as who could
secure monopolies. According to the code "no one shall exercise a monopoly over any
[...] material whatever by his own authority or under that of an imperial rescript
32
heretofore or hereafter promulgated [...]". As a result, only state monopolies, trade
monopolies in certain trades, exclusive rights of property owners to their real estate or
chattels, and negotiated or contractual monopolies of individuals and companies
trading with cities were allowed. These provisions conform to the practice described
as regards manuscript ownership, and to the rule solo cedit superficies. Publication
certainly terminated all property rights of the authors, ffowever, it cannot be said that
Romans did not perceive proprietary and personal rights as a whole; they simply did
not dissociate them. As soon as the first copies produced by the bibliopolas were in
the hands of the public, anyone could make copies of them. Therefore, the right to
reproduce was in a way a consequence of owning the manuscript. Once the
manuscript was bought the ownership was transferred from the seller to the buyer.
[Auerbach. 1965], at 243.
cited in [Prager, 1952], at 116.
"... the building goes with the ground", (Digest) [Auerbach. 1965], at 242.
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Justinian Code, iv, 59
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The author lost all rights in the manuscript. Nevertheless, the right to control the use
of the work was kept by the author. Moreover, Roman law regarded monopolies as
harmful to society because they were inequitable.
As such, Roman authors were aware that publication and exploitation of a
work involved economic and moral interests. The author was entitled to decide
whether to divulge his work or not. and plagiarists were exposed to public opinion.
Several literary texts allude to publication rights. Among them, Seneca exposes
33
clearly the case in De Beneficius between Cicero and Baldus. Cicero wrote to
Atticus:
"Tell me, is it proper for you to publish without my order? Even Hermodorus did not
do it, he who used to divulge Plato's books".14
The author complains about the publication without his authorisation of some of his
works. He refers to the unscrupulous Hermodorus. Also, Pliny the Younger wrote to
Septitius:
"You have frequently pressed me to make a select collection of my letters (if there
really be any deserving of a special reference) and give them to the public. I have
selected them accordingly; not indeed, in their proper order of time, for I was not
compiling a history, but just as each came to hand. And now I have only to wish that
you may have no reason to repent of your advice, nor ofmy compliance: in that case,
I may probably enquire after the rest which at present lie neglected, and preserve
those I shall hereafter write. Farewell"35
It is clear that Septitius urged Pliny to publish his letters because their publication was
subject first to his authorisation. In another letter, Pliny sent a book and asked
33
"Libros dicimus esse Ciceronis; eosdem Dorus librarius suos uocat, et utrumque verum est: alter
illos tamquam auctor sibi. Alter tanquam emptor adserit; ac recte utriusque enim sunt, sed non eodem
modo", Seneca, De Beneficius, Book VI, 6.
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Arrianus to make the necessary corrections. Thereafter, he would hand the
manuscript to a bibliopola with instructions to publish it. The author appears to have
an absolute control over his work before publication. On another occasion Pliny asked
Pompeius Saterninus to be kind enough to revise a speech made in his native town the
day he founded a library there, but reserved to himself the right to publish it or not
37
after examination/' Plagiarism was also condemned by writers. Horace denounced
the lifting of Celsus Albinovamnus and warns writers of the sort to be satisfied with
their own material, and thus not to appropriate other people's works, if they do not
38wish to share the humiliating fate of the jay strutting in borrowed plumes. Martial
wrote several epigrams against the plagiarist Fidentinus,39 and stands virulently
against literary piracy:
"My works need neither witness nor judge. Your page stands against you and tells
you: you are a thief'40
Plagiarism was a serious risk to an ancient author, as shown by the numerous attacks
made by Martial in his epigrams.41 Editors claimed also that it was not strictly with
plagiarism but with a certain degree of imitation or censorship which they suffered.4"
As a result, writers tended to publish their work in a hurry to prevent it being stolen
36
Letter to Arrianus, Pliny, Epist I. Book 2.
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"Fama refert nostros te, Fidentine, libellos non aliter populo quam recitare tuos", Martial, Epig





Martial, Epig 1:30, 52, 63, 66, 72.
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"Some of the Roman emperors exercised a strict censorship over literary property. Augustus on
assuming the office of High Priest [...] searched for books of spurious Sibylline prophecies, both Latin
and Greek, and committed the whole collection amounting to upwards of two thousand copies; to the
flames. Much more brutal outrages both on authors and publishers were perpetrated by Domitian. On
one occasion, according to Suetonius, Domitian not only put to death Hermogenes of Tarsus because
of certain passages in his history to which the tyrant objected but crucified also the copiers who had
issued the work", [Mumby, 1930], at 18.
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since unpublished works seemed to have a greater risk of being plagiarised than
published ones.43 As a matter of fact, Roman public libraries contained numerous
manuscripts unknown to the public at large which could have been easily copied or
plagiarised 44 Even though such act was condemned by public opinion no specific
legislation repressing plagiarism can be found.
During the Renaissance several jurists and scholars, for example Douaren,
Thomasius, Reinelius and Salden debated on the subject.46 They observed that the
Fabian law penalised an offence called plagium and that Justinian's Digest and Code
included some provisions relating to the subject.46 They noticed also that Martial used
in one of his epigrams the term plagiarius to designate a thief of verses.47 The
scholars simply concluded that Roman law was repressing plagiarism. A modern
author, Jules Mareschal, drew the same conclusion, referring to exactly the same texts.
He wrote:
"Thus plagiarism was not only stigmatised in Rome by the public opinion but
punished by law as a theft with it was assimilated".411
Although this theory could be sound, it appears that the interpretation of the term
plagium does not mean literary plagiarism but the disposal by means of selling or
otherwise of a free person. In fact, the Fabian law de plagiariis punished thieves of
children, slaves or free men. One may then assume that Martial compared his books to
43
Horace, Epist 1:3 and Ausonius Epist 1 :3 1,25
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[Mumby, 1930], at 16.
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Charles Nodier, Question de literature legale, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1928), cited in Marie Claude
Dock, Genese et evolution de la notion de propriete litteraire, 1 Revue Internationale du Droit
d'Auteur 1974, at 153, Hereafter: [Dock, 1974]
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Jules Mareschal, Memoires a consulter sur la question juridique de la propriete perpetuelle et
hereditaire des oeuvres de I'esprit (Paris, 1861), at 15, cited in [Dock, 1974], at 153.
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his children by way of a metaphor. Indeed, if one considers intellectual creation as the
projection of the author's personality, the very fact of plagiarism prejudices the author
himself. Other authors believed that there was a sanction ofmoral rights in the Digest.
The actio injuriarium would have been granted to the victim of a "glory theft" called
furtum laudis. In fact these texts concern those who spread slander and in no way
usurpers and infringers of works.4" This shows clearly how Roman texts have been
abbreviated and abused in order to find a sanction called plagiarism.
Nonetheless, by way of analogy, although Roman law did not have any
remedy on infringement, the right could have existed in abstracto on tangible forms
of expression. Although moral rights of the author were well asserted, economic rights
were simply interpreted as the sale of a commodity like any other chattel. More
importantly, the Justinianic Code defines an action, called actio servi corrupti, which
served as the remedy of a slave owner against the person who enticed his slave to steal
some proprietary information and surrender it to a competitor in exchange for
money.50 What we are to deduce from this is that the owner of information had some
legal means at his disposal in order to protect personal rights over his manuscript such
as right of first publication or respect for their work. As regards to the actio servi
corrupti, such legal means were intended. I venture to say, most certainly to include
the protection of secret information against unauthorised publication.
It may be concluded that the legal protection of authors in Antiquity, and
especially in Roman time, was well asserted. I would therefore agree with Eugene
49
Olignier, Le droit d'auteur, Vol, 2, Tome I, (Paris, 1943), at 19 & 20.
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Pouillet that "copyright has always existed, but it did not enter from the very start into
legislation". However, I would dissent on his affirmation that no legislation was
available to owners of manuscripts, whether authors or other proprietors, and to
authors in respect to their personal rights/1
In order to put some perspective upon authors' access to these rights, I would
like to examine the Greek and Roman social context in which creativity was
expressed. Moreover, the attitude of the patron and the artist or writer towards each
other and towards society needs some thoughtful appreciation. As opposed to Greece,
patronage was widely discussed in Roman literature. The problem that one faces in
Roman literature is that the Latin terms patronus and cliens do not have their
52
equivalent in ancient Greek. For my part, the possible non existence of patronage in
classical Greece was due to the political structure of Greek communities. Indeed, as
Andrew Wallace-Hadrill observes:
"In classical Athens, this was successfully reduced to a minimum; in Rome, from its
origins to late antiquity, most of the contributors see it playing a strategic role on
maintaining the social order"53
For the Greek, logos enabled citizens to perform, reasoned therefore to maintain their
social order.54 The exhaustive and exclusive aspect of Greek communities could not
sustain patronage as it existed in Roman time. Indeed, patronage represented a
voluntary but not legally enforceable relationship. In other words, patrons and clients
were mostly fellow citizens and equal in theory before the law." Moreover, patronage
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not only created personal ties between individuals but also formed a social system. It
represented a particular structure of human inequality which was not compatible with
the Greek notion of citizenship. In Roman time, patronage was a form of using public
resources to obtain private gains, especially in politics. Such a relationship would
have been objected to by any Greek citizen. These characteristics deserve special
consideration in the light of literary and artistic property. One important consideration
is to dissociate patronage of literature and patronage of art. For instance, writers
seemed to possess enough freedom to express their creativity. Artists, unlike writers,
rarely had freedom in choosing their themes, styles and materials.56 For instance, in
Greece sculptors were simply considered as manual labourers. Products of the
intellect permitted their creators to have more freedom in the manner in which they
were produced. Nonetheless, the personality of the patron and the authors blended to
form a third person and makes it difficult to dissociate each contribution. In general,
both artists and writers had restricted creative freedom.
We have so far concerned ourselves only with the literary merit of such
contributions but patronage was also a social system which aimed at influencing
society in its social, economic and political aspects. Writers and artists were needed
by society, and especially by patrons, to manipulate the perception of reality by the
57
general public. Patronage in ancient society was a means of control of the masses.
Artists and writers had to be useful to their patrons and not simply good in their
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creative skills. This position is put with commendable clarity, by Andrew Wallace-
Hadrill. He observes:
"Dionysius of Halicarnassus saw in the patronage instituted by Romulus an
instrument of social control, that kept the population in subjection to the ruling class.
[...] The secret of the game was the manipulation of scarce resources"58
Information, as a scarce resource, was most certainly a prime subject for
manipulation. Therefore, intellectual property in those times could have represented a
political and social compromise reflecting the position and role of artists and writers
in society, quite different from our modern copyright system, as a function. Moreover,
patronage was not a well-defined relationship with a predictable set of services
exchanged. It must have been rather ill-defined and unpredictable and writers had
most to say about literary patronage and its influence on their creativity.
Consequently, social environment played a vital role on creativity. Patronage
was also closely related to the medieval perception of the value of creators and
authors in society. As a matter of fact:
"Patronage, slavery and citizenship form a tight nexus in classical culture, and the
fate of all three may be seen as closely linked as the Christian culture of the middle
ages supervenes."59
Two important questions emerge. First, whether or not patronage and clientage
existed as a strategic mechanism of resource allocation which affected creativity. And
second, whether or not the system played a dominant role in the organisation of
economy, polity and society.
Medieval Non-Monopolistic Privileges
58




During the centuries which followed the fall of the Western Roman empire, barbarian
invasions drove the lay world away from intellectual speculations. In early medieval
society social and political conditions did not favour any development of the useful
arts. As Frank Prager observed,
"Political thinking had been impoverished by the physical destruction of brute force,
by dogmatism, intolerance and intimidation."60
Nonetheless, letters sought refuge and protection in the meditative silence ofmonastic
schools maintaining classical learning in its most elementary aspect. Therefore, the
task of early monastic scribes consisted in the re-production and preservation of
classic literature partially destroyed from years of turbulence. Skilful monks devoted
their time in the copying and transcription of Greek and Latin texts as well as the holy
scriptures. Soon in addition to their labour as transcribers, some learned monks, such
as Cassiodorus (c.480-575) influenced the Church in bringing a large measure of
scholarship and zeal for literary and educational interests.61 Comments on the
scriptures and the classics started being added. Saint Gregory the Great (c.540-604),
elected Pope in 590, exercised an important influence over intellectual interests. He
clearly defended his position as :
"The devils know well that the knowledge of profane literature helps us to
understand sacred literature. In dissuading us from this study, they act as the
Philistines did when they interdicted the Israelites from making swords and lances,
and obliged that nation to come to them for the sharpening of their axes and
ploughshares."62
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In the sixth century, Ireland, safe from unremitting barbarian invasions, became a
sanctuary for scholars of medieval Europe. Not only did monasteries act as
repositories of classical culture they also became major centres for book production.6"'
Certain religious orders charged themselves with literary responsibilities. Saint
Benedict of Nursia (c.480-c.543), for instance, did not limit monastic life to simple
spiritual labour but to external, manual and literary labour which had the effect of
preserving classical teachings and scholarship. His teaching was that:
"Idleness is the enemy of the soul: hence brethren ought at certain seasons to occupy
themselves with manual labour, and again at certain hours with holy reading. [...]
During Lent, let them apply themselves to reading from morning until the end of the
third hour, and in these days of Lent, let them receive a book apiece from the library
and read it straight through. These books are to be given out at the beginning of
Lent."64
Such a regulation gave a decisive impulse to scholarship and secured the continuity of
intellectual life through the Dark Ages. As distribution centres for classical and
religious literature, monasteries became so well organised that some of them became
unique reference sources with enlarged libraries. Such repositories rendered possible
the production of copies of books for exchange with other monasteries. Surely the
lesson to be learned from all this intellectual activity is that concern with regard to the
protection of literary endeavours must have existed.
A well-known case of infringement of the right to copy is reported in early
medieval Irish literature.66 A young Irish missionary. Saint Columba (521-97), became
associated with scholarship and intellectual influences in Northern Europe. He
[Mumby, 1930], at 30.
64
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26
undertook a program of copying and disseminating manuscripts transmitting the
senchas, Celtic traditions, and the filids, druidic institutions, and founded many
famous scholastic establishments known for their production of manuscripts. Always
in search of rare manuscripts he decided to make a clandestine copy of a Psalter,
knowing that the request to be allowed to borrow or copy it would have been rejected.
Finnian, Abbot of the monastery which owned the Psalter, claimed the copy on the
ground that a copy made without permission ought to belong to the owner of the
original manuscript. In support of his claim, the Abbot argued that the transcript was
the offspring of the original manuscript. The case was brought to the attention of king
Diarmaid mac Cerbaill since St. Columba refused to bring back the copy. The king of
Tara decided against St. Columba on the analogy that:
"To every cow belongeth her calf, to every book its little book"'1"
In order to give a complete report of the case, the legend says that Columba refused to
comply with the ruling precipitating the country in to civil war which deposed
Diarmaid mac Cerbaill using a kind of national military and religious palladium
known as the cathach, the fighter.67 The case illustrates and represents the impression
in the mind of Adomnan, writing not half a century after the death of the saint in 597
A.D., concerning property in manuscripts. Whether the case is entirely true or not,
important considerations may be derived from it which I will try to analyse in the light
of medieval life.
66
"Le gach boin a boinin, le gach leabhar a leabhrum", see [Philips, 1985], at 352.
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In becoming large production centres of manuscripts and storing them in
libraries with the intent of exchanging or selling copies, monasteries had to derive
certain benefits. According to the rule of Saint Benedict:
"...it was considered holy and proper work for monks to copy and transcribe "good"
books, and it was not unusual for the copier to try to protect it from theft and
destruction."68
Therefore, manuscripts represented a considerable value as a whole and not only for
their material value.69 Material production of manuscripts required not only
considerable expenditure of skilled labour and precious materials but also embodied
time-consuming research in many libraries, knowledge, and intellectual skills. The
development of exchanges between monasteries gave growing importance to the
70
unique literary and aesthetic importance of manuscripts. As a result accumulation of
property and wealth in the form of literary endeavours spread among monasteries.
This wealth rested upon ownership of parchments and manuscripts upon which
various texts had been placed. In that respect, monasteries strictly monitored rights to
copy texts and aesthetic forms of expression, and in this manner controlled the use of
the texts transcribed. Rights to copy and for collation of information were traduced by
reciprocal exchange of valuable manuscripts or sale of duplicated manuscripts.
68
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The Benedictine were expected to ruminate on a text which had been designated to them as a sacred
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Ownership of manuscripts sprang from the very essence of the texts
transcribed. Each text bore the doctrine of each individual religious order, in other
words their own interpretation of the holy scriptures. In practice, manuscripts of the
same scriptures from different orders could not be in exact accord. In order to control
the use of the text, or of their doctrine, religious communities needed to exercise
material control on manuscripts. Holy men were concerned with the exactness of and
respect for their work, and were therefore concerned with some prerogatives of what
we might call today moral rights.71 Complaints to the Church and state authority were
decided against St. Columba on the analogy that the original gave birth to its
transcripts. In strictly controlling access and the right to copy their manuscripts,
monks kept a firm control on reproductions, ensuring respect of the doctrine. By the
end of the twelfth century some writers among the lay community observed the same
attitude:
"implying both an awareness of the specificity of the creation and recognition of the
individual contribution".72
Nonetheless, one must insist that respect toward individual contributions did not
appear until the early Renaissance. The clerical character of the author and the
ecclesiastical nature of his compensation still constituted the principal distinction
between the beginning of compensation for literary labour in the early Renaissance
and the arrangements under which poets or chroniclers were rewarded or respected.
In early medieval times, only clerics devoted time to literary creation and they
developed a communal conception of literary property. The technique of committing
71
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words to writing clearly distinguished authors from duplicators. ~ Dictating was the
usual form of literary composition and the ars dictaminis were taught in monastic
schools as part of rhetoric and the skill governing it. The use of writing, scriptitare,
was confined to the making of a fair copy on parchment and has to be distinguished
from composition as a separate art. The role of the composer, dictator, is therefore
distinct from the work of the scribe, scriptor, who is a specialist in the art of
74
calligraphy. Scribes learned and practised their skills at the scriptorium. Moreover,
another distinction has to be made between scribes and mere copyists, who only
duplicate manuscripts. This technique of composition and writing books comes from
ecclesiastical schools, and especially the scriptorum, under the influence of classical
rhetoric.
These important distinctions demonstrate how specific and interdependent was
the role of each member of the community in the production of manuscripts. As
centres of religious meditation, intellectual development and communal work,
religious orders established rules based upon the concept of division of work. Monks
specialised in the dictation, writing, copying, illumination, or binding of manuscripts.
At first, manuscripts were done slowly, and probably with a different degree of
rapidity on the part of different specialised monks. It was probably arranged to divide
up the sheets to be copied among a number of scribes. There is evidence of this
arrangement in a certain number of manuscripts where the different portions put
together under one cover are evidently the work of different hands.77 The transcribed
7'
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texts reflected the doctrine of the community to which they belonged so the making of
these manuscripts was made possible by the co-operation of all its members. The final
work was not the result of one dictator but the result of a collective effort quite
indivisible.76 I would certainly agree that such a common effort represented a
77
collective work of authorship. Ownership could not be attributed to a single man,
but to a group ofmen, since all the community participated in a way or an other to the
final product. Therefore, the final product could be recognised as a collective work of
authorship in the sense of our modern copyright language. What is difficult to
determine is to what extent the role of self-expression was inserted in the classical or
religious texts within the dictation process. Questions of plagiarism apparently were
not of concern; however, the respect of the doctrine entrusted to the text was. As
regards the duplication process, minimal original literary creation had been involved,
whereas remarkable technical skills were demonstrated by the copyists.
Moreover, the teachings of Plato and Aristotle prevailed in this respect. Scribal
culture could not possibly conceptualise and attribute literary ownership or rewards to
78
a single author. Medieval European society was composed of many communities
where anonymity of individuals was the norm to the benefit of the group and refuting
personal responsibility. Control over holy scriptures and classical literature was
accorded such an extraordinary public significance that individual or personal
79
concerns, for instance those of dictators, were submerged by community ones. As a
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matter of fact, very few manuscripts bear the name of their author. The anonymity of
most medieval work is also explained by the modesty and egalitarian principles ruling
all ecclesiastical relationships, but more importantly by the very purpose of religious
orders. It would not have been difficult to identify one author for a particular book
since in practice:
"when a man took his vows, he abandoned the name by which he had been known in
the secular world, and he took a name of one of the monastic brothers who had
recently died. As a result, every Franciscan house would always have its
Bonaventura, but the identity of' Bonaventura' at any time could be defined only by
considerable research."80
The purpose of the religious orders was also to proselytise their faith and to transmit
81
to posterity their knowledge, not to claim authorship of their work. In certain ways
the texts were meant to belong to the Christian world and be for its future intellectual
development. From Normandy in 1170 Geoffrey sub-prior of St. Barbe wrote to
Brother Peter Mangot in such terms:
"A monastery without a library is like a castle without an armory. Our library is our
armory. Thence it is that we bring forth the sentences of the divine Law like sharp
arrows to attack the enemy. Thence we take the armour of righteousness, the helmet
of salvation, the shield of faith, and the sword of the spirit, which is the Word of
God".82
Duplicating or writing books was a secure means to spread Christian faith and to
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influence public opinion. Indeed, what was written was carefully chosen in order to
pass down to future generations what monks thought to be the truest or the best. It has
been also argued that preoccupation with posterity even led to forgery or alteration of
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documents. This all demonstrates that the purpose of the monastic orders was to
inform, or misinform, the public at large.
Religious communities not only derived important prestige but also sizeable
financial benefits from their work by exchanging and selling duplications to other
religious orders or secular authorities. Books were available for copying as they were
available for reference. Until the fifteenth century writing was a religious duty and an
exclusively ecclesiastical business. They enjoyed a privileged position in the
production of manuscripts because production centres carefully controlled the literary
wealth in their possession and because clerics formed the principal educated fringe of
the medieval population. The clerics by administering their ecclesiastical communities
or large properties also rendered the service of administering the lay world, until
learned laymen became able to do so. This service ranged from the daily
administration of private estates to the administration of the state. More
fundamentally, it is important to realise that throughout the Middle Ages Emperor
Zeno's law condemning monopolies was still in effect.
"While traditional monopolies, such as those of the guilds, were well recognised,
attempted monopoly grants to individuals were clearly illegal and were likely to be
85
invalidated by the Courts."
Therefore, the attribution of individual monopolies to authors would have been
certainly denied. The concept of individual literary property based upon monopolistic
appropriation and distribution of works was then impeded. Monasteries benefited
from non-monopolistic privileges in the production of manuscripts. In controlling
access to their manuscripts as pieces of literature or learning, they derived financial
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gains which could be secured for the monastery scriptorium by conceding for pay the
privilege of making one or more copies of the manuscript. In other words, the
privilege took the form of a prohibition to the effect of a property right involving a
source of income. Enforcement and control of the attribution and integrity of
manuscripts did not need the grant of a monopoly. According to St. Benedict:
"A common practice was for the transcriber to add to the close of the manuscript an
anathema against any person who would steal of destroy it."86
Threats of supernatural intervention or of religious nature such as penalties of
87
excommunication were not uncommon. For instance, King John borrowed "the book
called Pliny" only under the solemn pledge to return it. The custom of securing books
88
by chains prevailed in certain libraries in the most religious institutions. In the same
manner rabbinical authority controlled attribution and the integrity of Jewish
89
scholarship through the middle ages. However, it can be said that copying
manuscripts was a far greater privilege than simply consulting them. One could
assume that threats of excommunication or the mystic powers entrusted in
manuscripts may have been sufficient enough to protect them from being stolen.
Nonetheless, the help of temporal and secular powers seems to have been thought
necessary in the case of St. Columba.
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In the twelfth century an intellectual renaissance occurred among when more
peaceful times spread over medieval Europe. The development of ecclesiastical
education within court circles provided literate laymen for the general administration
of the state, who used the principle of dictating to scribes to run estates or public
affairs.90 The material of the twelfth-century writer who composed for himself or
wrote from dictation was not the parchment used by the copyist, but wax tablets on
which he put down notes or drafts. An increasing number of documents proliferated
throughout Europe as the bureaucracy expanded.91 Generally, works produced in the
lay community were mainly administrative documents such as deeds, wills or
charters. Therefore, no sense of literary ownership was perceived to be necessary
because no contribution was brought to society beside the administrative paper work.
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Nevertheless, authors of lay literature began composing as well. This early lay
literature was represented by minstrels or troubadours in courts, whose poems, plays,
and novels were presented at public recitations or dramatic performances.93 Soon, the
growing number of students and the quest for greater independence from the bishops
and the lay authorities and the corporate spirit which was developing everywhere in
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries all encouraged the establishment of universities.
Ecclesiastical schools, such as the Cluniacs or Cistercians, lost interest in scholarly
endeavours and declined. Universities were corporations of a new kind, bringing
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together the totality, universitas, of the masters and pupils. At a time when workers
and craftsmen, following the example of the municipalities, were united in guilds to
defend their interests, masters and scholars were doing virtually the same. They
maintained a link between education and civic life, gradually extending public interest
in promotion of the useful arts. There was an attempt to learn from others, which gave
rise to institutional and social changes foreshadowing the concept of literary property.
Major universities received students from all over Europe, and, thanks to the Papacy,
scholars could teach anywhere according to the licentia ubique docendi. In the
thirteenth century, universities were truly European institutions, but became more and
more national in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Papal protection gave them the
exclusive right to confer degrees which were practically the same throughout Europe:
the baccalaureate, the licence licentia docendi, and the doctorate. More strikingly,
universities enjoyed financial aid and fiscal non-exclusive privileges in order to
encourage the development of intellectual endeavour and yet be perfectly legal under
Zeno's law.94
It must be realised that these new attitudes evolved in spite of all legal and
philosophical difficulties as argued by Plato and Aristotle. With the beginning of the
thirteenth century, the responsibility for intellectual life in Europe was transferred
from the ecclesiastical schools to the early organised universities. As a result, an
immediate intellectual renaissance developed among laymen. This change meant,
among other things, that the control and direction of education, and also the
production of literary works, no longer rested solely with the ecclesiastics.
"4
[Prager, 1952], at 119.
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Consequently, a new body of scholars and lay writers appeared outside the restricted
circle of the clerics, so that the Church was not any more the only source or interpreter
of knowledge. Early literary undertakings concerned mainly scholarly matters within
the university curriculum. An important transition occurred, from the simple
duplication or translation of classics to the creation of pure original literary works.
Personal responsibility had to be assumed, and therefore one step was made in the
direction of recognising intellectual property attached to one person. Nonetheless, as
modern literary property developed, restrictions on its development evolved as well.
For instance, four great divisions or faculties formed in the early universities:
Theology, Philosophy (or Art), Law and Medicine.99 Obviously, the first faculty
remained under the close supervision of the Church as Rome contested heretical
doctrines by interfering with certain teaching, intending to keep control on the
knowledge taught in lecture-rooms which exercised a direct influence on other
faculties, such as Faculty of Art.
Soon university towns became interested in the production, hiring, and selling
of manuscripts. The early trade in manuscripts was carried out without any
supervision or restriction on the part of universities or any other authority. The only
control on book production was exercised by stationarii in connection with
educational materials required by the curriculum, therefore on practical matters.96
They were entrusted with the special responsibility of keeping in stock a sufficient
number of transcripts or copies of books ordered or recommended in courses of
universities in order to rent them to students and instructors. A general supervision of
95
[Putnam, 1896 (a)], at 179.
96
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the recommended texts for their correctness and completeness had already been
regulated in most universities. Official stationarii were appointed, or re-appointed
every year when their work was proving to be satisfactory in implementing
universities' code of practice. With the increase in the number of students, the
practice of buying manuscripts instesd of hiring them became common.97 As a result
transfer of material ownership of books from stationarii to individuals initiated a new
trade in book production. Between the years 1250 and 1350 certain obligations were
imposed on stationarii or lihrarii as they started being qualified. Most importantly,
they had to offer for sale or hire no manuscript that had not been passed upon and
"taxed" by the appointed authority, with the aim of controlling the new trade. A just
and proper price had to be declared conscientiously and exactly for each book,
together with the name of the owner in some conspicuous place in the work itself. No
disposition could be made of a consigned book without in the first place informing the
owner or his representative of the price to be secured. In the event of a book being
brought to Paris by a stranger, he had to give immediate information to the authorities
so that, before such work could be copied for hire or sale, it should be approved by the
authorities as orthodox and suitable for the use of the members of the university, as
well as complete and correct in its own text.,x
These rules operated as a denial of basic author's rights. Their primary
objective was to control literary creations as commodities, and in effect influence the
spread of knowledge. Indeed, authors had in effect to content themselves with the
97
[Putnam, 1896 (a)], at 189.
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Paul Delalain, Etude sur ta librairie parisienne du Xllf au XVs (Paris, 1891), cited in [Putnam,
1896 (a)], at 208.
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assurance of securing circulation of their work once they had been accepted by
university authorities. It was probably easier for a minstrel to give a public recitation
of his own verses, since there were no requirements, than for a scholar to publish his
own writings. Furthermore, it has been argued that minstrels or troubadours had a
certain awareness of their intellectual creation and of their individual contributions to
society.94 University authorities were still under the influence of the medieval use and
utility of manuscripts. Publications from scholars were made within and for the
universitatis community, as for an ecclesiastical community.100 No clear distinction
could be drawn between scribes and scholarly authors. Also, the communal
imperative was probably really strong. The principal concern of university authorities
was availability and access of manuscripts to students and scholars, along with the
duplication of manuscripts. Consequently, a conceptual dichotomy existed between
the dedicated scholars and the entertainers as to the protection of their own
endeavours. Added to that, recognition of the skills and labour exercised by scribes
emerged to prevail in the forthcoming conceptualisation of intellectual property.
Dealers in printed books started replacing manuscript traders, once the Press
imposed itself as the principal means of book-production. Also, the medieval society
was composed of professional organisations called guilds. Each town had its own
corporations, or craft guilds, characterised by a concern for economic and artisan-
manufacture interests and policies. Originally these fraternities offered mutual support
"
The religious drama, Le mystere d'Adam, explains in detail how words are to be spoken. Actors
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to its members upon payment of their entry.101 Similarly, early stationarii formed
their own fraternities and created their own printers' and booksellers' guilds. They
aimed to secure continuity of work and income for their members and to maintain a
fixed number of small independent producing masters and a satisfactory standard of
workmanship. To this end they sought to limit competition and therefore to secure
certain privileges. Nonetheless, many steps were to be made before the emergence of
copyrights as forms of patent monopolies.
Medieval quasi-patents and Patent-monopolies
The invention of the printing press occurred in Germany in the fifteenth century. This
revolutionary form of expression had a determinant impact on society. It changed
book production, increasing dissemination of ideas, and with it the legal context. It is
not necessary for the purpose of this section to give details of the controversies as to
the respective claims of Gutenberg of Mayence, or of Koster of Haarlem, as to the
original discovery of the printing-press. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that the
invention of printing is not so much the result of individual invention but the
consequence of a long series of experiments and of partial processes.10" The invention
of printing needs to be directly associated with the early introduction of paper making
in Europe. Before the introduction of paper, a sheep skin, called specia, was folded
into sections of four folios and added to others in order to compose a book. The
production of paper, fifteen times less expensive than the equivalent surface in
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parchment, had long been known to the Chinese, but reached Europe only after the
foundation of medieval universities.103 Added to the mechanisation of the printing
press, replacing copying books by hand under dictation, book production increased
immediately. The new process made it easier, faster and cheaper to produce multiple
copies of books. In terms of efficiency, printing appears to have reduced by about
four- fifths the price of works of a scholarly character.104
Also, production of books expanded as the public at large became more
educated and more interested in public issues, especially during the Reformation.
Directly hit, production of books in monasteries had practically ceased by the end of
the sixteenth century, since the production of manuscripts could not compete against
their printed copies.104 State authorities, especially the popes of the time, largely
influenced by the spirit of the Renaissance, gave a cordial welcome to the revival of
scholarly interest. The press was an important means of furthering general education
and the intellectual development of communities. In its early development the
authorities accepted the printing-press as a useful ally and servant. Publications were
not limited to doctrinal works but opened to works of the pagan classics. The clerics
themselves co-operated to a certain extent in producing classics for scholarly readers
and aimed at distributing cheap books to the public. This position changed later on as
the Reformation spread over Europe. As a result, secular and religious authorities
brought authors, printers, and publishers under close supervision and censorship.
IU-
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The first publishing undertakings appeared in Germany with the invention of
the printing press although Venice became the first early Press centre in Europe. In
France, the first printers were directly associated with the university of Paris,
succeeding to the official stationarii of the University. On the contrary, German
printers issued books which did not belong to any university curriculum but directly
addressed the population's diverse interests. Publications represented considerable
expenditures of skilled labour, travel in search of rare manuscripts, and financial
means such as lump sums. Printers had to pay for the privilege of examining, collating
information about or copying manuscripts held by monasteries. Added to this were
substantial investments in the printing-press itself, paper and ink. Nonetheless, early
undertakings were made seemingly without help from municipal, state or
ecclesiastical non-exclusive privileges. For instance, printing in France began in 1470
and expanded over the ensuing thirty-five years without any author or publisher
feeling the need to obtain protection.'06 Also, in 1476 William Caxton introduced
printing in England, exporting his press from Bruges to Westminster without seeking
107
any privilege, even though he enjoyed the support of royal patrons. Moreover,
German printers and publishers seem to have observed a "moral" code of conduct
establishing respect for each others' undertakings irrespective of any privileges or
other legal protection given to the works in question.108 Once printing spread all over
106 Elizabeth Armstrong, Before Coypright. The French Book-Privilege System, (Cambridge
University Press, 1990), at 21, Hereafter: [Armstrong, 1990]
107 He received the patronage of Edward IV and Henry VII, see Richard Deacon, A Biography of
William Caxton: The first English Editor Printer and Translator, (London, 1976), at 103.
108 Claims on the right to control the publication of books were brought successfully to court
without any copyright privilege. Schoffer & Hanquis brought a suit against Bernard Inkus of Frankfort
in 1480. In the same year the Magistracy of Frankfort applied to the Magistracy of Lubeck for the
protection of Schoffer for illegitimate infringement against Hans Bitz, see [Putnam, 1896 (a)], at 377 &
409.
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Europe, production of competing publications made it difficult to recoup the
considerable investments or simply to impose observance of codes of conducts. What
is quite certain is that by the time printers were facing strong competition, the concept
of individual literary property had arisen.
In late medieval Europe, society was ready to conceptualise the idea of
industrial and intellectual property establishing the regime of intangible property. In
spite of legal and philosophical difficulties, attribution of secondary grants to
individuals started being recognised as activities under the legal supervision and direct
monopoly of the state. Non-exclusive grants limited in time and to operations
connected with mining, rivers, forests and other natural resources, but not limited to
new inventions, were perfectly legal under Zeno's law. For instance, the grant of an
exclusive privilege to build a paper mill downstream on a river rested upon the state's
control of rivers.10' In effect, such privileges, called "quasi-patents", guaranteed a
monopoly in the use of resources by transfer of a state's monopoly. Incidentally, many
privileges were granted to processes which represented vital technical improvements
for the economic and social welfare of communities. By the same token people
became gradually familiar with the new institution which represented an official
recognition of their inventive skills. This new form of privilege was the deciding
factor in developing the idea of industrial and intellectual property. This was the first
step towards institutionalisation of exclusive privileges attributed to individuals by
decision of the state.
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The monastery of Chemnitz was granted the exclusive privilege to build a new mill paper "in
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A second step was needed in establishing the modern patent system as we
know it. From the principle of "unity of work", gilds inserted provisions in their status
protecting the inventive efforts of their members. The intention was to protect quality
of production among members, and more specifically to protect their investments
from:
"many fabricators of such material [who] are trying by means of fraud and deceit to
steal such patterns from said fabricators."110
Clearly, intellectual elements prevailing in new patterns and involving new processes
found equivalence in the minds of guilds with technical improvements of new
machines. In practice, guilds and corporations were powerless in granting privileges
since they did not have the legal authority to grant them. In response, the state decided
to grant monopolies in the form of patents to individuals for the prevailing idea of
technical improvements; thereby recognising the industrial and intellectual elements
involved in new inventions. Gradually patents extended to all other crafts by general
usage, and in particular to printing.
Stationarii collectively enjoyed privileges from their own university town. As
long as they obeyed the curriculum regulations, they gained exclusive contracts to
provide books for the universitatis. The development of trade and the formation of
gilds of stationers and booksellers gradually strengthened their trade powers. From
non-exclusive privileges they received virtually exclusive privileges. It should be
stressed that stationers enjoyed exclusive property in literary productions, not authors.
Property in books was created by virtue of the dictating and copying operations
involved. In replacing the ancient ars dictamis with printing, the converted stationers
110
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sought protection similar to patents already in existence. The transition from virtually
exclusive privileges to patents met no difficulties. Printing, composed of different
processes, fulfilled the new patent system's requirements. Patents were granted for
technical improvements in printing processes and tools, for new designs and also for
complete sets of compositions. The latter is commonly referred to as a copyright
privilege. From the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, the development of printing led
to the granting throughout Europe of an increasing number of privileges in the form of
monopolies.'" Three essential characteristics are to be found: an exclusive right of
reproduction and distribution, a limited term of protection, and remedies for
infringement of the right including fines, seizure or confiscation of the infringing
copies, and in some cases corporal punishments."- Thus, printers and publishers
gained proprietorship in printed compositions involving intellectual creation; thereby
recognising intangible property in books. However, copyright represented only a
special type of patent. New printing processes were intertwined with composition and
production of books. For instance, the invention of the cursive or italic character
allowed its inventor to secure a patent for technical improvement and, by the same
!il
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token, to secure a copyright for printed composition in cursive visual effect."1 In that
respect copyright privileges were intended as much as any other patent to secure
temporary market monopolies.
The scope of patent monopolies widened gradually to encompass any new
form of technical improvement or intellectual creation. As opposed to quasi-patents,
patent systems were no longer restricted to improvements in state resources.
Therefore, new justifications had to be given, since the traditional legal and
philosophical justifications which had prevailed for centuries became irrelevant to the
new situation. Two justifications could be found. One was based on the reasoning that
investments in labour and capital are required and it is equitable to grant exclusive
right to recover such expenditures. Patents represented an industrial safeguard
institution, designed to compensate individuals, printers, publishers (and authors as
well since they could have been their own printer), for their publication overhead
costs and for the commercial risks taken. This interpretation is confirmed by the report
made much later by Antoine-Louis Seguier, Avocat general, defending the 1777
French royal decrees reforming copyright privileges and other monopolies alike.114
This line of thinking leads to a secondary justification. Grants of monopoly
rights to inventors increase national welfare in society and induce further inventive
efforts. For instance, Flans Werner secured from the Elector John George a privilege
"for the furtherance of public interests".1" Incidentally, both justifications motivated
"-1 In 1501, Aldus Manutius obtained from the city of Venice a patent-copyright for ten years for
all works printed in the "lettere corsive et cancellaresche de summa bellezza non maipiu factaV (italic
character) which he claimed the invention, see [Brown, 1896], at 47 & 236.
114 cited in [Dock, 1974], at 164-5.
115 In France applications for privileges were commonly argued on the basis of public welfare, see
[Armstrong, 1990], at 82-83; [Brown, 1896], at 56;
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the widespread practice of using patent monopolies as a means of protectionism. Not
only did states intend to protect their home industries and economy, but also to
prohibit the spreading of licentious publications by censorship.1"'
Ultimately, the two justifications are the expression of one trend: the
deliberate intervention in political, economic and social affairs by European states
under the cover of public interest. Let us clarify, however, that states had enjoyed
exclusive and discretionary powers to grant monopolies before the creation of the
patent system."7 The determining factor which led public authorities to grant
individual patents, which intrinsically conflicted with ancient and medieval
118
regulations, was the gradual public support of individual property. More
importantly, it seems to me that public approval evolved from fundamental changes in
late medieval society accepting the concentration of powers in the hands of central
authorities benefiting from the reduction of diluted powers attributed to communities.
Therefore, society approved a less collectivist approach in attributing rewards from
social progress to a more individualistic one.
The common viewpoint is that, since patents conflicted with prevailing
regulations, they represented a considerable break-away from ancient culture. In my
opinion, this line of thinking misunderstands the ancient teachings and consequently
the reasoning behind the former regulations. Greek philosophers, such as Plato and
Aristotle approached the idea of general prize awards critically. Aristotle observed
that abuses could occur in the legal and constitutional field if awards were to be
1French Ordonance of 7 March 1537, see [Putnam, 1896 (b)], at 447.
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attributed. Freedom of speech was highly prized in Greek society. It was believed to
constitute the corner stone of Greek political liberty. Any means which could have
impaired that freedom would have inherently threatened the polis. These criticisms
have some validity in looking at the effects of censorship on society. It seems to me
that it was no coincidence that political and religious censorship found a servant in the
form of copyrights, in effect abusing the motive of public interest. In effect censorship
was more largely concerned with the supervision and regulation of the press for the
safety of the interests of the state and the Church, than with the protection of literary
property. According to a Bull of Leo X in 1515, no licence could be given for the
printing of a book until it had been examined and approved by an authority of the
Church."9 The ecclesiastical position on censorship was that no separation was
possible between politics and ecclesiastical dogma; therefore it took the authority to
supervise literature. The establishment of the Roman Index in 1557 gave precedence
to religious dogma. Previously book censorship had been the responsibility of secular
authorities, which delivered permits to print seemingly independent of religious
censorship. Now grants of patents and censorship control became intertwined to the
effect that they finally formed one single process directly involving Church
119 In fact Pope Alexander VI was the first in 1501 to issue a Bull prohibiting publication of
certain books. The Council of Lateran confirmed his decision in 1515.
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authorities.120 Moreover, authorities found among the printers and publishers
121
complaisant allies in exchange for stronger market monopolies.
Censorship regulated three aspects of the book trade: the religious, the moral
or political, and the purely literary.'22 Such control was variously perceived and
applied among European states. The German states never accepted this interference
with their political freedom. Not only was the realm too manifold but also centres of
intellectual activity and of publishing enterprise were too numerous to make
censorship practical. Let us remember that the Reformation was begun in Germany in
1517 by Luther, who benefited from favourable circumstances. Among many factors,
the invention of printing and the reaction of princes and jurists against the
encroachments of the papacy favoured the expansion of the new ideas. The
Reformation and the typographical revolution got along together very well. Indeed,
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"By this printing [...] the doctrine of the Gospel soundeth to all nations". A general
censorship supervision would have needed the centralisation of local powers into the
hands of the Emperor, which politically would have been unacceptable to German
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princes and their subjects.1"4 As a result, religious censorship was no more effective
or consistent than politics alone in the first place.
Nonetheless, when both interests could meet, censorship worked efficiently.
For instance, in France censorship was only admitted upon the condition that it should
always be exercised under the authority of the Crown. Centralisation and absolutism
facilitated the introduction of censorship as an institution. In 1521 it was officially
introduced in the realm by Ordinance of Francis I.125 Jurisdiction was conferred on the
University of Paris where religious works had to secure the approval of the Faculty of
Theology, and profane works that of the Faculty of Belles Lettres before being
published. The University approved, granted privileges and fixed penalties as late as
1789.126 In Italy, the Church authorities directly as censors. Italian states were
concerned with the supervision and regulation of printing for the safety of the Church
as a vassal of the Holy See. From all this it follows that copyright, as a means to
provide enough economic incentive to develop and help literary creations, became a
means to control literary undertakings, hampering literary development.12. Intellectual
property was then fostered and fashioned according to public interest motives which
ought to protect religious and political dogma.
The emperors did not accept the Vatican interference on their authority. The imperial authority
for the regulation of the Press was derived from or connected with the rights reserved to the emperor
under the Golden Bull, [Putnam, 1896 (b)j, at 417.
125 "Ledum est quoddam regis mandatum prohibitorium ne librarii aut typographii venderent aut
ederent aliquid, nisi audoritate universitalis et Facultatis Theologiae, et Visitatione facial", (Printers
and publishers are forbidden to print or sell any work which has not first been examined by the
University authorities and received the authorisation of the University and of the Faculty of Theology),
cited in [Putnam, 1896 (b)], at 441
126 Fancis M. Fligman, Censorship and the Sorbonne (Geneve, 1979), 15 & 23.
127 [Brown, 1896], at 147.
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All this goes to show that the position of authors must have been difficult
between complaisant printers, religious and political censorship, and the authorities.
It is obvious that most authors, printers, or publishers were not willing to risk their life
or business in publishing licentious publications. This brings us to consider more
closely their situation in light of the procurement of copyright privileges. In effect
there was no valid patent without a technical improvement of considerable inventive
merit, and consequently no intellectual property without intellectual creation involved.
Unlike quasi-patents, patent monopolies found grounds directly in creative inputs and
not solely in the introduction of manufactures beneficial to public welfare. In other
words, the intellectual property concept turned into the decisive criterion in
recognising personal monopoly rights, instead of the public benefits derived from
mere expansion of the industry. According to the successive legislation of the
128Venetian Republic, a publishing applicant could secure five types of privileges.
Protection could be secured for new books, maps, charts, musical works, illustrations,
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and engravings. Moreover, such privileges were attributed to printers and
publishers as well as to authors. The first kind of privilege represented a simple
monopoly under which the Republic granted to the beneficiary for a term of years the
sole right to print or to sell a whole class of books such as official or legal documents,
past authors of classic time, and compositions in particular languages.130 Another
128 The legislation of the Venetian Republic may be considered as mere ontinuous and complete in
regard to copyright privileges than in any other European state. Legislation was introduced as early as
the thirteenth or fourteenth century. The first law regulating copyright privileges was promulgated in
1517, see [Brown, 1896], at 50.
I2''
[Brown, 1896], at 41; see [Armstrong, 1990], at 165.
130
In Venice, privileges were given in books of Arabic, Moorish, Syrian, Armenian, Indian,
Barbary, Marc' Antonio da Bologna's system of printing music. For instance, in 1496 privilege was
granted to Baldus Manutius for a term of twenty years for all books printed in Greek text, see [Brown,
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class of privilege secured to authors a copyright in their own production. A third
class of privilege could be secured by editors or publishers for works not of their own
literary production. This class was by far the most commonly sought privilege. A
fourth kind more of the nature of a patent could be secured for improvements in the
art of printing and for specific classes of literature. A typical example would be the
case of Aldus Manutius who secured in 1501 patent and copyright privileges for the
use of cursive characters which also possessed the special advantage of
132
compactness. A fifth kind of privilege had for its purpose the protection of the
printing and publishing industry as a whole against the competition of foreign rivals.
The position of authors was reinforced a special law in 1545, by requiring consent
133
from authors in order for publishers to secure copyright in new works.
An important aspect of these privileges is the predominance of economic
rights and duties attributed to grantees. Copyright defines an exclusive right to publish
a work with the legal guarantee securing a return on the investment of the publisher.
Therefore, books represented a commodity which had a commercial value and could
be used to generate an income. If there was to be any individual property in literary
production and if there was to be any assured return for publishing risk, it was
necessary that some authority constituted a consistent and uniform legal system which
1896], at 43, 79 & 237; As regards compositions, Geoffroy Tory obtained a privilege protecting
original illustrations and decorations contained in his books, see [Armstrong, 1990], at 205.
1,1
Antonio Sabellico secured from the Venitian government copyright on his publication Decades
rerum Venetarium on 1st September 1486. The concession secured literary ownership in his work for
apparently an indefinite term. This is believed to be the earliest recognition by a European government
of authors' copyright in their own work, see [Brown, 1896], at 53 & 236.
132
[Brown, 1896], at 47
' "
In the year 1544-5 a decree was issued by the Venetian Republic forbidding anyone to print or
to sell a work without having first presented to the Rifformaton (the university commissioners)
documentary proof of the consent of the author or of his representatives, see [Brown, 1896], at 79
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should act for an entire territory to protect the publishing undertakings. Patents, and
especially copyrights, were found to be effective property control systems by
investors, justifying investments in labour and capital. To illustrate the truth of this,
Leonardo Crasso's edition of the work Poliftlo vulgar was granted a prolongation of
copyright in 1508-9 on the grounds that the wars had prevented him from getting back
his investment.134 Moreover, the scope of copyright protection extended to precise
economic rights and duties. Individual property was embodied into law by temporary
monopoly property over intellectual creations, fully analogous to property in a
material creation, although duration of protection varied greatly. Monopolies granted
to publishers could last from one year to fifteen years. After expiry of privileges,
works fell in the public domain; however, privileges could be extended if the work
sold well and if there was a need for reprints.136 As an exception, authors were to be
granted perpetual privileges in their work.',J Copyright protection could run from the
date of application or from the date of publication. Therefore, privileges granted by
authorities established only a limited monopoly in time for the printing and sale of
books. In effect, copyright protected publishing parties against outside competition.
Attribution of copyright was conditional not only upon written consent of authors but
1 4
Leonardo Crasso received the prolongation of copyright on Polifilo vulgar, opera motto utile et
fructuosa et de grandissima elegantia, see Document II: Analysis of the number of monopolies,
copyright and patents (1469-1596), see [Brown. 1896], at 237 & 58.
1,5
[Armstrong, 1990], at 118.
136
[Armstrong, 1990], at 199; Legislation in the Venetian Republic on the public domain, see
[Brown, 1896], Appendix.
' "
Ronsard was issued a perpetual privilege on his works, see [Armstrong, 1990], at 27; Peter of
Ravenna received a copyright for an unspecified term for his work Phoenix in January 1492, Giorgio
di Monferrato in 1496, see [Brown, 1896], at 236.
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also quality of final products. Thus, protection of the book-buyer against bad
workmanship and exorbitant charges was established. Control was exercised on the
text and the level of technical skills involved in order to ensure high quality in
finished products. Also, proof of authenticity was often given by means of an
i 139
impression or matrix acting as a seal. Price control was exercised by government
and integrated within the privilege terms. The intention was to set fair prices in order
to make publications accessible to the public at large and further public education.I4<'
Moreover, speed in production could condition the validity of certain privileges. For
instance, some works had to be published within a certain date or at a certain pace per
week.'41 Finally, protection of the moral, religious, economic and political interests of
states implied that control and censorship were used against licentious publications,
often with the help of guilds administering the trade. As a result, many formalities had
to be complied with, such as mandatory deposit of copies in official libraries in order
to validate copyrights.142
From all this, it follows that attention was concentrated on the economic
powers of holders of capital who monopolised printing processes. Copyright-
privileges were not designed as a means of protection of recognised economic rights
as such for authors. Moreover, the purpose for authors in securing privileges was not
1,8 The creation of guilds persued the goal of excellence of workmanship by ensuring that every
entrant were highly qualified, see examination for those who seek matriculation in the guild of
booksellers, see [Brown, 1896], at 186.
139 Charles Talbot, Prints and the Definitive Image, in Print And Culture in the Renaissance
Essays on the Advent of Printing in Europe, G.P.Tyson & S.S.Wagonhein, eds., (London, 1986), at
199.
140
[Armstrong, 1990], at 73.
141
[Brown, 1896], at 57.
142 A French ordinance of 7 March 1537 required deposit of one copy in the Bibliotheque Royale
of Blois. This edit was not only the first step toward the constitution of a national library to preserve
national literature but also a secure means to facilitate censorship, see [Putnam, 1896 (b)], at 447.
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so much to protect themselves from plagiarists as to prevent or impede competition.14'1
Clearly, printers, publishers, and authors alike gained a secure property title in order
to allow them to monopolise the publication of books for a limited period of time.
Nonetheless, the position of authors remained a complex one since the
materials for sale originated from their own genius. Therefore, it would be reasonable
to assume that the issue of a privilege constituted simply an official recognition of the
author's rights to the product of his mind. On the contrary, such right represented
solely the right of authors to put the results of their labour on the market first.
Copyright constituted only the legal recognition of the existence of economic rights
attributed to publishing parties, publishers or authors alike. In practice, most authors
had to content themselves with the assurance of securing circulation of their work by
printers or publishers, as they could not bear the cost of securing a privilege and of
publication undertakings. It was common practice for printers and publishers to secure
copyright privileges on behalf of authors in exchange for their consent "privileges" in
order to publish their writings.144 It would be probably a truism to add that authors
were not in a favourable bargaining position, and that abuses arose from printers and
publishers. Many manuscripts were published without the consent of their authors
and, once published authors lost all economic rights on the works, since the legal title
belonged to someone else or the work had fallen into the public domain.
,4''
J. S. Putter, Beytrage zum Teutschen Staats u. Fursten-Rechte, Gottingen, (1777), at 97, cited in
[Putnam, 1896 (b)], at 415.
144
Steven Rowan, Jurists and the Printing Press in Germany: The First Century, in Print and
Culture in the Renaissance, Essays and the Advent of Printing in Europe, G.P.Tyson &
S.S.Wgonheim, eds., (London, 1986), at 81.
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Intellectual creativity was required in order to secure copyright and generate a
secured income. Authors had an advantage since applications were conditional upon
the criteria of newness. Nonetheless, authors as well as printers and publishers had to
comply with other criteria such as accuracy, price, time, and respect of the Index in
order to be granted a privilege. Consequently, even though exclusive rights could be
granted to authors, this did not act as a recognition of intellectual property. Intellectual
property denotes the object of economic and moral rights which is not in the public
domain. In our case, commodities were subject to literary property as a legal title.
However, it should stressed that this legal title was attributed not by right to authors
but solely as the best bidder among other ones. In practice printers and publishers won
the competition more often. Literary property was only a title of property granted, and
not secured, by government since it did not protect a recognised right stemming from
the act of creation. Once privileges expired, editions could be copied freely without
any recourse for its author.14'^
Even though authors were not recognised as having economic rights in their
work, they imposed respect for their privileges. For instance, Durer's widow, who had
secured in 1528 an imperial privilege for her husband's writings, made a complaint
about unauthorised sales of his Instruction in Perspective. In 1532 the Magistrates of
Nuremberg cautioned all the booksellers of the town against keeping in stock or
selling any copies of mentioned editions. On the same day orders were sent to the
magistrates of Strasbourg, Frankfort, Leipzig and Antwerp with the request that
similar orders should be issued in those cities.146 Nonetheless, there was in certain
145
[Parent, 1974], at 112.
146
[Putnam, 1896 (b)], at 410.
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scholarly circles a prejudice against the receipt ofmoney for literary work. Luther was
in fact much keener on the correctness of the text than on receiving a remuneration.
Curiously, Erasmus was also against being paid for his writings. For instance, Ulrich
von Hutten had been paid for his writings and Erasmus made it a ground for criticism.
Hutten replied that not only was there no reason why reproach should have been
made, but also such criticisms came with a bad grace from Erasmus, who had been on
the payroll of Aldus Manutius of Venice and Froben of Basel. As a matter of fact,
Erasmus was possibly the first author after the invention of printing who was able to
secure from the sale of his books any substantial returns. It is evident from various
references that those returns were sufficient to make him substantially independent,
notwithstanding the fact that pirate editions of his books were printed in Paris,
Bologne and elsewhere.147 Other writers such as the jurist Ulrich Zasius received in
1526 from his publisher in Basel for his Intellectus Juris Singulares fifty guldens.
However, the general economic situation of authors was certainly not enviable.148
It should be stressed that Luther's and Erasmus's objections to pecuniary
advantage from writings rested upon different grounds such as the inherent purpose of
their respective literary creations. Luther observed that he was working for the cause
of the Lord and "Christ had already rewarded him a thousand fold".14'' As regards
Erasmus, financial gains helped him to pursue his research and pay for his expenses
around Europe. Luther's opinion did not reflect the reality of things. For instance,
Conrad Gerner, writing from Lausanne in 1539 complained that "I am, like others of
147
[Parent, 1974], at 116.; C. Augustijn, Erasmus von Rotterdam. Erasmus his Life Works and
Influence (1991); Bruce M. Mansfield, Man on His Own. Interpretations ofErasmus, (1992).
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my class, under the necessity of writing for daily bread". Authors tended not to
discuss in public their material preoccupations, and had the naive belief that public
opinion or privileges suffice to protect their creations against piracies. Also, most
compensations received by authors for their literary undertakings came from
initiatives on the part of publishers themselves. The custom of putting author's
compensation into the shape of books became used as a means for authors of securing
cash receipt.150 The dedications of books were not simple expressions of personal
friendship or of scholarly appreciation, but fulsome laudations and exaggerated
flatteries which were meant to be paid for in cash. It appears then that authors were
also responsible for the fading of the concept of authorship during the literary
renaissance. Two points have to be made. One is that authors in general were not
making a fortune from their writings, but that copyright was a means which enabled
them to secure a pecuniary right, either as a lump sum or as a rent, whatever was the
commercial value of their work. Therefore, contracts were commonly established by
notaries stating precisely to what rights or duties authors and publishers were
entitled.1111 The other point is that not only pecuniary rights motivate authors to create.
Moreover, I wish to focus attention on the fact that the personal rights of
authors were recognised but curiously tended to be analysed from a simple
152
commercial point of view. For instance, Luther himself emphasised the right of the
150 Authors seemed to give more importance in compensation into the shape of books than with a
direct cash compensation, see [Parent, 1974]. at 101 & 11 1.
151
[Parent, 1974], at 98.
152 "The magistrates themselves do not appear to have adhere to their original charge that Andrea
and Beham were pirating Durer's work, or they would, instead of prohibiting the publication until
Durer book was in the market have enjoined its publication altogether as a plagiarism of infringement.
They seem simply to have convinced themselves that Durer's wife and other heirs were entitled to the
first fruits of any profits that could be secured from the subject of Proportion", [Putnam, 1896 (b)], at
411.
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author in his relations with his readers, and his right to control personally all
publication of his works in order to prevent corruption, Text-Verfalshung, and
inaccuracy.153 Authors contended along with Luther that the first and chief right of an
author was to have his message correctly presented to his readers. Moreover, authors'
copyrights infringed by plagiarism or counterfeits were reprimanded.'"4 Even cases of
infringement came with the question whether an author's idea should be protected.1" '
Most cases show the unease of courts to form opinions on rights which had been
recognised since ancient times. In my opinion judges found themselves in a difficult
position and in need of legal support. They simply had to use what was at their
disposal, and analysed personal rights analogically as economic privileges. Obviously,
the handling of cases was really inadequate for lack of proper legislation, but also
because the concepts of intellectual property had not yet been affirmed. Furthermore, I
venture to say that the judges' attitude proves that personal rights could not be
conditional upon one technology, and especially printing, or upon the material form of
lx"
"There are many now busying themselves with the spoiling of books through misprinting
them", Geschischte der Deutschen Bibel-ubersetzung des Luthers, cited in [Putnam, 1896 (b)], at 408.
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In 1512 complaint was made to the Magistracy of Nuremberg that a certain man was offering
for sale some prints or drawings which pretended to be the work of Durer and which bore Durer's
signature, but that both the design and signature were counterfeits. The Magistrates decided that such
sales of prints had to be stopped and that the copies sold had to be confiscated, [Putnam, 1896 (b)], at
410.
155 Durer's treatise on Proportion was being put into print in Nuremberg by Hieronymus Andrea.
In conjunction with the latter a painter named Beham had in preparation a work on the subject of
Proportion. In July 1528 the Magistrates of Nuremberg issued an edict forbidding them from
proceeding with the publication of their volume until the publication of the authentic work das rechte
Werk had been completed. Beham protested that his volume was entirely original and quite distinct in
its plan from that of Durer. However, the Magistrates decided that on the ground of the idea of a
treatise on the subject had originated with Durer, he or his heirs were entitled to be protected against
any attempt to diminish the commercial value of the coming publication. This case is valuable on the
sense that the concept of moral rights attributed to authors was not unknown to judges However, these
rights were only perceived in the terms of their commercial value. Indeed, until Durer's work was on
the market and had enjoyed the first profits Andrea and Beham were prohibited to publish their own
work. The Magistrates decided that Durer's wife and other heirs were entitled to the first profits that
could be secured from the subject of Proportion on the ground that Durer was the first author to give
attention to this way of expression, see [Putnam, 1896 (b)], at 411.
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the author's expression as opposed to the economic rights. Moreover, I would affirm
that copyright as an exclusive economic right is inadequate as a form of intellectual
property recognition, since it depends entirely on technological processes. Intellectual
property, both as an economic and personal right, needs to stem naturally from
authors. Nonetheless, it is of the nature of a truism or self-evident fact that intellectual
property needs to be recognised by law in order to achieve its purposes. The system of
privileges narrowed down instead of widening the concept of literary property.
Property in literary undertakings was solely established upon the criteria of skill and
labour expenditures projected on a commodity. It was the creation of copyright and
not the affirmation of the natural right of an author to gain financial benefits from his
writings and protect the content of his work. Copyright, even liberated from state
control such as censorship, is a privileged property granted by states, dependent upon
the printing press, and assimilating authors as investors in their own writings and not
as creators. Copyright assumes that economic incentives motivate authors or inventors
and may be fit solely on economic grounds. Nevertheless, creativity ought to be
viewed as a complex process which involves primarily intellectual stimulation and
well-being. Financial benefits are only one factor among others which help in the
creative process.
I believe that I have demonstrated that copyright-privilege is a property title
dependent upon one technology, which concentrates on the economic powers of
holders of capital who monopolise processes. Literary property is conferred upon an
individual who is granted a privilege and not naturally upon the creator of the work.
As a consequence, public authorities grant such a title as a commercial security which
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not only allows the state to control, even to censor publications but also has no neutral
effect on the creative process and narrows the concept of intellectual property which
should to my belief denote the object of economic and moral rights which is not in the
public domain. As Plato and Aristotle observed grants of monopolies corrupt states
and citizens, as well as distracting people from their vocation. What is needed is a
protective and technologically neutral mechanism which affirms the value of products
of the intellect in enriching the exchange of ideas and freedom of expression amongst
its participants. In order to reach that aim one needs to move from a privilege system
based upon two principles, commercial security and public domain, to a liberated
system founded upon the recognition of the rights of authors in their work, requiring a
commercial monopoly in order to enforce authors proprietary rights, but limited in
effect by the public domain.
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Chapter II
The Modern Law ofCopyright inGreat Britain:
Privilege or Intellectual Property?
"Those who started using the word property in connection with inventions had a very
definite purpose in mind: they wanted to substitute a word with a respectable
connotation, 'property', for a word that had an unpleasant ring, 'privilege
- Machlup and Penrose*
The continuing development of copyright doctrine requires us to understand copyright
strictly as a creature of statute and not as a common law property right. Unlike its
continental counterpart based upon the natural right of the author, copyright
establishes a temporary commercial security attributed to authors or their assigns.
An examination of the historical evolution and subsequent rationales of
copyright shows the underlying economic and cultural nature, and purpose of
copyright. Copyright weights the rights of creators as investors against the public
interest, in other words the public domain. All copyright laws are a systematic
measure of these two interests. From prerogatives of the king to the powers of
Parliament, such commercial securities are the grant of public authorities and not the
recognition of the natural rights of authors in the product of their intellect. The
modern legal concept of copyright owes its inception to the rights of patentees under
royal grants and to the development of rights of unprivileged printers in the copies
lawfully licensed and entered in the records of the Stationers Company. Flenry vm
*
Machlup & Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 Journal of Economic
History 1950, at 16.
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fully initiated the process and Parliament under the reign of Queen Anne gained
power to attribute privileges indirectly by statutory enactment. Such enactment
recognised the creation of a public domain and the creation of a temporary economic
rights vested in authors for their intellectual endeavours. A great deal depends on the
accuracy or error of subsequent interpretations of the decisive case, Donaldson v.
Becket, decided in 1774 by the House of Lords. Nonetheless, the decision of the Lords
simply recognised the self-evident fact that copyright is a creation of statute intended
to provide economic well-being to authors within the United Kingdom.
This chapter will attempt to show that the current copyright rationales are
direct descendants of the copyright privileges created under royal prerogatives and
designed to appropriate commodities. As a result, it will argued thai such
instrumentalist rationales can only be sustained in a defined technological
environment such as printing, or any other similar technology which embeds works in
material forms. It has a threefold origin independent from statutory action or common
law court decision: the patents of monopoly, the licensing system, and the copy
records of the Stationers' Company.
Printing Privileges and Licensing
The great question of literary property decided in 1774 by the Lords, clearly
established that the Statute of Anne was a British Act which treated printers and
booksellers similarly on both sides of the border. Moreover, "while the two kingdoms
were under different crowns, and even after the Union of 1603 anything of a mutual
copyright did not exist". Although there were not many differencies in the
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development of printing between the two kingdoms, it is in England that the
development of copyright took a special evolution which was finally concluded in
Donaldson v. Becket in 1774.1 Therefore, special attention is given to the early
development of copyright in England. The credit for introducing printing in England
is given to William Caxton who imported the process from Bruges to Westminster in
1475. Many controversies arise as to whether Edward IV insisted upon Caxton
establishing himself at Westminster or whether Caxton himself took the initiative to
set up his press.2 It is more significant to notice that Caxton sought no exclusive
privileges from the Crown even though he enjoyed the personal patronage of Edward
IV and Henry VII. It would appear then that, like other European countries, the early
development of printing in England characterised a new craft, free of any corporate
influence and of any state intervention. Following Caxton, numerous foreign
competitors established their own presses in England, possibly under the influence of
a provision added to the Act of 1484 encouraging foreign printers and booksellers to
practise their craft freely within the realm.3 Incidentally, the first printing privilege is
attributed to Henry VII who took the initiative to appoint William Facques in 1504 as
the King's Printer. The office secured Facques with the exclusive right to print certain
Crown documents, such as proclamation of statutes and common law books, and to
supply the royal family with new publications.4 This royal intervention may have
1 See, Gordon Donaldson. Scotland, James V-James VII (Edinburgh, 1965), at 261-62; Edward J.
Cowan, The People's Past (EUSPB, 1980), at 34-35; Association of Scottish Historical Studies,
Dissent, Protest and Rebellion in Pre-lndustrial Scotland (St. Andrews University, 1987), at 62 ff.
2 Lotte Hellinga, Caxton in Focus: The Beginning ofPrinting and Translator, (London, 1982).
3 1 Ric. Ill, c. 9.
4 William Facques held the office from 1504 to 1508. He was followed by Richard Pynson (1508-
1530), Thomas Berthelet and others. After the Restoration this office had become the property of John
Bill and Christopher Barker. In 1666 the patent-monopoly was assigned to H. Hills and Thomas
Newcomb and in 1689 became the property of Charles Bill and Thomas Newcomb.
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initiated the long and consistent interventionist policy observed by the crown. Its
policy was carried out through instrumentalities based upon the authority of the
prerogative or, in other words, upon powers inherent in the office of the king,
especially in Tudor times, until 1709. Through royal proclamations, licences, patents
ofmonopoly and decrees, exclusive prerogatives controlled and regulated the press in
a unique form of intervention in Europe. This system was composed of two distinct
but indissociable institutions: the licensing system and the incorporation of the
Worshipful Company ofStationers ofLondon.
In the 1520s the Privy Council had been increasingly vigilant about books on
controversial religious and political matters.5 The Catholic Church wanted to prevent
the importation of reformed ideas and consequently of books containing such
contentions. Henry VIII, who himself was just entering into political and religious
controversies, was only too willing to strengthen the authority of the crown over the
press. In 1534 the Act of Supremacy was passed, and by 1535 the clergy had
submitted to the king to be followed in 1538 by a royal proclamation introducing a
formal requirement prior to publication. Approval in the form of a licence needed to
be secured from the Privy Council in order to print.6 Clearly the intention was to
control political and religious opposition to Henry's Church. As a result, the rights of
royal patentees rested upon the authority of the crown and its prerogative to control
and regulate printing. Any attacks upon the legality of these rights or any infringement
of his proclamations necessarily resulted in a conflict between the alleged infringer,
5 Fredrick S. Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776 (University of Illinois Press,
1952), at 43-46, Hereafter: [Siebert, 1952]
6 [Siebert, 1952], at 48-50.
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on one side, and both the patentee and the crown, on the other. Based on the royal
prerogative, the authority to issue proclamations had the force of law, giving the king
wide powers over fields left untouched by statute or common law.
Without an effective enforcement body, the licensing system would have
encountered difficulties in being respected. The authorities took the initiative to assert
control over the presses in order to impose a licensing scheme on the book-trade. The
claim to control the book-trade was valid in the sense that the Crown, concerned with
the contents of controversial books on religious and political matters, intended to
maintain peace and order within the realm.7 Nonetheless, it is clear that freedom of
expression was of no concern to the crown. Distribution of information on these
matters was treated simply as a state prerogative. Following this line of thinking, the
crown considered that all acts of printing were within the royal prerogative, and
consequently should be done under the direct supervision of the crown. Mary I, a
devout Catholic who found herself unpopular in her attempt to reconcile the divergent
religious elements, re-organised the licensing system to that effect. On 4 May 1557,
she granted a Royal Charter establishing the Worshipful Company of Stationers of
London, better known under the name of the Stationers' Company, since it became
impossible for the Crown to control the book-trade effectively.8 In 1559 Elizabeth
confirmed the charter, to strengthen the powers granted to the members. The company
7 John Feather, Authors, Publishers and Politicians' The History ofCopyright and the Book Trade,
12 European Intellectual Property Review 1989, at 377. Hereafter: [Feather, 1989]; Leona Rostenberg,
The Minority Press and The English Crown. A study in Repression 1558-1625, (New York, 1971), at
18
8 A society of writers of text letters existed before that time. In 1403 those "commonly called
limners, and others good folks, citizens of London, who were wont to bind and sell books" formed into
a craft with "good rules and governance" presided by two wardens. The word "stationer" was applied
to all the various members of this joint craft, William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol. 6,
(London, 1937), at 862, Hereafter: [Holdsworth, 1937]
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had the unique privilege in England to regulate all aspects of the book trade from the
supervision of apprentices, the number of presses and printing houses, to license,
print, bind, publish and set prices.9 In institutionalising the trade under one guild, not
only did the Crown gain secure control over distribution of information, but it also
changed the very idea and practice of copyright privilege as applied in other European
countries. In effect, Henry VIII established a quick, incisive and effective method
which intertwined a licensing system with patent and copyright privileges under his
personal supervision where rights to print extended over publication of books of any
kind. Inescapably, certain legal implications evolved with regard to literary property
which greatly influenced the early development of modern copyright law in the
United Kingdom.
The right of the crown to regulate the printing press can be explained by the
political and social conditions of the time and the political will of the crown. It had
been a prerogative of general practice for European authorities to confer patents upon
individuals in order to protect home industries as well as to make themselves sole
patrons of the destiny of new industries.10 For instance. Henry VII, known as a patron
of letters, gave the first official recognition to printing in the appointment ofWilliam
Facques as the King's Printer, showing his interest in the welfare of the realm. After
all, official documents which emanated from the crown itself were ultimately the
king's own property. Moreover, in securing a patent monopoly on certain classes of
9 Letters Patent of May 4, 1557 The Stationer's Company's Charter was confirmed in 1558 and
interpreted by the Company's own ordinances in 1562. A royal proclamation in 1559 reinforced its
privileges. In 1566 an Order-in-Council recognised the practices and was again reinforced through
decrees of the Court of the Star Chamber. Decree of June 23. 1586 and of July 11, 1637.
10 E.W. Hulme, History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and at Common Law, Law
Quaterlv Review. XII. at 141-54, and XVI. at 44-56.
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books, the crown was assuring wider dissemination of its legislation and information
among its subjects. Nonetheless, there is still the need to explain why the crown
claimed printing as part of its own prerogative. It can be argued that the Tudors tended
to establish their authority de facto as opposed to the Stuarts who, more concerned
with constitutional misgivings, adopted a de jure attitude. Historical circumstances
produced different approaches to similar problems.
"From Henry VIII to Elizabeth, the English sovereigns acted upon the principle that
the peace of the realm demanded the suppression of all dissenting opinion and
furthermore that the crown itself through its prerogative was the only instrument of
carrying through such a programme."11
As the trade in printed materials increased and later extended into the field of religious
and political controversy, the crown took direct control of the new craft. Only one step
was needed in order for the crown to extend its own prerogative on printing official
materials to any other material. On the one hand, as patrons of new crafts, central
authorities could easily monopolise the trade, having the motive of controlling
dissemination of information.12 On the other hand, worn out by dynastic struggles,
England found peace with the first Tudor and was not willing to fall again into a civil
war. Therefore, theoretical liberties would have been considered useless in a state of
perpetual turmoil.13 Henry VIII and Elizabeth I succeeding in identifying themselves
with the popular conception of peace and national unity and could adopt an aggressive
policy in order to reduce opposition to a minimum.
11 [Siebert, 1952], at 25.
12 Similarly in Scotland, the soveriegn claimed exclusive control both of the process and of the
products, on the assumption that "everything that might have a bearing upon the peace and security of
the realm" ought to be controlled by the crown, see Rev W J Cooper, "Records of the Glasgow
Bibliographical Society" vol 9 (Glasgow, 1931), at 43.
13 ibid, at 26.
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It is no coincidence that the crown succeeded in receiving the support of the
London stationers. In medieval times, the formation of corporate organisations had
become part of Europe's communal heritage. Although in many cases guilds
developed out of groups of a social and religious character, they were primarily
characterised by a concern for economic and above all artisan-manufacturing interests
and policies. The printers and booksellers of England were undoubtedly members of
printing craft organisations in order to oversee and to regulate the activities of all
practitioners in the region controlled by the town. Guilds clearly combined juridical,
political, religious and social aspirations; however, the economic motive of
establishing a corporate monopoly was primary.14 As such, the Company of Stationers
combined many of these traditional goals, but was a direct reflection of the seizure of
the crown on the book-trade. It aimed not only at maximising the volume of the trade
and the consequent benefits to the town and its own merchants, but was also
concerned with maintaining a steady volume of business for their members.15 There
was a mixture of public and self-interest in its policies. The Stationers' Company
distinguished itself from other European guilds in the sense that it had an exceptional
political role. Most European guilds shifted from social to economic priorities and
moved away from social solidarity to mere collective self-interest within the group. At
the same time they changed their liberal policies to protectionism in order to become
promoters of monopoly. Following that movement, the Stationers Company, once
embodying equality among its members, secured continuity of work and income for
14 Antony Black, Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought from the Twelfth
Century to the Present, (London, 1984), at 8, Hereafter: [Black, 1984]
15 [Black, 1984], at 8.
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its members, and above all maintained a fixed number of small independent printing
masters. To this end, it sought to limit competition, restrict membership, and
moreover became exceptionally involved in the polity of the state. As opposed to
other guilds, the Stationers' Company had not only a national economic role but also a
political role at a state level by means of power sharing between the crown and the
guild in the form of an oligarchy. Combining these aims, it became the instrument of
the crown's economic and political policy to form an integral part of the licensing
system. As such, the masters of the guild became the cornerstone of the polity by
controlling the corporate body.16
In the first place the letters patent gave wide powers for the control of the
printing craft. Printing was limited to the members of the London Company or such
others as secured a special licence from the monarch. Not only did members of the
Company maintain their own monopolies, but at the same time the Charter created a
structure of membership designed to safeguard a limited number of printers.
According to subsequent Star Chamber Decrees, printing presses had to be registered,
and printing was "prohibited outside the city of London except at Oxford and
Cambridge."17 Furthermore, the right to print was reserved to master printers who,
limited in numbers, were nominated by the Court of Assistants to be presented for
appointment to the High Commission for Causes Ecclesiastical.18 In the second place,
printing patents were monopolistic grants by the crown as distinguished from
copyrights, which arose out of prior registration in the books of the Stationers
16 ibid, at 67.
17 [Siebert, 1952], at 69.
18 ibid.
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Company. These privileges provided the only protection available against illegal
printed materials. The Court of Assistants or Star Chamber considered any
infringement, since patents, and subsequently copyrights, originated from royal
prerogatives and not from Parliament or courts of law. Added to that, the principal
function of the Company was to detect and prosecute "scandalous, malicious,
schismatical, and heretical" publications, especially during the reign of Elizabeth I and
the Civil War. In the performance of this task, the system of registration of published
books adopted by the Company was an invaluable aid. All books and pamphlets
including "title, epistle, poem, preamble, introduction, table and dedication" must be
licensed and registered in order to print.19 In practice, for self-protection they refused
to register any books which would be politically unacceptable. In this way, stationers
became de facto censors.
With regard to the concept of literary property, many implications may be
drawn. The right to print was dominated by a small group of influential patentees
from London, competing against each other, but ready to defend their royal
prerogatives. Fees were charged by master printers in order to allow other members to
print. The stationers protected copyright in such a way that it had come to be in
substance a right of property. They received powers to protect their copyright by
19 Registration was made mandatory in 1637 and in 1662 the Printing Act, concerned with pre-
publication censorship, required registration for all new books as proof of ownership, see respectively
Star Chamber Decree and "Act for Preventing the frequent Abuses in printing in seditious, treasonable,
and unlicensed books and Pamphlets, andfor regulating ofPrinting andprinting Presses" (13 and 14
Car. II, c.33; 16 Car. 11, c.8), renewed in 1664 until 1679 (16 and 17 Car. II. c.4), and revived in 1685
until 1694 (1 Jac. II, c. 17, sec. 15).
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having been recognised by the bye-laws of the Company and statute laws.20
Therefore,:
"The register of the Company listing the fees for permission to print took on a new
significance as these entries became useful in establishing ownership of copies. This
new use of the register resulted in a change of for "Licensed vnto him" becomes by
the end of the sixteenth century "Entered vnto him"."21
The Company kept records of all licensed books held by the printing houses and
members of the guild. Incidentally these records became extremely valuable as proof
of ownership. The simple act of registering a book sufficed to give an exclusive and
incontestable title to the book registered under one name. As a result, the act of
registration gave clearness and precision to the idea of copyright, and subsequently to
literary property. Patent monopolies in books, and subsequently copyrights, could be
sold, exchanged, assigned, subdivided, released by one partner to another, or settled in
trust, and of course inherited.22 Also, some printers were recognised to have
copyrights in unprivileged copies fully licensed by censors which they first published
without any registration.
Curiously, duration of ownership is not stated unless it is expressly stated in
the letters patent. With no duration mentioned, it could be assumed that patents were
perpetual. Also, as a form of property, it could be considered to be perpetual, unless a
general enactment expressly limited it. This is an important point which would be of
consequence in interpreting the 1709 Copyright Act. The by-laws of the Company
provided, however, that all rights in a book, which was out of print and which the
20 14 Char II, c33, par.5, recognises that copyright is granted wither by virtue of a riyal patent or
by the Stationers' Company.
21 [Siebert, 1952], at 77.
22 Edward Arber, A Transcript of the Registers of the Company of Stationers of London, 1554-
1640, Vol. 2 (1875), at 43.
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owner failed to reprint, should lapse and become open for the benefit of the poor
craftsmen of the company.23 In the case of the translation of a privileged book, the
printer of the translation owned the copyright and not the owner of the work from
wich the translation had been made from.24 The printer was listed on the title page
only as the assignee of the holder of the privilege. Curiously, the ordinance of 1637
established provisions protecting the privileges of authors, printers, or publishers as
the sole right of printing certain books. In practice, copyright provisions were so
closely bound up with both the exclusive printing privileges of the Company and the
patents on classes of books that by practice authors were denied any right on their
creations once they handed over their manuscripts for printing. This policy was
pursued until 1694, when the House of Commons refused to renew the 1662 Printing
Act. It was then the end of Henry VIII's licensing scheme, and also the end of the only
legal basis for copyright protection that the Company had.25 In effect, it may be
stressed that patent rights furnished the model for modern copyright, with the
licensing register as evidence for literary ownership. Consequently, copyright
privileges could not find grounds in common law. The royal prerogative and the Court
of Assistants reflected directly the policy of the crown.
Under the Tudors, patents of monopoly served three purposes. Their policy
allowed control in the interests of the state, protection of the monopolies of master
printers in the trade, and pay offs for opportune deserving supporters without dipping
23 An Order of 1588 stated that if a book was out of print, and, after warning, the owner of the
copy did not reprint within six months, any member of the company could do so, provided that the
author did not refuse,and the owner of the copyright was given such part of the profit, see fHoldsworth,
.937], Vol. 6, at 36s!
24 W.W. Greg, Records of the Court of the Stationers'Company (London, 1930), at 7.
2" R.C. Bald, Early Copyright Litigation and its bibliographical Interest, 36 Papers of the
Bibliographical Society of America 1942, at 81-96.
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into the royal treasury. In addition, the Stuarts used it as a means of raising money.26
As such, they extended printing patents to many different fields of the printing trade:
for instance, newspapers. In the early seventeenth century the crown struggled to
impose its policy. As Antony Black remarked:
"Parliament [...] while it tolerated monopolies in foreign trade, was less favourable to
domestic monopolies, from which the crown derived considerable benefits."27
The new principles of commercial freedom, or laissez-faire, could not fail to
have an effect upon the monopolistic printing trade in the Seventeenth Century.
Clearly, the liberal policy established under the reign of Richard III allowing foreign
printers and booksellers to establish their presses in England was in complete
opposition to the restrictive policy of his descendants.28 Moreover, Sir Edward Coke
posed the problem with commendable clarity in the early seventeenth century. He
"regarded privileges as no better than other forms of monopoly" and "ruled against
guild privilege, on the ground that it was a breach of 'liberty of the subject', even
appealing to Magna Carta".29 First, trade monopolies were hampering the
development of trade, and second, they restrained the freedom of the people,
especially literary expression. In 1621 the House of Commons asked the king to recall
the more oppressive grants, and in 1624 enacted the Statute of Monopolies which
placed the control of monopolies under the courts of common law. Nonetheless, as the
following passage shows, printing patents and grants of chartered companies were
excluded from the purview of the statute:
"...and be it enacted that this act or any declaration, provision, disablement, penalty,
forfeiture, or other thing before mentioned shall not extend to many letters patents or
26 [Siebert, 1952], at 128.
27 [Black, 1984], at 159.
28 1 Rich. Ill, c.9.
29 [Black, 1984], at 159.
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grants of privilege heretofore made or hereafter to be made of, for or concerning
printing."30
As a result, the legality of these grants could not be questioned in principle. It should
be stressed, however, that placing the control of monopolies under the courts of
common law was an important step which initiated a debate on the legality of
monopolies. Added to that, general opposition to domestic monopolies was not
lacking among unprivileged guild members. The Levellers, for instance, supported the
idea that domestic monopolies should be condemned but that craft-guild regulations
should be retained in order to extend franchises equally to all craftsmen and
journeymen.31 A Prime figure of his time, John Lilburne, member of a republican
faction, supported claims and petitions to Parliament on the ground of total social
equality.
Journeymen printers had already petitioned Parliament in 1614 against the
decree of 1586 which deprived them of the right to set their own press to benefit
master printers.32 Nevertheless, the case of Thomas Symcock, who in 1618 was
granted exclusive rights to print all Briefs printed on one or both sides of a single
sheet, accelerated the downfall of royal patentees. In July 1629, Charles I referred to
the Court of Chancery following a report from a commission condemning the grant. It
was the first time that a law court was allowed to consider the legality of a printing
patent. The court decided on the cancellation of the patent, following the opinion of
the commission, which considered Symcock's patent "verie dishonorable" and
"exceeding hurtful to the commonwealth".33 Such a decision has to be put in its
30 21 Jac. I, c.3.
31 [Black, 1984], at 127.
32 [Siebert, 1952], at 132.
33 ibid, at 133.
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political and legal context. The king being the final authority on the matter of printing
patents, the decision of the court as a legal precedent was weak. In 1632 the case
Mounson v. Lyster established that some patents were not valid.34 The question of the
validity of patents was again presented to the court of Parliament in 1666 by Richard
Atkyns. It was decided that the king through his prerogative powers could legally
grant an exclusive patent for the printing of law books. The Company "brought an
action of debt against Seymour for printing Gadbury's Almanac without their leave."35
Almanacs were under the government of the Archbishop of Canterbury and
considered "prerogative copies" with no particular author. Moreover, it was
established that:
since printing has been invented, and is become trade, so much of it has been
kept inclosed never was made common : but matters of State, and things that concern
the Government, were never left to any man's liberty to print that would."36
The Stuarts, as opposed to the Tudors, tried to find legitimacy from court decisions
and Parliament, since they were concerned with constitutional questions. The
Company strengthened by injunctions from Chancery its royal patents in almanacs,
books of laws, and against importation of books from Holland.37 It was argued that
the statute 21 Jac. 3, c. 3, against monopolies clearly excluded "patents for sole
printing". The act of Richard III allowed all foreigners to import and sell books;
however, the act of Henry VIII established "that none shall buy or sell again any
imported books ready bound, otherwise that in gross, and not by retail".38 Once again,
crown prerogatives restraining the liberty of the subject were justified by state
34 Mounson v. Lyster, King's Bench, 1632, 82 Engl. Rep. 122.
35 The Company ofStationers v. Seymour (1677), 86 Engl. Rep. 865.
36 ibid, at 866.
37 The Company ofStationers Case, Chancery (1681), 22 Engl, Rep. 849, 854 & 862.
38 The Company ofStationers v. Lee (1682), 89 Engl, Rep. 927.
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interests in the trade and public order. Also, importance was given to the bye-laws of
the company:
"it was urged that [the Company] had quietly enjoyed the sole printing of these books
[...] and that all particular members of the company have distinct shares and benefit
in the printing of them according to the stock they put in, by virtue of a bye-law of
the company"39
Once again in 1709 the court was asked to rule on the validity of the almanac patent
but "no opinion was given".40 In that year Parliament voted on the Copyright Act.
Nonetheless, it is essential to understand that even though the centre of
authority was shifting from the crown to Parliament and that master printers shifted
their allegiance to Parliament, the overall state policy did not change. Parliament
enacted, for instance, an Ordinance for the Regulation of Printing on June 14, 1643.41
The enactment of the Ordinance confirmed the transition from control of the press by
the crown to give jurisdiction to Parliament. The Stationers Company agreed in return
for the protection of its monopolies and property in copies to assist Parliament in
suppressing licentious publications. The Restoration brought with it the Printing Act
of 1662 which confirmed the rights of both the royal patentees and of the owners of
copyrights "for preventing the frequent abuses in printing seditious, treasonable, and
unlicensed books and pamphlets and for regulating of printing presses" 42 In fact, the
cases brought to court had an effect on the Company's patents (and incidentally the
prerogatives of the crown on printing) but not on the more fundamental questions
39 ibid
40 The Company ofStationers v. Partridge (1709). 88 Engl. Rep. 647.
41 The ordinance ordered that no other book was to be "printed, bound, stitched, or put to sale"
unless both licensed and entered in the register. The copyrights of the company and private persons
were not to be infringed, either by printing or importing printed copies, see [Holdsworth, 1937], Vol. 6,
at 371.
42 14 Charles 1 I, c.33.
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such as freedom of the press and especially literary ownership. Nonetheless, many
writers and pamphleteers attacked the Ordinances, in other words the status quo. For
instance, William Walwyn, a religious and political writer, reached a theory of liberty
of the press through his effort to secure religious toleration. Another writer, Henry
Robinson, advocated freedom of discussion and the right of private judgement as a
necessary adjunct to the economic principles of private enterprise and private property
as presented by the new principles of commercial freedom. Analogically, he
developed the doctrine of free conscience as the most practical method of hurdling
theological questions.
"No man can have a natural monopoly of truth, and the more freely each man
exercises his own gifts in its pursuit, the more of truth will be discovered and
possessed."43
John Milton, rightly in my view, posed the problem in different terms. He defended
literary expression with freedom of expression in which the state had a role to play. In
1644 Milton made his point thus:
"1 deny not but that it is of greatest concernment in the Church and Commonwealth,
to have a vigilant eye how Bookes demeane themselves as well as men; and
thereafter to confine, imprison, and do sharpest justice on them as malefactors : For
Books are not absolutely dead things, but do contain a potencie of life in them to be
as active as that souls was whose progeny they are; nay they do preserve as in a violl
the purest efficacie and extraction of that living intellect that bred them. I know they
are as lively, and as vigorously productive, as those fabulous Dragons teeth; and
being sown up and down, may chance to spring up armed men. And yet on the other
hand, unlesse warinesse be us'd, as good almost kill a Man as kill a good Book; who
kills a Man kills reasonable creature, Gods image; [...] We should be wary, therefore
what persecution we raise against the living labours of publick men, how we spill
that season'd life ofman preserv'd and stor'd up in Books;"44
4-' William Haller, Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution (1934), I, at 69
44 John Milton, Aeropagitica; A Speech of Mr. John Milton, For the Liberty of unlicensed
Printing, to the Parliament of England (24 November 1644) The Legal Classics Library (New-York,
1992), at 16-18; see also, Charles Blount, A Just Vindication of Learning: or, An Humble Address to
the Gigh Court of Parliament In Behafof the Liberty of the Press, by Philopatris (London, 1679), in
Classics ofEnglish Legal History in the Modern Era (London, 1978), at 3 & 7
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Clearly, literary expressions reflect their author's soul or personality and deserve
respect as much as all mankind. Milton does not refer directly to literary property;
however, his concerns raise the issue of freedom of expression and implicitly the
economic right for authors to dispose freely and control their own creations.45
As for literary ownership or individual copyrights, as long as the Act for the
Regulation of Printing was in force there was at least some semblance of legality
attached to the ownership of a copy which had been entered in the Stationers'
Register. With the expiration of the Act in 1694 the Company found itself incapable
of enforcing its own bye-laws, especially against stationers who were not members.
Extended discussions at Parliament started in 1694, to produce finally the Copyright
Act of 1710.46 In fact, the Lords wanted to renew the 1662 Act with minor
amendments, but the Commons ordered a new draft. The trade petitioned Parliament
to safeguard their property rights in copies and argued that, unless the Act continued,
the printing trade would be "open to all Persons; which may not only be of dangerous
Consequence to the Government, but will be ruinous to the said Trade."47 The House
of Commons refused to renew it by emphasising the commercial restraints contained
in the draft.48 The Commons grounded its reasoning on John Locke's argumentation
against the un-natural monopolies of the Stationers Company. It pointed out that the
monopoly system under the letters-patent, as confirmed under the Act legalising
45 "Augustine Birrell is right to suggest that John Milton was making no declaration for author's
rights when he exclaimed in Aeropagitica about "the just retaining of each man his several copy, which
God forbid should be gainsaid"", see Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View ofCopyright (Columbia
University Press, 1967), at 5, Hereafter: [Kaplan, 1967]
46 Table 1, Bills relating to the book trade 1695-1794, in John Feather, The Book Trade in
Politics: The Making of the Copyright Act of 1710, 8 Publishing History 1980, at 22, Hereafter:
[Feather, 1980]
47 Commons Journal IX, at 289.
48 Lords Journal XV. at 545-46 (18 April 1695).
79
property rights, should not have been granted. They argued the injustice of fettering
unduly the freedom of individual authors, and on the harm done to learning. Also,
there were more practical reasons such as the difficulties of administration in a
licensing system, as well as restraints on the trade. Also, the gradual settlement under
a two party system at Parliament, prevented the Houses to come to agreement.49 The
Whigs were opposed to any powers given to the crown which could interfere to a
large extent with individual liberty.50 In the meantime the stationers, printers, and
binders continued to petition for relief.51 The absence of any petition for protection on
the part of authors and translators should be pointed out. It was in line with the
general state of docility authors had been put in.
The Modern Law of Copyright
Pre-publication censorship in England came to an end in 1694 when the House of
Commons refused to renew the 1662 Printing Act.52 With it the only legal basis for
copyright protection lapsed, consequently leaving the Company without any legal
means to protect its stocks. As Lord Camden remarked, the Stationers,
"[...] came up to Parliament in the form of petitioners, with tears in their eyes,
hopeless and forlorn; they brought with them their wifes and children to excite
compassion, and induce Parliament to grant them a statutory security."53
49 [Holdsworth, 1937], Vol. 6, at 375; [Siebert, 1952], at 260-63.
50 In the aftermath of the Revolution, the majority ofWhigs had no desire to change society on the
basis of such radical notions as the contract theory of Locke, the natural rights of man and the
sovereignty of the people. They wanted to restore the powers of the crown, the privileges of Parliament
and strengthen the civil liberties of the people. However, they remain more liberal than the Tories on
certain issues such as the control of the press or the control exercised by the crown, h.T. Dickinson,
Liberty and Property (London, 1977), at 44-45, 58-59, 80.
51 Common Journal. XV, 313 (26 Feb. 1707)
52 Raymond Astbery, The Renewal of the Licensing Act in 1693 and Its Lapse in 1695, 33 The
Library 1978, at 296-322.
53 Donaldson v. Becket (House of Lords, 1774), see 17 Parliamentary History of F.ngland 1813, at
995.
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As a matter of fact, no less than ten Bills were introduced to Parliament and failed to
pass until the Copyright Act of 1710.54 The Bills which were introduced aimed at
controlling newspapers rather than the trade as a whole. As Queen Anne moved
towards a childless grave, the Whigs and the Tories were fighting about the
succession and its implications within the kingdom.55 Each party was afraid to trust
the other with the administration of a new licensing act. Parliament wanted to keep a
firm grip on newspapers. News of any kind was regarded as a state secret and its
distribution as a monopoly. Therefore, with the lapse of the Act Parliament sought in
different ways means of controlling the Press. Nonetheless, the debate was not only
political but also philosophical. Issues were raised concerning freedom of expression
and disputes over ownership of printed materials.
Daniel Defoe wrote a pamphlet in order to gain attention for what he called
"the Propriety of the Work".56 His position has been established as that of a moderate
Tory on press regulation.57 He wished to set up some form of restraint on
licentiousness but not on knowledge. Furthermore, Defoe wanted to:
"put a Stop to certain sort of Thieving which is now in full practice in England, and
which no laws extends to punish, viz. some Printers and Booksellers printing Copies
none of their own".58
54 [Feather, 1980], at 20-30.
55 H.T, Dickinson, Liberty and Property (London. 1977), at 39.
56 "To restrain the Licentious Extravagance of Authors therefore, and bring the Press under
Regulation, is the Case before us and this is for that Reason call'd, An Essay on the Regulation of the
Press", Daniel Defoe, An Essay on the Regulation of the Press, (7 January 1704), Classics of English
Legal History in the Modern Era (London. 1978), at 21, Hereafter: [Defoe, 1704]
57 [Feather, 1980], at 29; "Licentiousness of all sorts ought to be Restrain'd, whether of the
Tongue, the Pen, the Press, or any thing else, and it were well if all sorts of Licentiousness were as
easy to Govern as this; but to Regulate this Evil by an Evil ten times more pernicious, is doing us no
service at all", [Defoe, 1704], at 11.
58 ibid, at 19.
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The question of literary property regained some interest. Defoe argued that practices
which roh authors of their property have the effect of discouraging the publication of
learned and useful works. Consequently, authors need to be protected in order to
prosecute people publishing pirated works, or any abridgement.59 Nonetheless, he
subordinated the protection of copies to the regulation of the press. The terms are not
new as regards the development of intellectual property in Europe. Defoe found
grounds for his argument from the well-known justification whereby grants of
monopoly rights to inventors increase national welfare and induce further inventive
efforts. Therefore, the state has a duty to intervene, all the more so since the state's
own interests are at stake. Interestingly, Defoe, in raising the point that authors ought
to be protected, argued that they should be able to act on piracies. He concluded:
"The Law we are upon, effectually suppresses this most villainous Practice, for every
Author being oblig'd to set his Name to the Book he writes, has, by this Law, an
undoubted exclusive Right to the Property of it. The Clause in the Law is a Patent to
the Author, and settles the Propriety of the Work wholly in himself, or in such to
whom he shall assign it: and 'tis reasonable it should be so."60
His line of thinking, it seems to me, advocates nothing more than the continental, and
especially the Venetian philosophy of copyright, whereby authors having economic
interests in their works have an exclusive right to the property of them. Nevertheless
in Britain, Defoe's argument paved the way for a new concept of copyright.
On 11 January 1710 a new ministerial Bill was introduced for first reading.61
The book-trade immediately went into action. Several petitions were sent to
59 "Authors would be known as soon as the Book, because this Law would oblige the Printer or
Bookseller to place the Author's Name in the Title, or himself', "I think in Justice, no Man has a Right
to make any Abridgement of a Book, but the Proprietor of the Book; and I am sure no Man can be so
well qualified for the doing it. as the Author, if alive, because no Man can be capable of knowing the
true Sense of the Design, or of giving ot a due him that compos'd it", [Defoe, 1704],at 18 & 20.
60 ibid, at 21.
61 Commons Jounal XV, at 313.
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Parliament with recurrent and identical arguments, although with important variations
of emphasis.62 Petitions were presented by all the leading members of the trade, copy-
owners, booksellers and apprentices, who had tried over ten years to protect their
separate interests. The trade started emphasising Defoe's arguments that literary
protection should be beneficial to authors as well as to the book-trade as a whole.
Two main themes were advocated: a "Bill for Encouraging Learning" and "for
Securing copies of books to the rightful owners".63 In doing so they intended to give
pre-eminence to the protection of authors without undermining their own position, in
other words, to protect their former patents in classes of books. Professor Benjamin
Kaplan, in his famous James Carpentier Lecture in 1966, observed with much truth:
"There is an apparent tracing of rights to an ultimate source in the fact of authorship,
but before attaching large importance to this we have to note that if printing as a
trade was not to be put back into the hands of a few as a subject of monopoly - if the
statute was indeed to be a kind of "universal patent"- a draftsman would naturally be
led to express himself in terms of rights in books and hence its initial rights in
authors. [...] I think it nearer to say that publishers saw the tactical advantage of
putting forward authors' interests together with their own, and this tactic produced
some effect on the tone of the statute".64
For instance, among the various minor amendments accepted, two significant ones
reveal the true intent. In the original draft, the Bill placed a far greater emphasis on
authors' rights. Books were authors' "undoubted Property" which concerned "all
civilized Nations" where an author could "reserve to himself" some or all the rights
attributed by the bill.65 In the final draft of the Bill such generous terms vanished. The
trade could not afford to give away such wide generous rights to authors. Its wealth
62 [Feather, 1980], at 34.
63 "The Booksellers' Humble address to the honourable House of Commons, in behalf of the Bill
for Encouraging Learning" (11 January 1710), Bodleian Library, John Johnson Collection, cited in
[Feather, 1980], at 34.
64 [Kaplan, 1967], at 8.
65 Commons Journal XVI, Preamble and third paragraph, at 260-61 & 339.
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depended entirely upon the securement of its exclusive ownership on copies. Also,
one petition established clearly the matter as The case of the booksellers' rights to
their copies, or sole power ofprinting their respective books.66 Furthermore, it may be
argued that the distinction established in the Act between old and new books was
intended to impose some "ingredient of fresh authorship and not to be merely a
reissue" in order to protect old entries of the Company's Register against
competition.67
The 1710 Copyright Act attempted to solve three issues: the question of
imported books, the question of piracy, and the question of copyright.68 The Act
created a new kind of property, formerly unknown to English law: literary property.
The Act was the first statute in Britain to recognise the legal existence of an exclusive
right to print a manuscript, for a determined period of time, and where the original
copy is a piece of property which ipso facto has an owner.69 I wish to focus attention
on the similarity which can be drawn between the Venetian law of copyright and
Queen Anne's Act. The Republic of Venice had already regulated copyright along
these lines by a special law in 1517 which confirmed the new patent system, and
especially copyrights, so that grants of privileges in a book provided an exclusive
right limited to newly printed and not newly written works. Copyright was based upon
the economic merit of the work and not on censorship features. Furthermore, in 1545
consent of authors was required in order for anyone to secure copyright. Both acts
66 British Library, 1883.b.58(3.), cited in [Feather, 1980], at 35.
67 [Kaplan, 1967], at 9.
68 8 Anne c.21
69 John Feather, The English Book Trade and the Law 1695-1799, 12 Publishing History 1982. at
56 & 67, Hereafter: [Feather, 1982]
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reflected the concern of European states in balancing public and private interests. As
such, problems of interpretation emerged from Queen Anne's Act due to its relative
vagueness and new approach towards the dissemination of information. It should also
be stressed that the traditional practices of the trade had a major influence on its first
application. During the eighteenth century, the Act would be challenged and a precise
interpretation of its content would be given to establish "the foundation of copyright
as we know it. It established the author's right to his own property".70 It is then of
importance to understand what this Act truly means.
The preamble explains in detail the need for a statute. Unauthorised copies
were ruining the business of established printers, so a statutory protection was
required "For Preventing therefore such Practices for the Future". A restricted
copyright monopoly was, however, created "for the Encouragement of Learned Men
to Compose and Write useful Books". The focus of the Act shifted from the printer to
the author, although it was not unambiguous. As the creator and originator of works,
the author became the source of the right of copy. The copyright was then the reward
for his creative contribution to society. Therefore, the intended results of such
protection would benefit the author as well as the public. Thereafter, the provisions of
the Act fall into three parts. First, from April 10, 1710, all existing books were
copyrighted to their present owner for twenty-one years, while all new books were
protected for fourteen years from the date of publication with the possibility of a
second fourteen-year term if the author was still alive. All books had to be recorded in
the "Register-Book of the Company of Stationers" in order to claim protection or
70 Victor Bonham-Carter, Authors by Profession, Vol. 1 (London, 1978), at 16.
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ownership under the Act. Penalties were prescribed for any breaches of the law.
Second, from March 25, 1710, a price control on books was established and anyone
might complain about "High or Unreasonable" prices.71 And third, after April 10,
1710, one copy of every new book had to be deposited in the nine copyright
depository libraries. Penalties were prescribed here too.
The limited duration of protection introduced for the first time in England the
concept of public domain, since no more protection could be sought. It could be
argued, however, that the book-trade recognised implicitly that protection at common
law was insufficiently protective as the preamble of the Act mentions that without
copyright the trade would be at its "Detriment" and "Ruin". Another vital issue was
limited copyright protection. Booksellers strarted pressing claims that copyright was
perpetual. With the printing monopolies a copyright was clearly a piece of property
whose owner had total control but was subject to temporal limitation. The book trade
claimed that such temporality could not exist in law, and that, while there was a
temporal limitation on specific statutory penalties for infringements of the property,
there could be no such limitations on the property itself. Stationers acted as if they
believed in the existence of perpetual copyright. The confusion over the term of
copyright was helped by the long time unchallenged practice of the Company to
consider exclusive royal grants or privileges to print as proof of ownership, which
implied that all acts of printing were the prerogative of the king, and that the crown
transferred its perpetual ownership of printed publications. Also, nothing was said on
the Act about what happened to copies after losing their term of protection. Was the
71 This clause was repealed in 1739, 12 George II, c. 36.
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copy in public domain? However, some booksellers pressed a claim that copyrights
were perpetual in common law.
The Act was no more than a statutory recognition of the economic rights of the
author where books could be registered in the Stationers' Company Register.
Problems of interpretation arose concerning the ownership of entries. The trade did
not interpret the Act this way at all. Authors were recognised as the source of the
right, but it was vested into the hands of the stationers ultimately. Booksellers raised
the spectre of common law copyrights which was to be solved finally in 1774. They
claimed that under common law any man who purchases a property enjoys it for ever,
whether the property is an estate or a copyright. In 1695, the concept of ownership of
copies existed in law only as part of the general ownership of real property, and the
idea of intellectual property was unknown to English law.72 Confusion was legitimate
since patents provided the model for the exclusive right to print and the licensing
register the evidence for ownership. Nonetheless, all rules developed in the period
preceding the Act evolved from the orders and decisions of the Court of Assistants of
the Company.73 Also, far from helping, the Act did not define literary property as
such. The Act may have encouraged learning, but it is impossible to quantify such an
affirmation. It certainly introduced a new way of protection and of looking at
intellectual creations, allowing the establishment of a statute based on a recognition of
72 Patents and copyrights came to be classed as choses in action. The conception of a chose in
action was extended from a right to bring an action to the documents which were the necessary
evidence of such right. Patents or printing privileges depended upon royal grant and analogy to the
franchise was made, [Holdsworth, 1937], Vol. 7, at 528-30.
73 Cyprian Bladgden, The Stationers' Company. A History 1403-1959 (London, I960), at 45
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economic rights of an author in his creations. The statute could be seen as a basis for
civil suits in defence of certain property with penalties attached.
In practice the trade interpreted the new Act literally. A copy entered in the
Register was the property of the entrant. Anyone who would print without the
permission of the owner was breaking the law. Since no definition of "literary
property" was provided and the Act said nothing about what happen at the end of the
terms of protection, it needed some clarification from the courts. The Court of
Chancery simply continued to apply the common law of property to such cases
reinforced by the statute's provisions in the light of the traditional trade practices.74
However, only a few stationers claimed such remedies. The usual practice was for the
copy-owner to seek an injunction to prevent the printing or publication of pirated
copies. Therefore, it was the literary property of the publishers and not of the authors
that the Act was protecting according to the trade.
Once the protection of the pre-1710 copyrighted books ended in 1731-32,
problems of ownership appeared. Copy-owners asked instantaneously for a new Act.
Parliament found instead that the problem was the import of English language
piracies, notably from Ireland. In 1739 Parliament passed an Act to forbid import of
such books. The end of the first set of 28 years of copyright protection arrived in
1738. The book trade in Scotland had been growing significantly, since the North of
England was not well supplied in books by the London publishers. As a result, the
Scottish as well as the Irish publishers found an open market in the North. The trade
of pirated books simply met the demand. Since the 1707 Act of Union, Scotland was
74 John Feather, The Publishers and the Pirates. British Copyright Law and Practice 1710-1775,
22 Publishing History 1987, at 6, Hereafter: [Feather, 1987]
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not legally considered as importing English language books unlike Ireland which
would not be in the Union until the Act of 1800. In practice, it was difficult for the
English printers to inhibit the trade of pirated books. Suits were brought in Scottish
and English courts on the expired copyrights.
Challenging The Act
Stationers had protected copyright-privileges in such a way that they had come to be
in substance a right of property. With the last printing acts sufficient powers were
given to them to protect their ownership in stocks and challenge infringers.75
Moreover, since ownership of works had depended for so long upon patent-privileges
and had been protected by the penalties provided in subsequent licensing acts, the
withdrawal of these privileges and the abolition of these penalties left the legal
position very obscure. Stationers argued that copyright existed at common law.
Nevertheless, their right was based not only upon the licensing Acts, and their
remedies, but also originated from royal patents giving exclusive rights to print and
copyright-privileges gained by registration. In effect, copyrights were protected solely
by the Court of Assistants or prerogative courts, the Star Chamber or the Privy
Council. Plaintiffs for infringement had recourse to these remedies and not to
common law ones. In fact a copyright-privilege was, I venture to say, not believed by
stationers to be so much a right of property recognised at common law but simply a
monopolistic right depending upon royal grants and exercised by officers of the
Company to prevent piracies and preserve their family-settlements. In effect this
75 14 Charles II. c.33 Par. 5, recognises that copyright is gained either by virtue of royal patent or
by registration with the Stationers' Company.
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instrumentalist perception of copyright influenced subsequent interpretations of the
Copyright Act until the House of Lords rejected it in 1774.
The fundamental question was whether copyright as a form of literary
ownership existed before the 1710 Copyright Act and how it was protected. First the
use of the terms "common law" and "copyright" should be clarified. On the one hand,
the term "common law copyright" refers to a right at common law that would grant
the artist or creator the exclusive right to make, distribute and sell copies of his work,
regardless of any statutory protection.76 Therefore, protection is afforded to creators
during the period of creation and after creation but before the economic exploitation
of the work.77 It is sometime called the right of first publication. Consequently, the act
of publication would terminate the common law copyright for authors. According to
printers and booksellers, no such right existed; on the contrary common law copyright
was a perpetual property right. On the other hand, the expression "the common law of
copyright" is a right established by decisional law or statute and vested in authors,
preventing any unauthorised publication of unpublished work.78 Once the work has
been published it loses its protection and passes in to the public domain unless it
receives a statutory protection for a limited period of time. Therefore, copyright
protection comes to protect what has been publicly disclosed. As a result, the question
which was put with much clarity by Professor Kaplan is:
"Did the copyright in published works cease at the expiration of the limited periods
specified in the statute, or was there a non-statutory, common-law copyright of
76 Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation ofAmerican Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth
ofCommon Law Copyright, 29 Wavne Law Review 1983, at 1130. Hereafter: [Abrams. 1983]
77 James M. Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's "MoraI Right", 16 The American
Journal of Comparative Law 1968, at 488.
78 [Abrams, 1983], at 1130.
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perpetual duration, with the statute merely furnishing accumulative special remedies
during the limited periods?"79
This traditional formulation refers to the nature and philosophy of the copyright
system as it had been defended by the trade. Nonetheless, this question tends to look
at the act solely in the light of the instrumentalist perception. This brings us to another
question of whether the Act directly recognised authors as the source of literary
property, as a property rather than a statutory privilege.
"The great question on literary property" is of theoretical and practical
significance.80 Arguments viewing copyright as a common law right uphold the
author's rights and look at the users as having limited access to the private property of
the author. On the other hand, arguments viewing copyright as a statutory protection
support a limited copyright monopoly for the author, ensuring access to the public of
literary work. It should be stressed that in the interval between the expiration of the
Licensing Act of 1679 and its revival by the 1685 Act, the case Ponder v. Bradyl had
already presented the issue of common law property.81 Nathaniel Ponder had entered
first on the Book-Register John Bunyan's book The Pilgrim's Progress on 22
December 1677, and it had been licensed by Roger L'Estrange on 18 February 1678.
With the expiration of the Licensing Act, Ponder lost his statutory protection and
brought an action on the case. Unfortunately the case was aborted, although it would
had been a test for the theory of common copyright law.82 The issue was finally raised
79 [Kaplan, 1967], at 12.
80 Donaldson v. Becket (H.L. 1774), 17 Parliament History of England at 953
81 Harrisson, Nathaniel Ponder: The Publisher of the Pilgrims Progress, 15 The Library 1934, at
257.
82 "an action on the case brought for printing the Pilgrims' Progress; ofwhich the plaintiff was and
is the true proprietor; whereby he lost the profit and benefit of his copy. But I don't find, that this action
was ever proceeded in.", Justice Willes's opinion refering to Ponder v. Raddyl in Millar v. Taylor, 4
Burr, at 23 17, 98 Eng. Rep, at 209 (K.B. 1769).
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when the first terms of copyright for old books expired in 1731. It should be noticed
that, curiously, the following cases were to he inconclusive. In Tonsori v Walker the
plaintiff sought an injunction restraining the defendant from publishing an edition of
John Milton's poems which were first published before the Statute of Anne in 1710,
on the grounds that the statutory protection of twenty-one years had expired.83 Lord
Mansfield stated during the hearing on the injunction that:
"[i]f this case comes to be heard, I shall be inclined to send a case to the judges, that
the point of law [common law copyright] may finally be settled, for I do not know
that it has been judicially determined".84
Another case, Tonson v. Collins. involving new books, tried to establish a precedent
affirming the existence of common law copyright.85 Incidentally, the judges suspected
that the action was brought by collusion. Finding some clear evidence "that the whole
was a collusion, and that the defendant was nominally only, and the whole expense
paid by the plaintiff, they refused to proceed any further with the case.86 Not all the
cases were inconclusive. In July 1765, two cases involving the Scottish bookseller
Alexander Donaldson raised the question whether there was any basis for the
exclusive right to print a work other than the parliamentary statute. In Osborne v.
Donaldson and Millar v. Donaldson the plaintiffs obtained injunctions prohibiting
Donaldson from "printing and vending certain publications".87 The latter argued that
the term of protection had expired, so such copies were not protected by statute. The
Lord Chancellor dissolved the injunctions, however, stating that "it was a new
83 Tonson v. Walker, referred to at 4 Burr. 2325, 98 Eng. Rep. 213 (Ch. 1739); Tonson v. Walker,
3 Swans. 672, 36 Eng. Rep. 1017 (Ch. 1752)
84 Tonsonv. Walker, 3 Swans. 671. 36 Eng. Rep. 1019(Ch. 1752).
85 Tonson v. Collins, 1 Black. W. 301, 96 Eng. Rep. 169 (K.B. 1761)
86 Justice Willes in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr, at 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769)
87 Osborne v. Donaldson, 2 Eden at 328, 28 Eng. Rep. 924 (1765).
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question" and "that it was a point of so much difficulty and consequence, that he
should not determine it at the hearing, but should send it to law for the opinion of the
judges".88 The legal situation of published manuscripts was only to be settled in 1774
by the House of Lords.
As opposed to the question of literary property in published books, the
question of literary property in unpublished manuscripts was recognised with no
difficulty in common law courts. In 1741, the defendant was enjoined in Pope v. Curl
from publishing a book containing unpublished letters written by the plaintiff. The
ruling established that the recipient of letters owned only the paper on which the letter
was written, but not the right to publish the letters.89 In July 1758, the defendant was
forbidden in Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare from printing a previously
unpublished manuscript of the Earl of Clarendon's "History of the Reign of Charles
the Second to the year 1667". The Lord Keeper held that giving a copy of an
unpublished manuscript to another did not create a presumption that the recipient had
a right to print and publish the manuscript.90 Moreover, in Macklin v. Richardson the
defendant was enjoined from printing the plaintiffs play Love A-la-mode when the
court held that the public performance of the play did not constitute publication.91
Courts recognised clearly that authors had perpetual property in an unpublished work
independent of the statute. The decisions in effect corroborated the statutory provision
in published books. Unpublished manuscripts were to be protected by common law
88 Ibid.
89 Popes v. Curl, 2 Atk. at 342, 26 Ensi. Rep. 608 (Cli. 1741).
90 Duke ofQueensberry v. Shebbeare, 2 Eden, at 329, 28 Eng. Rep. 925 (Ch. 1758).
91 Macklin v. Richardson, 27 Eng. Rep. 451 (Ch. 1770).
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copyright and not by statutory copyright. In 1769 Justice Yates in Millar v. Taylor
reasserted:
"It was therefore alleged, "that a literary composition is certainly in the sole
dominion of the author, till he thinks proper to publish it:" for, no man can lawfully
take it from him to publish against his will."92
Moreover, he added that the theory of first publication was the starting point of
statutory protection.93 Nonetheless, this idea of common law property vested in
authors is interpreted solely as a mere right of action, "a right of bringing an action
against those that print the author's work without his consent."94 Important
considerations were to be drawn from this line of thinking in the case of Millar v.
Taylor.
Another important step towards the recognition of literary property in authors
was the a gradual erosion of the supremacy of the royal patents. The courts and
Parliament became concerned with finding a special interest in the Crown to justify
the royal prerogatives. Here, I am concerned with prerogative property which stands
on different principles from that of authors. In theory, royal prerogatives were not
assigned by the monarch himself but by the kingly office.95 The king embodies a
corporation which is said never to die. Therefore, the king could own property in his
politic capacity separately from his private capacity. Following this reasoning, the
sole right of printing and of what are called prerogative-copies was to be challenged in
courts and by Parliament. It was then established that the king has no property in the
art of printing.96 On the one hand, the right of the crown to print is founded on
1,2 Justice Yates in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr, at 2356, 98 Ena. Rep. 230 (K.B. 1769)
93 ibid, at 242-43
94 ibid, at 245
95 [Holdsworth, 1937], Vol. 9, at 4
96 Basket v. The University ofCambridge, 1 Black W. 106-122. 96 Eng. Rep 59-67 tK.B. 1758).
94
religious and stately reasons. Accordingly, in the cases which had been determined in
favour of the royal patentees, the courts went upon the letters patent. In 1666, for
instance, the House of Lords in the Atkins case affirmed a decree in Chancery
prohibiting all members of the Company of Stationers from printing law books
without Colonel Atkins authorisation in the right of his wife, daughter of John More
who was granted by James I with the exclusive right to print law books.97 Similarly,
prerogatives in printing psalms, psalters, almanacs were attributed to the crown since
the king has ecclesiastical jurisdiction.98 As for law books, it was argued, and
rationalised by proponents of common law copyright, that the king paying the salaries
of judges had a special interest in the reporting of law.99 Also, it was of concern for
the crown to preserve good understanding between king and people. It should be clear
that the king had no private interests or private property in prerogative-copies. For
instance, the king himself do not pay salaries personally but rather the crown itself
does, as a public charge. On the other hand, there are cases which relegate claims of
copyright made by printers based on the purchase from an author of copies which
have a lesser status than a letters patent. The fundamental issue is whether literary
property is to be a right recognised in an author by common law as a natural right
flowing from the act of creation, labour or composition or any other circumstances
attending the case of authors or established by statute. In Roper v. Streater, for
instance, the plaintiff had purchased the third part of Justice Crook's reports from
97 The Stationers v. the Patentees about the Printing ofRolPs Abridgment, Cart. 89, 124 Eng. Rep.
842 (H.L. 1666)
98 The Company of Stationers v Lee and Others, 2 Shower at 258, The Stationers Company v.
Partridge and The Stationers Company v. Seymour.
99 The Stationers v. The Patentees about the Printing of Rolls' Abridgment, Carter 91, 124 Eng.
Rep. 843, alluded to by Justice Willes, in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr, at 2316, 98 Eng. Rep. 208 (K.B
1769).
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Crook's executor, which Streater published under the authority of a royal patent for
the printing of law books.100 Roper brought an action of debt upon the Licensing Act.
The court adjucated for the plaintiff but was later on reversed in Parliament. Despite
the reversal, it seems to me that the fact that Roper purchased the copy from the
author's executor shows that even judges were recognised some sort property in their
work. Added to that, the reversal was argued upon the opinion that laws pronounced
by judges are king's laws. However, 1 venture to say that it is questionable that the
crown had any interest in Justice Crook's reports even if it paid his salaries. In my
opinion, the gradual erosion of the force of royal patents was a questioning of the role
of the Crown in English law rather than a rising theory of author's right. Recognition
of literary property vested in authors was to be established only after the conclusion of
the case Donaldson v. Beckel in 1774. Incidentally, the force of the royal patents
seemed to have disappeared to almost a point of non-existence after the Lords'
decision.
The Question of Literary Property
The question concerning literary property received its first determination in Millar v.
Taylor in 1769.101 Andrew Millar brought a case over the epic poem, The Seasons, by
James Thomson, from whom Millar bought the rights in 1729. The statutory
protection ended in 1758, and Robert Taylor produced some reprints of the poem in
May 1763. The plaintiff advocated that there was a common law property right vested
100 Case unreported but it is discussed in The Stationers v. Patentees about the Printing of Roll's
Abridgment, Carter at 89, 90 Eng. Rep. 842 (Common Pleas 1666) and Company Stationers v. Parker,
Skin. 233-234, 90 Eng. Rep. 107-08 (K.B. 1685)
101 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr, at 2303-2416, 98 Eng. Rep. 201-266 (K.B. 1769)
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in authors "independent of and not taken away from the statute" of Anne in order to
preempt Taylor from publishing the poem.102 Counsel for the defendant claimed on
the contrary that no right remained in authors at common law. The opinions stated in
this case marked a fundamental transition in legal thought in analysing an author's title
to a copy. Accordingly, the judges covered the topic extensively. Justice Willes
presented the issues as follows:
" 1st. Whether the copy of a book, or literary composition, belongs to the author,
by the common law :
2d. Whether the common law-right of authors to the copies of their own works is
taken away by 8 Ann. c. 19."103
In answering the question, the court held that the owner of the copyright could sue an
infringer because common law recognised a perpetual copyright notwithstanding the
expiration of the statutory copyright term. It was the first time that a court had
confirmed the book-trade's perpetual right interpretation of copyright.
The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Mansfield, arguing in favour of the result and the
source of common law copyright in unpublished manuscripts, declared:
"[...] - because it is just, that an author should reap the pecuniary profits of his own
ingenuity and labour. It is just, that another should not use his name, without his
consent. It is fit, that he should judge when to publish, or whether he ever will
publish. It is fit. he should not only choose the time, but the manner of publication;
how many; what volume; what print. It is fit, he should choose to whose care he will
trust the accuracy and correctness of the impression ; in whose honesty he will
confide, not to foist in additions : with other reasonings of the same effect."104
His argumentation, as well as other Justices', reflects the instrumentalist views of the
book trade whereby authors are suppliers of works to printers who in turn take
immediate control of the work. It is well worth noting the choosing of the words
which reflects printers' concerns. In choosing the time, the manner of publication, the
102 ibid, at 203
103 ibid, at 206
104 Lord Mansfield, ibid, at 252
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number of copies, how many volumes, and deciding what to print, it seems to be more
printers than authors who are making decisions. Furthermore, emphasis is given to
printers who will not "foist in additions: with other reasonings of the same effect",
which could insinuate that authors are only a source of rights which ought to be
perpetual for the printers' interests.105 In other words, authors' rights are reduced to
printing and selling, the ones which characterised the business of printing and selling
books. Lord Mansfield concluded, then, that once published, the Act was no answer to
authors' problems in reaping pecuniary profit from their work. As a result, "it is
agreeable to natural principles, moral justice and fitness, to allow [the author] the
copy, after publication, as well as before."106 Furthermore, Justice Willes, in an
attempt to undermine the negative effects of such perpetual monopoly, argued the
public benefits brought by monopolies. Fie observed "that the plaintiff always had a
sufficient number of these books exposed to sale, at a reasonable price" and that the
common law copyright could not prohibit "bona fide imitations, translations, and
abridgements".107 Therefore, by advancing the rights of the author as their
justification, the book-trade found an appealing disguise which drew attention away
from their monopoly claims. Clearly, this concept of common law copyright weakens
the scope of author's right. In other words, the trade analysed copyright protection as it
was practised before the Statute of Anne. If an author was to be published, the
105 [Abrams, 1983], at 1154.
106 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr, at 2399, 98 Eng. Rep. 253 (K.B. 1769).
107 ibid, at 205
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copyright was almost inevitably to pass into the hands of the stationers without the
least regard to authors and compositions, and even sacrificed the public domain.108
The judges analysed the Act as a measure designed to provide a temporary set
of additional quasi-criminal remedies in support of common law rights. In other
words, the adoption of statutory remedies was, in my opinion, turned into a
recognition of the inadequacy of remedies of a supposed common law copyright.
Justice Aston made the remark:
"This Act was brought in at the solicitation of authors, booksellers and printers, but
principally of the two latter ; not from any doubt or distrust of a just and legal
property in the works or copy-right, [...] but upon the common-law remedy being
inadequate, and the proofs difficult, to ascertain the damage really suffered by the
injurious multiplication of the copies of those books which they had bought and
published"109
As a matter of fact, the trade was facing a difficult situation. Pirated books from
Ireland and Scotland were sold in England, and legal remedies at common law seemed
to be non-existent.110 Lord Mansfield argued that since the king had no authority in
restraining the press, the prerogatives of the crown on printing rested "upon the
foundation of property in the copy in common law".111 Similarly an author ought to
have perpetual property in his copy at common law. Consequently, the Act
independent from common law copyright gave additional security to a proprietor. This
interpretation by the majority of justices can be questioned on the ground that it seems
108 "The lack of personal and literary status in the community at large was manifested in a more
concrete way in the organisation of the mid-century press. The need for substantial backing and the
intervention of the booksellers and politicians pushed the 'author', in whatever capacity, into a clearly
subordinate position", Michael Harris, Journalism as a Pofession or Trade in the Eighteenth Century,
Publishing Pathways Series, in Author/Publisher Relations During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries (Oxford Polytechnic Press, 1983), at 57.
109 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr, at 2350, 98 Eng. Rep. 227 (K.B. 1769); see also Lord Mansfield, ibid,
at 256
110 Before 1710, the normal practice was for the copy-owner to seek an injunction to prevent the
pirate from printing or publishing the work in question, see John [Feather, 1987], at 6.
111 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr, at 2405, 98 Eng. Rep, at 256 (K.B. 1769)
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doubtful that Parliament had adopted an Act solely as a temporary measure to support
a perpetual common copyright which had not been affirmed by any court.
Accordingly, Justice Yates dissented from that majority. He resisted the notion that
property in books existed before the 1710 Copyright Act, springing from the act of
creation. It seemed doubtful to him that Parliament would have provided temporary
protection to support a possible recognised, perpetual common law right. He added
also that "if authors derive their right from common law, [...], the author's right will be
the same, whether it enters it in that [register] book, or not."112 Unfortunately that
issue was not explored. Justice Yates agreed on the perpetual nature of copyright of
authors, or their assignees, but rejected its embodiment at common law. He
formulated the issue as:
"whether, after a voluntary and general publication of an author's work by himself, or
by his authority, the author has a sole and perpetual property in that work ; so as to
give him a right to confine every subsequent publication to himself and his assigns
for ever".113
This formulation of the issue gave it a different focus.
Yates agreed that literary composition belongs to the author and that no man
can lawfully take it from him or compel him to publish against his will. Creation and
labour are the means of acquiring property, and literary compositions are the objects
of the author's sole right of possession until he publishes. From the act of publication,
literary compositions are no longer an exclusive private right. Authors acquire
property from their labour and literary compositions are the fruits of this labour.
Moreover, the composition of the book is capable of the sole right of possession but
112 ibid, at 231
113 ibid, at 229
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not ideas, because "|p]roperty is founded upon occupancy."114 Again, his dissenting
opinion formulates intellectual property upon instrumentalist contentions. From this
line of thinking, common law copyright is argued in terms of a property right in
personam which stems from the act of creation, result of the author's creative process.
As a result literary property starts from the act of publication as a right in rem rather
than from the act of creation. Yates pointed out that the statute of Queen Anne fixed
adequately the commencement of the author's corporeal right from the time of
publication when first entered in the Register, notwithstanding that authors derive
their incorporeal right at common law whether or not they enter their work. As a
result, every man is entitled to the fruit of his own labour.
"he can only be entitled to this according to the fixed constitution of things, and
subject to the general rights of mankind, and the general rules of property. He must
not expect that these fruits shall be eternal ; that he is to monopolize them to eternity
[...]. In that case, the injustice would lie on the side of the monopolist, who would
thus exclude all the rest of mankind from enjoying their natural and social rights."115
Accordingly, statutory provisions fixed the extent of the author's exclusive economic
property to twenty-eight years maximum from publication, while the manuscript still
remained the author's personal property. Yates observed that authors are not victims
of an injustice, since it would be an injustice to establish a perpetual monopoly which
implies limitations on public access to works by publishing, printing or using it.
Therefore, the initial focus was on the act of creation and on what ought to be the
legal consequences of the act. In other words, what the trade was aiming for was a tort
right and not a property right reinforced by statutory provisions independent of
114 ibid, at 230
'>5 ibid, at 231-32
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perpetual common law copyright The second focus concerned the impact of perpetual
protection on the users prevented from having access to ideas.
What 1 am concerned with here is the basis of the rationale of copyright
protection in common law tradition countries. Proponents of broad common law
rights stress the act of creation as the proper starting point for analysis. Advocates for
restricted or pre-empted common law rights look first at the impact of the alleged
copyright on the public. Likewise, concerns shift from the trade to authors and the
public interests as a whole. Even Lord Mansfield recognised this move implicitly:
"The accurate and elaborate investigation of the matter, in this cause, and in the
former case of Tompson and Collins, has confirmed me in what I always inclined to
think, "that the Court of Chancery did right, in giving relief upon the foundation of a
legal property in authors ; independent of the entry, the term for years, and all other
provisions annexed to the security given by the Act." 16
As opposed to Lord Chancellor Northington, in the case Osborne v. Donaldson, he
did not send the question for opinion to the judges but instead decided in favour of the
plaintiff. Incidentally, Taylor appealed to the Lords but curiously decided to terminate
it. On the circumstances of the trial itself, an anonymous editor commented that Millar
first dropped a suit against Donaldson,117 "but began another for the same book with
Taylor, as he no doubt thought him a fitter person to be dealt with in case at any time
compromise should be useful". As regards the dropping of the appeal he concluded:
"[Taylor] at first took out a writ of error against the determination of King's Bench,
but was afterwards prevailed with to compromise matters with the Booksellers: the
reason is obvious, they wanted that no chance should be given for a reversal of this
judgement ; and their arguments with Taylor were so powerful (although a certain
person had offered to be at one half of the expense) that he withdrew his appeal".118
116 ibid, at 257
1,7 Richard S. Tompson, Scottish Judges and the Birth of British Copyright, Juridical Review
1992, at 26, Hereafter: [Tompson, 1992]
118 Speeches Arguments of the Judges of the Court ofKing's Bench ... in the Cause Millar against
Tavlor, Leith 1771, from an anonymous Scottish publisher cited in [Tompson, 1992], at 27
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Richard Tompson reports a supposition that Taylor got an annual pension from that
day. Would it be possible to draw a parallel with Osborne v. Donaldson? Such
circumstantial evidence coupled with the evident desperate attitude of the trade could
make a compromise plausible. Moreover, the collusion in Tonson v. Collins makes me
wonder about the impartiality of the case Millar v. Taylor. Nevertheless, the
booksellers seemed to be in a commanding position. Five years later, however, the
decision was overruled by the decisive case Alexander Donaldson v. Becket and
Others.
As for the story of the case. Alexander Donaldson was already well known for
his campaign against his London rivals in business and their monopoly.119 Bookseller
in Edinburgh, he opened his first bookshop in 1750, edited the Scots Magazine and
launched the Edinburgh Advertiser in 1764.120 In effect, he was the perfect target for
legal action from the London booksellers since he was making a flourishing business
by publishing cheap reprints of books. In 1771 Donaldson had two legal actions
brought concurrently against him. The first one was brought in Edinburgh by a
London bookseller, John Hinton, for the publication and sale of Thomas Stackhouse's
New History of the Holy Bible.121 The second action was brought in London by
Thomas Becket the new copy-owner of Thomson's The Seasons. Becket obtained
from Chancery an injunction on the strength of Millar v. Taylor, which was made
119 Alexander Donaldson, Some Thoughts on the State ofLiterary Property, pamphlet published in
London in 1764, cited in [Tompson, 1992], at 27-28.
120 [Tompson, 1992], at 27; James Boswell, The Decision of the Court of Session, Upon the
Question of Literary Property; in the Cause john Hinton of London, Bookseller, Pursuer; Against
Alexander Donaldson and John Wood, Booksellers in Edinburgh, and James Meurose, Bookseller in
Kilmarnock, Defenders, (1774), Notes Upon the Question of Literary Property (taken from Boswell's
Life ofJohnson), 1925, National Library of Scotland, listed X.175.C., Hereafter: [Boswell, 1774]
121 Morison, ed., The Decisions ofthe Court ofSession, Vol. 19 & 20, (1811), at 8307
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permanent in 1772 by Lord Chancellor Bathurst. Donaldson appealed against the
latter to the House of Lords. The Lords received his petition in December 1772; the
hearing was set for January 1774. The hearing began on 4th February where the Lords
issued writs of assistance, requesting the judges of the King's Bench, the Common
Pleas and the Exchequer to give their opinions on five questions pertinent to the case
and formulated by the House of Lords. Following these opinions, the Lords debated
and voted against the existence of copyright at common law in published materials,
thus denying Thomas Becket's claim. This case has been commonly interpreted as
holding that copyright was recognised by common law but was pre-empted by the
Statute of Anne. On the contrary, the Lords clearly decided that copyright had never
existed at common law.122 Confusion between the opinions of the judges and the
decision of the Lords is at the core of the misinterpretation of the opinions expressed
by them. At the time, by parliamentary procedures it was a contempt punishable by
imprisonment to publish any statements made by a member of Parliament in the
course of its business.123 This explains why official reports on the case omitted
statements made by the Lords, and state only that the House of Lords overturned the
injunction. Fortunately, three anonymous reports including the debates help us to
establish the argumentation in the Lords since the judicial opinions are merely
advisory.124 These debates represent the opinions of the House of Lords, which is the
tribunal which decided the case.
122 4 Burr, at 2408, 98 Eng. Rep, at 257 (H.L. 1774).
123 [Holdsworth, 1937], Vol. 10, at 610-11.
124 The Case of the Appellants and Respondents in the Cause of Literary Property, before the
House ofLords: wherein The Decree ofLord Chancellor Apsley was reversed, 26 Feb. 1774, attributed
to a "Gentleman of the Inner Temple", listed as cataloged at the British Museun under classification No
515. f. 16(2); another report. The Pleading of the Counsel before the House ofLords, in the great Cause
concerning Literary Property; together with the Opinions of the Learned Judges, on the Common Law
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For my part it is important to realise that the Scottish courts played a decisive
role in the development of British copyright law.125 The Court of Session began in
1746 to receive complaints from London booksellers against a number of booksellers
from Edinburgh and Glasgow who were selling reprints in England.126 Their
complaints argued that the reprints were sold in England in violation of the 1739 Act
"prohibiting the importation of books reprinted abroad" which were in English.127 The
term "abroad" definitely included Holland, Ireland and the Colonies but it remained
unclear whether or not importation of books from Scotland violated the Act. It should
be stressed that the Act clearly referred to Scottish courts has having jurisdiction to
hear proceedings against alien importers.128 Finally, in December 1747 the Court of
Session concluded that no further action should be engaged against Scottish
booksellers. Unsatisfied with the decision, the London booksellers appealed to the
House of Lords who sent the matter back to the Court of Session unable to give an
opinion on the case in 1751.129 The Scottish Lords clearly rejected the London
booksellers' claims. Lord Kennet was "of opinion that Literary Property is not in the
law of Scotland. It is not in the law of nature, which is one great fountain of our
Copy right ofAuthors and Booksellers, in [Holdsworth, 1937], Vol. 10, at 572-73; A third report can
be found in 17 Parliamentary History of England 953 (H.L. 1774)
125 Morison, ed., The Decisions ofthe Court ofSession, Vol 19 & 20, (1811), at 3295.
126 [Tompson, 1992], at 19.
127 The Copyright Act of 1710 implied only that it was illegal to import any English-
language books into England and Wales. The 1739 Act, 12 George II c. 36, forbade explicitely the
import into England and Wales of any reprints of a book first written, composed printed, or reprinted
there, unless it had not been printed in England and Wales for twenty years before the date of the
imported reprint. The Act lapsed in 1747 and therefore was not applicable to Scotland but the 1710 Act
was still applied in relation to books printed outside Great Britain. However, the legal situation
remained obscure, [Feather, 1982], at 57.
128 Midwinter v. Hamilton 1748 & Millar v. Kincaid 1748, actually the same case, Morison's, The
Decision ofthe Court ofSession, Vol. 19 & 20 (1811), at 3295-8307; [Feather, 1987], at 17.
129 Paton's Appeal Cases, Reports of Cases decided in the House of Lords upon Appeal from
Scotland, T&T Clark, ed.,(l 849), at 488-492.
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law".130 Once again judges could not justify any principles of natural justice which
could justify perpetual literary property at common law. The London bookseller found
themselves out of recourse and unwillingly ended their campaign on Scottish ground.
Furthermore, on 28 July 1773 the Court of Session concluded a case brought by John
Hinton brought against Alexander Donaldson over the question of literary property.
The Court unanimously decided that the judgment had to rest on Scottish law. They
held that Scotland had no common law right of literary property, whereas English law
rested upon Millar v. Taylor, which they claimed not to understand.131 Lord Hailes
decisively observed:
"Of this right there is not a vestige in the law of Scotland. From Lord Stair down to
Forbes, all our authors are silent concerning it. From Lord Stair down to Forbes, all
our authors have acted as if there had been no such right "132
Furthermore, the Lords concluded that the Act of 1710 did not create a property, but a
limited monopoly.133 Within seven months their conclusions were to be adopted by
the Flouse of Lords.
Not only did the Court of Session object to the claims of the London
booksellers but also a young advocate, John MacLaurin. In a thoroughly documented
legal essay, he reviewed all the relevant litigation to conclude that there was no legal
130 Lord Kennet reported in [Boswell, 1774], at I, and "These gentlemen, the London booksellers,
who have obtained so many patents, and even the act of Queen Anne; -though they call printers who
interfere with them pirates, (a cruel name), never pretend that they can hinder written copies to be
taken. The law, then, is directed only against printing, and is no restraint from writing; though we all
know, that, before the art of printing there was no other method of spreading books. It was then a great
trade. It may be so again; and the London booksellers would have no remedy. This is a clear proof, that
the restraint was introduced after printing began, and that it is no way founded on common law, but on
grants; for if it were founded on common law, it would reach against manuscript copies, as well as
printed one's : and this to me is demonstration, that these is no common law property in authors" Lord
Auchinleck, at 4.
131 [Tompson, 1992], at 30; Hailes, Decisions of the Lords ofCouncil and Session from 1766 to
1791, Vol. 1 (M.P Brown, 1826), at 536, Hereafter: [Hailes. 18261
132 [Hailes, 1826], at 538.
133 [Boswell, 1774]
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foundation for common law copyright. Insisting upon the statutory foundation of
literary property, he argued:
"Supposing Authors to have had a Right of Property antecedent to the Act, yet it
cannot be disputed, that the Legislature could annihilate it altogether, or new-model
and abridge it at Pleasure. The Legislature has, in the most explicit Terms, declared
that Authors, and Purchasers from them, shall have the sole Right of printing their
Books for a certain Term of Years, and no longer1,134
Turning his analysis to the attitude of the London booksellers towards the printing
practices in Ireland, he critically pointed out:
"But it is remarkable, that they have never once attempted to call the Booksellers of
Ireland to account, though they have suffered most by them; which seems to indicate,
that they themselves have no Faith in this new Doctrine, of a Right at common Law,
which must have suppoited them equally in Ireland as in Britain, though the Statute
ofQueen Anne could not reach that Country".135
The fact of the matter was that London booksellers had started publishing their own
editions in Ireland in order to compete directly with the pirated editions of their books
printed in Ireland. He remarked that if common law copyright existed in England it
should have existed in Ireland as well. As a result he deduced that obviously they did
not claim such common law copyright simply because they could not. Concluding his
argumentation, he insisted upon the evils of perpetual monopolies in books:
"Lastly, The perpetuating the Monopoly of Books, must inevitably enhance their
Prices beyond all Bounds, the infallible Consequence of which is to retard, and
indeed stop altogether the Progress of Learning. This has been complained of as the
Consequence of Patents and Privileges, from their first Introduction; and that these is
as much Reason, if not more, for exclaiming against that Abuse at present, than
formely. must be felt by every Man. who is desirous of having a tolerable Library of
Books, and is not possessed of a most opulent Fortune".136
134 John MacLaurin (Lord Dreghorn),Considerations on the Nature and Origin of Literary
Property, subtitled Wherein that species ofproperty is clearly proved to subsist no longer than for the
terms fixed by the statute 8vo Annoe, 1767, National Library of Scotland, listed 2.5(2),at 32, Flereafter:
[MacLaurin, 1767]
135 [MacLaurin, 1767], at 13.
136 ibid, at 34.
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Surely, MacLaurin's conclusions along with the publication in London of James
Boswell's The Decision of the Court ofSession, a few days before the Lords debated
Donaldson's case, advanced the position against the common law literary property .
At first, the House of Lords heard counsel for four days and then submitted a
set of five questions to the High Court judges. The five questions were:
" 1. Whether, at common law, an author of any book or literary composition, had
the sole right of first printing and publishing the same for sale ; and might bring
action against any person who printed published and sold the same without his
consent?
2. If the author had such right originally, did the law take it away, upon his
printing and publishing such book or literary composition : and might any person
afterward reprint or sell, for his own benefit, such book or literary composition,
against the will of the author?
3. If such action would have lain at common law, is it taken away by the statute
of 8th Anne? And is an author, by the said statute precluded from every remedy,
except on the foundation of the said statute, and on the terms and conditions
prescribed thereby?
[4.] Whether the author of any literary composition and his assigns, had the sole right
of printing and publishing the same in perpetuity, by the common law?
[5.] Whether this right is any was impeached, restrained, or taken away, by the
statute of 8th Anne.?"137
In order to clear the ground, some comments have to be made on the semantic
formulation of the questions. Incidentally, it would have been inconsistent to answer
the five questions by yes or no.138 What the Lords asked about essentially was
whether or not common law copyright existed in unpublished and published
manuscripts in the absence of statutory protection, and in published manuscripts under
statutory protection. Hypothetically, a judge who would have denied the existence of
common law copyright in all circumstances should logically answer the five questions
respectively, no. yes, yes, no, and yes. Consequently not only had judges to have a
good understanding of the questions, but also the second and fourth question were
137 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr, at 2408; 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774); see also 17 Parliamentary
History of England 970-71 (H.L. 1774).
>38 [Abrams, 1983], at 1157.
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identical but formulated differently as if the Lords wished to check an the consistency
of the answers. The overall question was whether there existed a perpetual common
law copyright after an unauthorised publication of a manuscript. The formulation of
the second question asks whether the act of publication nullifies the common law right
which is presumed to exist in unpublished manuscripts, while the formulation of the
fourth question asks whether such a right exists in published manuscripts.
Consequently, the logical answers to the second and fourth questions should be
opposite.139 These preliminary remarks are intended to point out the apparent
contradictions concerning the answers given by the eleven judges. As a result, the
relevance of the answers on the point of copyright at common law could be
questioned on that basis.
Members of the common law courts debated over the arguments presented by
each contestant before answering the five questions. Thurlow criticised the concept of
property advanced by the booksellers and its application to literary property. He
insisted that their sudden interest in authors' rights was intended only to hide their
more personal interests of protecting their monopolies. In introducing the common
law of property, they could retain perpetual ownership of the copies.140 He insisted
that the Copyright Act was "a new law to give learned men a property which they had
not before", which proved that the common law right had not existed before.141 In
concluding he hoped that the Lords "would likewise [the Scottish Court of Session],
139 ibid, at 1158.
140 "He observed that the Booksellers had not till lately ever concerned tehmselves about authors",
Thursday April 6, 1775, lettre from Johnson to Boswell, Notes Upon the Question of Literary Property,
see [Boswell, 1774]
141 17 Parliamentary History of England 954 (H.L 1774).
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by a decree of a similar nature, rescue the cause of literature and authorship from the
hands of a few monopolising booksellers".142 Sir John Dalrymple added also that the
Lords of the Court of Session voted ten to one against the appellants, therefore
Alexander Donaldson "had a substantial justice on [his] side" and that only England
had such a claim of literary property, while it could not be found in "the laws and
customs of every nation, ancient or modern".143 In defence of the plaintiffs,
Wedderburn attacked their arguments in putting forward the royal patents and licences
attributed to the book-trade and the non-restrictive clauses of the 1710 Copyright Act.
He also refuted the argument that property must be tangible by recalling Millar v.
Taylor, and its judgement in favour of perpetual literary property. Wedderburn
emphasised the time and expense incurred by the trade, drawing the conclusion that
"if such protection should be now withdrawn, many families would lose their whole
estates, and necessarily be involved in ruin".144 Dunning, arguing in support of the
plaintiffs, tried to demonstrate that since authors cease to exercise property right over
their composition under statutory provisions, they are better off with customary rules
where booksellers buy as cheap as they can and authors sell as dear as they can. He
deduced that authors were then well rewarded only because the common law right was
prevailing and established by the determination of the King's Bench in Millar v.
Taylor. Possibly lacking arguments, he concluded sarcastically by comparing the
importation of books by Donaldson to England to the importation of "Scotch cattle" as
142 ibid, at 957
143 ibid
144 Alexander Donaldson, and another v. Thomas Becket and others II Brown 1, 1 Eng. Rep, at
846.
110
an invasion of "the legal purchaser by printing a copy in Scotland, and offering it to
sale in London".145
Finally the judges voted. The judges recognised that authors have a copyright
in an unpublished manuscript and that the right was not lost upon publication but that
it was limited to its term by the statute of Anne following publication. As regards to
the fourth and fifth questions they voted accordingly seven to four in favour of the
existence of perpetual copyright at common law after publication and decided six to
five that the right was preempted by the statute. Consequently, the judges by a narrow
margin upheld the common law right but accepted that it was superseded by the
language and the intent of the statute.
Having heard counsel, the Lords had to decide on the appeal. Lord Camden
argued that nothing supported the existence of common law copyright. His powerful
speech condemned the argument of the stationers:
"The argument attempted to be maintained on the side of the respondents, were
founded on patents, privileges, Star Chamber decrees and the bye laws of the
Stationers Company; all of them the effects of the grossest tyranny and usurpation;
the very last places in which I should have dreamt of finding the least trace of the
common law of this kingdom; and yet, by a variety of subtle reasoning and
metaphysical refinements, have they endeavoured to squeeze out the spirit of the
common law from premises, in which it could not possibly have existence."146
He reminded the members of the House that authors were not permitted to own
copyright on their work, and that the Stationers' Company had the sole right to
print.147 Commenting on the sudden perpetual property claim of the Stationers, he
observed that the Statute of Anne was adopted at the lapse of the licensing acts and
"[djuring the succeeding fourteen years, no action was brought, no injunction
145 17 Parliament History of Enuland 967 ("H.L. 1774)
146 ibid, at 992-1002
147 ibid, at 993
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obtained, although no illegal force prevented it; a strong proof, that at that time there
was no idea of common law claim" ,148 Then he took the issue of whether the common
law should recognise such a right. His attention was focused on the consequences of
monopoly, concluding that perpetuity deserved much reprobation and would have
become intolerable. As Lord Camden observed:
"what a situation would the public be in with regard to literature, if there were no
means of compelling a second impression of a useful work [...] All our learning will
be locked up in the hands of the Tonsons and Lintons of the age, who will set what
price upon it their avarice chuses [sic] to demand, till the public becomes as much
their slaves, as their own hackney compilers are".149
He feared than that printing would find better places in Scotland, the Americas or
Ireland.150 He concluded that the legislature had sealed the question of perpetual right
by establishing terms of protection. Another severe blow against the cause of
perpetual copyright was given by Lord Chancellor Apsley. It was he who issued the
decree against Donaldson; however, at the House of Lords he declared that he had
done so because he was bound by the Millar v. Taylor precedent. However, it ought to
be precised that he was only acting on Chancery on common law right. He then
attacked the relevance of any of the internal records of the Stationers' Company on the
issue of common law rights.151 Lord Lyttelton, in favour of the plaintiff, "urged that
the science of literature, though not tangible, was nevertheless property; and that it
must receive a very sensible shock from the reverse of the decree".152 Other Lords are
reported to have opposed the common law copyright claim and their arguments follow
the lines of Lord Camden's statements. The House finally voted on the issue.
148 ibid, at 994-95.
149 ibid, at 1000
'50 ibid, at 992-1002
151 ibid, at 1001
152 ibid, at 1002
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Thirty two voted, with a majority of twenty one to eleven in favour of the
reversal of the injunction.153 The opinions of the Lords reveals a total rejection of the
notion of common law copyright. Curiously, Lord Mansfield "did not speak a word on
the subject, either as a judge, or a peer, although he had formerly decided in the Court
of King's Bench, for the perpetual monopoly, in the case of Thomson's The Season,
Millar against Taylor".154 This silence may have been pivotal in the final decision
since there may have been a very different vote among the peers. His failure to defend
his decision in Millar v. Taylor may suggest that there was something he did not want
to explain. The strange chronology of the case, the dubious identity of Taylor, the
division within the Court, and finally the dropping of Taylor's appeal to the Lords,
make the case as dubious as the collusive case Tonson v. Collins. An undeniable fact
is that the silence of Mansfield allowed Lord Camden to dominate the final debate and
make a powerful attack on the respondent's case.
In sum, the Scottish courts initiated an irrevocable process by denying
perpetual property to claimants under Scottish law. In England, courts were not really
conclusive until Millar v. Taylor. First, English judges in Millar v. Taylor considered
that copies as a form of property had a perpetual existence. Consequently they did not
recognise the Act in itself and therefore the limited term of protection. Also, they
looked at the Act simply as an additional form of protection. Second, in Becket v.
Donaldson they finally argued that these rights were originating from the author, who
transferred his rights, which are restricted by the Act, to a publisher Therefore, the
153 ibid, at 1003; for comments about the vote see [Abrams, 1983], at 1164-65
154 Edinburgh Advertiser (March 1), cited in Richard S. Tompson, Scottish Judges and the Birth
ofthe British Copyright, Juridical Review 1992, at 36.
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role of the author became central in the analysis of the Act and not the publisher.
Copyright was created by an author. The term of copyright had then to be related to
the author and particularly the author's life time, regardless of what he did with the
copyright. Once the term expired, the ownership of the book vested in the public
domain. Finally the term had been extended by the post mortem principle. The Lords
considered that, on the principles of natural justice, they could not restrict the exercise
of a natural faculty, which is multiplying copies of books. Copies of books have
existed in all ages, and they have been multiplied, but never as an exclusive privilege
for perpetuity or dictated by natural justice. As a result, common law has always
regarded public utility as the mother of justice and equity. Every book consists of two
distinct parts ; the material part and the immaterial part, in other words "the doctrine
contained in it, which is the facture of the mind".155 The property in the material part
is transferred by sale according to law, and the immaterial part remains with the
author. It is therefore concluded:
"Some have stated the property to exist in the profits of the sale, which, as they
assume for the purpose, belong to the original author. But this is only substituting
another, and as it seems, a less proper phrase in the place of the word monopoly,
which, to use the words of Brooke, is property not properly known. The privilege,
however, ofmonopoly, is an interest or estate well known to the law. It only remains
to shew what title the author has to it."156
The title is granted by statutory provisions. Consequently, the Lords undoubtedly
decided that authors had been granted a temporary privilege established by the Statute
of Anne. In sum, the modern law of copyright is a temporary privilege of the sole
right of printing and disposing of copies, vested in the author or his assign.






"A/en of industry or of talents in any way, have a right to the property of their
productions ; and it encourages invention and improvement to secure it to them by
certain laws, as has been practiced in European countries with advantage and success."
- Rev. Samuel S. Smith*
The origins of droit d'auteur and copyright, in France and in the United States of
America respectively, have their roots in the deliberate intervention of political
authorities rather than in the spontaneously evolved European legal tradition.
In French law the concept of droit d'auteur, a literary and artistic right,
involves two elements. The first one, quite similar to its English counterpart, is a
temporary property right, or economic right, over the exploitation of works of the
intellect. Authors are vested with the exclusive right to control the reproduction,
performance, and exhibition of their creation. This right rests on legislation dating
back to the French Revolution. The second element, not the least important one,
encompasses the moral rights, droit moral, a legal expression of the intimate bond
which exists between a literary and artistic work and the personality of its author. This
fundamental element of the French droit de la propriete intellectuelle is intended to
prevent any violation of the literary personality and thought of the author, and thus of
the work itself. As opposed to the economic rights it is not a property right. Unlike the
*
Reverend Samuel Stanhope Smith, letter written in Princeton, Sept. 27, 1782, in Noah Webster,
Collection ofPapers on Political, Literary and Moral Subjects (New York, 1843), at 173-172.
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property right, the moral right had at the outset no basis in any code. It has grown up
little by little out of judicial decisions handed down by French courts and tribunals
since the middle of the nineteenth century .
In this chapter, attention will be given to the rationales upon which French
copyright law is based as well as its American counterpart. It will argue that French
revolutionary legislation was in fact a balanced combination of an instrumentalist
notion of the public good and of the Enlightenment theory of authorship based upon
natural rights. Importance will be given to the development of the concepts of literary
property in works of the intellect during the Ancien Regime and post-revolutionary
period. As Marcel Flenrion admitted:
"our laws of the revolutionary period of which we are justly so proud, are not
altogether a product of a spontaneous generation"1
Then, it will be established that the concept of droit d'auteur evolved from principles,
based upon the premise of natural justice, which affirm the value of a technologically
neutral protective mechanism, in enriching the exchange of ideas and the expression
of information. These principles are the creation of a public domain for the progress of
the enlightenment of society, the recognition of economic rights vested in authors, and
the necessary creation of a monopoly limited in time. Finally, American copyright law
will illustrate the difference between droit d'auteur rationale and the copyright law
instrumentalist rationale, to conclude with the rationales behind the French droits
moral and common law moral rights.
1 Marcel Henrion, Appoint a I'etude des privileges de librairie aux XVF et XVII6 siecles, 6 Revue
International de Droit d'Auteur 1955, at 115, Hereafter: [Henrion, 1955]
116
Concept of Privileged Literary Property wAncienRegime
In France, from the start, initiatives regarding the protection of works of the intellect
had come from public authorities, on the one side, and creators and publishers, on the
other side. As in other European states, regal authorities initiated and developed a
patent system, stemming from prerogative powers, in order to help and control the
expanding book trade. This development responded to the needs of creators as well as
publishers, who were facing an increasingly competitive market. The Ancien Regime
granted privata lex privileges in the form of grants of monopoly conceived for one
specific item to one individual and limited in time. Conceived primarily as industrial
safeguards, printing privileges were designed to compensate investors for the costly
and risky investments represented by printing. Antoine-Louis Seguier reported in
1777 that:
"Competition between editions, by multiplying copies, decreased sales. The most
famous printers were on the verge of being empowered and several, ruined: at the
beginning of the xvith century, one did not dare go into a business requiring
considerable investments. This prior difficulty required a prompt remedy and in
order to safeguard "stationers" from annihilation one was compelled to resort to the
King's authority : one asked the sovereign for permission to print a given work and
prohibition for any other to do so"2
French royal authority, whether exercised by Chancery, the Parlement de Paris,
provincial parliaments, or any other official, granted these commercial concessions as
a grace from the king solely on genuine new publications.3 Works for which it was
sought were examined by the authorities who could refuse for the whole or part of the
proposed publication. Prominent authors and wealthy publishers as well as humble
2 Report given in 1777 by the Avocat General, Antoine-Louis Seguier, cited in Marie-Claude
Dock, Genese et evolution de la notion de propriete litteraire, 1 Revue Internationale du Droit
d'Auteur 1974, at 164, Hereafter: [Dock, 1974]
3 Elizabeth Armstrong, Before Copyright. The French Book-Privilege System, (Cambridge
University Press, 1990), at 22
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writers and librairies sought privileges en librairie. According to the number of grants
attributed, patentees must have been reasonably satisfied with the results since they
were prepared to pay for the cost of securing a privilege. Book privileges did not
originate as such in France; however, the strongly unified Capetian kingdom had a
better chance of providing some effective protection than most other European states
of similar size. As such, Paris, like the city of Venice, became one of the most
important centres in Europe for the trade of books.
The study of early French privileges has allowed scholars to carry out detailed
analysis of the arguments put forward in seeking privileges.4 The Ancien Regime, like
its European neighbours, instituted the concept of literary property based upon the
justifications for patents-monopolies. Authors, printers or publishers alike relied on
similar arguments. Considerations related to public usefulness and public welfare
were relatively common. Not only did this argument reflect the interest of the crown
in advancing knowledge within the realm, but it also corresponded to the necessary
criterion of newness normally imposed on publications. Most of all. pleas considered
the expenditure of time, skills and money involved in producing new books,
expressing the need to recoup the investment before others could be allowed to re¬
print them. Clearly, economic concerns primarily motivated applications for book-
privileges in order to deter pirate publications.5 Authors, as investors in their own
4 ibid, at 79.
5 "With great care, labours and cost, he discovered the true original types of the Pandects... But he
is in doubt lest several printers in our Kingdom and others, as soon as the said books would see the
light of day, wish to imitate the order, correction and presentation of the said printing and to sell and
display such books of their in our Kingdom; ny so doing, the said supplicant would be deprived of the
salary if his labour and of costs he incurres and will, were it not pleasure to provide it for him", Emile
Montagnon, Principes de la legislation des droits d'auteur (Lyon, 1883), at 5, cited in [Dock, 1974], at
172.
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manuscripts, sought privileges to secure temporary monopolies in order to gain
financial benefits from their work. Moreover, the concept of equity, and especially of
natural justice, extended especially to authors since manuscripts originated from their
own labour. The Parliament of Paris, for instance, recognised explicitly in 15 March
1586 the right of Marc-Antoine Muret, a French poet and scholar, to his own
creations, annulling a privilege granted to the publisher Nicolas Nivelle. His advocate
pleaded that:
" [...] the author of a book is full master thereof and as such may dispose of it freely;
even to possess it always under his private hand, as a slave, or emancipate it by
granting it common freedom; and to grant this pure and simple, without keeping back
anything, or with the reservation, after a sort of fatherhood right, that nobody but
himself could print it before some time; which is indeed a contract void of a proper
name and compulsory hither and yon, because it holds its cause equally just on both
sides by one unwilling to give the public what belongs to his private, were not the
public to give him as a reward this prerogative and thus to the contrary."6
Clearly, the plea advances natural justice arguments formulated as "a sort of
fatherhood", which gives Muret the exclusive right to put on the market his works first
and therefore choose who will publish it. It should be stressed, however, that such a
recognition turns into economic motivations justifying grants of privileges.
Further analysis of privileges granted to authors prove that public authorities
were concerned with the relationship between authors, their work and the trade. Take
the case of Rabelais, author of Pantagruel, who obtained, on behalf of the king, a
privilege from the Cardinal of Chatillon in 6 August 1550.7 According to the text of
the privilege, Rabelais was given the right of publishing his works, of putting the
copies in circulation, the right of revision and correction, and even of what could be
considered a moral right, the right of paternity or to prevent false attribution. The
6 ibid, at 174.
7 [Henrion, 1955], at 125.
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privilege implied that all the works of Rabelais in French, Italian and Greek, as well
as past, present, and future, were protected for ten years. As regards moral rights, the
text was intended to reprehend publishers who committed acts against Rabelais's
personality and work. The formulation used clearly sufficed to determine the position
of the granting authority:
"the Printers corrupted, depraved and perverted the said books in several places ;
furthermore they printed several other scandalous books, in the name of the said
suppliants [Rabelais], to his great displeasure, prejudice and ignominy, totally
disavowed by him, as false"8
It should be stressed, nonetheless, that our author was well known for his
controversial publications, and he might well have put forward printers and
publishers^ mistakes to cover up his own mistakes. As a matter of fact, it is reported
that the Faculty of Theology of Paris and the Parliament of Paris wanted to prevent
the publication of volume four of Pantagruel, but the royal privilege superseded the
judges' decisions.9 Another example showed that in 2 February 1611 the king granted
to Thibault Desportes the right to print the works of his late brother, the famous poet
Philippe Desportes. As Marcel Henrion justly remarked "one might be tempted here to
see here an acknowledgement of the hereditary vocation of Thibault on the patrimony
constituted by the literary work of his brother".10 Nevertheless, Thibault was an
influential private secretary and Grand Court Usher of France, who may have simply
received book-privileges on his brother's works as a form of gratitude for his services.
In my opinion, such examples show that privileges are motivated by instrumentalist
justifications establishing temporary monopoloy in a commodity.
8 ibid, at 124.
9 ibid, at 125.
10 ibid, at 130.
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Similarly to England, the French crown developed its own peculiar system
which greatly influenced the concept of intellectual property. For instance, grants of
monopolies became an offshoot of censorship, allowing the crown to exercise its
political control on publications.11 Not only were grants of privileges attributed
following formal applications, but they were also conditioned and validated upon
compliance with certain formalities. Measures such as deposit of copies in the
National Library of Blois, inclusion of the text of the privilege in each printed copy,
and registration of copies with the guild of the publishers were intended to keep a firm
grip on the trade.12 Nonetheless, the French crown, as opposed to its European
counterparts, objected to the authority of the papacy in controlling religious and
political orthodoxy. As early as the Valois dynasty, and especially Francis I, the
crown jealously exercised political and religious censorship. This was confirmed in
1682. when Louis xiv gained the "Four Articles" from the assembly of the clergy,
reasserting pre-eminence of ecumenical councils over the pope and the autonomy of
the French Catholic Church.13
Moreover, Absolutism and Mercantilism, which characterised the exercise of
the monarchy, added to the unique development of intellectual property in France.
The Bourbon dynasty, and especially Louis XIV, personalised the heyday of the
absolute monarchy, with the help of Jean-Baptiste Colbert who elaborated the theory
of Mercantilism. This policy, applied to trade, was intended to produce an excess of
11 Article 78 of the 1566 Ordinance de Moulins, forbade printers to print any work whatever its
content without license from Chancery on pain of strangling or hanging.
12 [Henrion, 1955], at 123.
13 David Parker, The Making ofFrench Absolutism (Ed. E.Arnold, 1983), at 122.
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national exports over national imports in order to reach self-sufficiency.14 To that
effect, the crown indirectly took control of the existing guilds by legislative means, in
order to regulate manufactures and other commerce to realise its policy. Most
importantly, patent-monopolies represented one of the tools which allowed the crown
to secure such control. For instance, the crown regulated public performances of
dramatic works by vesting in the Comedie Franqaise the exclusive right to perform
theatrical works. Moreover, Colbert created a corporate body formed mainly of the
Paris printers' and booksellers' guilds, which received commercial-monopolies. The
patent-monopoly system contained all the basic elements of a traditional European
patent system, such as the examination of utility and commercial success, but omitted
the inventive step leading to the concept of intellectual property.15 As distinct from
Venice, but like England, it was not the inventive aspect of inventions or literary
creations which inherently established property, but the mere administrative grants of
privilege that could be given or refused solely upon the king's grace. The corporate
monopolies were to be strengthened in 1723 with the promulgation of the Code de la
librairie regulating the Parisian publishing world, and extended to the entire nation in
1744.16 This code defined a literary privilege as a legal exclusivity on the commercial
publication of the work granted by the state.
Before the six royal decrees on the book trade in 1777, then, there was no
legal recognition of authorship or of the personal relation of an author to his text. In
14 ibid, at 73-74
15 Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 Journal of the Patent
Office Society 1944, at 721, Hereafter: [Prager, 1944]
16 Jourdan, Decrusy, and Isembert, eds., Rect/eil general des anciennes lois franqaises, Vol. 21
(Paris, 1826), at 216-252.
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practice, authors sold their manuscripts to a bookseller if they could not secure by
themselves a privilege. As a matter of fact, privileges to print and publish made no
legal distinction between dead or living authors, and anonymous or collective works.17
Attribution of copyright privileges was merely a matter of grace founded on equity as
an affirmation of the absolutist divine interpretation of regalian prerogatives. The law
of 30 August 1777, Arret du conseil portant reglement sur la duree des privileges en
librairie. echoed this royal compromise opposing against the notion that privileges
could be a matter of claims or property, equitable principles to justify grants of
privileges. The introductory paragraph of the Arret made clear that:
"His majesty [Louis xvi] has recognised that a privilege for a text is a grace founded
in justice [...] the perfection of the work requires that the publisher be allowed to
enjoy this exclusive claim during the lifetime of the author [...] but to grant a longer
term than this, would be to convert the enjoyment of a grace into a property right,
and perpetuate a favour against the intentions of the title itself which determines its
lenght; it would be a recognition of a monopoly."18
This engrained notion of mercantilism was only overcome in 1789, to the effect that
until then, while inventions or creations are generally useful, they differ from
property, and especially intellectual property, in that they may or may not be protected
by the laws as the state sees fit. Mercantilism and Absolutism had to be broken down
to a large extent, and especially revolutionary measures, in order to free the ground for
17 Carla Hesse. Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws ofAuthorship in Revolutionary France,
1777-1793, 30 Representations 1990, at 112, Hereafter: [Hesse, 1990]
18 "S.M a reconnu que le privilege en librairie est une grace fondee en justice, et qui a pour objet,
si el le est accordee a l'auteur, de recompenser son travail, si elle est obtenue par un libraire. de lui
assurer le remboursement de ses avances et l'indemnite de ses frais: que cette difference dans les motifs
qui determinent les privileges, en doit produire une dans sa duree plus etendue, tandis que le libraire ne
peut se plaindre, si la faveur qu'il obtient est proportionnee au montant de ses avances et a l'importance
de son entreprise: vue la perfection de l'ouvrage exige cependant qu'on en laisse jouir le libraire
pendant la vie de l'auteur avec lequel il a traite; mais qu'accorder un plus long terme, se seroit convertir
une faveur contre la teneur meme du titre qui en fixe la duree; ce seroit consacrer le monopole", in
Jourdan, Decrusy & Isambert, eds., Recueil genera! des anciennes iois franfaises, Vol. 25 (Paris,
1826), at 109.
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the recognition of intellectual property.19 In comparison. Great Britain had embraced
the theory of laissez faire, which gave rise to the Statute of Monopolies curtailing
abusive royal patents and preparing the way for the statute of Queen Anne. As regards
to the 1777 decree, Louis XVI strengthened, with similarity to the Statute of Anne, the
legal position of author in creating two categories of privileges, a privilege d'auteur
distinct from the traditional privilege en librairie. The former granted exclusively to
authors, on a legally grounded favour, a perpetual property right over their creation in
recompense for their labour, unless the title was transferred to a third party. Following
the death of the author, the work fell in to the public domain, in fact the king's
domain, to be enjoyed by any licensed publisher with the permission of the king. By-
contrast, a privilege en librairie was limited to the lifetime of the author and non¬
renewable. The difference of the royal motive governed the differences in the extent
of both privileges. For an author, the privilege of publishing was the price of his work:
for the bookseller it was the security covering his financial advances. The overall aim
was to increase dissemination of ideas in consolidating the power of authors over their
work rather than in publishers. More fundamentally, the legal recognition of authors
expressed a well-defined policy. As Carla Hesse defines it:
"The first aim of the Crown was to individualize knowlege by creating the author as
a privileged site of regulation - in both senses of the term, politically and legally. It
was also the aim of the Crown to deprivatize texts whose authors were dead, to
remove them from the private (property) claims of Publishers' Guilds."20
19 On 5 February 1776, A.J.R. Turgot, Comptroller general of France, under Louis XVI issued an
edict abolishing altogether the guilds in order to emphasise the rights of inventors and creators in their
invention and works. However, it should be noticed that Turgot had exempted the book guild from the
Edict. As regards to the Edict itself, it was revoked on 12 May 1776 along with the dismissal of Turgot,
[Prager, 1944], at 734.
20 [Hesse, 1990], at 113.
124
As a direct consequence, recognition of literary property vested in authors was
established under absolutist principles, and created a perpetuity right in ideas. Also, it
constituted a direct control over the form, content and means of dissemination of
knowledge without any intermediary between the state and authors. Unlike Great
Britain, where Parliament was in effect granting right to authors, the French monarch
kept his prerogative to grant privileges to authors.
The promulgation of the 1777 Arret mirrors ongoing debates of the time on the
origins and nature of literary property. Publications of ancient authors dwindled to
give room to new publishable materials available from living authors, with new ideas
reflecting society's interests. In other words, the professional man of letters came in to
existence. Within the context of the struggle of authors against grants of privileges,
and between the Paris booksellers and their counterparts in the provinces, the
traditional system of royal privileges found opponents. It appeared that the Paris
booksellers had obtained more privileges than the provincial ones. As a result,
difficulties arose in renewing these privileges, and provincial publishers opposed their
renewal. They argued that in the interest of the public wider dissemination of great
works was necessary. In other words, they put forward the theory of the public
domain. On the contrary, the Parisian booksellers put forward the theory of the
author's right. Their advocate, Louis d'Hericourt. argued that the work was the
creation of the author and belonged to him. He was simply transferring his property in
the work to the publisher, who takes the risks of publication, the main attribute of the
right being perpetuity. The argument sounds familiar The London booksellers had
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already attempted a similar argument. Accordingly, Louis d'Hericourt pointed out
that:
"Having no rights in authors' works, the King may not transmit them to anybody
without the consent of their legitimate owners.. There must be no doubt that
privileges which authors and booksellers are for the present obliged to obtain may
only be considered as genuine approvals."21
As a result, renewal of existing privileges was merely the recognition of the state of
affairs where a new word, property, was substituted for privilege. Moreover, in 1767
Andre-Francois Le Breton, chief officer of the Paris Booksellers' and Printers' Guild,
succeeded in securing the support of Denis Diderot.
The case was occasioned by the affair of La Fontaine, where the king's council
had issued a privilege to La Fontaine's grandchildren although the author himself had
received previously a privilege which was sold and still in possession of a publisher.
Diderot's Lettre sur le commerce de la librairie came to the defence of privileges
affirming author's property in their work against the notion of the king's grace.
Consequently, he argued in favour of the original privilege of the elder La Fontaine,
and for the new one to the benefit of his decendants. It should be stressed that
Diderot's support for perpetual property should be highlighted since he had declared
himself the enemy of monopolies. His position can be easily rationalised. He had
incorporated the doctrine of author's perpetual right in the broader concepts of a free
society, where ideas are an inviolable form of property because they spring from the
individual's mind. Consequently, such privileges were necessary exceptions as "the
21 Laboulay and Guiffrey, La propriete litteraire an XVIIf siecle, (Paris 1859), at 21-40, cited in
[Dock, 1974], at 189.
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best guarantee of the progress of knowledge and the spread of enlightenment."22
According to Diderot the terms of the issue were:
" The question is whether a privilege should be classified as one of the obnoxious
monopolies .. You will say it is a monopoly in derogation ofCommon-Law rights.
That is quite true.
... And, you will add, it must have seemed harsh to concede to one what was
refused to another.
It seems harsh ; but either that is done, or no one can ever plead the cause of the
first occupant and of legitimate possession, founded on risks, labour and advances.
However, so that the derogation of Common-Law rights might not be excessive, they
saw fit to limit of this monopoly
... The author is master of his work, or nobody is master of his goods,.."23
These new ideas taken up by La Fontaine's grandchildren had been also advocated by
other heirs, such as the families of Crebillon, Luneau de Boisgermain and Fenelon.
They all claimed the right to sell their manuscripts to editors of their choice and to
publish and print the books themselves. Also, they asked that the exclusivity for
editing, printing, and selling, implied by royal privileges, should be generalized to all
publishing companies with which authors had already contracted. Moreover, authors'
and families' claims extended beyond their classical individual freedom. They
challenged directly the right of the king to grant privileges at his pleasure, which was
formalised by the traditional mention "aw bon plaisir du Roy". More importantly,
freedom to create or not, to publish or not, under any circumtances, was sought as a
fundamental right of anyone who creates or who exercises a creative talent.24 It should
be stressed that it was common practice, for instance, to employ ghostwriters. As
Pierre-Yves Gautier observed:
22 [Hesse, 1990], at 115.
23 Denis Diderot 1767, cited in [Prager, 1944], at 754.
24 Georges Michaelides-Nouaros, Le Droit MoraI de I'Auteur (Paris, 1935), at 183, Hereafter:
[Nouaros, 1935]
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"before the French Revolution, it was commonplace for high-ranking princes or
clerical dignitaries to claim letters and meditations as their own; if their work were to
be published, few readers were fooled, or cared."2-s
Also, it should not be forgotten that sovereign powers had regularly forced artists to
create against their own wishes, and that censorship limited the scope of creativity.26
For instance, the question still remains whether or not Leonardo Da Vinci moved to
Amboise Castle freely upon the invitation of Francis I, conqueror ofMarignan.
In sum, I venture to say that the 1777 decree is identical in principle to its
British counterpart, and only the mechanisms differ. The argument advanced by
printers was based upon a gross mis-interpretation of authorship or intellectual
property. The Paris publishers mixed up privilege with property title. Logically,
provincial publishers opposed that view, addressing differently the purpose of
privileges as temporary monopolies sanctifying freedom of exploitation in order to
enable an author, or a publisher, to recover his costs. Once the goal was reached,
privileges had therefore no raison d'etre.
The 1777 decree set up a system of literary property based upon two
principles: public domain, and exclusive economic right. In order to assure a decent
economic return on investments, the king granted a pivilege to the copyright owner.
This privilege was believed to be a necessary measure which allowed appropriation of
books as commodities and gave enough incentive to authors, printers and investors
alike to produce more work. To that effect, the public domain was enlarged for the
2> Pierre-Yves Gautier, L'Oeuvre ecritepar autrui, 1 Revue Internationale du Droit d'Auteur 1989,
at 65.
26During the creation of Westmister Abbey, Artists and artisans were impressed by royal decree to
work for the Crown. Also, it is reported that Fra Filippo Lippi was imprisoned by Cosimo de Medeci
until a desired painting had been completed, see MacNeil, Some Pictures Come to Court, Harvard
Legal Essavs. 1934, at 247.
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benefit of society; moreover, the principle of public domain limited the term of the
privilege to the length necessary to give a fair return. Incidentally, privileges were also
attributed as a means of equity. Since authors were the true originators of future
commody, they received grants of privileges as a priority. As opposed to the Statute of
Anne, the Arret allowed the state to keep a tight control on publication as a means of
censorship. Therefore, authors were fully vested with their economic rights.
Nonetheless, this system could only efficiently control commodities or physical
expressions of the intellect, which made it dependent upon technologies embedding
works in material forms, such as printing.
Breaking away from the two principle model, the issue of literary property was
articulated differently by Marie-Jean-Antoine Caritat, marquis de Condorcet. In his
1776 pamphlet. Fragments sur la liberte de la presse, Condorcet rejected pre-
publication censorship and monopolies altogether. He suggested the enactment of
liberal laws against libel and sedition, assuring freedom of expression and commerce.
Condorcet attacked "both the royal theory of literary privileges and the theories of
authorial property rights advanced by Diderot", on the grounds that there was no
property in ideas.27 Ideas are inherent in nature and belong to society as a whole,
while no individual claims on knowledge may attribute property or privilege. As a
result literary property is strictly limited as Condorcet defined it:
"It is thus uniquely for expression, for phrases, that privileges exist. It is not for the
substance of things [les choses], for ideas; it is for words [les mots], for the name of
authors."28
27 [Hesse, 1990], at 116.
28 cited in [Hesse, 1990], at 116.
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Ultimately exclusive rights in literary works reduce rather than enhance public debate.
Fundamentally, he argued that knowledge is "objective, inhering in nature", and
therefore property to all, as opposed to Diderot who viewed ideas as "inherently
subjective and individual", springing from the author's mind and constituting his
inviolable private property.29 Both approaches were going to influence and formulate
the revolutionary decree of intellectual property.
29 [Hesse, 1990], at 117.
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The French Republique and Intellectual Property
In August 1789, the Constituent Assembly abolished the principle of privilege but
differed over resolution of the question of corporate monopolies and privileges. It
declared the freedom of the press as part of the declaration of the Droits de 1'Homme
et du Citoyen. The intention was to liberate the minds of citizens from royal
censorship, and to liberate the presses in order to spread enlightenment. The march
towards intellectual property was initiated following a dispute between theatre authors
and the Comedie Frangaise over the exclusive right of the latter to produce theatrical
works. In response to petitions, the Assembly recognised the performance right of
authors in January 1791. The law abolished all past privileges attributed to the
Comedie Frangaise, and recognised dramatists' exclusive property rights until five
years after their death, at which point the work would become part of the public
domain. The decree is predominantly pre-occupied with the recognition and
enlargement of the public domain proclaiming the rights of all citizens to open their
own theatres and to produce plays. In March 1791 the Assemblee Nationale abolished
the exclusive monopolies of the former Publishers and Printers' Guilds on the trades
of publishing, printing and bookselling.30 The death warrant of the guilds concerned
authors indirectly. The ideology of freedom of commerce sponsored a new tax law "as
much in the service of state revenues as in that of social, economic, or cultural
freedom: more business meant more taxes."31 As a result, this massive deregulation of
30 Carla Hesse, The Dilemmas ofRepublican Publishing, 1793-1799, in Publishing and readership
in Revolutionary France and America (London, 1993), at 61, Hereafter: [Hesse, 1993 (a)]
31 Carla Hesse, Publishing and Cultural Politics in Revolutionary Paris, 1789-1810 in Publishing
and readership in Revolutionary France and America (London, 1993), at 56, Hereafter: [Hesse, 1993
(b)]
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the trades of printing, publishing, bookselling and producing theatrical plays was
intended to institute a free market in ideas, enabling dissemination of ideas as the
cultural ideal of an enlightened nation.
The results were devastating for the trade. Literary piracy ran rampant,
provoking bankruptcies, since no laws establishing literary property provided
adequate protection of investments in publications. In response, the National
Assembly enacted on 19 and 24 July 1793 a decree establishing the exclusive
reproduction right vested in authors in order to restore order within the trades. Both
decrees form the cornerstone of the French intellectual property legal system. Apart
from successive amendments the two decrees stood until the Law of 11 March 1957
which codified for the first time jurisprudence and doctrines developed from the
decrees.32 What is important to realise is that the decree of 1793 was not an
overwhelming recognition of authorship but a self-evident necessity required for the
benefit of society.
The revolutionary debate on literary property evolved out of legislative efforts
to restore the book-trade and to control seditious publications. On the one hand, the
new liberties acquired from the massive liberalisation of the trades brought chaos.
Jean-Baptiste Lefebvre de Villebrune, director of the Bibliotheque Nationale, outlined
acutely the causes of the crisis.33 First, not only were there "fewer customers" within
the new nation, but also the people "incapable of being republicans" had fled the
32 "La legislation revolutionnaire, sobre comme d'une inscription dans le marbre, selon
I'expression de Marcel Plaisant, allait regir la France pendant plus de cent ciquante ans; jusqu'a la loi
du 11 mars 1957, les textes legislates de 1791 et 1793 ne furent que l'objet de legeres modifications et
de divers complements.", Claude Colombet, Propriete litteraire et artistique et droits voisins. 7e ed.
Precis Dalloz (1994), at 4 -7, Hereafter: [Colombet, 1994]
33 Lefevbre de Villebrune, "Considerations sur le commerce de la librairie franqaise", in Proces-
Verbaux, ed. Guillaume, Vol 3, at 613, cited in [Hesse, 1993 (a)], at 63
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country. In other words, people who simply by taste, pleasure or status created
libraries retracted from the market. In fact Villebrune. I venture to say, refers tactfully
to the aristocracy and other influential people who supported the trade as patrons to a
large extent. He then gives an account of the patriotic citizens "who educate
themselves and read in order to educate themselves, absorbed by the defense of the
fatherland or by the posts that they occupy, are not reading or are reading much less."
A direct result of the civil wars in Vendee and Brittany along with the revolutionary
wars against hostile European powers, the war time economy paralysed French
cultural life to a state of inertia. Moreover, the successive regimes prohibited exports
of any kind, and especially of books, "to hostile countries" with which the trade had
branches of exports. Furthermore, "the obstacles imposed on commerce with neutral
countries" eradicated chances for the trade to explore foreign markets or divert
commercial prohibitions on hostile countries. On the other hand, the new regime had
to face a flood of anonymous, seditous and libellous pamphlets. Many favoured
requiring authors to sign published works in order to hold them accountable for their
publications. The National Assembly had to face a "conservative backlash against the
collapse of all regulation of the printed word", added to pressing economic complaints
from publishers.34 Fundamentally, the Assembly had to resolve opposing views as to
the freedom of the press and literary property. The Committee on the Constitution,
presided over by a moderate, the Abbe Emmanuel Sieyes, was entrusted with the task
of submitting a proposal which could restore order and check the radicalisation of the
revolution within the country.
34 [Hesse, 1990], at 118.
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On January 1790 Emmanuel Sieyes presented to the National Assembly a
comprehensive projet de loi on sedition and libel which could meet the commercial
interests of book publishers and the political imperative of the National Assembly.35
The proposal in itself reflected the influence of moderate men such as Lafayette,
Rochefoulcauld. and especially Condorcet. As a matter of fact Franpois Lanthenas
publicly attributed the proposal to "MM. Condorcet et Sieyes".36 This project intended
to hold authors, publisher, and printers alike accountable for their publications
establishing a property privilege limited to the authors' life plus ten years. Assuming
that Condorcet participated in the draft of the proposal, it represented a change in his
position since he objected to the Ancien Regime inquisitorial institutions. Also, as
Carla Hesse reported:
"instead of denouncing literary property as a privilege, they claimed instead that "the
progress of enlightenment, and consequently the public good united with notions of
distributive justice to necessitate that the property of a work should be guarded to the
author by law.""37
Aside from the repressive character of the project on authors, important
considerations on literary property can be drawn from that position. The notion of
property in ideas is introduced as a privilege limited in time. The limitation is
justified, not by private claims on ideas from authors, but rather by the necessity to
access ideas freely for "the progress of enlightenment". Nonetheless, ideas are not
entirely free from individual claims since they become a commercial commodity
protected by law. Above all, freedom of expression, and consequently of the press, are
fettered from the imposition of accountability and responsibility as a police measure.
35 [Hesse, 1993 (b)], at 797-114.
36 Francois Lanthenas, De la liberte indefmie de la presse (Paris 1791), at 6, cited in [Hesse,
1990], at 135.
37 [Hesse, 1990], at 119.
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The whole proposal attempted to regulate and limit a natural right, in contradiction to
the inviolability of the rights of all individuals proclaimed in the Declaration des
Droits de I'Homme et du Citoyen, especially article 17 stating the droit sacre to
property.38 Accordingly, the National Assembly refused to vote on the projet on the
basis of the repressive character of the proposal. Moreover, criticism attacked the
notion of literary property, introduced by Sieyes. For instance, Louis-Felix
Guynement, Cornte de Keralio, rejected the projet on the basis that it disguised "a
regime of privilege into a rhetoric of property" which represented a threat to freedom
of thought inhibiting the expansion of human knowledge, since "printed matter sold to
the public belongs to the public".39 He rejoined Condorcet on the principle that
knowledge is social in character and belongs to all. Another attack stemmed from
printers and publishers themselves, who reintroduced Diderot's argumentation
insisting on the chaotic situation of the trade and of French letters. Incidently, a
proposal, the Hell projet, was published in summer 1791, advocating literary property
transmissible in perpetuity similar to the Old Regime literary privilege.40 Finally, it is
worth mentioning the dissenting view of Charles-Joseph Panckoucke, dominant
publisher in Paris, who defended the guild in order to regain control of the work force
and to aid in monitoring property titles. Accordingly he proposed to introduce a law
similar to the Copyright Act of Great Britain which would fulfill his aspirations for an
•'8 Art.17, Declaration des Droits de I'Homme et du Citoyen (1789).
39 Louis-Felix Guynement de Keralio, De la liberte d'enoncer, d'ecrire, et d'imprimer la pensee
(Paris, 1790), at 51-53, cited in [Hesse, 1990], at 121.
40 ibid, at 123.
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enlightened nation where public interest limited private claims and where ideas are
freely accessible to all.41
Critical changes in the political and legislative relolutionary scene helped
finally to establish the 1793 law on literary property. On the one hand, advocates of
perpetual property in ideas found themselves isolated from the political debate. First
they lost support from the Publishers' and Printers' Guild since from March 1791
corporations were abolished. The suppression of the guild deprived the perpetual
property lobby of its political force. Also, a total re-organisation of the Assembly's
committees resulted in transfer of powers from the Constituent Assembly to the
Legislative Assembly on October 1791. Similarly, Condorcet was entrusted with the
presidency of the new Committee on Public Instruction and was joined by the Abbe
Sieyes. Since the Assembly voted a distinct law dealing with libel and sedition in
September 1791, the Committee was able to look at the question of literary property
solely in terms of education and encouragement of knowledge. The Hell project
seemed to have been lost between the transfer of jurisdiction from the former
Committee on Agriculture and Commerce to the new Committee on Public
Instruction. As a matter of fact, the Assembly seems never to ave never discussed the
proposal.42 On the other hand, a dispute between the Comedie Franqaise and theatre
authors who protested against the property privileges of the former on dramatic works
initiated the first recognition of authors' rights. Founded in 1680, the Comedie
Franqaise had at the time the unique privilege to perform and publish theatrical
works. Leading the attack, Beaumarchais called for the abolition of its privilege. A
41 [Hesse, 1993 (b)], at 61
42 [Hesse, 1990], at 125.
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petition was presented to the Assembly in August 1790 advocating property in
dramatic works in the lifetime of the author plus five years after his death, and
freedom to open a theatre. Furthermore, they introduced a clause requiring written
consent from living authors to perform their work In fact, the law used some of the
terms of the Seyies proposal on libel and sedition. Mirabeau drafted a project de lot
which was to be presented to the Assembly by the well known Isaac-Rene-Guy Le
Chapelier on behalf of the Committee on the Constitution.43 The proposal, a redraft of
the Sieyes proposal on literary property, defended theatre authors' works alone. On 13
January 1791 the proposal passed into law, abolishing all past privileges, recognising
for living authors and five years after their death the right to be produced anywhere as
they wish. Plays by authors dead for more than five years were declared part of the
public domain. Moreover, the works of Corneille, Moliere, and Racine fell instantly
into the public domain, breaking the monopoly of the Comedie Frangaise.
Traditionally, the 1791 decree has been interpreted as the formal recognition
of author's rights. In fact, the 179! decree is predominantly pre-occupied with the
recognition and enlargement of the public domain. Authors' property represents solely
a means to enlarge that domain. As Carla Hesse argued, "authors represented
themselves as servants of the public good, of its enlightenment, in opposition to the
private interests of publishers and theater directors."44 This traditional misconception,
that the law is supported by author-oriented rationales, finds its origin in the famous
43 "Mais ils pretendent etre proprietaires sans partage des chefs-d'oeuvre de Corneille, Racine,
Moliere, Crebillon et autres, et de tous les auteurs qui, par la disposition d'un reglement, ont, suivant
les comediens, perdu leur propriete, ou qui, sous la loi du privilege exclusif, ont traite avec eux. Tel est
le debat que vous devez terminer par une loi generale sur les spectacles, sur la proprietedes auteurs, et
sur la duree qu'elle doit avoir". Rapport Le Chapelier, Bulletin de I'Assemblee Nationale (Seance du
jeudi au soir), Le Moniteur Universel 15 janvier 1791, Hereafter: [Le Chapelier, 1791]
44 [Hesse, 1990], at 126.
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Rapport delivered by Le Chapelier in the National Assembly, and especially the
famous extract:
"The most sacred, the most legitimate, the most unassailable, and [...] the most
personal of all property, is the work which is the fruit of a writer's thoughts ;"45
The extract taken out of its context can be interpreted as the recognition of authors'
property in published works. However, Le Chapelier went on to specify that:
"When an author prints his work or produces a play, he gives them over to the
public, [...] who appropriates them if they are good" 46
The public domain is in the nature of things; however, it is equitable to authors that
they receive a lifetime proprietary right plus five years for the heirs as a reward for
their work. Nonetheless, Le Chapelier stressed that such right must be viewed as an
exception where the principle is the public domain. Incidentally, Le Chapelier
observed that the British Copyright Act protects authors too much to the detriment of
the public domain. Consequently, I venture to say that Le Chapelier was in
accordance with the philosophy of the Revolution which is based upon the theory of
natural justice. The principle of public domain defends the Rights of Man and the
Citizen to access ideas freely. The Revolution put forward the principle of public
domain, and therefore limited instrumentalist theories just to establish authors' rights
as an exception in order to enlarge the nation's cultural heritage. Consequently, an
45 "La plus sacree, la plus legitime, la plus inattaquable, et, si je puis parler ainsi, la plus
personnelle de toutes les proprietes, est I'ouvrage fruit de la pensee d'un ecrivain ; cependant c'est une
propriete d'un genre tout different des autres proprietes.". [Le Chapelier, 1791]
46 "Lorsqu'un auteur fait imprimer un ouvrage ou represente une piece, il les livre au public, qui
s'en empare quand ils sont bons, qui les lit, qui les apprend, qui les repete, qui s'en penetre et qui en fait
sa propriete. II semble que, par la nature des choses, tout est fini pour l'auteur et pour l'editeur quand le
public s'est de cette maniere saisi de la production ; cependant a considere qu'il etait juste de faire jouir
un auteur de son travail, et de lui conserver pendant sa vie, et a ses heritiers quelques annees apres sa
mort, le droit de disposer de l'ouvrage ; mais c'est une exception qui, dans notre ancien regime, etait
consacree par des privileges royaux; qui, en Angleterre, est l'objet d'un qui, dans notre nouvelle
legislation, sera l'objet d'une loi positive, et cela fera beaucoup plu sage. Sortez du principe, mettez
l'exeption a la place, et vous n'avez plu de base pour votre legislation, et vous meconnaissez qu'un
ouvrage public est de sa nature une propriete publique.", [Le Chapelier, 1791]
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author represents "a hero of public enlightenment, rather than a selfish property
owner."47 The exclusive rights vested in authors are necessary to the perpetuation and
development of the revolutionary ideals. Accordingly, individual claims are limited
since literary works belong to and should be enjoy by many individuals
simultaneously. Also, the principle of public domain put forward by Le Chapelier
required from 1792 that authors notify the public that they have retained their rights
on plays, as well as to deposit a copy with a notary. Unless these formalities were
fulfilled, the rights of the author would never vest.48 Such formalitites undercut the
notion of a perpetual right inherent in authors in published matters.
By 1793 the revolutionary legislators shifted their droit d'auteur rhetoric away
from the Le Chapelier principle toward a stronger recognition of proprietary rights in
works of the mind after publication.49 The 1793 decree established a mechanism for
promoting and ensuring public enlightenment by encouraging and rewarding
intellectual creativity. The Committee on Public Instruction presented a proposal on
19 July to the Assembly which was passed without any discussion following its
defense by Joseph Lakanal.50 Like Le Chapelier's report, Lakanal's report seems to
adopt a more favourable attitude towards authors. Nonetheless, the emphasis on the
protection of authors reported by the Committee was presented as not detrimental to
society and therefore not in relation to the public domain either. As a result, Lakanal
simply announced a property right in works; however, he never asserted like Diderot
47 [Hesse, 1990], at 127.
48 Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and
America, 64 Tulane Law Review 1990, at 1008, Hereafter: [Ginsburg, 1990]
49 [Hesse, 1993 (b)], at 114-124.
50 "Le rapporteur lit un projet de decret qui est adopte en ces termes:", Raport Lakanal, "La
declaration des droits du genie". Le Moniteur Universel 21 July 1793, Hereafter: [Lakanal, 1793]
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that an "author is the master of his work, or no one in society is master of his
goods".51 Unlike Le Chapelier he did not invoke "the most sacred, the most
legitimate, the most unassailable[...], the most personal of properties"; rather he
proclaimed that:
"Of all rights the least subject to criticism, a right whose increase can neither harm
republican equality, nor offend liberty, it is without question the property right on
creations of genius."52
There is no conviction of the centrality of authors' personal claims in Lakanal's
rhetoric. Confusion over this issue can be found among many leading writers by
removal of the unsettling passage which claims that authors' exclusive property does
not harm the Republic.53 Republican equality has freed authors from the yoke of
privileges and censorship. To attribute them another copyright-privilege under the
cover of a natural right would be against that equality. Recognition of authors'
intellectual property is required since he "devotes his wakefulness to the education of
his fellow citizens".54 Moreover, certain requirements were to be necessary in order to
gain protection. Early court decisions under the 1793 law held that deposit of copies
51 [Prager, 1944], at 754
52 "De toutes les proprietes, la moins susceptible de contestation, celle dont l'accroissement ne
peut ni blesser I'egalite republicaine. ni donner d'ombrage a la liberte, c'est sans contredit celle des
productions du genie, c'est qu'il ait fallu reconnaitre cette propriete, assurer son libre exercice par une
loi positive, c'est qu'une aussi grande revolution que la notre ait ete necessaire pour nous ramener sur
ce point, comme sur tant d'autres, aux simples elements de la justice la plus commune", [Lakanal,
1793]
53 "La loi du 19 juillet 1793 consacre le droit de reproduction : elle est votee sur le rapport de
Lakanal qui n'exprime pas une idee differente de celle de Le Chapelier lorsqu'il ecrit: « de toutes les
proprietes, la moins susceptible de contestation, c'est sans contredit celle des productions du genie; et
quelque chose doit etonner, c'est qu'il eut fallu reconnaitre cette propriete, assurer son exercice par une
ioi positive ».", [Colombet, 1994], at 5; see also Eugene Pouillet, Traite theorique et pratique de la
propriete litteraire et artistique, Tome 1 (Paris, 1908), at 14-15.
54 "Par quelle fatalite faudrait-il que l'homme de genie, qui consacre ses veilles a l'instruction de
ses concitoyens, n'eut a se promettre qu'une gloire sterile, et ne put revendiquer le tribut legitime d'un
si noble travail", [Lakanal, 1793]
140
not only met a procedural requirement but also gave rise to copyright protection.55
Failure to do so resulted in the fall of the work into the public domain. All these
rulings suggest a judicial view that the act of authorship did not itself afford a basis
for recognizing or maintaining protection of authors' right. Also, the right vested in
authors themselves curiously appeared to be called the "public property right" to
confirm, in my opinion, that exclusive rights in published publications were an
exception; ultimately they belonged to the public. The law did not recognise the
author's claim beyond his lifetime but established the notion that the only heir to
authors' works was the nation as a whole. Consequently, rights of authors in published
works were a reward for their service as an agent of enlightenment through the
publication of their ideas. Authors' position moved from a privileged agent of the
absolutist police state to an egalitarian servant of public enlightenment as a result of
political negotiation.
Moreover, the 1793 laws sought to promote dissemination of productions of
the beaux arts and letters.56 The law was intended then to promote works of
information and education as well as the arts and letters, similar in spirit to the
Consitution of the newly emancipated United States of America.57 Nonetheless, since
55 The court held that it was "formal" and clear" that "the author of a work acquires the public
property right in it by conforming formalities", Judgment of 23 October 1806, Cass, crim., [1808], 2
Recueil General des Lois et des Arrets 1.300; the Cour de Cassation held that the 1793 law "guarantees
literary property, upon condition of deposit of two copies with the Bibliotheque Nationale" and refers
to the "loss of that property right through failure of deposit", Judgment 1 March 1834, Ch. crim.,
[ 1834] Recueil General des Lois et des Arrets 1.75.
56 "Les auteurs d'ecrits en tout genre, les compositeurs de musique, les peintres et dessinateurs que
feront graver des tableaux ou dessins" Art 1, Law of 19 July 1793.
57 Constitutional Convention concerning copyright submitted a document to the Committee of
Detail in August 18, 1787, "To secure to literary authors their copy rights for a limited time. To
encourage by proper premiums and provisions the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries";
1 Document Illustrative of the Formation of the Union, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Congress, 1st Session
130 (1927), cited in Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17
Geogia Law Journal 1929, at 119.
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the book trade in France encountered difficulties, the revolutionary regime took the
initiative to invest directly in the trade. Villebrune, director of the Bibliotheque
Nationale, argued that such intervention did not break from the revolutionary
principles based upon freedom of commerce, of expression and the press where the
mercantile interests of the publisher did not coincide with the national interest and it
became necessary for the government to intervene in the publishing world".58 As
result, "prohibition of works contrary to the republican principles is indispensable".59
Consequently intervention became twofold. The government encouraged publishers in
the production of the beaux arts and letters not contrary to republican values, and
patronised republican publications. However, the government selectively encouraged
utility instead of works of higher arts and letters. Revolutionary France saw art, or
some kinds of art, as worth protecting in the service of utility.60 A prosecutor, for
intance, complaining about the inadequate enforcement of dramatists' rights, reported:
"Shall literary properties be less sacred in the eyes of the republican judge than other
properties? It is to the wise men, to dramatic authors, to all literary authors that we
principally owe the uncontested superiority of the French language over all the
languages of Europe. It is they who render all nations tributaries to our arts, tastes,
genius, glory; it is through them that the principles and rules of a wise and generous
liberty penetrate beyond our borders and sphere of activity."61
According to Jane Ginsburg a review of droit d'auteur infringement actions and
decisions, under the law of 1793 through 1814, shows that the main subject matter
concerned informational works, then works of drama, music, art, poetry, or fiction.62
58 Lefebvre de Villebrune, "Considerations sur le commerce de la librairie fransaise" March 19,
1794, in ed. Guillame, Proceces-verbaux, vol. 3, at 614, cited in [Hesse, 1993 (a)], at 68.
59 Lefebvre de Villebrune, "Considerations sur le commerce de la librairie fran?aise" March 19,
1794, in ed. Guillame, Proceces-verbaia, vol. 3, at 614, cited in [Hesse, 1993 (a)], at 69.
60 Not all forms of literary expression received revolutionary approbation. Novels apparently were
considered retrograde and useless, Judgment of 21 nov. an7, 2 Revue International du Droit d'Auteur
1954, at 99
61 Judgment of 21 Nov. An 7, ibid
62 [Ginsburg, 1990], at 1016.
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It should be stressed, however, that it is difficult to distinguish between works of
information and of art since both may entertain as well as educate according to
republican standards. Moreover, the point that needs to be made is whether or not the
principles elaborated in July 1793 are unworkable or their application in the law is
faulty.
In answering that question, it is of interest to consider the effects of the 1793
law from the point of view of the trade. According to a survey conducted in early
1800, publishers testified unanimously that the underlying and persistent problem for
commercial publishing was the law of 1793. Such straightforwardness needs to be put
in perspective. On the one hand the civil, revolutionary and expansionary wars in the
late eighteenth century had a direct influence on the trade. Also, other laws separate
from the 1793 decree, prohibiting the export of books and the repressing laws of
December 1792 and March 1793, the latter called "law of suspect", had a dramatic
effect on the printing and publishing communities.63 On the other hand, upon the
assumption that printers and publishers initiated the demand, the transition from
former aristocratic markets to the new moral republican ones took time. Monsieur
Lamy, a publisher in Paris, analysed figuratively the question of literary property and
decay of the trade upon that view;
"In 1793 the law which came to regulate us destroyed the foundations of literary
property. It resulted in the undoing of the premier publishing houses and in universal
disorder. Immorality supplanted the good faith of yore."64
Was the law of 1793 on the rights of the genius harmful? The results of the survey
conducted in late Consulat and early Imperial periods showed that in fact most
63 [Hesse, 1993 (a)], at 64.
64 Archives Nationales, F 18, carton 11 A, plaque 1, Lamy, publisher in Paris, May 8, 1810, cited
in [Hesse, 1993 (a)], at 71.
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publishers had survived.65 Also, bankruptcy was often triggered not by piracies or lack
of markets but simply by abuse of credit and credibility within the old corporate
structure.66 Nonetheless, it can be affirmed that the provisions of 1793 law were both
legally and institutionally inadequate in promoting the principles enunciated in 1793
and consequently as a means to protect the book trade. Printers and publishers
complained against pirating editions and high competition in public domain
publishing. The text of the decree itself did not require formal deposit the National
Library even though the courts made it obligatory as a proof of literary property.
Moreover, proceedings were not quick enough to prevent illegal publications reaching
the market, and gave time to the pirate to get rid of compromising printed copies.
Furthermore, the newly created public domain was left open to abuses, since "the
public does not even benefit, because the editions are truncated, inexact and poorly
executed".67 As a result, social progress was forfeited since there was no effective
mechanism to monitor the trade. The fundamental dilemma of commercial publishing
under the Republique was that the trade did not receive enough support from the state
in a totally free market. Being unable to fulfill the Republic's aspirations, the
government had to subsidise itself the market. I would like to stress that the
mechanism protecting literary property set up in 1793 was inadequate in easing
publishing markets, and consequently inadequate in consecrating the fundamental
revolutionary principles. For instance, the term of protection limited to ten years after
the death of the authors may have been too short in motivating publishing companies
65 footnote 42, in [Hesse, 1993 (a)], at 77.
66 [Hesse, 1993 (b)], at 76
67 Archives Nationales, F 18. carton 11 A, plaque 1, report from Briand, Paris publisher, cited in
[Hesse, 1993 (a)], at 72.
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to invest in the new productions, since it reduced the commercial value of new books.
More importantly, competition practices over work in the public domain was unjust
and damaging to society as a whole in considering the quality of works produced.
Realism forced the young Republic to elaborate more thoughtfully on the laissez faire
idealism of 1789 and its law on literary property.
The French droit d'auteur initiated a liberal policy based upon a legal
synthesis which combines an instrumentalist notion of the public good with a theory
of authorship based upon natural justice consecrating the public domain. I would point
out that this instrumental policy differs from its British counterpart, since it is the
public domain which evolves or motivates the recognition of literary property vested
in authors. Authors are the instrument of a general policy and are rewarded for their
efforts and genius. Such progress is believed to occur through access and exchange of
ideas, which can be supported by liberal states founded on conflict and negotiation,
not like an absolutist state grounded on police measures. French revolutionary texts,
foundations of the current French droit d'auteur, expressed mixed protective motives,
emphasising the rights of man in their essence as authors, who ultimately, are an
integral part of a community and draw their creativity from that community. This
unstable and liberal legal synthesis establishes a public domain based upon authorship
laws, which shifts "the problem of determining the meaning of the text away from its
source, the author, and toward its destination, its representation and reception by the
editor and reader."68 As a result there is an integral effort to accommodate individual
interests, in other words, an effort to distribute resources within society whereby
68 [Hesse, 1990], at 131.
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authors as sources of ideas do not exclude other individuals from these resources.
Clearly, this demonstrates that there is a complex relationship between the law,
society and cultural change which requires an adequate definition of what is an author,
or authorship, in order to achieve these goals. Revolutionary acts chose not to grant
exclusive rights to authors on the sole aspect of natural justice. They could only
secure or recognise such rights. The current of Enlightenment thought objected to the
sole instrumentalist grounds which asserted exclusive property rights on commodities.
As Condorcet argued, exclusive individual property claims would retard the progress
of knowledge, opposing freedom of expression not only with censorship but also
copyright.69 Literary property can be analogised to real property as advocated by
Louis d'Hericourt. Condorcet challenged that point of view. Asserting the public good
nature of information, he argued that a field may belong to only one person; by
contrast, a literary work can belong to and be enjoyed by many simultaneously. Social
intervention was believed to be needed to create and secure a property interest in such
works. Therefore, if society is to intervene, the creation of a privilege must be
necessary, useful, and just. Condorcet concluded that authors' and publishers'
privileges were none of these in 1776. They concentrated power over books and ideas
in a few hands rather than disseminate knowledge. He concluded that rights in literary
works diminished rather than enhanced public debate.70
Accordingly intellectual property stems from revolutionary dialectics. In
suppressing privileges, printers' and publishers' guilds collapsed concomitantly but did
69 Condorcet, Fragments sur la liberte de la presse, in 11 Oeuvres de Condorcet (Paris, 1887), at
308-11.
70 ibid, at 311.
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not produce the expected increase in intellectual creations.71 Revolutionary thinkers
and legislators had to deal with this crisis in ideas and letters. As Lakanal argued,
recognition of authors' exclusive rights became a necessity in order to perpetuate and
further revolutionary ideals. The principle of public domain reflecting the liberal
approach of laissez faire could not sustain itself. Temporary exclusive rights had to be
introduced in order to further enlightenment. Along these lines of thinking, Condorcet
himself collaborated with the Abbe Sieyes and participated the formulation of the
1793 law. He recognised that :
"the progress of the enlightenment, and thus of the public good, join themselves to
the ideas of distributive justice, to require that the law assure to author property right
in their works."72
The public domain as a principle of copyright accepted by Condorcet and Sieyes
became a necessary and useful solution that in practice had proved delicate to apply.
What was sought was not the individual exchange of ideas among a limited circle but
an enlarged place for exchange, requiring social negotiation as a principle of social
progress. Under this view, a just copyright law should be no more extensive than
required to promote the public welfare. Therefore, the introduction of
instrumentaliststheories, and as such exclusive proprietary rights, adequately
promoted revolutionary ideas as long as public motives were driving forces. Such
legislation expressed the suspicion of the legislator towards proprietary rights in
works of authorship both as a matter of Enlightenment theory and anticorporatism.73
Proprietary right was perceived as a vehicle to foster the public welfare. However, the
71 Carla Hesse, Res Publicata: The Printed Word in Paris 1789-1810, dissertation cited by
[Ginsburg, 1990], at 995.
72 4 Histoire Parlementaire de la Revolution Franqaise (Paris, 1834), at 282.
73 [Ginsburg, 1990], at 1014.
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whole body of principle could work only if exclusive rights were secured and not
granted, because the public domain also stems from natural justice. In granting an
exclusive right, legislators would in fact have introduced a privilege which would
have the balancing force of the public domain simply because private forces could
have used the force of intellectual property rights to claim exclusive rights over ideas.
Also, the system is technology neutral since rights of authors are enforceable upon the
theory of intellectual property and upon a commodity. The French legislator resolved
the public-versus-private tension by casting primarily as an aid to the advancement of
public instruction the protection of works of the mind, asserting the principle of
public domain and its corollary, a personal right vested in authors.
The Dilemmas of American Revolutionary Literary Property
In America, copyright was the subject of almost immediate legislation as soon as the
new nation was founded. In fact, colonial America had not secured as such any form
of protection covering publications. Nonetheless, contrary to common opinion, the
General Court for elections of the Massachussets Bay Colony issued an order in 1672
granting the exclusive right to print, publish and sell a revised version of its public
laws to John Usher.74 The laws of Great Britain applied throughout its empire;
however, Connecticut, Massachussets, and Maryland had already enacted
74 "In ansr to the petition of John Vsher, the Court judgeth it meete to order, & be it by this Court
ordered & enacted, that no printer shall print any more coppies then are agreed & pajd for by the ouner
of the sajd coppie or coppies, nor shall he nor any other reprint or make sale of any of the same,
without the sajd ouners consent, vpon the forfeiture and peonalty of treble the whole charges of
printing, & paper &c., of the whole quantity payd for by the ouner of the coppie, to the sajd ouner of
the coppie, to the said ouner or his assignes", 4 records of the Governor and Company of the
Massachussets Bay in New England, part 2 at 527, cited in Francine Crawford, Pre-Constitutional
Copuyright Statutes, 23 Bulletin.Copvright of the U.S.A. 1975, at 11, Hereafter: [Crawford. 1975]
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comprehensive copyright statutes, under the influence among others of Jeremy Belnap
and Noah Webster75, when the Congress of the Federation passed a resolution on 2
May 1783:
"recommending] to the several States to secure to the authors or publishers of new
books not hitherto printed, being citizens of the United States, and to their executors,
administrators, and assigns, the copy right of such books for a certain time not less
than fourteen years from the first publication ... such copy or exclusive right of
printing, publishing and vending the same, to be secured to the original authors, or
publishers, their executors, adminstrators, and assigns, by such laws and under such
restrictions as to the several Sates may seem proper."76
Importance was given to the cultural heritage of the young nation for the first time.
Accordingly, twelve states had secured to authors or publishers copyright protection
before the enactment of the Constitution of the United States of America in July 1787
and the first federal copyright act passed by Congress in 1790.
An analysis of the states' copyright statutes shows that they were either
designed after the Statute of Anne or took different patterns.77 On the one hand, the
statutes which contain a preamble assert exclusive rights in authors to secure profits in
their works even though the resolution recommended states to secure to authors, or
publishers alike, copyright protection. Also, the concept of encouragement of learning
and scholarship was predominant in most preambles.78 Such affirmations would
suppose that legislators had been aware of theories putting forward the natural rights
of authors in their work since they had a clear choice between authors or publishers.
Also, the reason for securing author's rights was consistent with the aim of
7:1 Noah Webster, Origin of the Copy-Right Laws in the United States, in Collection ofPapers on
Political, Literary andMoral Subjects, (New York, 1843), at 174.
76 Journals of the United Sates in Congress Assembled, Containing the Proceedings from Nov.
1782, to Nov. 1783, at 256-257, cited in [Crawford, 1975], at 13.
77 Lyman R. Paterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, (Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), at
184, Hereafter: [Paterson, 1968]
78 [Crawford, 1975], at 14-16
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encouraging authors to create for the greater benefit of society. On the other hand, the
statutes established a government grant of economic rights limited in time in order to
prevent a monopoly for the benefit of society. Like the Statute of Anne, the states'
copyright statutes protected works solely as commodities in giving authors exclusive
rights limited in time in printing, publishing, and selling their works. As a result,
authors as well as their assigns had to fulfil certain requirements such as depositing a
copy in order to gain copyright. Furthermore, a majority of statutes required authors to
be citizens or residents of their state. Therefore, state statutes were not consistent with
the principles of natural justice. However, this can be explained rationally. As long as
the idea of copyright as a right vested in authors upon the principle of natural justice
predominated, copyright could be analysed as a system composed of two bodies of
laws. One was formed by a statutory law of copyright, preventing monopolies on
commodities, and another a common law of literary property as a recourse to protect
possible rights not provided for in the statute. I would simply stress that the statutes
represent a transitional step between instrumentalist copyright mechanisms and
natural right copyright ones. It is of importance to bare in mind that this ill-defined
system was never tested in the courts but it most certainly influenced Congress in the
drafting of the first federal copyright act.
In recommending states to secure copyright statutes, the Congress of the
Federation did not impose any uniformity of form from the states. As a result,
copyright statutes differed in their principles and provisions in each state. Seeking
uniformity in copyright protection, as opposed to separate effectual provisions79, in
79 "States cannot separately make effectual provision for either [copyright or patents]", The
Federalist, No. XLIII at 267, cited in [Crawford, 1975], at 36.
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order to correct the narrowness and unenforceability of certain provisions the Fathers
of the Constitution debated and proposed different animating principles in provision
to a future federal copyright system. For instance, James Madison proposed the
following goals for future federal copyright law:
"To secure to literary authors their copyrights for a limited time. To establish a
university. To encourage, by premiums and provisions, the advancement of useful
knowledges and discoveries"80
His principles recognise exclusive but limited property rights vested in authors, a
"university", or the need for a public domain, and the need to encourage the
advancement of knowledge and inventions. It is difficult to ascertain whether or not
Madison intended to put a certain consequential order to his principles. However, all
the principles are based upon the premise of natural justice. More importantly, the
final product formed clause 8 of the Constitution of the United States of America
which was approved on 5 September 1787, The Constitution empowers Congress:
"To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their Writings and
Discoveries"81
This constitutional mandate establishes the very principles on which Congress has to
legislate. I would like to insist on the fact that the clause is fully integrated in the
Constitution, the supreme body of law which formally states people's rights and duties
according to the animating principles and aspirations which gives purpose and
direction to a nation. Congress has then the duty and the right to secure provisions
giving for a limited time exclusive rights to authors in their writings.
80 V. Elliot, Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 2nd ed. (1836), at 440, cited in
[Paterson, 1968], at 192.
81 Article I, § 8 cl. 8, U.S. Consitution
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Moreover, it is significant to observe that the clause is a reflection of the
European enlightenment, which "fought for the legal recognition of natural rights and
for the elimination of institutions and practices associated with the ancien regime" *2
This evidently set the tone and the importance attached to the formulation of the
clause. Fundamentally, Congress was entrusted with the right and duty to ensure the
advancement of the nation's cultural and scientific heritage. To that effect, Congress
might set adequate mechanisms in the form of limited exclusive property rights, and
not monopoly-privileges. Clause 8 entrusts Congress to "secure", in other words to
recognise, all rights pertaining to authors and not to grant solely an economic
monopoly by contrast to the Statute of Anne. As a result, the U.S. Consitution takes a
liberal approach similar to the later enacted French droit d'auteur. Rights of creators
in their work are recognised as an inescapable natural right which in effect is shifted
from individual claims to the overall claim of a nation to its scientific and cultural
heritage. Consequently, such exclusive claims cannot be of any harm since their
purpose is to further the public domain. As early as 1782. Reverend Samuel Smith,
professor of theology in Nassau Hall, expressed that opinion in a letter defending
"copy-right laws". He wrote:
"And it is my opinion that it can be of no evil consequence to the state, and may be
of benefit to it, to vest by a law, the sole right of publishing and vending such works
in the authors of them."83
Interestingly, his remark seemed to have found an echo in the report given by Lakanal
in July 1793 to the French National Assembly in support to the declaration des droits
82 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, (Harvard University
Press, 1992), at 27.
83 Samuel S. Smith, Princeton, Sept. 27, 1782. letter to Noah Webster, in N. Webster, Origin of
the Copy-Right Laws in the United States in a Collection of Papers on Politival, Literary and Moral
Subjects, (New York, 1843), at 174
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du genie. The danger of monopolies is prevented by the intent of the clause, which is
the furtherance of the public domain: Congress is to secure "for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors" exclusive rights in their work. Furthermore, recognition of
both "Authors'" and "Inventors'" exclusive but limited rights supports the self-evident
recognition of their economic interests as an aid to promote learning. Also, the
formulation of the clause, unlike the states' copyright statute preambles, has with
consistency established natural justice principles, breaking away from the simple
grant of privileges to investors. In sum, I would maintain that the constitutional
mandate in asserting "the sovereign's interest in promoting a socially desirable end" is
fully consistent with the recognition of the right of authors and inventors in their
works, in other words in their intellectual property.84
On 31 May 1790 Congress passed the first federal copyright act entitled "An
Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and
books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein
mentioned."85 Benjamin Kaplan admitted that clause 8 is a "means of releasing the
energies of creative workers" and without any surprise analogised the first federal
copyright Act with the Statute of Anne.86 The fact of the matter is that Congress in
misunderstanding clause 8 has hampered the transition from the constitutional
principles into their embodiment in law. In order to clear the ground, I would like to
84 By contrast, DaSilva opposes that view claiming "The contitutional mandate receals that
American copyright arises not fom a perpetual, natural right of "propriete incorporelle," as in france,
nor even from a "right of personality," as in Germany, but rather from the sovereign's interest in
promoting a socially desirable end", DaSilva, Droit Moral and Amoral Copyright: Artists' Rights in
France and the U.S., 28 Bulletin, Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 1980 ,at 55.
85 ch. 15, 1 Sta. 124.
86 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View ofCopyright, (Columbia University Press, 1967), at 25,
Hereafter: [Kaplan, 1967]
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draw a parallel between the former states' copyright statutes and the final
congressional product. Undoubtedly these statutes seem to have had an influence on
Congress in drafting the federal copyright act, and its subsequent versions. Francine
Crawford has even argued that the act is:
"a direct descendent of the 1783 Connecticut statute, and elements in the national
statute can be traced back as far as the 1672 Massachusetts Bay Colony order."87
According to its title the Act intends to secure exclusive rights to Authors for the
purpose of encouraging learning. As such the principles of limited monopoly, public
domain, and authors' rights would reflect the constitutional clause. Nevertheless, a
study of the provisions of the act shows that Congress did not respond adequately to
the three principles. Not only do seven sections of the act follow a similar pattern to
the Statute of Anne, but it develops provisions solely for the attribution of a literary
privilege. For instance, section 1 provides for two copyrights in published and future
publications of selective commodities: maps, charts, and books. Correspondingly, the
exclusive rights of printing, reprinting, and publishing are vested in their authors
unless attributed to third parties. The granted monopoly is limited to fourteen years, a
term renewable if the author and proprietor or his assign were still living. Also, it has
to be noted that only citizens or residents of the United States will receive copyright
protection. Section 2 explains more clearly the purpose of the Act, which is to protect
works from piracy. Copyright is then deemed to be a right to which a work is subject.
Correspondingly, section 3 requires that certain formalities are fulfilled. The act itself
recalls the former states' copyright satutes. Furthermore, the tone of the act betrays the
constitutional provisions, and also opposes the vision of the Constitution and the Bill
87 [Crawford, 1975], at 36.
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of Rights "that declared the people's "unalienable and fundamental rights in such a
way as to set limits to the power of government and to serve as an alarm when
legislators and rulers overreached their proper bounds."88 Congress contravened its
duty in the sense that it established a purely literary privilege to authors instead of
securing solely an exclusive right limited in time for the greater benefit of society.
There is no reliance on the natural rights of authors. Possibly, Congress being
influenced by the states' copyright statutes wanted to retain a distinction between
common law rights in unpublished works and statutory rights in published works. The
first reported federal copyright case, Morse v. Reid, in 1798 would confirm that point
where the act provided solely remedies for infringement and lacked any provisions for
the moral right of authors.89 Nonetheless, by the simple fact that courts refer to both
the Act and the constitutional provisions, the discrepancies make the act impossible to
apply with consistency "leading to open abuses".90
Above all the most direct abuse which pervades such a system is that
copyright ceases to be limited in scope and becomes the entire property interest of the
copyright owner in his works after publication. The fundamental question remains
whether American copyright is an author's right in its own right or a creation of statute
which prevents monopoly. Today some argue that the most recent acts fail to fulfill
88 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, (Harvard University
Press, 1992), at 351.
89 Morse v. Reid was decided in the U.S. Circuit Court for the District ofNew York on April 4 and
6 1798, see John D. Jordan III, Morse v. Reid: The First Reported Federal Copyright Case, 11 Law
and History Review 1993, at 34-37.
90 "The laws as they stand fail to give the protection required, are difficult of interpretation,
application, and administration, leading, to misappropriation and misunderstanding, and in some
directions are open to abuses", Copyright in Congress 1789-1904, U.S. Copyright Office Bulletin n°. 8
(1904), at 7.
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the constitutional principles. Commenting on a recent Supreme Court decision. Eileen
Selsky declared:
"The U.S. Supreme Court, in Sony Corporation ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., declined a prime time opportunity to affirm the value of copyright protection in
enriching the exchange of ideas and the expression of information in our society."91
Answers to the overall question can be found in Henry Wheaton and Robert
Donaldson v. Richard Peters and John Grigg, the American counterpart to Donaldson
v. Becket.92 The circuit court dealt with the special claim that Wheaton failed to
deliver to the Secretary of State a copy of the book within six months of its
publication as required by the fourth section of the Act of 1790.93 Judge Hopkinson
concluded that such delivery was essential to secure a copyright. As such, he held that
copyright was a privilege and not a right, since copyright is a grant from government.
Moreover, Judge Hopkinson held that:
"The public, the citizens of a community, acting by their representatives, confer upon
an author certain privileges or rights for his exclusive benefit; and to protect him in
the enjoyment of them, they impose certain penalties or give certain remedies against
any person who shall violate these rights. But some protection is due on the other
side, that innocent and ignorant invaders of the privilege may not be involved in suits
and penalties, by the want to accessible means of information of the subject and
extent of the grant."94
Consequently, any claim of copyright at common law was to be inconsistent with the
passing of the Act which grant a privilege to authors. Furthermore, he observed that
there was no federal common law.95 In my opinion, that strengthens the assumption
that copyright system could be formed by two systems, a statutory and a common law
91 Eileen L. Selsky, Is Copyright a Property Right or a Creation of Statute?, 2 Entertainment &
Sports Lawyer 1984, at 14.
92 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) (1834), at 591.
93 Wheaton v. Perters, 29 Fed. Cas. (C.C.E.D Pa 1832), at 862
94 ibid, at 867.
95 "It is clear, there can be no common law of the the United States. The federal government is
composed of twenty-four sovereign and independent states; each of which may have its own usages,
customs and common law. [...] The common law could be made part of our federal system, only by
legislative adoption", Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) (1834), at 658.
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copyright. Wheaton appealed to the Supreme Court. In 1834 the Justices held by a
majority of four to two that opinions of the Court could not be subject to copyright.
Nevertheless, "marginal notes, or syllabus of the cases and points decided, the abstract
of the record and evidence, and the index to the several volumes" were subject to
copyright.96 On the one hand, the judges made the point that no federal common law
copyright existed. On the question whether common law copyright existed in
England, the dissenting judges argued that it existed. The majority held that no
common law copyright existed in each state but also that only the Federal State
provided to that effect under the form of a grant from government. On the other hand,
the majority held that all requirements for securing copyright were to be fullfilled, or
mandatiry, and not merely directory. As regards the decision of the circuit court
whether Wheaton had complied with the requirements, the Court remanded the case
for a determination of fact by a jury, since the Justices were not satisfied with the
circuits court findings. Finally, the decision established the American concept of
copyright as a statutory grant of a monopoly for the benefit of the author. It would
appear then that even the Supreme Court misunderstood the principles enunciated in
the constitutional mandate.
It is important to look at the arguments advanced by different Justices. On the
one hand, Justice McLean, writing on behalf of the majority, based his argumentation
upon the premise that copyright is a monopoly in nature. They agreed that authors
have at common law a property right, preventing anybody from publishing their
manuscript; however, they observed that it was a very different right once the
96 ibid, at 698.
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manuscript has been published.97 Accordingly, the Justices objected to the underlying
notion that authors hold a perpetual copyright on ideas. They observed that the value
of a book lies in its content, and the question arises as whether any buyer is allowed to
print content that freely. McLean concluded that Congress, in recognising the
economic interests of authors in the value of books, "by this act, instead of
sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created it."98 He consequently adopted
a stout approach to the requirements for securing copyright. Deposit of a title of the
work in the clerk's office of the district court and publication of the clerk's record in
the book were required. Nonetheless, subsequent conditions such as public notice in
the newspapers and deposit of a copy of the book with the Secretary of State were
"important, the law requires them to be performed, and, consequently, their
performance is essential to perfect the title".99 On the other hand. Justice Thompson,
as one of the two dissenting voices, contended that:
"The great principle on which the author's right rests, is that it is the fruit of his own
labor, which may, by the labor of the faculties of the mind, establish a right of
property, as well as by the faculties of the body; and it is difficult to perceive any
well-founded objection to such a claim of right"100
He advocates clearly that an author is entitled to the property of his labour as a matter
of natural justice. Justice Thompson argued then that common law copyright existed.
However, he added that literary property:
"seems founded upon the same principle of general utility to society, which is the
basis of all other moral rights and obligations. Thus considered, an author's copyright
97 ibid, at 658.
98 "The Congress, in passing the Act of 1970, did not legislate in reference to existing rights,
appears clear from the provision that the author, &., "shall have the sole right and liberty of printing,"
&c. Now if this is exclusive right existed at common law, and Congress were about to adopt legislative
provisions for its protection, would they have used this language? Could they have deemed it
necessary to vest a right already vested? Such a presumption is refute by the words above quoted, and
their force is not lessened by any other part of the act.", ibid, at 660-661.
99 ibid, at 665.
100 ibid, at 669-670.
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ought to be esteemed an invaluable right, established in sound reason and abstract
morality "l01
Therefore, Justice Thompson considered that author's rights are not a creation of
Congress but a simple recognition for the "general utility to society". Nonetheless, he
did not pursue the argument further. He saw the statutory provisions only as an
additional protection. Here, as well as dissenting, Justice Henry Baldwin argues that
Congress intended only to limit the common law right of authors but afforded authors
with additional security. As Justice Baldwin observed:
"So far from any act of Congress having impaired this common-law right, they seem
to me to recognize its existence, and to have been intended to afford it additional
security."102
In sum, the justices approached the issue from two sides. The majority analysed the
Copyright Act as a means to afford protection to authors and the creation of a limited
monopoly. The dissenting Justices viewed copyright as a recognition of author's
rights, affording additional but limited protection. Moreover, both sides argued in
their own way about how Congress intended to balance authors' individual claims and
the public's interest but in an uneasy manner.
Successive copyright laws have revised the original Copyright Law of 1790,
but discontent has always emerged about the applicability of the text. Justice Joseph
Story argued that it was not possible to "lay down any general principles applicable"
to copyright cases.103 In my own opinion, courts simply cannot produce consistent
decisions because the Act prevents it, since Congress has not succeeded in translating
into law the principles enunciated in clause 8. In response to Eileen Selsky, I venture
101 ibid, at 671.
102 ibid, at 698.
103 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), at 344. cited in [Paterson, 1968], at 213.
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to say that it is true that the Supreme Court has failed to correct the discrepancy.
Nonetheless, it is more significant to observe that the causes of the problem have
never been defined correctly,104 On the one hand, exclusive property right is a
necessary monopoly which is intended to provide financial reward to authors.
However, Congress did not conceive that a literary monopoly is a legal confirmation
of natural rights, balanced in effect by society's natural rights to access information.
Both rights cannot be privileged ones. If that happens, an imbalance occurs which
distorts the system of exchange of information resources. On the other hand, the
situation has created a dilemma for Congress, as well as the Supreme Court, since
they could not detach their mind from the effects of monopoly which has prevented
them from conceptualising intellectual property.105 Moreover, Congress has simply
granted privileges to copyright owners giving in effect an appearance of control. As a
result. Congress has tried to apply to a mechanism fit for two variables, monopoly
rights over a commodity and public interest, a third variable, authors' rights. Fear of
monopoly along with the necessary expansion of authors' recognised rights under the
law, economic as well as moral rights but socially required for the benefit of society,
have been possible key factors in the creation of the legal situation. The idea that
copyright was an objectionable monopoly was a difficult one to maintain in absence
of any means of control. Congress in a reassuring move granted privileges as a means
of control at the expense of the idea of author's right protecting his natural rights.
104 Eileen L. Selsky, Is Copyright a Property Right or a Creation ofStatute?, 2 Entertainment &
Sports Lawyer 1984, at 14.
105 [Paterson, 1968], at 215.
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Important implications can be drawn from that unstable situation. In
advocating author's rights, in a system which in effect does not recognise them, the
role of the publisher is eradicated in a law designed in fact to control economic
transactions over a commodity, and therefore the publisher's interests. It is assumed
that the publisher's right to control the commodity derives from the author, as it
should be under a true author's right copyright system. In fact, the right comes from
Congress, not from authors, since it grants a limited monopoly providing limited
economic rights to authors. Problems arise since authors advocate their natural
economic rights based upon a system which protects monopoly rights over
commodities. Economic controls not only allow control over the economic
commodity but also state control over the publication. The concept of public interest
is possibly limited to what the state, or publishers, wish the public to be informed
about. As a result, copyright ceases to be limited in scope, to distort a system designed
only for appropriable commodities. Consequently, claimants for copyright protection
tend to extend their rights over the domain of ideas which either under a normal
instrumentalist or a natural right system would be prevented under the principle of
public domain. Natural rights or authors' rights have become an easy extension of
monopolistic rights over works, simply in shifting the right to access to ideas from the
public to private individuals. Moreover, an instrumentalist copyright mechanism can
only be sustained in a defined technological environment such as printing or any other
technology which embodies works in material forms. Information technology changes
the technological deal and facilitates the game of individuals claiming private
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monopolistic rights over ideas, since an intrumentalist system cannot enforce the
public domain principle.
Droit Moral v. Moral Rights
The French droit d'auteur involves a second element: the droit moral. Moral rights
have no basis originally in any code. They ares the outcome of decisions handed down
by French high courts and tribunals since the middle of last century.106 They include
non-property attributes of an intellectual and moral character which give legal
protection to the intimate bond which exists between a literary or artistic work and its
author's personality. The intention is to protect moral integrity as well as economic
return.107 It has been submitted that Anglo-American court solutions applying the
theory of torts in cases involving defamation, unfair competition, or injury to the
rights of the individual, obtain results analogous to those which derive from the
application of the French theory of the moral right.108 These solutions are what
Professor Kaplan has called "forms of protection cognate to copyright" that have
grown up in an unprincipled way outside the statute.109 Common law equivalents
reflect, in my opinion, a certain scepticism towards the author who failed to look after
the integrity of his work, as opposed to the French concept, which is composed of a
framework of rights based upon definite principles. The moral right involves the right
106 Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right ofAuthors and Artists Under French
Law, 16 The American Journal of Comparative Law 1968. at 465.
107 "Le droit moral est le droit pour l'auteur de creer, de presenter ou non sa creation au public
sous une forme de son choix, de disposer de cette forme souverainement et d'exiger de tout le monde le
respect de sa personalite en tant qu'elle est liee a sa qualite d'auteur", [Nouaros, 1935], at 68.
108 William Strauss, Les substituts du droit moraI en droit americain, Droit d'auteur. 1955, at 173-
185.
109 [Kaplan, 1967], at 79, 88-89.
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of disclosure, the right to withdraw or disavow, the right of paternity, and the right of
integrity of the work of the mind. Only the creator, or his lawful executors or legatees,
can exercise such rights. As a personal right, it cannot be based on any theory of
property or whatever property the creator may possess. As a result, unlike the literary
and artistic economic property right which is limited in time to fifty years after the
author's death, the moral right is perpetual. As a result, once the work has fallen into
the public domain moral rights remain except in the case of deceased authors who
have no known heirs.110
The essential difference from the Anglo-American conception appears to stem
from the inalienable, imprescriptible, non-seizable and perpetual nature of the French
moral right.111 Indeed, this principle takes precedence over the enforcement of
contracts and may always be invoked by an author or his heirs. The remedy would
probably take the form of an injunction against the offending activity, although it
should not by any means be so limited. What is essential to understand is that the
development of moral rights follows directly from the simple recognition of the
author's property rights. As explained, such rights have been recognised in order to
further the public domain. Moral rights are personal rights and therefore are not based
110 Case of the Society of Men of Letters who asked for an injunction against the use of the title
"Les liasons dangereuses" in a film based upon the eighteenth century novel written by Choderlos de
Laclos and bearing the same title. A preliminary injunction was granted on grounds of unlawful
reproduction which was penal in nature (Trib. civ. Seine, Sept. 25, 1959, Gazette du Palais 1959.2.202;
App Paris, April 4, 1960, Gazette du Palais 1960 1.253).The decision implied then that moral right
could be enforced through the criminal law and as a result would have changed completely the case
law and the spirit of the 1957 law (Sarraute, Gazette du Palais 1959.1 Doctrine 2; Plaisant, J.C.P.
1959.11319; Contra, Desbois, D. 1960.530 and Revue Trimestrielle du Droit Comm., 1960 at 88).
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals and the Court of Cassation ruled that the claim was unacceptable
(Decision of Nov, 10, 1961, d. 1962.116, note Lyon-Caen; Decision of Febr. 19, 1964, Gazette du
Palais 1964.1.247, conclusions by Delsangles; Decision of Dec. 6, 1966, Gazette du Palais 1967.1.98).
111 [Colombet. 1994], at 110-111.
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on any theory of property, or whatever property the creator may possess or exist in the
rights protected by the copyright statute. The whole doctrine of moral rights puts
emphasis upon the personal protection of works of the mind. Moreover, the
fundamental reason for the protection of the moral right lies in the need for society to
protect the integrity of its cultural heritage. It is believed that authors, and especially
heirs or legatees, are better placed than any other person to preserve the integrity of
the deceased author. Such powers, however, should not curb the freedom of creativity
of individuals. The public has defined interests in preserving its cultural heritage
intact, as well as in protecting creators, since it may stimulate their creativity. I would
like to stress that creativity is a complex process where financial benefit is certainly
not the sole motive. The creator obviously has an interest which is more than a simple
economic one. The droit d'auteur has accordingly recognised authors as creators and
not as inventors, even though it recognises their pecuniary rights. The doctrine of
moral rights favours then the creator and the public against the entrepreneur and the
performer. The interests of the performer, publisher or entrepreneur are distinctly
adverse to the existence of the moral right.112 Obviously their interest is mainly to
derive economic advantage from the created work by strictly ensuring a exclusive
commercial security. The droit d'anteur attempts to prevent such economic powers
from exercising a pressure on authors.
The French moral rights reflect the intimate union between the personality of
the author and his work. During the period of creation the moral right concept gives to
the author without limitation of time the right to determine when the work has been
112 [Nouaros, 1935], at 268.
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finally completed.1'3 After publication the concept gives to the author the right to
have his authorship acknowledged, the right to have the integrity of his work
respected and the right in the case of publishing contracts, to withdraw the work. The
droit moral has come to be understood as the assurance of respect for the work of art,
first while it is being created, and second when completed, unveiled, published and
sold. These are two distinct periods, separated by the artist's act of disengaging
himself from his work and submitting it to the judgement of the public. Until that
moment, the work is an expression of the artist's personality and remains his own. No
one can claim any right to the work. It could be a rough draft or a completed work, but
the artist may modify or destroy it at will. He alone can determine when his plan has
been realised, when his work has been completed, and when he feels that he can
without injuring his reputation reveal it to the public. Similarly, at common law the
right of first publication protects authors from unscrupulous publications wihtout the
consent of the author. At common law a work that has not been exploited or published
can be withheld from public circulation by the creator or his successors even when the
physical property is owned by a third party or even when the physical property is
owned by a third party even when the work has been recognised as completed by its
author.114 According to an old American dictum:
"there is no law which can compel an author to publish. No one can determine this
essential matter but the author. His manuscripts, however, cannot without his
consent, be seized by his creditors as property;"115
1 !3 Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the MoraI Right ofAuthors and Artists under French
Law, 16 The American Journal of Comparative Law 1968, at 470-472; [Colombet, 1994], at 112-114.
114 Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 342, 26 Eng. Rep, at 608 (Ch. 1741); Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare,
2 Eden. 329, 28 Eng. Rep, at 924 (Ch. 1758); Maklin v. Richardson, 27 Eng. Rep at 451 (Ch. 1770).
H5 Berry v. Hoffman, 125 Pa. Super. 261, 189 A.516 (1937); Eyre v. Higbee, 22 How. Pra. 198
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861) [Letters ofGeneral G. Washington],
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Under such circumstances the fundamental right for anyone to create or exercise the
right to exercise his creative talent is respected or cannot be denied by statutory
provisions.116 In effect, here there are no major differences between the common law
and civil law approaches.
Once the author has made the decision to publish his work, then the work falls
under the scope of statutory copyright or droit d'auteur in the same way as regards
pecuniary rights. By contrast, the right of respect for the integrity of the work, the
right of paternity and the right of withdrawal and of modification are applied
differently. This difference stems mainly from the four characteristics of the droit
moral: inalienable, imprescriptible, non-seizable and perpetual. For instance, the
inalienability of the French moral rights applies to authors even when the author has
purported to surrender his rights by contract. From the time an author has published
his work he has the right to insist that the integrity of the work must not be violated by
measures which could alter or distort it. Such a claim may conflict with the creative
freedom of adapters. For instance, there is a well-known case about a refrigerator
which was painted by Bernard Buffet and which was to be auctioned in pieces.117 The
artist brought an action in order to prevent the separate sale of the different panels
composing the refrigerator. The court accordingly prevented the sale and awarded also
one symbolic new franc to the artist as a form of damages. One can see clearly that
adaptation of a work needs the unconditional authorisation of its creator in order to
proceed. Libel law may provide some ground for the prevention of deformation of the
116 [Nouaros, 1935], at 183.
117 John H. Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 Hastings Law Journal 1976, at
1023.
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body of the work as well as the title of the work. However, it may be difficult to apply
since the copyright owner, who may not be the author, would need to exercise a
personal right. Moral rights are intended to protect creators' personality and not their
proprietary rights. To that respect, protecting the accuracy of a text may be as
important for the publisher as for the author ; however, the statutory term of
protection limit in time possible action. Also, the concept of libel may have to be
strained beyond breaking point in order to protect creators of non-literary works and
to prevent deformation of the work after the death of its author.118 Other theories such
as unfair competition could be used, but this doctrine is designed to protect the
economic rights of authors and not their moral rights. The very name suggests
exploitation and protection of the value of commodities, and its expansion in the field
of moral rights or to the protection of purely personal rights will certainly be difficult
for the courts.
In sum, what I wish to demonstrate with these few examples is that the
recognition of authors' rights has far-reaching consequences in monitoring the cultural
heritage of one nation. Common law protection has been through libel, unfair
competition, copyright, and possibly the right to privacy. In my opinion it is difficult
to homogenise and set up a consistent approach to authors' moral rights. Moreover,
this shows that copyright is driven primarily by economic motives. The French
system, despite its over-protective abuses, which in my opinion tend to undermine
public access to works of the mind, tries to answer the need for the protection of the
118 Hoffman, European Legislation and Judicial Decision in the Fields of Copyright in 1930, 8
New York Law Universtiv Law Ouaterlv Review 1931, at 369.
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creator's personality. I am concerned here ultimately with the effect that both systems
may have on the creative environment. Once again, when making choices one has to




The Emergence ofIntellectual PropertyRights:
A New Economic Approach
"Information technologies also may succeed in undermining the economic incentive of
knowledge-producers to continue producing knowledge. With every man a publisher,
traditional publishing houses no longer control the technical means of knowledge
production that once did. Therein lies our dilemma
- Nicholas L. Henry*
Intellectual property, and especially copyright, offers ample grounds for theoretical
and empirical analyses of markets in products of the mind. In conventional
economics, intellectual property rights incorporate an explicit trade-off between
private incentives and social benefits which determines exclusive rights on copies for
a limited period of time. Accordingly, private incentives are expected to arise from the
right holder's limited monopoly powers and social benefits are expected to include
additional benefits to society from the induced disclosure and dissemination of
products of the intellect.
Unfortunately, economists do not have a final word for legal practitioners
concerning the optimal intellectual property system. Only a broad economic literature
on intellectual property and innovation is at the disposal of legal theorists. Some
people simply believe that they provide an unwitting parody of what must be done by
*
Nicholas L. Henry, Copyright: Its Adequacy in Technological Societies, 186 Science 1974, at
993.
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way of the least productive lines of inquiry.1 In my opinion, this shows lack of
openness and understanding of what contrives intellectual property rights. Moreover,
many economists have dedicated their efforts to bring new light to intellectual
property issues. These efforts to comprehend issues related to intellectual property are
made all the more difficult by the rapid changes in technology. The position has been
put with commendable clarity by Donald Quigg:
"After all, it has been said many times that the field of intellectual property
protection stands at the crossroads of technology, the law, and economics."2
As a system, intellectual property seeks to fulfil certain goals by legal, economic, and
social means. As such, copyright and droit d'auteur create private property in creative
works so that the market can simultaneously provide economic incentives for authors
and disseminate authored works. Accordingly, the system responds with other modes
of resource control when markets fail to generate economically desirable outcomes,
works of the mind in our case, or when using the market process would threaten other
social goals, the dissemination of works.
This chapter will be mainly concerned with the fundamental problem of the
emergence of property rights and market formation in products of the intellect.
Markets are systems for consensual exchange of owned goods which are intended to
encourage people to make productive use of resources. Nonetheless, many
impediments prevent markets from forming. Accordingly, the effects of information
technology on the current intellectual property right system will be explored in order
' George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property?. 8 Research
in Law and Economics 1986, at 19-20.
- Donald J. Quigg, Safeguarding Intellectual Property - Stimulus to Economic Expansion, in
Intellectual Property Rights and Capital Formation in the Next Decade, Charls E. Walker & Mark A.
Bloomfield, eds., (New York: University Press of America, 1988), at 33.
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to elaborate a new approach toward the formation of intellectual property rights and
achieve desirable dissemination and to avoid the erosion of incentives. Emphasis will
given to intellectual property as economic rights within market mechanisms rather
than legal property ones.
Above all. 1 would like to introduce the problem of intellectual property in a
more societal manner. In doing so, I will insist upon a point of definition which has its
importance in the information age society. Economists use the term information in
theorising about works of the mind. The trouble with using the term information is
that it seems to place no value upon differentiation, in other words to give meaning tfc
data or facts. Therefore, I will use the term information in opposition to data or factual
knowledge. There is of course nothing wrong with facts or data such as given in a
dictionary, or a telephone directory. Nonetheless, it is used exclusively for support
rather than illumination. Also, the rate of increase of data, especially with the
introduction of the Internet, has not been matched by the rate of increase of
information, and accordingly knowledge and wisdom. What I would like to highlight
here is that the more data people have access to, the greater the need for them to
interpret them. To that respect, information technology allows us to transform data
into information or knowledge on a greater scale. An information society is a society
which puts greater emphasis on knowledge. Accordingly, intellectual property, and
especially copyright protection, has been sought to increase and disseminate such
products of the intellect for the benefit of society. Intellectual property, and especially
copyright protections, has been designed to increase and disseminate products of the
intellect for the benefit of society. With the advent of information technology, more
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works are being disseminated and copyright protections have been undermined in the
digital environment. A questions arises whether copyright is still nescessary to give
economic incentives to produce optimal levels of information. I will attempt to
demonstrate that information technology will give greater incentives for the
production of works of the mind and may well be undermining the economic
approach defended by conventional copyright contenders, baring in mind that
copyright cannot not be resumed to the sole protection of economic interests.
First the problem of the production of works of the mind will be posed in
conventional economic terms in order to bring a critical position on the conventional
approach in the light of information technology. Finally, an attempt to apply this
approach to the information infrastructure will be carried out in order to find a
rejoinder to the introductory remarks on information.
Posing the Problem in Conventional Economic Terms
Welfare economics explores how many individual and group decisions interact to
affect the well-being of individuals and therefore of society as a whole. General
welfare is expressed by a general equilibrium achieved only where competitive forces
have led to the equality of marginal benefit and marginal cost in the market of every
single commodity.3 Following Adam Smith's analysis of market-forming, social
welfare depends on the market place, since individual transactions serve both social
and individual needs. Smith argued that unfettered markets, through the signals
transmitted by prices, guide self-interested individuals, "led by an invisible hand to
3 Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, (HarperCollins Publishers, 1988). at 44.
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promote an end which was no part of his intention", to do what is best not only for
themselves but also for society as a whole.4 The equilibrium achieved is socially
optimal because it is efficient both with respect to the production of goods and to their
allocation to consumers. To that effect, goods are distributed efficiently among
consumers when it is impossible to transfer or re-allocate goods and services among
consumers so as to make any consumer better off without making some other
consumer worse off. As a result, any changes in the production and allocation of
goods would harm someone and break economic efficiency. An economy that is
efficient in production and allocation is socially optimal in the sense of being Pareto
efficient.5 Nonetheless, in reality such conditions are not met due to market failure.
Such failures occur for many reasons such as monopoly, public goods, or external
effects. As regards knowledge goods, their inherent characteristics prevent markets
from forming.
In economics artistic or literary works and inventions of scientific or
technological nature constitute knowledge goods, in other words expressions or
technical implementations of information or ideas. Interestingly, such goods have
some peculiar properties that differentiate them from other goods. Inherently ideas are
free goods because the use of an idea, data, and information by one person neither
reduces the availability of that information to others nor interferes with the ability of
another to consume that same information. As a result, such goods are non-
4 Adam Smith, Am Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth ofNations, Vol.1, (1776), at
477.
5 Vilfredo Pareto, Manual ofPolitical Economy, ( 1972), at 103-180; alternative formulation to the
theory by B. Blackwood, Pareto Efficiency, The New Palgrave Dictrionarv of Economics. Vol.3,
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1987), at 811-813.
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exhaustible since they are free goods whose stock does not decrease with use.
Therefore, it is unlikely that access to ideas and information will lead to rivalry since
there are free goods. In other words, joint consumption is described as non-rivalrous.6
According to Paul Samuelson:
"A common, collective, or public good is here defined as any good such as that, if
any person x; in a group Xj, ...Xj, ...X consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld
from others in that group."7
Society as a result maximises its welfare by not charging for the use of a book or the
ideas contained which are free goods. In economics, the marginal cost of supplying an
additional unit of knowledge is near zero since it springs from brain power and does
not involve any obvious costs. Furthermore, the idea which may spring from one brain
does not preclude someone else's brain coming up with the same idea. As a result,
static efficiency standards suggest that a zero price achieves the optimal allocation of
resources since there is no cost to recover.
Although these goods once created may be used at no additional economic
cost, to create them may be an expensive proposition.8 This introduces another
dimension specific to intellectual goods. Invention or literary work involves
production costs, possibly important ones, that obviously cannot be recovered at a
zero selling price. On a purely economic perspective, artists and investors would have
no incentive to create since they would have to do it for free and possibly lose money
6 Paul Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 Review of Economics & Statistics
1954, at 387-389; Paul Samuelson, Diagrammatics Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37
Review of Economics & Statistics 1955, at 350-356.
7 Mancur Olson, The Logic ofCollective Action Public Goods and the Theory ofGroups, Harvard
Economic Studies. Vol.124, (Cambridge, Mass.- Harvard University Press, 1965), at 14.
8 For a general economic framework for analysising net benefits involved out of markets in
relation to intellectual property, see John P. Palmer, Copyright and Computer Software, 8 Research in
Law and Economics 1986, at 212-214.
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in the process. Also, a person who transfers information does not give up the
information itself since such a person cannot unlearn that information.9 In effect both
individuals may use the information simultaneously. Consequently, there is no
complete exclusivity in knowledge once given out. The public good nature of
information goods further complicates the problem since ideas and information cannot
be appropriated. Understandably, since invention of the wheel was made public, it has
been virtually impossible to prevent others from using the same idea freely. As a
result, conflicts arise between the efficient static allocation of ideas and the efficient
dynamic production of knowledge goods. Static efficiency calls for free access to
ideas because additional users do not impose any extra static costs to society. Thus a
zero price maximises welfare in the static sense. Dynamic efficiency requires, by
contrast, that creation or innovation be pursued to the point where the total
incremental value, across all members of society of the incremental creation or
invention, is equal to the cost of producing the good.10 Consequently, individual
transactions result in the maximisation of value establishing a price which maximises
production and allocation of products. In other words production is limited in quantity
and consumption is rivalrous where a price controls access to products. Clearly,
reliance on such consensual bargains to achieve a socially desirable result cannot be
complete since knowledge goods' characteristics inherently prevent markets from
9 Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Information as Property Databases and
Commercial Property, 1 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 1993, at 11.
10 Robert P. Benko, Intellectual Property Rights and New Technologies, in Intellectual Property
Rights and Capital Formation in the Next Decade, Charls E. Walker and Mark A Bloomfield, eds.,
(New York: University Press of America, 1988), at 29.
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achieving that goal. In effect the transaction costs outweigh the net benefits that the
parties would have gained.
Fundamentally, there is a need to understand how markets are being formed
since these are the essence of the economic theory of property, and especially
intellectual property in the form of copyright. Dynamic efficiency evolves out of
consensual bargains. The bargaining model works as a co-operative game because
parties can both benefit from co-operating with each other.11 As a result, an
agreement, if reached, will be the product of negotiation between the parties. The fact
that the parties can negotiate is an advantage of bargaining games relative to other
games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, in which the inability of the parties to
communicate makes achieving a co-operative surplus difficult, even impossible.12 The
possible outcomes of this game theory are a co-operative solution or a non-
cooperative one. With a co-operative solution, a surplus is determined and distributed
according to the terms of the agreement. But disagreement or failure to cooperate may
happen. The fact that parties do not agree means that nobody is better off or loses
since they keep their original position or threat value. However, no surplus can be
shared. Therefore, it may be argued that both parties have lost a possible surplus to
share. As a result, the process was costly of the possible surplus. Rationally each party
tries to minimise costs, and especially the loss of a possible surplus. Failure to co-
11 See generally, Martin Shubik, Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions,
Vol.1, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984).
12 For a comprehensive expample of the Prisoner's Dilemma using intellectual property rights as
an example, see Wendy J. Gordon, Asymetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual
Property, 17 University of Davton Law Review 1992, at 860-866.
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operate in fact prevents markets being formed. In other words, transaction costs are
conditions impeding perfect competition which involves losses for society.
Thomas Hobbes echoed the importance of minimising such losses.13 He
argued that people would seldom be rational enough to agree upon a division of the
co-operative surplus even when there were no serious impediments to bargaining. As
a result the natural cupidity of people would lead them to quarrel unless a third and
stronger party forced them to agree. Hobbes suggested a principle to structure the law
in order to minimise the harm caused by failures in private agreements over resource
allocation.14 This principle has been known as the Normative Hobbes Theorem. Law
should be designed to prevent coercive threats and to eliminate the destruetiveness of
disagreement. Other obstacles to co-operative bargaining exist, whether in a state of
nature or in a modern legal framework, The central purposes of property law, and
contract law, are to remove such obstacles to private bargaining since voluntary
exchange is mutually beneficial and successful bargaining generates a co-operative
surplus. Therefore, an economic analysis of property ought to investigate the obstacles
to private bargaining and demonstrate how legal rules can contribute to overcoming
these obstacles.
Three obstacles to co-operation may be determined as communication costs,
monitoring costs, and strategic costs.15 First, bargaining is made easier when the threat
points are public knowledge. As a result, rules which allow parties to be aware of their
13 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ot the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth
Ecclesiastical! and Civil, Part. 1-Chapter 15 "Of other laws of nature", (1651).
14 Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 Journal of Legal Study 1982, at 1.
15 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, (Harper and COliins Publishers, 1988),
at 101
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respective opponents' position are more likely to co-operate and facilitate co-operative
solutions minimising negotiation time and expenses.16 Therefore, when stated
publicly in legal terms, positions or rights facilitate bargaining games or help in
solving legal disputes. Therefore, the simpler property law criteria are the easier it is
to determine ownership. Second, co-operative solutions require monitoring and
policing which can be costly. The number of the disputants and their geographical
dispersion play a major role in the cost of negotiating or communicating. Also,
monitoring the cost of enforcing the agreement would be low inasmuch as violations
of the agreement are easy to observe and manage. Third, dividing the surplus is
difficult without any rational agreement. Unreasonableness in demands may result
from emotional concerns or when parties strategically push their claims beyond
reasonable limits. In sum, one essential aspect of bargaining is to anticipate
strategically an opponent's threats and position in order to establish a surplus. Any
wrong assessment of the opponent's expectations may result in failure to cooperate as
parties immediately insist on their own position. Explanations of failure are often that
parties are unknown to each other and cannot foresee what to expect from each other
before entering any co-operative game. Consequently, one can see that beyond the
normative Hobbes theorem, property law could facilitate private agreements by
reducing communication, monitoring and strategic costs. Ronald Coase argued
16 Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25
Journal of Law & Economics 1982, at 73.
another normative principle which asserted that the law ought to be structured in order
to remove impediments to private agreements over resource allocation.17
Clearly, legal systems act in diverse ways to increase the probability that such
conditions will be present for market-formation. Therefore, when a market does not
work properly, a decision will often have to be made on whether market transactions
or collective fiat are more likely to bring parties closer to the result the perfect market
would have reached. Two possible legal responses may occur. One is the creation of
governmental or public agencies which make resource allocation decisions by means
of regulations or are empowered to enforce regulations. For instance, some authors or
public agency may enforce intellectual property rights and help contracting parties.
Another is to set up incentives that encourage the achievement of efficient results even
in the absence of markets. Intellectual property systems, and especially copyright law,
intend to produce incentives for the production of knowledge goods. As Isaac Newton
confessed, "[i]f I have seen far, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants."18
Copyright law creates private property in creative works as an effort to cure market
failure stemming from the presence of public good characteristics. On the one hand,
such legal means secure monopolies to remedy the appropriability problem, thus
reaching a social optimum in dynamic situations. To that effect, they violate static
economic efficiency, or optimal resource allocation, in the short term in an effort to
generate a continuing supply of creative goods by facilitating dynamic efficiency.
17 Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1960, at 1;
alternative formulation to the theorem presented by Robert Coter, The Coase Theorem, The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Vol.1, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1991), at 457-459
18 Isaac Newton cited in Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives 1991, at 29
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Copyright monopolies guarantee owners the right to control the use made of their
works in order to receive a revenue producing an appropriate level of incentive to
create or produce knowledge goods. On the other hand, monopoly imposes certain
costs on society for the promise of additional and future benefits, namely creations
and inventions. As Judge Frank Easterbrook put it:
"The tradeoff is not monopoly versus competition, or protection in exchange for
disclosure. It is dynamic gains in exchange for allocative losses."19
Therefore, copyright law attempts to balance costs imposed on society with the
benefits gained, in other words to strike a balance between future diffusion and
immediate exclusion. For instance, technical implementations or artistic creations
would legally be considered copyrightable or patentable, or neither, according to the
principles applied by each form of protection. Consequently, copyright and droit
d'auteur alike have been designed to protect only the expression of ideas and not the
ideas themselves, since society ought to have free access to ideas and knowledge. As
such, the system is designed to reflect the economic interests of creators and society
as well as to strike a balance between the social costs and social benefits of creations.
The chief justification for imposing such disturbances to static efficiency is taken as a
reflection of broader social concerns for long-run growth, technological progress and
cultural enlightenment. Nonetheless, costs and benefits must be weighed and balanced
in the construction of any particular intellectual property system. Society has relied
mainly on legal monopolies, in the form of copyright and patent, in order to balance
individual and social interests.
19 Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Proerty is Still Property, 13 Harvard Journal of Law &
Public Policy 1990, at 110.
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Copyright creates private property in creative works so that the market can
simultaneously provide enough economic incentives for authors and disseminate
authored works. The case for private ownership rather than communal or public
ownership advocates principles of efficient use of natural resources. It is not by
accident that society has made the choice of privileging private ownership in the form
of copyright. The rise of private ownership came along with the promotion of patent-
monopolies and individualism in medieval and renaissance times. More recently, it
has been argued that communal use as an open access to natural resources, results in
over-use and ends in destruction of natural resources.20 Therefore, resources are
efficiently used when among other things the price for using resources reflects their
value in the next best alternative use, in other words what economists call their
"opportunity cost". Therefore, a pricing scheme leads to the efficient use of property.
For instance, ideas contained in books may be free goods, but copyright allows
publishers to appropriate the value of books through a pricing scheme. By private,
economists mean an individual, for instance an author, or an organisation such as a
publishing company. Therefore, a publisher becomes a temporary private owner of the
written contents of his publications. Efficient use of resources would result from
private ownership as opposed to communal property which would lead to a sizeable
welfare loss due to reliance upon communal property rights. Copyright, in attributing
private property rights, allocates resources to people in order to give them liberty over
knowledge goods, in other words, creates a zone of discretion within which owners
20 R. J. Agnello and L.P. Donelly, Property Rights and Efficiency in the Oyster Industry, 18
Journal of Law & Economics 1975, at 521; G. Power, More About Oysters Than You Wanted to Know,
30 Maryland Law Review 1970. at 199.
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are free to exercise their will over their property in order fully to appropriate
production of knowledge goods. Exclusion is thus the means by which authors and
publishers protect their publications. As explained, the marginal cost of use of free
goods is zero. Copyright allows creators to set a price in excess of marginal cost and
therefore create an allocative loss for society which should not exceed the benefits of
the creation for society. Nonetheless, creation of a zone of exclusion assumes that one
author's use, or expression, of ideas can be separated from others since different
publications may rest upon identical ideas. For instance, individuals who
independently express identical ideas or discover the same information are not subject
to the first company's rights but hold independent rights to use, transfer or disclose
their property.21 Clearly, one can see that it is difficult to separate the property
interests of each individual protected by copyright law. Added to this, the essential
role of property, in other words of copyright, is to use ideas efficiently in maximising
production of knowledge goods in order to increase the public domain. Once non-
separability of individual property rights occurs, difficulties arise about enforcing
individual property rights and producing knowledge goods efficiently.
Fundamental considerations may be drawn from the non-separability problem
of private property. The key condition for efficient use of resources, or market-
forming, is that all costs and benefits are internal to the transactions that generate
them. As a result, costs or benefits must be borne by persons with decision-making
power in a given transaction and not by persons external to it. By contrast, public
21 Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Information as Property Databases and
Commercial Property, 1 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 1993, at 9
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goods involve externalities which induce market failure.22 Copyright law intends to
internalise externalities. Knowledge goods have two crucial properties, non-
exhaustiveness and non-excludability. The full benefit of the good is available to each
individual without reducing the quantity or quality of the good which is thus
characterised by indefinite large marginal costs of exclusion. Consequently, potential
consumers are uncertain about the utility of knowledge goods because it is difficult to
determine their value until they have them, having necessarily paid for them. Since
potential consumers cannot establish their utility it is impossible to offer a price for
the use of the good. Producers face problems of similar economic importance. They
encounter extreme difficulties in appropriating the value of knowledge goods through
sale after devoting resources to their production. This is explained by the fact that
once information is sold to one person, the latter becomes a potential competitor of
the original producer owing to the low cost of transmitting information. Therefore,
each consumer is a potential "free-rider". By definition a free-rider is an individual
who makes decisions in his own interest and is thus willing to pay no more than the
cost of transmission for the commodity. A free-rider may well be a person who makes
a tape-recorded copy of a CD for himself, or for sale and therefore make a profit
without having to bear all the costs of producing the CD. Such a behaviour has in fact
an imperceptible effect on society since markets for pure public goods are
characterised by a large number of participants.23 Nonetheless, one can understand
that for information goods, free-riding may prevent people from producing original
22 Paul Samuelson, Pure Theory of Public Expenditure and Taxation, in Margolis and Guitton,
eds., (London: Public Economics, 1969), at 102.
23 Earl R. Brubaker, Free Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule?, 18 Journal of Law &
Economics 1975, at 148.
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works since others may "steal" them. The law may consider the second situation as an
infringement of copyright and act against the person who is deliberately pirating the
works for profitable ends; however, in economic terms both situations have an effect
on markets, and excluding non-paying beneficiaries, in other words non-contributors
to the costs of supplying such goods, becomes an extremely expensive proposition.
Because of the difficulties of determining a collective demand, a collective good
intermediation is necessary in order to internalise such externalities. Accordingly,
copyright laws are meant to provide such a service in facilitating the necessary
negotiations in order to establish optimal allocation of resources. Therefore copyright
is a form of coercive polity initiated by government, which is intended to induce full
expression of demand since full voluntary expression of the amount of public good
desired and full voluntary contribution to its supply is highly unlikely to occur.24 As
Lord Macaulay stated :
"The principle of copyright is this: it is a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a
bounty to writers. The tax is an exceedingly bad one - it is a tax on one of the most
innocent and most salutary of human pleasures; and let us never forget that a tax on
innocent pleasures is a premium on vicious pleasures".25
Copyright is undoubtedly a coercive governmental intervention which intends to
correct market failures for the public interest. Accordingly, careful attention ought to
be given to any forms of taxation which cannot be sustained by the public interest.
With the advent of information technology, one may inquire whether copyright still
serves the public interest.
24 Ibid.
2:1 T. Macaulay, Speeches:Parliamentary and Micellaneous, Vol.2, (London: H.Vizetelly, Clarke,
Beeton, 1853), at 292.
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It should be stressed that an externality is not only a cost but also a benefit that
the voluntary actions of one or more people impose or confer on third parties without
their consent. Creation of knowledge goods assumes the use of resources which may
or not belong to the public domain. In some cases, such as academic endeavours,
much of the social benefit produced by use of resources by scholars does not translate
into full compensation. Added to that, such endeavours may generate external benefits
which are not fully translated in incomes received.26 As a result, it may be assumed
that scholars' willingness to pay for resources might understate their ability to use
resources in a way that serves social needs. In other words they may over-invest and
thus not induce efficient use of resources. What I am concerned with here is the
efficiency of markets established by copyright. Copyright as a mechanism for
facilitating socially desirable transactions fails to a certain extent to internalise
correctly such production. Consequently, the costs and benefits for the uses of
resources may differ from the exact social costs and benefits at stake in such
circumstances, to the effect that transactions leading to an increase in social benefit
may not occur. These beneficial externalities induced by potential users who may
wish to produce socially meritorious works by using some copyright materials are in
fact unable to use the materials because the market structure prevents them from being
able to capitalise on the benefits to be realised. I have argued that copyright creates a
zone of exclusion within which owners are free to exercise their will over their
property in order fully to appropriate production of knowledge goods. Enforcement of
copyright exercises a coercive power, giving owners an ability to bar certain uses of
26 Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Columbia Law Review 1982, at 1630.
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their creative work and thus giving them the ability to extract a price from the use
from those who wish to use their work. Such a constraint is balanced in theory by free
access to ideas and concepts in order to ensure that production and allocation remains
socially optimal. One can clearly understand that striking a balance between exclusion
and dissemination depends highly on the principles upon which the intermediation
service is based. The twin pillars of copyright law are that only expressions of an
original idea are granted monopoly rights, and that only the physical expression which
embodies the idea is protected, as opposed to the droit d'auteur which protects
expressions of the intellect whatever their form. Failures in respecting any of these
respective principles lead to an inbalance. As long as the benefits exceed the costs
imposed to society, copyright remains overall beneficial to society.
Economic efficiency concerns solely the production of wealth. Because a
society incurs the costs of defining property rights over a resource only when the
benefits of that definition exceed the costs, valuable resources remain in the public
domain until the cost of administering a system of property rights is not prohibitive.
Therefore, it may be argued that laws which tend to evolve toward economic
efficiency need to obey that principle. Copyright law has depended upon physical
commodities; in other words it is a system of control based upon a medium-by-
medium basis.27 With the rise of new technologies, and especially communication and
information technologies, the very foundations of copyright law have been
challenged, and questions arise whether or not copyright still fulfils that purpose. New
media of expression have been reduced to a single digital form, which has evolved
27 Janusz A. Ordover, A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion, 5 Journal of Economic
Perspectives 1991, at 43.
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into complicated electronic networks leading to market failure. Property interests of
different individual authors have become complex to monitor since separation
between ideas and their expression has been blurred. Because separability of
individual property rights has become difficult, enforcement of individual property
rights, and thus efficient allocation and production of ideas, has turned out to be
impractical due to a rising of social costs to the detriment of social benefits. In
practice, information technology has heightened the strategic significance of access to
information in today's competitive world markets. For instance, access to worldwide
information databases has been made possible through the Internet. Moreover,
importance is given to the control of information, since it has become a crucial
resource for public and private organisations, and nations alike. Such developments
have raised questions about current copyright mechanisms establishing property
ownership and the optimal production of knowledge. Hybrid forms of copyright
protection, incomplete and often uncertain in their ability to strike a balance between
social and individual interests, have attempted to stretch traditional intellectual
property systems in order to fit new technological requirements. Contrary to the
expected effect, such systems have over strained the original mechanism to run the
risk of inadvertently undermining it.28 It is enough to mention copyright protection of
computer software to illustrate this dilemma. In stretching copyright principles
beyond their original intent in order to accommodate software's intellectual property
needs, copyright protection has been undermined. The consequence has been to blur
the distinction between industrial property and literary or artistic property, in their
28 J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 Columbia Law
Review 1994, at 2432.
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respective monopoly rights and their intended purposes. Accordingly, a review of
their structure and operation in light of each system's goals has become necessary.
In order to re-examine copyright protection, it should be clearly understood
that what one should analyse is how efficient copyright is as a common good
intermediation service. Copyright is one system among many others which has served
this purpose. Two fundamental questions need to be answered. First, I will look at
current intellectual property rights to see whether or not they are adequate incentives
for the optimal production and allocation of information resources. In other words, is
there a need for intellectual property or copyright protection? Second, as an
intermediary service it is crucial to consider whether or not the system is practicable
in order to provide the intended incentives. Such a system must allow potential users
to bargain around its coercive mechanisms. Markets allow owners of knowledge
goods to sell their work and not copyright. If such people are unable to obtain a price
reflecting the value of their work, there will be a lack of incentives which will result
in fewer works being created. Market failures exist because bargaining is impeded by
problems of externalities, high transaction costs, and no market substitute and
therefore access to ideas will be denied to society. Consequently copyright should not
be enforced since the mechanisms are faulty, in other words do not strike a balance
between exclusion and dissemination. Some have already argued that there may be
some situations when authors could obtain payment, and therefore appropriate their
goods, without copyright protection. For instance, Stephen Breyer29 and Tom
29 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study ofCopyright in Books, Photocopies,
and Computer Programs, 84 Harvard Law Review 1970, at 281.
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Palmer30 have debated on the extent to which intellectual property protection is really
necessary in various industries. In order to answer these questions, it will be necessary
to investigate how rational player behave under a variety of specified constraints, and
especially under the new information technology ones. This will determine which
payoffs each players may receive according to their constraint choices and how they
act in order to maximise the benefits.
Critical Position Toward The Conventional Theory
The conventional theory attempts to establish how knowledge good markets are
prevented from being Pareto efficient. Attribution of temporary monopoly has been
the economic answer to market failures in an attempt to remedy such deficiencies. To
that effect, it has already been argued by Bruno Leoni and Friedrich Hayek that
copyright provisions are not forms of legitimate property rights but of illegitimate
state-granted monopoly. They are not natural wealth maximisation out of a bargaining
process.31 Since the publication in 1960 of Ronald Coase's essay on The Problem of
Social Cost, the attention of economists has been generally focused on the institution
of property.32 The work of Coase on externalities, and especially transaction costs, has
brought the problem of property rights into focus, allowing greater attention to be paid
to the emergence and structure of property rights. As such, intellectual property has
come under closer scrutiny. Coase's analysis recognised external effects which can be
internalised through the assignment of property rights in order to correct market
30 Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12
Hamline Law Review 1989, at 261.
31 Peter H. Aranson, Bruno Leoni in Retrospect, 1 I Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 1988,
at 665.
32 Ronald Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 Journal of law & Economics. I960, at I.
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failure, especially concerning public goods. Following his analysis, I will attempt to
examine the effects on intellectual property rights in light of information technology
development.
The conventional approach to the economics of intellectual property rights is
illustrated by two divergent property propositions expressed by the copyright law and
droit d'auteur. The economic approach attempts to explain how society makes the
best use of scarce resources in putting resources under the exclusive control of
individuals rather than their exploitation at will by all comers on the market. The two
legal approaches attempt to provide incentives for creative activity. And both
advocate the creation of property rights in order to reach their common objective.
Some have argued that:
"This theory was latent in the Roman law development of the rights of property, with
its emphasis on dominium, or exclusive control over tangible objects."33
As a matter of fact, I have already argued and contended that not only had the Romans
elaborated a concept of intellectual property based upon physical ownership of
manuscripts but also one of personal rights which remained the property of creators.
No economic provisions were prescribed to internalise externalities; nonetheless,
semi-legal provisions prevented plagiarists from unscrupulously copying someone
else's verses. To that effect, it could be argued that protection of accuracy and
integrity of works is guaranteed to provide reasonable incentives to creators to publish
their work. Also, the theory about the evolution of property rights is based upon the
assumption that the structure of property institutions evolves out of "factors which
33 Robert M. Hurt and Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale ofCopyright, 56 American
Economic Association 1966, at 422
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govern changes in the content of property rights".34 Factors of change range from
technological innovations and the opening of new markets relative to scarcity factors
to the behaviour of the state. Western society has experienced many changes such as
the introduction of the pergamon in Roman time and the invention of the printing
press in the late Middle Ages. Similarly, different property rights have been
established by society. As a result, the rise of information technology will
undoubtedly affect the institutions of intellectual property rights. Currently, copyright
claims are acquired from and enforced by government in an attempt to have an entity
which gives control over products of the mind. Such contentions can be supported
especially by copyright law as developed in common law countries. Investors in
intellectual products serve the polity of the state. Copyright protection distinctively
relates to the acceptance of John Locke's philosophy in which the primary function of
a government is to protect property titles and to the laissez faire philosophy inherited
from Adam Smith.35 There is no need to emphasise that the logic of copyright
protection is firmly a response to technology, and especially printing, where, as
Jeremy Bentham put it:
"Property is nothing but a basis of expectation; the expectation of deriving
advantages from a thing, which we are said to possess, in consequence of the relation
in which we stand towards it."36
34 Terry L. Anderson and P. J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American
West, 18 The Journal of Law and Economics 1975, at 164.
35 Right of governing and power set alongside that of presserving oneself and the rest of mankind,
see John Locke, OfCivil Government, Two Treatises, II § 128-30, (17"").
36 Jeremy Bentham, Theory ofLegislation: Principles of the Civil Code, Chapter 8 "Of property"
(1776), at 111; Also "the common tendency of man to make a duty and a virtue of following his self-
interest", see John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism; On Liberty; Essay on Bentham, (London: Fontana Press
Ltd, 1985), at 118.
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Moreover, property rights rest in the hands of authors according to the postulate upon
which the use of reason attributes to man property of the products of his creation.37
Such contentions have become today the refuge of justification for intellectual
property titles vested in authors by copyright law. Moreover, there is a different
degree of importance and interdependence according to whether concerns are
expressed from creators or producers.
In theory, decentralised property rights rather than state provisions are
normally preferred in order to avoid interference with markets in the form of imposed
monopolies. Copyright provisions have been introduced because investors in
knowledge goods could not sustain the optimal amount of production in a competitive
environment. In such an environment, marginal benefit and marginal cost would be
equal where price per unit equals marginal cost. By contrast, a profit-maximising
monopoly results in an output and price combination which occur at a point where the
price per unit exceeds the marginal cost of production.38 As a result, the efficiency of
monopolies can be questioned since a monopoly's price does not result from an
equilibrium. Therefore, the obvious public policy would be to replace such monopoly
by competition in order to introduce efficient uses of resources. As regards copyright,
government has on the contrary created temporary monopolies by law in order to
sustain an optimum level of creative activity. Such public intervention may be called
the standard economic theory of intellectual property. Since Coase's work, additional
theories have been advocated which seek to suppress monopolies when the original
37 Man has the right to the fruits of his labour, see John Locke, Of Civil Government, Two
Treatises, II § 32-40,(1698).
38 Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, (Harper Collins Publishers, 1988), at 45.
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producer can indirectly appropriate enough revenue to compensate costs of producing
or when there is too much information created on one specific area.39 Therefore, one
might assume that economists have proposed alternative theories to the conventional
one. I would contend that this is not the case. What economists have argued is
alternative public policies which require a certain of taxonomy of information which
would allow the state to determine when to attribute monopolies or not to intervene.
Therein lies a problem. Proponents of such theories recognise that it is impossible to
determine such a system. Some have argued that markets of non-tangible goods may
function in the absence of intellectual property rights.40 1 would simply contend that
property rights should be formed outside the interventionist scope of the state.
Alternative economic solutions have to be found at the formation of property rights
which can recognise the intellectual interests of creators in the product of their mind.
Therefore, a close examination of the emergence of property right institutions need to
be pursued.
The primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve
a greater internalisation of externalities.41 By making possible negotiations among
parties whose actions create external effects, property rights allow them to attain
higher levels of satisfaction than would otherwise be possible. Property rights can
emerge when changes in technology, demand, or other factors create externalities that
were previously absent, and internalise externalities when the gains of internalisation
39 Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, (Harper Collins Publishers, 1988), at 115,
40 Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economic Approach, 12
Hamline Law Review 1989, at 261; see also its critic, Michael J. Krauss, Property Monopoly and
Intellectual Rights, 12 Hamline Law Review 1989, at 305.
41 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, The Economics of Property Rights, (E.
Furobotn & S. Pejovich eds. 1974), at 32.
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become larger than the costs of internalisation.42 Following this line of thinking, two
fundamental criticisms can be brought against the conventional economic theory. On
the one hand, the conventional theory argues that under-investment in inventive
activity of knowledge occurs because the public nature of knowledge goods prevents
producers from fully capturing the benefits of their production. As a matter of fact, it
should be recognised that traditional "discussions of public good do not pay close
enough attention to the definition of a public good" from an institutional point of
view.43 Two main critiques should be brought to our attention. First, the joint
consumption assumption ignores the varying levels of use of consumers. Certain
circumstances may reduce the consumption of knowledge goods. For instance, certain
books may be highly recommended by university teachers, and may result in
additional investments to provide substitutes. Therefore, the distinction between
private and public good may be blurred in choosing different marginal units by simply
itemising course requirements in units.44 Consequently, the more limited our
perception of what is the relevant marginal unit of the good, the weaker we are to
perceive goods as private. Second, excludability assumes that there are two ways of
supplying goods: one which excludes free-riders and another which does not.
According to John Head and Carl Shoup, goods can be supplied in a marketing mode
which allows exclusion and in a non-marketing mode which does not exclude
42 Ibid.
43 Tyler Cowen, Public Goods Definitions and Their Institutional Context: A Critique of Public
Goods Theory, 43 Review of Social Economy 1985, at 53.
44 Tyler Cowen, Public Goods Definitions and Their Institutional Context: A Critique of Public
Goods Theory, 43 Review of Social Economy 1985, at 57.
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anybody.45 Both modes imply costs of production and therefore comparison of
optimal level of production cannot be assessed, as it is under the conventional theory,
upon the quantity of output. Accordingly, these critics astutely contended that the
optimal level of production should be considered in relation to the mode of supply.
Consequently, supply of goods can looked at from a different angle. Clearly,
exclusion may be said to be always possible; it is more or less costly. Therefore,
excludability is not related to the nature of goods but rather how they are supplied and
at what levels they are produced and consumed.46 As regards information technology,
emergence of property rights will therefore be modified since exclusion may become
less costly. On the other hand, contentions that a creator or inventor can only hope to
capture some fraction of the technological benefits due to his discovery overlooks the
consideration that there will be. aside from the technological benefits, wealth
redistribution due to price revaluation from the release of the new information.47
Accordingly, publishers in being first on the market with the publication should be
able to capture a portion of these pecuniary effects. As such, this should be socially
useful in motivating publication of knowledge goods. Furthermore, Jack Hirshleifer
contends that:
"Even though practical considerations limit the effective scale and consequent
impact of speculation and/or resale, the gains thus achievable eliminate any a priori
anticipation of underinvestment in the generation of new technological
knowledge."48
45 John Head & Carl Shoup, Public Goods, Private Goods, and Ambiguous Goods, 79 Economic
Journal 1969, at 569 cited in Tyler Cowen, Public Goods Definitions and Their Institutional Context: A
Crtique ofPublic Goods Theory, 43 Review of Social Economy 1985, at 60.
46 Tyler Cowen, Public Goods Definitions and Their Institutional Context: A Critique of Public
Goods Theory, 43 Review of Social Economy 1985, at 61.
47 Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive
Activity, 61 The American Economic Review 1971, at 573.
48 ibid.
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What I am concerned here with is that not enough attention has been given to the
formation of markets themselves. Because production of knowledge good has been
protected for so long under the auspices of the state, there has been no attempt to look
at alternative incentives which trust market mechanisms. This, I venture to say, is a
direct consequence of the narrow vision of what should be intellectual property: a
right inherent from creators and not a narrow vision of property rights limited to
economic rights. Accordingly, special attention should be given to the situation of
both beneficiaries of copyright protection, authors and investors.
Creativity is a complex process in which motives are far from being solely of
an economic nature. Expectation of monopoly profits cannot be considered as the
exclusive motivation for creativity because the creativity evolves out of emotional and
irrational human behaviour.49 By contrast, economic theory assumes that individual
behaviours are by nature rational because homo-oeconomicus pursues his self-interest.
Added to this prescriptive motivation, rational behaviour:
"concerns the possible use of models of rational behaviour in explaining and
predicting actual behaviour. [...] The first consists in characterising rational
behaviour, and the second, following that, bases actual behaviour on rational
behaviour."50
In reality, some people simply create without any intention or hope of revealing to the
public the product of their own minds. Propagation of religious, political or any other
partisan ideas as well as altruism certainly play an important part in the motivations
49 Even though Zhi Griliches looked at patents and patent statistics it has been recognised that
"there seemed to be little correlation between aggregate total factor productivity and total patenting
numbers". As a result, inventive activity or creation is not as such induced by means of patent or
copyright protection, see Zhi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 Journal
of Economic Literature 1990, at 1670.
50 For a complete definition of rational behaviour, see Amartya Sen, Rational Behaviour, The
New Palsrave Dictionary of Economics. Vol.4, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1991), at 68-74.
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which lead to the creation and publication of works of the mind. For instance,
recognition by peers or enhancement of one's reputation may well give impetus to
creation. Furthermore, some creators are also ready to meet the expense of their
creative process or pay for some or part of their own publication in order to satisfy
their own desires to express themselves. In situation like that in the academia, the rule
"publish or perish" dictates most certainly the rate of scholarly publications, which
springs less from emotional creativity than from conscious and planned enterprise.
Therefore, I believe that all human beings possess the ability to create. With the
advent of information technology more opportunities have been offered to individuals
to express themselves and to develop their own creativity. What is a creation is a
matter of definition; in economic terms it is a matter of social utility or value
attributed by society in which emotional and irrational judgement take place under
cover of rationality. Contributions with high cultural or scientific content may require
financial help before the work is even carried out. By contrast, other artistic, literary
and scientific endeavours may spring out of any planned and financed process.
Clearly, this shows that the diversity of intellectual endeavours complicate the task of
economists in theorising about creators' behaviour. Nonetheless, what should be
recognised is that certain works need financial help in advance in order to be carried
out. People who invest in such works require a certain assurance that they will get
back their investments either in pecuniary form or other benefits. There are some
publications, such as magazines and large public literature, which are primarily for the
purpose of providing an income to their authors or investors.51 Investors in such
5' Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,
and Computer Programs, 84 Harvard Law Review 1970, at 281.
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products need efficient means to secure incremental income from subsidiary and re¬
print rights. However, many other publications with high knowledge content and
purely artistic works reflect different concerns, more intellectual than commercial. For
instance, creativity may need to be supported at an early stage during the moment of
creativity, before the period of publication, and not during the period of income. This
can be done through private patronage, tax-exempt foundations, or governmental
support. Return on investment will be secured by adequate control of access.
Commercial concerns will however be closely associated with authors' concerns in
protecting the integrity and accuracy of works, which in fact represent the inherent
value of works. One question may have arisen in the mind of the reader: how can one
determine to which category each work belongs since 1 have already rejected the
taxonomy proposed earlier on? In our case it is not the state which determines what
"public" policy should be applied; rather as creators themselves private individuals
determine what is necessary for the realisation of their projects. The approach has
shifted from the public authorities to private individuals who co-operate with
producers for the provision of knowledge goods. As already noted, such a shift
occurred in the emergence of droit d'auteur. Moreover, it should then be clear that
adequate intellectual property rights, and especially moral rights, would protect
authors' creative independence against pressure from investors.
On the supply side, publishing houses and other investors in knowledge goods
have direct commercial concerns unless they act as liberal patrons. Nonetheless, in the
latter case, creators are commissioned for a definite work which as a result will also
bear the personality of its commissioner. It then becomes difficult to distinguish each
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personal contribution and accordingly to value its utility. Here lies another
fundamental difference between droit d'auteur and copyright. For instance, rights vest
in the employers and not the employees unless otherwise provisioned. Incentives to
create fall on the side of a system which recognises personal contributions. Generally
speaking, publishing houses perceive creative activity as a source of profits and
increase their assets by acquiring rights in products of the intellect. The function of
publishers is almost exclusively entrepreneurial. As a matter of fact, certain houses
argue that they are generally publishing at a loss and the reason why they are still
publishing is because the few successes compensate the losses of the many. With the
rise of information technology and other computing facilities, publishing is no longer
the exclusive field of established houses, and is open to small businesses.52 Computer
hardware costs are continuing to fall. For instance, four years ago the entry price for
an IBM mainframe was almost $3 million. Nowadays IBM second generation CMOS-
based mainframes are expected to be a bargain with prices starting at about $500,000
for a uniprocessor.53 Technology has become more affordable to individuals enlarging
publishing potential for independent publishing endeavours at the same quality level.
In other words, there are fewer capital requirements and the industry is becoming
highly competitive, lifting entrance barriers which have been supported by copyright
law. Also, with the enlargement of the creators' community and the new technical
facilities, users will most certainly become beneficiaries in terms of access to a wider
range of work. Nonetheless, concerns are expressed about the quality of future
52 Nicholas L. Henry, Copyright: Its Adequacy in Technological Societies, 186 Science 1974, at
993.
53 Information Week. 19 June 1995, at 24.
199
endeavour as well as about the future of publishing houses, and it is argued that users
will ultimately be the losers of the game. Such gloomy descriptions of the future of
publishing need careful critical analysis.
Monopoly grants cannot be the only method of avoiding bankruptcy. For
instance, in the early years of the French droit d'auteur, bankruptcies were far from
being imputable to the lack of monopoly rights. Moreover, in a competitive
environment new markets are formed and others vitiated. Judge Stephen Breyer
carried out a survey of the economic health of publishing enterprises and concluded
that the case for granting copyright monopoly and for extending it to new types of
creative activity is weak.54 He pointed out that the original publisher has an
advantage: a "lead time". As a matter of fact, Sir Louis Mallet had already argued in
1878 in favour of the abolition of copyright monopoly in similar terms. He explained
his position in contending that:
"it will always be in the power of the first publisher of a work so to control the value,
by a skilful adaptation of the supply to the demand, as to avoid the risk of ruinous
competition, and secure remuneration both to the author and himself."55
The entrepreneurial function of publishers includes the ability to gauge demand at the
projected price. In economic terms the fixed costs of the copier are lower; however,
the marginal costs of production will be similar to the first publisher on the market.
The copier will therefore probably need to sell on the market as many copies as the
original publisher in order to reduce its average costs significantly below those of the
original publisher. As a result, a large quantity of books will not be sold at "normal"
price until they are reduced. Since both publishers have similar marginal costs and
>4 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study ofCopyright in Books, Photocopies,
and Computer Programs, 84 Harvard Law Review 1970, at 281.
5:1 cited in Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects ofCopyright in Books, 2 Economica 1934, at 193.
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possibly the original publisher has a better edition in terms of quality, it will be
possible for him to reduce his price and dispose of his stock competing against copied
editions. As a matter of fact, such a hypothetical case may have been drawn from real
situations where established publishing houses have had to engage in price wars
against pirated editions, establishing by the same token "a reputation for retributive
conduct".56 Contracts with authors may also reserve exclusive rights to new
introductions, additions and revisions by the author to subsequent editions. This
should reinforce especially the theory of assignment of rights to authors and their
intellectual interests in protecting the accuracy and integrity of their works. Would
Arnold Plant be right in declaring that "[t]he abolition of copyright need not therefore
result in the complete abandonment of the business of book production either by
publishers or by professional authors"? 57 Clearly, changes in copyright protection
will most certainly not affect publishers so dramatically but simply require a better
integration of authors' interests in the production of products of the intellect. What it is
important to realise is that there are some ventures which are expected to and do cover
costs of production even in the absence of copyright. Therefore copyright is not
necessary as encouragement to take these risks. In fact, copyright simply enhances
artificially private returns on these ventures and leads to the distortion of monopoly
prices. In other cases, some ventures cannot cover costs of production despite the
assistance of copyright. Thus the commercial success of one venture could cover the
failure of others.
56 For instance, American publishers in the nineteenth century threatened pirates with retributive
behaviour in order to deter the copier until the first edition was sold out, see Arnold Plant, The
Economic Aspects ofCopyright in Books, 2 Economica 1934, at 173.
57 Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects ofCopyright in Books, 2 Economica 1934, at 175.
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Consequently, the focus of attention should be the emergence of property right
in light of new technologies. Markets are formed by exchange which needs to be
voluntary and mutually beneficial for all parties. Therefore, an economic effect which
is external to market exchange may be involuntary, a cost or a benefit. For instance,
information technology makes it easier to manipulate knowledge goods since they are
reduced to a single dematerialised form expressed in digits. Also, many devices have
become accessible to the public at large, increasing the trend. Unlawful actions, such
as unauthorised duplication of copyright materials, add external costs to the market
which need to be internalised. This may be considered harmful to the copyright owner
but beneficial to users. The reasons why markets fail in the presence of such external
costs is that generators of externalities do not pay for harming others since they do not
take part in market formation. In terms of economics, the sum of all private costs
added to the additional costs created by free-riders cannot equal the private marginal
cost of the producer, which results in market failure. Consequently, private markets do
provide inefficiently at private levels and even less efficiently at social levels. What
society wants is that its social level is optimal. In order to achieve a social optimum, it
is then necessary to induce private profit-maximisers to produce information to the
socially optimal and not the privately optimal point. Thus, prices are raised in order to
cover the difference, since temporary and artificial monopolies are created. Clearly,
copyright in doing so does not attempt as such to internalise such costs creating
inefficiency, but simply provides a tax on society as a form of compensation which
raises prices. Imposition of such an economic system has been possible on tangible
commodities; however, it is hardly feasible with modern information technology,
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since control over material duplication is lost. In other words, the problem of
externalities has never been cured and has become more acute since new technologies
have questioned the practicality and rationales under which copyright provisions are
based upon, in particular printing technology. Consequently, I will look for a social
optimum which is achieved only when externalities are internalised in the sense that
the private producer takes them into account. That is a new approach toward
intellectual property rights.
I have so far focused much attention on property rights analysis. However, any
attempt to explain intellectual property rights needs to take adequately into account
the central role of scarcity in the emergence of rights and the difficulties inherent to its
application to knowledge goods. It should be clear that scarcity does not apply to
ideas. It is self evident, as Thomas Jefferson stated, that:
"if nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive
property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual
may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself."58
From the moment one individual delivers his thoughts to the public, another
individual is free to use his ideas. It would be in practice impossible to restrain anyone
from using disclosed ideas. Also, identical ideas may spring from several people at the
same or a different time. As a result, restricting access to ideas would be
fundamentally wrong because it would result in preventing others from freely
exercising their right of thinking. Consequently, ideas are inherently not scarce in
either static or dynamic manner. It should be stressed that the notion of scarcity is not
a question of material or of immaterial form, but solely a question of material
58 Thomas Jefferson, "Letter to Isaac McPherson, Monticello, August 13, 1813", in The Writings
of Thomas Jefferson, Vol.XIII, (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904), at 326-38.
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availability. For instance, the issue arises in looking at books as instantiations of ideas
in material form. In static terms ideas cannot be scarce; however, in dynamic terms
their access may be restricted due to copyright provisions. In other words, dynamic
scarcity applies to the tangible instantiation or embodiment of knowledge. While this
differentiation exists economists have been insisting only on the latter in analysing
intellectual property rights. Arnold Plant expressed his astonishment, pin-pointing the
institutionalisation of the situation:
"It is a peculiarity of property rights in patents (and copyright) that they do not arise
out of the scarcity of the objects which become appropriated. They are not a
consequence of scarcity. They are the deliberate creation of statute law; and, whereas
in general the institution of private property makes for the preservation of scarce
goods, [ ] 'to make the most of them,' property rights in patents and copyright
make possible the creation of scarcity of the products appropriated which could not
otherwise be maintained"59
Intellectual property rights have become accepted and legally enforced out of the
contention that incentives for innovation and creativity "could not be otherwise
maintained", if not eliminated. The problem of lack of scarcity has been used to
support monopolistic means of property. Also, the creation of exclusive monopoly
rights on works of the mind evolves from contentions which inherently wish to
ascribe public attributes to expression of ideas.
A common, collective, or public good is defined as any good which cannot
feasibly be withheld from individuals.60 Being a public good means that production,
for instance of books, entails the creation of external effects which prevent private
investors from producing. In principle public goods can be consumed by any
59 Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, (1934), at 36.
60 Mancur Olson, The Logic ofCollective Action Public Goods and the Theory ofGroups, Harvard
Economic Studies. Vol.124, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), at 14.
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additional users at virtually zero marginal cost.61 Copyright monopoly seeks to create
scarcity to facilitate their appropriation in order to provide enough incentives to
producers of such goods. Nonetheless, I have argued that there exist opportunity costs
of acquisition for ideas because, as 1 have already contended, there are always
opportunities for exclusion, such as prohibitive pricing schemes, and also because
public goods are not equivalent to free goods. The public element of ideal goods must
be embedded in a tangible substrate before they can be consumed or enjoyed. Also, it
has been noted that "publicness" is not a characteristic inherent to goods. The public
nature of knowledge goods is a function of the manner in which they are produced, in
other words the choice of the relevant marginal unit, rather than their capacity to
support free goods such as ideas. As Tyler Cowen concluded:
"publicness is an attribute of institutions, not of abstract economic goods. Every
good can be made more or less public by examining it in different institutional
contexts"62
Consequently, a distribution system that allows private consumption or a system that
allows public consumption antedates the classification of a good as private or as
public. Therefore, the fundamental issue which is faced by society is not how to
provide enough economic incentives but:
"Rather, we are faced with an unavoidable choice regarding every good or service:
shall everyone have equal access to that service (in which case the service will be
similar to a public good) or shall the service be available selectively: to some but not
to others? In practice, public goods theory is often used in such a way that one
overlooks this important choice problem,"63
61 T. Brennan, Harper & Row v. The Nation: Copyrightability and Fair Use, U.S. Department of
Justice, Economic Policy Office Discussion Paper (EPO 1984-85), May 11, 1984. at 8.
62 Tyler Cowen, Public Goods and Their Institutional Context: A Critique of Public Goods
Theory, 43 Review of Social Economy 1985, at 53.
63 Kenneth Goldin, Equal Access vs. Selective Access: A Critique of Public Goods Theory, 29
Public Choice 1977, at 53.
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Society itself gets confused between restrictions imposed on access to material
expressions and free access to ideas. Information technology, and other devices, have
simply made this confusion more acute Intellectual property rights are the reflection
of society's evaluation of its cultural and scientific heritage, and development.
Communal ownership of intellectual products of the mind dominated ancient society
as well as the Middle Ages to give way during the Renaissance to a more
individualistic perception of intellectual ownership. Ultimately, the problem which
society has to face is whether intellectual property should follow the more economic-
driven copyright law system or author-oriented contender, the droit d'auteur. With the
advent of information technology, only a system which is technology neutral and
which recognises creators' contribution to society will be fit to serve society's goals:
wider access to its heritage.
Providing services or producing goods includes not only capital, marketing,
and other cost components, but also fencing, or exclusion costs as well. Copyright in
that sense permits to fence or prevent people from pirating others peoples works.
Dematerialisation of forms of expression has not only facilitated transmission and
manipulation of knowledge but also plainly reduced costs of production. It should be
stressed that costs of exclusion are involved in the production of virtually every good
imaginable. This decision is itself the relevant factor in converting a potential public
good into a private good. Above all, such a decision depends simply upon the
assertion that given a knowledge good for which the marginal cost of exclusion is
greater than the marginal cost of provision, it is inefficient to expend resources to
exclude non-purchasers. In reducing costs, information technology brings new
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opportunities for fencing strategies. Similarly, choices will have to be made as to what
extent access to knowledge goods will be open. The politicisation of goods, in other
words the decision to provide knowledge goods on a non-exclusive and available-on-
demand basis either for free or in exchange for the payment, directly concerns the
future of society's cultural and scientific knowledge. Society made a choice in late
medieval times to impose monopolies in the form of copyright because fencing was
too prohibitive in order to increase its knowledge. As a choice of distribution which
creates public goods, it occasioned free-riders which in turn has been used to
demonstrate that private markets unaided could not satisfy properly demands.64
Moreover, it should be understood that public provisions such as copyright have not
eliminated costs of exclusion, although they have changed the structure of imposition
on users. Tax collectors, state surveillance of economic transactions of every sort, and
jail sentences have simply replaced voluntary arrangements between parties.
Furthermore, enforcement of intellectual property rights has been framed in purely
static rather than dynamic terms, since none of the provisions take account of the
production process.65 With regard to information technology, questions arise whether
it would be inefficient to expend resources and exclude non-purchasers. In my
opinion, it could be efficient since the marginal cost of making a given knowledge
good to one more person could be more than the cost of exclusion. Production poses
the problem of how best to produce knowledge goods, taking into account all the
relevant costs and benefits. Copyright has supported arguments for a method of
64 Boudewijn Bouckaert cited in Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and
Economics Approach, 12 Hamline Law Review 1989, at 285.
65 A. Alchian & W. Allen, University Economics, 3rd ed. 1972, at 147-48, 245-47
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production that assumes that the good is already produced. That is no argument at all.
Exclusion devices should be seen as endogenous to the market. In other words,
encryption and encoding devices or other mechanisms may serve to fence the creative
domain and should be considered as endogenous of the production process. The
advent of information technology integrates such mechanisms inherently. Copyright
and droit d'auteur alike have supported static answers to market failure and need to
reconsider their approach into a more dynamic one.66 The problem which remains is
to define a mode of production which respects the entrepreneurial abilities of potential
producers.67
Emphasis will now be given to alternative means of internalising externalities
within the scope of public provision. Printing has focused the attention of economists,
as well as the state, on return for investment in terms of outputs of sale of copies. For
instance, the Posnerian position stands on Bentham's contention that for any new work
to be created the expected return must exceed the expected costs from the sale of
copies. I have already presented the normative theory of Ronald Coase which
establishes that assignment of property rights should be the only means available to
reach efficiency. I have disputed the application of his theory in the case of copyright
since it does not integrate externalities fully in the formation of markets. Nonetheless,
Coase has introduced another general rule which needs careful consideration since
copyright provisions fail to integrate markets in a dynamic fashion. Moreover, society
claims wider access to information via information technology, which brings some
66 Besen, New Technologies and Intellectual Property: An Economic Analysis, The RAND Corp.,
IST-8415297-NSF, May 1987, at 4; Brennan, Taxing Home Audio Taping, Economic Analysis Group
Discussion Paper (EAG 86-6), US Department of Justice, Antitrust Division 26 (April 15, 1986).
67 Ronald Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 Journal of Law and Economics 1974, at 357.
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conflicts between the public and producers of information. Coase has enunciated a
general rule which considers two ways in which it would be possible to achieve an
efficient solution. One way would be for the law to adopt rules for which the non-
cooperative solution would become the efficient one.68 Accordingly, rules of property
rights may be used to induce parties to achieve an efficient solution minimising the
harm of free-riders. For instance, one rule may leave free-riders to act freely as they
wish, the second one may bring them to court in order to forbid them from pirating,
and third rule may force them to participate in sharing the cost of production. Because
society's overall goal is to increase its cultural or scientific knowledge, parties would
choose the rule or efficient solution which increases the public domain regardless of
individual positions. In other words, a co-operative and efficient solution under all
three possibilities should in principle always be found. For instance, assume that
parties decided to let free-riders be free. The efficient solution should demonstrate that
the public, creators and producers altogether gain. The other way to achieve efficiency
would be simply for the parties to cooperate when there are no impediments to co¬
operation. In sum this positive rule contends that when parties can bargain together
and can settle their disagreements by cooperation, their behaviour will be efficient
regardless of the underlying rule of law.69
Consequently, whatever the assignment of rights, the resulting mix of the
outputs will be efficient. Accordingly assuming that all behaviours are competitive, all
equilibrium allocations will be Pareto optimal regardless of initial endowments. In
68 Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, (Harper and Colins Publishers, 1988), at
104.
69 Ibid, at 105.
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other words, Coase's principle postulates that successful bargaining cures inefficient
law so long as parties can bargain. As a result legal entitlements make no difference to
efficiency so long as the parties can cooperate together and bargain to an agreement,
although the distribution of the co-operative surplus is affected. This general rule
looks as if it is the panacea to market failures. In fact, such a rule is far from being
coherent. The fundamental question remains whether there is any need for property
rights or property claims since parties may at any time contest whatever are the
property titles claimed by opponents and brought to the negotiating table. This
situation resembles more the state of nature where efficient use of resources is not
found. Consequently, it is doubtful whether all allocations will be Pareto efficient
with a large number of participants. Furthermore, Ronald Coase's rule still does not
answer to the need to internalise externalities fully. Rules as imposed by a state are
static answers to market failure. Nonetheless, I would like to insist that Coase assumes
that laws affect the probability that bargaining will succeed by facilitating bargaining.
That is a positive point which needs to be carefully considered because private
bargaining is unlikely to succeed in disputes involving a large number of
geographically dispersed individuals.70 With a large number of participants,
communication costs are high and difficult to monitor, and strategic behaviour may
occur. Therefore, legal rules enforced by courts of justice contribute to the efficient
use of resources. However, helping parties to find an efficient solution, they form an
hypothetical market which should be accepted by parties. Therefore, property rules
should be defined to guide and settle disputes only when necessary, since it cannot
70 Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules,Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 Harvard Law Review 1972, at 1089
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replace the dynamic function of markets. Intellectual property provisions may be
looked at now under a different angle in light of technological change. Property rights
should allow people to bargain around rights, in other words, operate in a dynamic
fashion.
In economics the central element in the spontaneous emergence of property
rights is scarcity. Free access to information or ideas is fundamentally accepted since
they form the national cultural and scientific heritage. Nonetheless, appropriation of
the expression of these ideas remains a key element in providing enough incentives to
creators. Hayek summarised clearly the dilemma in which society is placed:
"The difference between these and other kinds of property rights is this: while
ownership of material goods guides the use of scarce means to their most important
uses, in the case of immaterial goods such as literary productions and technological
inventions the ability to produce them is also limited, yet once they have come into
existence, they can be infinitely multiplied and can be made scarce only by law in
order to create an inducement to produce such ideas. Yet it is not obvious that such
forced scarcity is the most effective way to stimulate the human creative process."71
In the absence of scarcity, the mere existence of externalities, such as free-riders, does
not justify the creation of enforceable property rights in the form of monopolies.
Therefore, the problem lies in dealing with externalities in a dynamic fashion. Harold
Demsetz has proposed a new approach on the emergence of property rights. He
contended:
"what converts a harmful or beneficial effect into an externality is that the cost of
bringing the effect to bear on the decisions of one or more of the interacting persons
is to make it worthwhile [...] internalising such effects refers to a process, usually a
change in property rights, that enables these effects to bear (in greater degree) on all
interacting persons [...] A primary function of property rights is that of guiding
incentives to achieve a greater internalisation of externalities."72
71 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors ofSocialism, (London: Routledge, 1988), at
6.
72 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory ofProperty Rights, The Economics of Property Rigths, (E.
Furobotn & S. Pejovich eds. 1974), at 32
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His proposal insists upon the dynamic internalisation of externalities whereby
property rights would stimulate spontaneously the needs of society. This approach
differs from Ronald Coase's contentions in the sense that it focuses esclusively on
creators of works of the mind and not intermediaries in order to provide optimal levels
of information. This approach seeks to "explain the evolution of private rights as a
social response to emerging scarcity problems" which provide incentives as a proper
system to social needs.73 I venture to say that Demsetz's argumentation looks like a
rejoinder to the approach taken by Ancient Greeks in participating in the politics of
the city. Citizens gave importance to other citizens contributions because it implied
that their own views would be taken into consideration and they would avoid being
marginalised in the life of the city. Furthermore. Demsetz, as opposed to Coase, does
not imply that the state can simply define property rights in any way as it sees fit and
then let the regulated market perform its magic.
What it is important to recognise is that Demsetz does not exclude the
necessity of establishing some guiding rules. He objects to property rights that would
require massive and continual state interference in the market because it is not
consistent with a market system. Identifying potential externalities to advocate the
creation of new property rights is unjustified. Moreover, state enforcement of
intellectual property rights with regard to high speed electronics and information
technology would in effect require so much state intervention in the social process
that it could not keep up with the speed of technology developments. What I wish to
convey here is that law is a matter of individual claim and information technology has
73 Harold Demsetz, Commentary on Market and Meta-Market, 1-5 September 1986, Mont Pelerin
Society General Meeting.
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in effect given such a power back to individuals. Property rights may be enforced by
states or international treaties; nonetheless, their establishment evolves out of people's
current needs. As Bruno Leoni asserted:
"The legal process always traces back in the end to individual claims. Individuals
make the law, insofar as they make claims"74
Furthermore, he included "his warning about the incompatibility of the free market
economy with legislation."75 Ultimately, rights are not creations of the state, bestowed
as gifts upon the people by wise and beneficent legislators, but rather the spontaneous
product and the basis of a system of voluntary interactions that we call the market.76
To that effect one may conclude that intellectual property rights "have atrophied,
generating substantial rent-seeking and political conflict, as well as numerous
restraints on the market process, including restrictions on the introduction of new
technologies."77 Any system of property rights that requires the violation of other
property rights such as the right to determine free use of one's own video-recorder in
the privacy of his home or to purchase blank tapes without paying a royalty to a third
party, is no system of rights at all. By contrast, it has been demonstrated that Roman
law in the field of intellectual property followed and validated common practices
between artists and bibliopola. As Leoni observed, law evolves alongside practice but
74 Bruno Leoni, Lectures, 2-6 December 1963, Freedom School Phrontistery, Colorado Springs,
Colorado which are composed in his book. Freedom and the Law, (2nd ed.), (1972); see also, Peter H.
Aranson, Bruno Leoni in Retrospect, 1 1 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 1988. at 665.
75 Leonard P Liggio & Tom G Palmer, Freedom and The Law: A Comment on Professor
Aranson's Article, 11 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 1988, at 713.
76 R. Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare, 1986; R. Sugden, Labour,
Property and the Morality ofMarkets, in The Market History. B. Anderson & A. Latham, eds 1986; V.
Smith, Comment, in Progress in Natural Resource Economics. A. Scott ed. 1985, at 414.
77 Leonard P. Liggio & Tom G. Palmer, Freedom and The Law: A Comment on Professor
Aranson's Article, 1 1 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 1988. at 715.
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does not dictate it.78 Fundamentally, no system of intellectual property is compatible
with a system of property rights in tangible objects, especially with a system of
property rights to tangible objects based upon one's own body which is at the
foundation of the right to property in alienable objects.79 As Leggett advocated:
"The mental processes by which [the author] contrived those results are not, and
cannot properly be rendered, exclusive property; since the right of a free exercise of
our thinking is given by nature to all mankind, and the mere fact that a given mode
of doing a thing has been thought of by one, does not prevent the same ideas
presenting themselves to the mind of another and should not prevent him from a
perfect liberty of acting upon them"80
Therefore, proposals to ban or cripple entire technologies, and especially information
technology, which can render current intellectual property rights nugatory, would
wipe out areas of property rights altogether and cannot be defended in the name of
certain established property rights.81 Copyright as opposed to droit d'auteur is
extremely limited in its application to information technology. Droit d'auteur
recognises property rights inherent to the act of creation and not to the production of
commodities. Moreover, a system like droit d'auteur based upon natural right
principles has the fundamental flexibility to work in a dynamic economic approach to
markets, since rights are simply secured and not granted by the state.
Richard Adelstein and Steven Peretz have suggested a model for the evolution
of property rights in knowledge goods that draws on the Demsetz model but
supplements it with an entrepreneurial and evolutionary dynamic in order to explain
78 Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law, (2nd ed.), 1972, at 84.
79 For a derivation of rights to tangible objects based upon self-ownership, see John Locke,
Second Treatise ofGovernment, II § 32-40 (1698); for a theory of contract based on transfer of rights
to alienable property, see Barnett, A Consent Theory ofContract. 86 Columbia Law Review 1986, at
269.
80 W. Leggett, Democratick Editorials: Essays in Jackson ian Political Economy, 1984, at 399.
81 Thamas, Record Makers Ban Digital Audio Tape to Protect Copyright, Financial Times. 8 May
1987; Sanger, Vexed by Tape Technology. The New York Times. 13 May 1987, at Dl, Col.3
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the emergence of property rights.82 They have identified two dimensions of the
process of market exchange. One dimension identifies and exchanges information
with prospective buyers in order to negotiate mutually agreeable terms of trade. The
second one transfers control over the resources, on the one hand, while on the other
protects:
"this channel of exchange with buyers against the constant threat of those who
would, where possible, breach the channel so as to extract the value of the
commodity being traded without purchasing it from the seller"83
In other words the market will be able to exclude potential free-riders from enjoying
the good without paying for it. Interestingly, the process of technological innovation
is assumed to be driven partially by competition exercised among potential sellers,
who try to fence access to the goods, and potential free-riders, who try to free-ride
their production. As a result,
"the competition of technologies, in which entrepreneurs attempt simultaneously to
overcome the obstacles separating them from willing buyers and to place
corresponding impediments in the path of free riders, who are constantly in search of
ways to dissipate them."84
As regards knowledge goods, changes in technology may allow sellers to embody the
good in tangible forms at the same time that they allow users to extract a knowledge
good from its tangible embodiment, or host. The former would then reflect the
essential properties of private goods, while the latter would take some of the attributes
of public goods. Accordingly,
"intellectual goods can be traded in markets as private goods only so long as the
governing technology renders them impure and [...] technological change which
purifies the intellectual good will require some kind of collective action to ensure
that the incentives to produce and purchase the good in markets are maintained"8-"1
82 Richard P. Adelstein & Steven I. Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in Markets for Ideas:
Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 International Review of Law and Economics
1985, at 209.
83 Ibid, at 213.
84 Ibid, at 215.
85 Ibid.
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This model postulates a new type of emergence of property right where externalities
are directly taken into account by the market and where creators control with
independence the use of their work. Intellectual property rights are therefore
independent from property rights in the tangible embodiments of ideas. As with the
introduction of copyright, when printing technologies made it easier to extract and
reproduce intellectual goods than was the case under ancient methods, the
contemporary challenge to intellectual property is the doctrine that users should have
the widest possible access to all knowledge goods at the lowest possible cost. Such a
claim is consistent with a system where intellectual property rights are in the hands of
authors. Moreover, in separating intellectual property rights from property right in
tangibles dangers to the liberty of the subject, including freedom of speech and
expression in literature and the arts, are reduced.86 The main attack on the current
economic approach is that it is in opposition to the free flow of and access to ideas.
New property rights which function as incentives to risk-taking in authorship and
production of goods may be needed; however, I venture to advocate that the general
framework of the droit d'auteur has a sounder foundation in the light of information
technology challenges. The concerns of authors and publishers are not necessarily
identical, but the economic health and independence of one affects the other. What I
will examine is the application of this new approach to the economics of intellectual
property rights to the information infrastructure.
86 Stephen Stewart, Geiringer Lecture at New York University, 28 Bulletin of the Copyright
Society 1981, at 351.
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Application to the Information Infrastructure
The key feature of intellectual property in knowledge goods is that it is meant
to deprive no one of what they would have had in the absence of the owner's creative
activity. Accordingly, any property rights which will emerge out of the information
infrastructure should not deprive any users of the use of ideas. People have to be able
to build upon knowledge in order to further knowledge. In other words, people should
be able to bargain around the property rights established, otherwise markets cannot be
formed properly. As regards current intellectual property rights, the droit d'auteur
defends property by treating an author's work not as objects of benefit but rather as
subjects worthy of protection for the greater benefit of the many. Consequently,
creators are not considered investors in their own creation, but are simply recognised
as due a just return from society for their contributions. To that effect, the French
approach seems to be more consistent than its Anglo-American counterparts, since
droit d'auteur protection is extended to an author for his inherent contribution to
society's cultural and scientific wealth rather than for strict economic reasons. For
instance, French courts have been much more reluctant to extend copyright protection
to non-intellectual creations such as computer programs than their Anglo-American
counterparts.87 Emphasis is given to recognition of an author's contribution and not to
the economic process of publishing. Therefore, the value of contributions is not
assessed by outputs but by the inherent intellectual quality of publications. As a result,
French courts have developed specific principles conceptualising authors' moral rights
87 Robert M. Hurt and Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56
American Economic Association 1966, at 423.
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and recognising their precedence over temporary exclusive commercial interests since
they are not property rights. Also, droits moraux are reflections of the author's
personality, as opposed to common law moral rights which place moral rights of
authors under a commercial bias. In sum, droit d'auteur may put information
technology to use as a convenient way of fulfilling society's obligation to reward
writers for their contribution but independently from any technical form of production
or expression. I am concerned here with knowledge goods and not simple information
and that these goods are assumed to be willingly supplied or exchanged over the
information infrastructure. Therefore, I exclude from in my argument concerns which
relate more to privacy and security issues for individuals or states and which are
exogenous to intellectual property issues as such.
Problems concerning public good allocation are based upon the free-rider
hypothesis, which implies that individual consumers fail "to state publicly their full
monetary evaluation of a collective good", preventing markets from forming.88 It is of
importance for this study to re-assess this universally adopted model in the light of a
new technological context such as information technology, which is predominantly
illustrated by the Internet. This information infrastructure has already affected our
civilisation as deeply as Gutenberg's printing press, and will certainly alter our current
intellectual property institutions. The Internet may be defined as an electronic
superhighway which represents a high capacity multi-media carrier where broadcast,
messaging and database communication models converge.89 Broadly speaking it
88 Earl R. Brubaker, Free Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Ride?, 18 Journal of Law and
Economics 1975, at 147.
89 Henry H. Perrit, Jr, Regulation and the National Infrastructure, Conference on Business and
Legal Aspects of the Internet and Online Services. New York. 30 September 1994 (conference paper
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regroups a large number of services such as long-distance computing, information and
data transfer. The brainchild of a peculiar military strategic problem at the U.S.
Department of Defence, the Rand Corporation elaborated a daring concept upon
which the infrastructure is based. The concept postulates a decentralised structure
which originally established a post-nuclear command network in order for the military
to communicate securely all over the country while traditional communication lines
would be in tatters. With no central authority and assumed to be unreliable at all
times, the network was designed to transcend its own unreliability as "a true modern
and functional anarchy".90 What I will be concerned with here is whether an open,
distributed infrastructure like the Internet can successfully provide optimal levels of
knowledge, in other words enough economic incentives for production of knowledge
value.
In my opinion this apparent anarchy has already played a decisive role in
internalising externalities in a dynamic fashion. In other words, the system has all the
potential to correct market failure in providing efficient levels of information which
would provide incentives to entrepreneurial creative enterprises. The carrier functions
according to unique standard protocols which involve an open and non-proprietary
system. Indeed, all nodes are equal and independent which means that they all
communicate to each other as peers so long as they obey identical protocols. In fact,
this established standard is the unique way in which machines can communicate. To
that effect, being neither social nor political but only technical, the protocols have
available from the World Wide Web page of Villanova University School of Law,
http://www.law.vill.edu).
90 Bruce Sterling, Short History of the Internet, The Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction.
February 1993, column 5.
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reduced transaction costs to a minimum since people must obey them. Furthermore,
the system is composed ofmany independent nodes, ranging from supercomputers to
home desktops, which means that there is no official entity exercising power over any
other. Therefore, strategies for one to take over another are prevented. Each person
accessing the highway is responsible for his own machine as well as the maintenance
of his own section of line. The Internet is therefore common property. One question
immediately arises whether or not "the tragedy of the commons" may occur to the
Internet. The tragedy is that commounal ownership, understood as open access to a
natural resource, results in over-use and destruction of the resource.91 One may argue
that because the costs of using the Internet are disconnected from the price paid by
users, the protocols are "a recipe for gridlocks."92 According to economist Hal Varian:
"The average load is not the problem. Most of the time the Net is working at maybe
5% of capacity. But the peak ioad is a major concern. Service begins to degrade at
about 20% of capacity, and the sudden upsurge can make demand jump to that point
in an instant."93
This analysis needs to be put into perspective. The carrier evolves out of independent
nodes which interconnect as a form of goodwill. From this arises a service, the
Internet, which sustains a defined level of communication as decided by the technical
capabilities of the nodes and dedicated as common property. As a result, technical
limits imposed on the carrier are independent from the intermediation service itself.
The network belongs to everyone and no-one similarly to a common good; however, it
is up-graded by the natural self-interest of its users who in effect are the nodes
themselves, and subsequently services available on the network. Nodes, as private or
91 see footnote 20
92 Bridger Mitchell, Inc. 13 June 1995, at 47.
93 Hal Varian, Inc. 13 June 1995, at 47.
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public entities, need to improve constantly their technical facilities in order to be able
to provide and receive better information services. It is in their own interest that the
infrastructure as an intermediation service works at its best. Also, because nodes are
independent entities or public institutions, costs for improving the system should be
reflected in prices for accessing the system or supported through taxes. The problem
posed by Hal Varian in effect should find its answer among players of the game
making possible the existence of the infrastructure.
Thus, Mitchell and Varian are partly right in their analysis; however, they have
neglected to mention the interrelated structures from which the infrastructure evolves.
A clear line must be drawn between the carrier itself, governed by its protocols and
the users who provide or demand information. This unique combination explains the
functional anarchy which is the strength of the system but also its Achilles heel. This
is where adequate emergence of property rights is fundamental for the protection of its
neutrality. Analogically, because protocols are neutral technical keys to access the
carrier, the system can act as an intermediation between many participants who are
ready to exchange at mutually acceptable rates, given their tastes and technical ability
to access the Internet,94 Participants as individuals or groups of individuals are all
potential buyers and sellers since they may be information users as well as
information providers. As a result, the Internet gathers a large number of participants
who make decisions by expressing their own self-interests which in effect represent as
many potential markets as there are participants. It is at this level that price becomes a
concern because it should reflect, not only the cost of maintenance of the
94 Earl R. Brubaker, Free Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule?, 18 Journal of Law and
Economics 1975. at 148.
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intermediary-system, but also the cost of providing added value information services.
Therefore, in absolute terms the tragedy of the commons should not happen, since the
technical capabilities of the system are integrated in the dynamics of exchange
without fettering the neutrality of the carrier. In other words, price and technical
considerations become exogenous to the Internet itself. Nonetheless, herein lies the
Achilles' heel of the system. Any attempt to impose a certain order which would affect
the anarchic functionality of the system would take the risk of breaking its ability to
transcend impediments to co-operation. Issues which reside on the use of the network
should be resolved at its source, in other words at the users' level. Various claims are
put forward. Business people want the Internet for financial opportunities and
technical reliability. Government people want it more fully regulated. Academics
want it dedicated to scholarly research and exchange of knowledge. Military people
want it to be spy-proof. All these interests are sources of conflict which can be
reduced to one problem. Because intellectual property represents rights over products
of the mind which are not in the public domain, the problem of accessibility is a key
element in the formation of intellectual property rights in light of information
technology.
There are two aspects to the problem. One is technical and the other relates to
the formation of property rights. The free-rider hypothesis focuses on the non-
exhaustiveness and non-excludability of collective goods. This means that
information is available simultaneously to all, and users who do not provide for the
good have an imperceptible effect on the system since the number of participants is
extremely large. In theory, there would be no attempt to limit access to such non-
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participants because it would be highly costly. However, copyright is one of the
remedies to prevent people from free-riding. With the advent of the information
infrastructure, technical fencing becomes possible at negligible cost. For instance high
powered cryptography is a possible technique.95 On the one hand, this means that
technical means may keep pirates to a minimum which remain imperceptible on the
market ; on the other hand, producers of information services are able to manage
piracies in such a way that it becomes worth investing in information services. For
instance. Internet producers may rely on the computational prowess of computer
systems to encode digital files in such a way that only the intended recipient may
decipher the encoded files. Consequently, people who provide for the formation of the
service will be able to access it. As it has been argued, fencing should be taken into
account in the dynamic formation of markets and information technology allows
bargaining considering the cost of fencing. Rising costs are associated with movement
from the concept of privateness toward collectiveness.96 Here parties to the bargain
use a common good for which costs are internalised in a private manner. Since costs
of fencing and impediments to bargaining will be reduced to a minimum, prices will
reflect the marginal costs, leading to greater optimal levels of co-operation. While
95 A public key method called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) has been freely distributed since 1991
and has aroused much controversy in the U.S. Also, the Clinton Administration has endorsed an
encryption scheme based upon a microchip baptised Clipper Clip which hopes to become a national
standard for government agents if necessary to decrypt encoded private communications, see Wendy
M. Grossman, Cryptic Code, Personal Computer World July 1994, at 420-424; Also, a new high
technological method of on-line crime has been detected recently. For instance, on 25th December
1994 intruders took over a computer network for more than a day and electronically stole a large
number of security programs, see New Method ofOnline Crime, New York Times. Monday 23 January
1995; In the U.K., the Court of Session awarded British Telecom an interdict against a journalist who
received from an Internet anonymous source sensitive and confidential information about facilities
used by Government and military establishments and personel. see John Robertson, BT wins interdict
against Scots journalist, The Scotsman 10 December 1994.
96 Earl R. Brubaker, Free Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule?, 18 Journal of Law and
Economics 1975, at 149.
223
mentioning cryptography techniques one cannot elude controversies which arise out
of them.97 For instance, government agencies may want to be able to decrypt
messages when necessary, as opposed to creators or investors in services who may
want to restrict access. Beyond the claim of the state to have access to such networks,
restrictions could act to the detriment of society. Ultimately, what I am concerned
with here is freedom of speech and expression, since encryption methods are a way of
restricting not only access to, but also dissemination of information. On that particular
issue, encryption methods need to be carefully monitored in order to guarantee
creation and dissemination of works with promotion of the interest of creators and the
public. Therefore, encryption methods are possible threats to the functional anarchy of
the infrastructure and therefore, if extended to the intermediation service. It has
already been demonstrated that encryption must be taken into account for the
formation of knowledge good markets. As a result, I would advocate that markets
should be set free from intervention to set up their own encryption means solely at
participant level. The market will decide what means of protection are necessary
against free-riders without threatening potential users. As a matter of fact, software
companies have already combined their forces to develop technical solutions for
filtering content and access to the Internet.98
97 See report of a special panel of, ACM U.S. Public Policy Committee, Codes, Keys and
Conflicts: Issues in U.S. Crypto Policy, (New York: Association for Computing Machinery, Inc.,
1994), also available in electronic format from ACM's Internet host,
http://Info.acm.org/reports/c_report.html).
98 Investor's Business Daily 14 June 1995, A2; Nonetheless, in the U.S. the National Information
Infrastructure Forum has already proposed the creation of a new federal agency to monitor electronic
baking and other transactions, and provide security against computer break-ins recommending by the
same token criminal and civil laws to control the use of the internet. Not only the Senate has voted
overwhelmingly to prosecute users who distribute sexually explicit or other "obsene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy or indecent" material over computer networks, see New York Times 15 June 1995, Al, but the
federal intelligence agencies have been called upon to share some of their security technology with
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In conventional economic terms, the larger the size of the community, the
more benefits will be reduced due to large transaction costs. Thus, it is postulated that
transaction costs and the non-expression of demand for collective goods lead to a non-
optimal level of information because they generate difficulties in handling
negotiations. What the new medium succeeds in doing is to facilitate a large number
of transactions and to internalise externalities to a large extent. In essence, it may be
argued that it reduces transaction costs to zero since the cost of setting up the system
is supported by all participants and each individual needs to acquire his own machine
to access the network. Therefore the medium facilitates parties' capacity to bargain
and use resources at optimal levels. Choice to purchase goods is determined by
evaluation of the value of the good. Moreover, in accessing the Internet users may
interact directly with the service, or bargain, and receive customised services which
will maximise their utility. Consequently, it is in the best interest of users to submit to
the intermediation service their subjective evaluation of quantity of the knowledge
good in order to permit providers to determine an optimal allocation of resources to its
production. This may be referred to as "the golden rule of revelation" enunciated by
Earl Brubaker.99 Problems of gathering data and determining the optimal level of
information are reduced to the merely technical problem of accessing the system.
Traditionally, the simple fact that individuals act in their self-interest gives them no
incentive to express their demand for common goods since they can fully enjoy
benefits from the good without participating. In our case, the Internet allows people to
industry and government to establish a secure "digital signature", see Wall Street Journal 14 June 1095,
B3.
99 Earl R. Brubaker, Free Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule?, 18 Journal of Law and
Economics 1975, at 150.
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co-operate and may prevent users from accessing the good unless they have
voluntarily provided for the good or expressed their demand intention. Potential free-
riders cannot also assume that other members of the community will contribute to pay
for the good, or that the costs of their free-ride will have no perceptible effect on the
community, or that there will always be enough people to make voluntary
contributions. One key aspect for the application of the rule is that pre-contract
excludability is conditional upon the "golden rule". In order to understand clearly
what are the implications of pre-contract excludability in terms of property rights, it is
necessary to give the definition of the condition. According to Earl Brubaker:
"[i]t asserts that under pre-contract group excludability the dominant tendency will be
for each individual to reveal accurately his preference for a collective good provided
that he has some assurance that others will match his offer in amounts he perceives
as appropriate."100
Therefore, the rule may apply whenever the individual has reason to count on the
community.
This assumes that before accessing or creating the good exclusion is possible.
In fact, individuals will have reason to count on the community because fencing is
always possible on the infrastructure. Moreover, it has already been argued that costs
of fencing should be integrated in the bargaining process at producer level and would
provide enough incentives for production of knowledge goods. Also, because the
good does not exist, there is simply no possibility to pirate the work. There is no
public or private good in existence. Consumption is therefore possible only for the
people who have contracted in advance with the service. To that effect exclusion or
appropriation is facilitated prior to consummation group-wise and individually.
100 Earl R. Brubaker, Free Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule?, 18 Journal of Law and
Economics 1975, at 153.
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Several fundamental conclusions can be drawn in respect to property rights. It has
been already argued that the nature of goods, for instance of "publicness", depends
upon the manner in which products or services are supplied according to the criterion
of efficiency, and especially of fencing. Moreover, I have contended that products of
the intellect have to be considered according to the level of knowledge content and
their artistic value as defined by creators themselves. On the one hand, knowledge
goods can be produced in a marketing mode when it will be worthwhile for creators
and entrepreneurs in knowledge goods, in other words more efficient, to produce the
good in such manner rather than in a public mode. For instance, producers may work
on the basis of pre-paid orders. Because the choice of the marginal unit will reflect the
customisation of knowledge products, it is doubtful that once supplied the product
will be pirated and therefore become a public good to other users. On the other hand,
knowledge goods, for instance with high knowledge content which require large
investment before being created, will be supplied in a public mode. These goods will
resume the characteristics of publicness where there is no need to restrict access to use
the public domain. Such contentions should, it is submitted, respond to the concerns
expressed by Professor Henry Perrit to ensure that "public information remains
public" and that enough "incentives for producing information value" will be provided
on the information infrastructure.101 The most important aspect of the emergence of
such proprietary rights over knowledge goods is that it has to work in hand with
101 Henry H. Perrit, Jr., Key Note Presentation, Electronic Communications, 10th BILETA
Conference, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 30 & 31 March 1995; Henry H. Perrit, Jr., Regulation
and the National Information infrastructure, Conference on Business and Legal Aspects of the Internet
and Online Services New York 30 September 1994 (copy available from the World Wide Web page of
Villanova University School of Law, http://www.law.vill.edu).
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adequate intellectual property rights. Creators receive adequate economic return for
their contributions to society, either from private investors or from society. Also, they
will be able to claim and enforce their moral rights independently from any
commercial pressure. Claims will come from individuals themselves and may be
enforced if necessary by courts, since they are simply recognised as their fundamental
natural rights. In practice, one can see already the application of such a theory on the
provider side. For instance, members of the Association of American Publishers have
been highly reluctant to invest in electronic publishing because no copyright
protection has been imposed over the network. Now, they have decided to resolve
free-rider issues:
"before copyright infringement on the network becomes very widespread and
assumed to be the way the network works. It's a recognition that whereas in the past,
publishing members of the AAP have been able to leave technological concerns to
suppliers - such as compositors, typesetters and printers - in network publishing, we
cannot leave it to others."102
Clearly, members are ready to co-operate with creators and define pre-contract
excludability in their approach to the market in order to provide electronic publishing
products on the network. Clearly, the information infrastructure is far from being a
public coercive method of control of markets, but is rather a system open to market
opportunities.
In practice problems have already arisen about determining under current
intellectual property rights what sort of information should be protected. I wish to
bring special attention to the issue of information versus knowledge because it allows
us to determine clearly which individual claims intellectual property rights ought to
protect in a digital environment. The word information is a term indiscriminately used
,02 Chronicle of Higher Education 23 June 1995, A18.
228
for different concepts such as factual information or knowledge goods. With reference
to the introductory remarks on knowledge, it is of importance to define clearly both
terms in the context of information technology. In order to support my argumentation,
1 will confine attention to databases which will be extended in the next chapter to
computer programs from a legal angle. A fundamental difference exists between
individual claims for control over disclosure of medical records and for control of use
of works of the mind. The former stem less from a need to promote knowledge but
more from a need to control personal information in an electronic milieu. Legitimately
individuals have the right to object to invasion of their own privacy and have their
consent sought before disclosure of any personal data.103 By contrast, intellectual
property rights ought to protect works of the intellect which have been made public
but not the ideas, and raw data whatever their importance might be. Therefore, control
over factual information under the form of copyright would result in similar effects to
protecting ideas, in opposition to what intellectual property seeks to protect. As such,
the strength of information technology is to:
"allow mankind to transform data into information, which means that the data get a
certain meaning, answer certain questions."104
Accordingly, the term "information age society" as opposed to common belief does
not refer to a society dominated by data or facts but a society which ought to place
greater value on information by means of interpretation of data or facts. In that sense,
Peter Drucker argued that knowledge is the only meaningful economic resource.
Furthermore, he called in 1959 for:
103 Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A. Frauthaus, Information as Property Databases and
Commercial Property, 1 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 1993, at 7.
104 Professor G.P.V. Vandenberg (ed.). Advanced topics of Law and Information Technology,
(Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1989), at 1.
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"a change in the meaning of 'knowledge'. In the traditional concept the aim of the
systematic search for knowledge, is new facts [...]. In our view of the world, we have
moved from cause to configuration. From this shift arose innovation, this shift led to
its emergence and gives it power."105
As a result, there is a need for "new knowledge, new approaches, new opportunities" a
foundation of innovation "to develop new tools, new methods, new methods,
distributive systems."106 Ideas, facts or data gain meaning only when they are put into
context similarly to ideas. As a result, confusion arises over the respective claims
because information technology blurs the distinction between expression of ideas and
ideas themselves and also renders their expression highly versatile. Thus,
differentiation in forms of expression is irrelevant in an electronic environment.
However, content should be the focus of attention in order to differentiate factual
information and knowledge, and to determine what should attract copyright
protection. Content may be categorised in separate sets.107 Factual information which
contains minimal or no descriptive form at all which ought to be differenciated from
knowledge goods which bring meaning to facts and ideas in a descriptive and
analytical manner.
Intellectual property rights are intended to encourage creativity and
publication of products of the intellect by attributing exclusive property rights.
Moreover, the current system attributes exclusive rights in copies. Some have argued,
such as Professor Arthur Miller, that databases are fit to be protected under copyright
protection, consequently attributing an exclusive right to reproduce copies.108 I would
105 Peter F. Drucker, The Landmark ofTomorrow, (London: Heinneman, 1959), at 18-19.
100 Ibid.
107 Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A. Frauthaus, Information as Property Databases and
Commercial Property, 1 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 1993, at 14.
108 Professor Arthur Miller defends CONTU's recommendations to protect computer programs
and databases by copyright not only as a scholar but also as "an active participant in the debates.
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contend that such a proposition leads not only to an abuse of fundamental principles
of intellectual property but also contributes to endanger the concept itself.109 Limits
are set upon copyright claims whereby only expression of ideas is protected. This
principle defines major restrictions on the use of "copyright protection" in electronic
milieu because raw facts often define the core value of databases. The critical problem
has been to decide when a database is more than a mere collection of data.
Hypothetically if copyright protects databases, protection would have to vest on the
entire "work" In other words, the selection and arrangements of the data would need
to be protected simply because it would be impossible to dissociate the data from their
arrangement. In principle, copyright protection extends only to those components of a
work that are original to the author.110 Originality requires minimal intellectual
creativity from the author which entails personal choices. Presumably, the exercise of
that choice cannot be obvious, mechanical and similar to anyone who undertakes the
same task. As Jane Ginsburg put it:
"to the extent that the worth of the work lies in the information, rather than in the
form imposed on the facts, the modern copyright emphasis on subjective
characteristics fails to secure the commercial value of these kinds of endeavours."111
hearings, and negotiation that led the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976", see Arthur R. Miller,
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is
Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 Harvard Law Review 1993, at 979-81.
109 See generally, J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms,
94 Columbia Law Review 1994, at 2432.
110 For instance.the Supreme Court unanimously held that even the white pages of a telephone
book were not copyrightable and found them "devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity".
Moreover, "the originality requirement ... remains the touchstone of copyright protection" although
"the requisite level of creativity is extremely low," the "time-honored tradition does not possess the
minimal creative spark required by the Copyright Act and the Constitution", see Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Ill S. Ct 1991, at 1296 & 1287-88.
111 Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of
Information in the United States, in Protecting Works of Fact, Copyright Freedom of Expression and
Information Law E.J.Dommering ed., Kluwer, 1991, at 43
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In a database, data are unchanged but arranged in a form which aims at facilitating
their use. Clearly, difficulties arise in applying copyright principles to databases.
Curiously, Professor Miller recognises "conceptually complex problems that today's
technologies pose for the copyrightability of information packages".112 It has been
argued that intellectual property rights evolve out of the value that individuals
attribute to knowledge goods. Therefore it is of interest to understand what makes
factual databases valuable.
A database is simply a unique organisation which avoids deviating from
standard practice.113 Intellectual property seeks to protect descriptive or original
expression. Creators of databases simply arrange the data in ways which facilitate
their use. Thus, data are the important items in a database but not their arrangement.
Consequently, the act of copying data could not be considered an infringement of the
expression of data. Moreover, alleged copies would offer nothing more than mere
facts of no inherent value expect in considering expenses for collation. Furthermore,
in technical terms the act of downloading data reduces itself only to sub-select data
sorted according to criteria chosen by the person who does the act of selection. In such
a case. I would not venture to determine who is the real "original" author of the data in
intellectual property terms. Some arguments may look at the range of the duplication
but it would again miss the fundamental value of databases, which is the ability to
compile and make accessible updated factual information. The threat is not to copy
the data but to access and downloading without authorisation. Therefore, neither the
112 Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-
Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 Harvard Law Review 1993, at 1041.
113 Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A. Frauthaus, Information as Property Databases and
Commercial Property, 1 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 1993, at 17.
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parameters for protection nor the substantive rights granted by copyright match the
needs of electronic databases. Moreover, what I wish to argue is that commercial
value should not influence attribution of copyright protection as a default one-size-fit-
all system, and especially attribute authorship to works with no intellectual content.
For instance, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognised that the "classic formulation" of the "sweat of the
brow" has "numerous flaws, the most glaring being that it extended copyright
protection [...] beyond selection and arrangement [...] to the facts themselves."114 In
other words, the viability of copyright law itself is questioned. Furthermore, chapter
three enounciates the fundamental differences which exist between copyright law and
droit d'auteur. As opposed to copyright law, its French counterpart does not attribute
authorship upon commercial considerations but upon natural right principles
independently from technology or modes of distribution. Accordingly, I venture to say
that droit d'auteur has the fundamental prerequisites to establish intellectual property
rights in product of the intellect over the information infrastructure. At this point, I
wish to clarify my argumentation. I do not refute the right for authors to be
compensated for their contribution to society. My purpose here is to demonstrate that
the superior interest of authors in being recognised as such strengthens their right to
be compensated.
Important considerations can be drawn from this analysis with respect to
intellectual property claims in electronic milieu. Unlike printing, electronic
dissemination does not involve publication of copies. Consequently, claims of
114 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 111 S. Ct 1991, at 1291.
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intellectual property rights in electronic milieu can no longer be an exclusive right to
reproduce commodities for sale. To that effect, the right to control access has become
the claim which individuals will put forward. Intellectual property seeks to provide
protection over original expressions of the mind which are not in the public domain.
One may differentiate property claims based upon a right to control access to
databases and knowledge work. The difference lies in the substantive rights which
protect products of the intellect, ensuring qualitative electronic publishing with
respect to originality, integrity, accuracy, and traditional recognised moral rights. As
opposed to property claims in databases, limited to rights of access, intellectual
property in extending its protection to moral claims allows the user to use ideas freely
and therefore protect the public domain. Accordingly, incentives to creativity will
reflect the irrational aspect of the creative process as well as the rational behaviour of
individuals who maximise their utility. Two modes of production will open
opportunities for creators and investors in products of the intellect to bargain around
intellectual property rights and ensure dissemination of such products. It has been
argued that in the case of private knowledge goods, provision of goods would be
customised, so that, it would be unattractive for others to acquire, even for free, goods
designed for others. Also, users acting in their best interests should be reluctant in
sharing goods they have provided for with others, since it would simply reduce their
utility function. Thus, investors in knowledge goods should find enough incentives in
producing electronic services. As regards high-content knowledge goods, their
production will be ensured by public or private procurement in the most efficient
mode. Some scientists have already lead the way in on-line publishing, recognising
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that the peer review process enabled by electronic publishing can be just as thorough,
if not more efficient, than print journals, ensuring high credibility.115 Furthermore,
scholarly and scientific research costs and publication costs can be reduced for the
greater benefit of research and society. Moreover, since recoupment of investment
will be adjusted to the marginal cost of production, the duration of the economic right
of protection should be reduced to the length of time necessary for doing so. A less
lengthy period would allow more dissemination of works or distribution of knowledge
goods.
In sum, intellectual property seems to comprise two modes of legal protection,
one for authors, and another to cover access, distribution and manipulation of works
of the mind in which authors play the central role in the emergence of property
claims.116 In other words, information technology has created a new medium of
production and new conditions for authors and users in which authors and users are
parties to the game. Intellectual property needs therefore to be more author oriented
since in every user rests a potential publisher.117 Information technology needs a
reduction of the potency of the state to impose laws on the market calling into
question the ability of the state to protect property. As I have argued property claims
are a matter of individuals which should be supported by state legislation and not as a
form of control in order to allow people to bargain around. Concerns may be
expressed for individuals themselves in enforcing their rights. It has been suggested
by Professor Cornish that:
115 Business Week 26 June 1995, at 44.




"The best hope, so far as earnings are concerned, is indeed that interests will be
represented through collectivities of authors, composers and artists. This should
reduce the pressure for rules concerning copyright contracts which are bedrocked
into the general law."118
With an enlarged community of authors it becomes doubtful that interests of authors,
composors and artists will be comprehensively represented by such collectivities
unless choices are made concerning who should receive help in a discriminatory
manner. As contended, assertion of property rights is a matter of individual claims and
bedrocked rules which are incompatible with a free market economy should fall
within the information infrastructure. Such communities are market substitutes which
act as markets do, simultaneously enabling the public to use works of the mind and
directing compensation toward the creator.119 Nonetheless, they are likely to be much
more expensive and cumbersome than ordinary markets are in an electronic milieu.
These devices are also likely to be imperfect market mimics, for nothing calls forth
accurate revelation of preferences and costs like a real bargaining situation. Most
certainly their administration costs will be high to outweigh the benefits of a given
licence; also there will be gaps in covering all creators.120 Thus, I venture to say that
"individuals will continue to fall outside the range of collective bargains".121
Furthermore, not only might the administrative cost cancel out much of the incentive
gains, but incentives themselves may not be low because some potential uses will
remain unexploited.
118 W.R. Cornish, Authors in Law, 58 The Modern Law Review 1995, at 16.
119 Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual
Property, 17 University of Dayton Law Review 1992, at 859.
120 In his article Douglas Smith defines a "copyright collective" as "an organization to collectively
enforce property rights which cannot be economically enforced individually. The point of this
definition is to exclude collectives formed solely for the purpose of generating monopoly rent."
Clearly, that definition excludes individual claims, see Douglas A. Smith. Collective Administration of
Copyright: An Economic Analysis, 8 Research in Law and Economicss 1986, at 149.
121 W.R. Cornish, Authors in Law, 58 The Modern Law Review 1995, at 16.
236
From all this it follows that claims will be individualised within a collectivist
framework which will allow society to benefit instantly from works of its members. In
1959 Peter Drucker contended that an innovative organisation will emerge and be
characterised by collectivism which he thought more rhetorical than real.
Accordingly,
"The new organisation expresses a dynamic order: it expresses a configuration of
wills, decisions, responsibilities the whole of which is much greater that the
individual parts."122
The community would in practice be a collectivist community limited by individual
claims. I venture to say that the information infrastructure has provided the means for
society to move towards that goal. As has been argued, society has moved from a
collectivist approach towards an individualistic one. Accordingly, intellectual property
systems have evolved out of societies' mutation. It may be therefore time to reconsider
our current intellectual property system in accordance with society's new goals.
122 Peter F. Drucker, The Landmark ofTomorrow, (London: Heieman, 1959), at 81.
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Chapter V
Intellectual Creation and Commercial Value :
The Dilemma o/Copyright Protection of
Computer Programs
"Copyright for computerprograms was far more attractive: for a twenty dollars it costs
to obtain a copyright registration certificate, one could get immediate access to federal
courts and the extensive array of legal remedies against copyright infringement ...
without having to go through a lengthy or searching patent examination process. ...,
many software producers cast their fortunes with copyright, hoping that the law's easy¬
going, Holmesian embrace, when coupled with a judicial instinct to extend copyright
where no other form ofprotection was at hand, would protect the investments made in
theirprograms' underlying methods."
- Paul Goldstein*
With the emergence of a global information infrastructure, intellectual property, and
especially copyright, has become of trans-national importance. As a matter of fact, the
subject matter has brought considerable attention on trade-related issues. As such the
question of the copyrightability of computer programs has concentrated most energies
and poses directly the problem of the future of intellectual property in an information
technology environment.
The raison d'etre of copyright is to facilitate the widest possible dissemination
of works, and to encourage creativity by economic and moral incentives as well as
assuring the owner of copyright an equitable compensation. New creations evolving
from the realm of computer science have proven to test intellectual property
principles to the limits of their flexibility. Accordingly, the question of the most
*
Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox, (New York,
1994), at 204.
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suitable form of protection for computer programs has initiated a process which is
determinant in approaching intellectual property issues in electronic milieu.
Moreover, I would contend that the actual debate has lost sight of what is the inherent
purpose of copyright, the protection of a determined value: authorship. Undoubtedly,
the digital environment as such has re-enforced the state of confusion about that
purpose. As a result, the study of the case of computer programs is crucial in
untangling the issues in order to determine the proper intellectual property regime for
intellectual creations which evolve in a digital environment.
The application of copyright to computer programs has initiated a threat
against the fundamental nature of copyright, namely a process whereby non-literal
elements of expression have been found protectable by U.S. courts of law. This trend
has clearly surfaced in European courts and will most certainly influence future
legislative as well as court decisions. The situation has become critical since certain
individuals have acquired powers to stop others from engaging in creative
endeavours. Further, a more immediate threat comes from proponents of the
application of copyright in computer programs who now advocate the application of
copyright in the same terms to digital works.' In other words, the future of intellectual
property is under attack not only from commercial or political censorship, but more
crucially from a self-destructive mode arising from abuses in use of its underlying
principles. Freedom and independence to create, according to one's inspiration and
one's conscience, and to communicate creations to the public are at stake, and risk
wrecking the future of the information infrastructure. Creation must be free in the first
1 Allen N. Dixon and Laurie C. Self, Copyright Protection for the Information Superhighway, 1 I
European Intellectual Property Revue 1994, at 467
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place to let the public be judge. As such "[a] bad copyright law can destroy that
independence, a good one can help to preserve it."2
This chapter will attempt to determine what are the fundamental threats which
put at risk the principles of intellectual property, and especially copyright. In
particular the international relations of copyright will be considered, in order to have a
closer look at national legislation and present my dissent from the copyrightability of
computer programs. As a result, attempt will be made to determine what is the
inherent value of computer programs in order to formulate a new approach towards
the protection of works of purely utilitarian features. The case of computer programs
will help to illustrate the situation and to make some projections in relation to the
information infrastructure. It will be demonstrated that the value of computer
programs calls for a different form of protection, separate from copyright law and
droit d'auteur. This analysis will differentiate works of authorship from works of a
utilitarian nature, in order to deduce stable grounds for determining authorship in an
electronic milieu.
The International Relations of Copyright
As things stand, there is no such thing as an "international copyright system" that
automatically protects an author's creations throughout the world. Protection against
unauthorised use in foreign countries depends upon the national legislation where the
infringed act occurred. Disparities exist between national laws and the principles they
2 Barbara Ringer, Copyright and the Future ofAuthorship, Copyright 1976, at 155.
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are based upon.3 Nonetheless, a certain uniformity in national legislation has been
initiated since most countries offer protection to foreign authors under certain
conditions which have been greatly simplified by supranational arrangements. Two
main conventions, the Berne Convention (1971) and the Universal Copyright
Convention, gather a large number of countries forming a large consensus upon
minimum protective measures due to creators of works of the mind. Moreover, this
internationalisation of the subject matter is in constant evolution since countries have
been far more concerned with the protection of their own intellectual resources.
Nonetheless, such concerns have recently been focused in trade-related issues of a
commercial and industrial nature, moving away from fundamental issues concerning
the basic rights of authors. Above all, intellectual property has become a key part of
trade relations. Knowledge, and especially its dissemination, is a determinant factor
not only for cultural development but also economic development of countries, and
especially developing countries. On the one hand, the mere existence of unauthorised
copies of copyrighted materials in foreign countries may be considered as an unfair
form of competition. On the other hand, copyright protection is perceived as an unfair
trade barrier for countries which do not have the means to pay the price for western
knowledge, and especially technological knowledge, for instance in the case of
computer technology.
Moreover, the possibility of piracies has captured the main attention of
producers and dominated the debate in legal terms, especially in relation to
3 There are two main systems described commonly as "common law tradition countries"
represented by "copyright law" and "civil law tradition countries, represented by "author's rights", see
chapter 2 and 3.
241
international trade. Curiously researches on that subject have been inconclusive. For
instance, wipo itself has had difficulties in finding cases of piracy at such a large scale
that it would threaten the industry. According to the 1978 wipo report:
"At no stage in the meetings of the Group was any convincing case ever made out
for the proposition that computer software did actually need any additional legal
protection; the most the representatives of the computer industry could say was that
they 'would like some further form of legal protection ' No documented instances of
piracy were adduced; and there was no serious suggestion that technological
progress in the software field had been inhibited by any shortcomings there might be
in the legal protection presently available."4
Therefore, it is of interest to understand why copyright has been chosen as the most
suitable form of protection. The main objective has been to be able to keep control of
the market by minimising or managing efficiently piracies at least cost but not to
curtail piracies. Other forms of legal protection such as trade secrets or patents could
have been strong candidates in order to prevent people from "stealing" programs.
Secrecy has the advantage of restricting access to the logic, all the more so since once
in low level language it is impossible to recreate the program as developed by the
programmer. Nonetheless, copyright has been chosen. Some may argue that
transaction costs could rise for producers by looking for other legal protections, and
would result in an overall price rises.5 In fact, the current state of oligopoly in the
software market proves that other forms of protection could not fulfil producers' main
4 CISAC document n° CJL/78/45.266, at 2; similarly, CONTU looked at the possible effect of
piracies on the computer industry. However, "In all the months of its hearings and inquiries, this
Commission has not been given a single explicit case of computer 'rip-off that was not amenable to
correction by laws other than copyright.", Dissent ofCommissionner Hersey, CONTU, Final Report on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, 31 July 1978 (Washington, 1979), at 30, Hereafter:
[contu, 1979]
5 John P. Palmer, Copyright and Computer Software, 8 Research in Law and Economics 1986. at
210, Hereafter: [Palmer J. 1986]
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objective : keep control of the market by managing piracies.6 As Alistair Hirst, a
representative at the wipo discussions, observed:
"Even amongst those representing the computer industry, there was a singular lack of
representation from the smaller independent software houses, who were intended to
be the chief beneficiaries of the new software right: those who had the most
influence on the discussions were in fact the representatives of the large companies
who are in many ways the economic adversaries of these intended beneficiaries."7
Such lack of representation may demonstrate a lack of concern from smaller entities
about the form of legal protection needed to develop software. Nonetheless, it is
sound to argue that strategically small entities want to sell their software for many
different lines of hardware, whereas large corporations tend to lock their software
within the hardware in order to strengthen their market position, making it an
oligopoly which inhibits competition. As Paul Goldstein argued, "many software
producers cast their fortunes with copyright, hoping that the law's easy-going,
Holmesian embrace [...] , would protect the investments made in their program's
underlying methods."8
6 American software companies supplied nearly 80 % of the world packaged-software market in
199!. Europe buys nearly as much software as its American counterpart; however, it produces only one
fifth as much. Some of the difficulties encountered by European companies "no matter how good are
their technology, is the fragmentation of the European market. Europe is a patchwork of languages,
legal systems, cultures and currencies", see Europe's Software debacle, The Economist November 12th
1994, at 101-2; The U.S. Justice Department has been looking at cases of violation of antitrust laws by
leading software companies such as Microsoft Corp, and especially in relation to Microsoft network
access with Windows 95. Also, Apple's chief executive, Michael Spindler, "has delivered a tirade
against Intel Corp. for undermining the economic foundation of the personal computer business". He
alleges that Intel makes microprocessors for 80 % of the world's PCs and that dominant position "has
more far-reaching consequences on how the PC industry works in its economics than Microsoft does",
sze Facing Computer 'Monopolies'. Herald Tribune July 15-16, 1995 at 9
7 Alastair J. Hirst, WIPO Discussions as Representative of the International Confederation of
Societies of Authors and Composers, cited in John Hersey, Dissent From CONTU's software
recommendation, in Technology and Copyright, Georges P. Bush and Robert H. Dreyfus eds.,
(Maryland, 1979), at 260.
8 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox, (New York, 1994),
at 204.
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In 1994, the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations led to an
agreement known as the "Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
including trade in counterfeit goods" abbreviated to trips.9 This agreement attempts
to establish a settlement machinery before the International Court in order to facilitate
disputes between countries on trade related aspects. Further, the trips agreement
intended to remedy the lack of an effective copyright enforcement mechanism.10
Disputes over intellectual property rights may be taken to the International Court of
Justice at The Hague following Art.33(l) of the Berne Convention. As a matter of
fact, not all signatories have ratified the provision.11 Therefore, the article has become
optional since any country ratifying the Convention can declare itself not bound by
the provision. Consequently, the gatt agreement should be viewed as a mechanism
for arbitration to settle disputes, providing possible sanctions against countries in
breach.12 Moreover, such important steps need to be placed in context, since they are
limited in scope. Remedies are not open to the aggrieved right-owners under the gatt
agreement or under the Berne Convention. Because they have no self-executing
9 The Draft Final contains 28 legal texts which spell out the results of negociations since the
Round was launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986. It covers negociating areas cited
in the Punta del Este Declaration and as such the Agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights, including trade in counterfeit goods, produced on 10 December 1991.
10 "Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade and taking into account
the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to
legitimate trade;
Recognising, to this end, the need for new rules and disciplines ...", Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (Annex III), Part
I. at 58.
11 Berne Convention, 1971 (Paris revision), Art 33(3)
12 "Emphasising the importance of reducing tensions by reashing strenghtened commitments to
resolve disputes on trade-related intellectual property issues through multilateral procedures",
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods (Annex III), Part I, Part Ill-Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Part V Dispute
Prevention and Settlement, at 58.
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character they are open only to states, not to individuals. Furthermore, international
conventions like the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention bind
signatories, whereas piracies occur mainly in non-member countries. It should be
recognised that gatt procedures are intended to co-exist along with the international
conventions. As a result, national laws remain the only efficient means in protecting
non-national authors as long as countries have bilateral or multilateral agreements. As
such, the conventions may be seen as worldwide protection systems since they are
joined by nearly two-thirds of the countries of the world. Nevertheless, a large
number of signatories does not prevent great disparities in wealth and in culture
among members. As a result, major issues are unlikely to be resolved among
signatories or obtain the unanimity required in order to revise the Berne Convention.
The consequences for the subject of intellectual property rights are
devastating. The subject has been spoiled by national and commercial interests which
in effect endanger the subject matter itself in the light of information technology. In
the field of computer technology, and especially computer programs, pressure to
apply copyright or droit d'auteur has reduced the propensity of their principles to
adapt to electronic milieu. By contrast, pressure from other "copyright industries",
such as the Press, which have already described themselves as unable to operate
profitably without copyright protection of their products, have had a determining
effect on economic and cultural national interests.13 Nonetheless, their voice seems to
13 "...the Press is small change compared to the rest of the media, including the entertainment
industry, which are absolutely dependent upon intellectual property for the revenues that give the
media their present character.", see David Lange, At Play in the Field of the Word: Copyright and the
Construction ofAuthorship in the Post-Literate Millenium, 55 Law and Contemporary Problems 1992,
at 142.
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be unheard even though their endeavours carry definite cultural value suitable for
copyright protection and worth protecting at international level.14 By contrast, the
computer industry has been more successful in putting forward its claims even though
its products are more of technical than cultural value.15 In effect, the industry has had
its "ways of bringing trade in copyright works within the ambit of the major
multilateral trade treaty, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade".16 Accordingly,
intellectual property issues, including specific proposals to provide protection for
computer software, were scheduled for negotiation in December 1991. As it resulted,
a revised text of the proposed agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property
Rights was prepared by the GATT secretariat for review, and it was agreed to provide
full copyright protection to computer programs as "literary works" in conformity to
provisions of the Berne Convention. The GATT agreement states that "copyright
protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of
operation or mathematical concepts as such",17 but computer programs are declared
protected "whether in source code or object code", "as literary works under the Berne
Convention (1971)."18 For the first time an international agreement clearly considers
"source code" as well as "object code" copyrightable. By contrast the EC Directive on
14 Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that in 1993 during the final GATT agreements the French
government succeeded to impose quotas on the importation of U.S. films in the E.C. in order to defend
not only European film industry but also, and most certainly, the French film industry.
1? This issue of the copyrightability of computer programs encompasses another general dilemma
where " [f|ew industrial design pass into the realm of copyright; fewer still deserve patent protection.
Others, at the whim of the judiciary, are seemingly condemned to a state of limbo between the two: not
sufficiently artistic for copyright, and failing just short of patentability, hence, denied any protection.",
see Mark A. LoBello, The Dichotomy Between Artistic Expression and Industrial Design: To Protect
or Not to Protect, 13 Whittier Law Review 1992, at 108.
16 Stephen M. Stewart, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, (London: Butterworths,
1989), at 344.
17 Art.9(2), Section 1, Part I, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade on Counterfeit Goods.
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computer programs, the most integrated legislation at a supranational level, is not
even precise as to what shall be protected, leaving the task to the courts. In my
opinion, signatories to the agreement have transgressed the purpose and principles of
intellectual property rights as a whole. Objections should be raised against the
agreement which jeopardises the future of intellectual property in electronic milieu
but is also in opposition to society's needs.19
Most certainly, research and development in computer programs is costly.
Rationally, few people would invest time and money to develop new software unless
they have the assurance that they can recover their investment back. Therefore, it can
be argued that only a few will invest in computer technologies, namely computer
programs, unless a certain return on investment is guaranteed. Some may suggest that
restricting the act of copying by copyright protection provides a legal mechanism for
securing such return on investment which, by the same token, benefits society by
increasing the number of inventions. Nonetheless, it would appear that the industry
itself does not believe in such contentions and would admit that copyright does not
respond to the problems related to the subject matter.20 It is clear that fear of
competition, especially from Asian competitors, acted as a strong motive to look for
an inexpensive and easy means of protection. The focus of the debate has been
18 Art. 10, Section 1, Part I, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade on Counterfeit Goods.
19 Ill-founded conclusions have been drawn from the example of computer programs arguing
favourably for copyright protection in electronic milieu, see Allen N. Dixon & Laurie C. Self,
Copyright Protection for the Information Superhighway, 11 European Intellectual Property Revue
1994, at 467.
20 "Many computer people will, if pressed, admit that copyright doesn't fit very well onto object,
but, they say, patent protection is expensive and time-consuming to obtain, and most programs have
only a short commercial life", William S. Strong, The Copyright Book: A Practical Guide, 4th ed.,
(The MIT Press, 1993), at 27, Hereafter: [Strong, 1993]; Also, a survey demonstrates that copyright
protection comes at equal rating with trade secret protection, see [Palmer J, 1986], at 212,
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whether new rights should emerge, as Professor Cornish puts it, either by emulation
or by accretion.21 In other words, the question is whether sui generis or copyright
protection is more suitable for protecting computer programs. The question of the
most appropriate form of protection for computer programs has been debated for the
past twenty years or so. From 1974 to 1978 wlpo worked with an advisory group of
non-government experts to prepare a draft treaty and the so-called Model Provisions
on the Protection ofComputer Software.22 The objective was to define a special form
of protection for computer program similar in form to copyright. The draft of the
treaty was finally abandoned in 1983 when most members of the expert committee
agreed that such special protection was unnecessary, wipo also carried out a survey
from 1979 to be considered in 1985 at a general meeting on the evolution of national
legislation or case law for the legal protection of computer software. No definitive
conclusion was drawn from the survey, but copyright was thought to be the most
appropriate form of protection by a great majority of participants. They opposed the
introduction of a sui generis legal regime for computer programs, because national
copyright legislation operates territorially and international agreements had been
made available to protect rather foreign authors. It should be clear that commercial
considerations rather than real intellectual property ones had weight in resolving the
issue.
21 W.R. Cornish, The International Relations of Intellectual Property, 52 The Cambridge Law
Journal 1993, at 54, Hereafter: [Cornish, 1993]
22 Model Provisions on the Provisions of Computer Software, WIPO Geneva, 1977, cited in
Stephen M. Stewart, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, (London: Butterworths, 1989),
at 306.
248
In my opinion, this international consensus on the emergence of property
rights by means of copyright or droit d'auteur protection teaches two important
lessons. First, latent monopolists, as in to eighteenth-century France and Britain, have
deliberately abused the generous principles and purposes of intellectual property. To
that effect, it is necessary to untangle the confusion brought up by contenders in
favour of copyright protection for computer programs in order to restore freedom of
access to ideas and freedom of expression. Following this line of thinking, it is
necessary to re-assess correctly intellectual property rights in light of information
technology and the immutable principles from which intellectual property rights
emerge. Second, on a wider scale it should be recognised that "what currently is
missing in our international foundations is a sufficient accord on the proper scope of
industrial property, as distinct from copyright."23 Moreover, confusion has occurred
over the proper means of protection because more applications in technical industrial
processes use knowledge and data indiscriminately. In other words, protection of the
industry is quite a different task from protecting authorship, where the inherent value
is distinct. For instance, confusion easily happens in determining what is the inherent
value of computer programs which in essence needs to be adequately protected. Thus,
granting copyright protection to operating systems, as William Strong contended,:
"is in effect granting a long-term patent-like monopoly in the machine itself, without
requiring the inventor to meet the standards of patentability. This is not healthy for
the economy, nor in the long run for the law either. A better solution might be to
enact a special statute for software, combining elements of patent and copyright"24
Because difficulties in determining that value is heightened by international trade
issues, more careful consideration should be given to the value of knowledge in a
23 [Cornish, 1993], at 60
24 [Strong, 1993], at 27.
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global information age society. Countries who may be excluded today from accessing
the world's intellectual resources may tomorrow restrain others from accessing it.
Therefore, as Professor Cornish explained:
"[i]n any event the object is to find some means which will enable individual
countries, in considering the balance of interests between protection of competition
in each case, to proceed essentially by emulation rather than by some more or less
forced and inappropriate accretion"25
As regards works of the intellect, a proper scope of protection will be crucial in the
development of all countries. Abuses similar to the field of computer programs may
block access to ideas or knowledge. Moreover, commercial pressure in what is
already a global information structure should be carefully monitored in order to
develop a flexible copyright where people can have open access to the world's
resources as well as being compensated for their contribution to this international
wealth.
Dissent from the Copyrightability of Computer Programs
The impulse for copyright protection of computer programs came from the United
States. Following the recommendations of the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), the U.S. Congress amended its
1976 Copyright Act in 1980 to embrace computer programs expressly within the
scope of literary works. As a matter of fact, Congress brought up the issue of
computer programs as early as 1976. With respect to computer programs, Congress
decided not to legislate immediately on technological issues and vested CONTU with
25 [Cornish, 1993], at 61.
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the responsibility to explore and formulate policy.26 Nonetheless, Congress had
already expressed its intention to cover them as literary works "to the extent that they
incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of original ideas, as
distinguished from the ideas themselves".27 In amending the 1976 Act, Congress
made clear that, although not expressly listed among the seven categories of
copyrightable works, computer programs were eligible for copyright protection as
literary works. Consequently, it was left to federal courts to determine what was
entitled to copyright protection. At first, courts sought to distinguish between source
code and object code but soon rejected the distinction and held that programs in
source code and in object code were equally copyrightable.28 With respect to the
distinction to operating system programs and application programs, the courts found a
distinction without a difference of treatment.29 Moreover, programs were to be
protected regardless of whether they were stored externally or permanently in the
memory of a computer. Nonetheless, the question has persisted whether the non-
literal elements of a program such as its structure, sequence and organisation are
copyrightable. In other words, difficulties arise over whether, as with any other
literary work, a computer program is entitled to protection not only for its literal
language, but also for original non-literal elements of structure.
26 Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection For Computer Programs, Databases, and COmputer-
Generated Works: Is Anything new since CONTU?, 106 Harvard Law Review 1993, at 1979, Hereafter:
[Miller, 1979]
27 U.S. House Report n° 94-1476, 3 September 1976, at 54.
28 Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artis International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3rd Cir. 1982); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert, denied464 U.S. 1033
(1984); Apple Computer, Inc. V. Formula International Inc., 562 F.Supp. 775 (N.D.Cal. 1983).
29 For instance in Whelan the court without any copying of the program code, appropriation of the
structural aspects of a program constituted infringement, see Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2n 1224-25 (3rd Cir. 1986, cert, denied. 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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Clearly, national and commercial interests have played an important role in
the process of embracing computer programs as literary works. Nonetheless, I venture
to say that such interests do not explain how proponents of the copyrightability of
computer program persist even though courts struggle with the subject matter.30 With
the question of computer programs and copyright in the courts since CONTU, two
points have to be made which will lead to a critical third one. Fundamentally,
copyright does not fit the needs of computer programs, and so courts will always have
trouble in defining the proper scope of protection. Application of the idea-expression
dichotomy is not feasible because copyright is not intended to protect the inherent
value of computer programs. On the specific aspect of idea-expression dichotomy, a
separate section will determine specifically in technical terms why the doctrine cannot
apply. Therefore, I would not even attempt to prove that courts are not "capable of
understanding the technology, applying the doctrine to it".31 Following that line of
thinking, there is a practical point which has to be made. In the field of intellectual
property rights, courts whether from the common law or the civil law tradition have
the duty to implement legislation voted by parliaments. To that effect, courts have
been placed in a situation, whether they like it or not, to fit a round peg in a square
hole.
Nonetheless, one may argue that the U.S. Supreme Court has the duty to
check whether any law passed by Congress respects the U.S. constitutional
30 Professor Miller was appointed a CONTU Commissionner and believed then as he believes now
that "CONTU made the right decision in treating computer programs, databases, and computer-
generated works as copyrightable material", see [Miller, 1993], at 981.
31 [Miller, 1993], at 992.
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provisions.32 Thus, one may rightly assume that following the case Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc.,33 courts would conform to intellectual
property doctrine as defined by the constitutional mandate, and therefore the law itself
would be rightly suitable to computer programs. On the contrary, as has been already
argued, the constitutional mandate has never been applied properly and leads to
unsatisfactory decisions from the courts.34 The U.S. copyright system has to be
analysed as a system composed of two bodies of laws which represent a transitional
step between instrumentalist copyright mechanisms and natural right ones. As a
result, claimants for copyright protection may easily extend their rights over the
domain of ideas, and especially in our case to object code or operating systems. Under
a normal instrumentalist or natural right system, such extension would be prevented
following the principle of public domain which developed the doctrine of idea-
expression dichotomy. Because U.S. copyright attempts to protect an author's
32 "resolutions reached by legislators and judges are legal resolutions that possess no independent
claim on truth". As a result, a federal court decision remains the law until an appellate court decides
otherwise. Then, the Supreme Court may change the law as could Congress if it desagrees with the
Supreme Court result. Following this line of thinking Congress has the last word, and I venture to say
that the constitutional mandate is interpreted according to the public interest polity decided by the
strongest forces in presence, see Paul Goldstein. Copyright's Highway, From Gutenberg to the
Celestial Jukebox, (New York. 1994), 17.
33 The U.S. Supreme Court decided that copyright law did not protect the white pages listings of a
telephone book. This decision confused an important area of copyright law in relation to application to
factual compilations, see Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Ill S.Ct. 1282
(1991); Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy ofFeist: Consequences of the Weak Connection Between Copyright
and the Economics ofPublic Goods, 52 Ohio State Law Journal 1991, at 1345.
34 In March 9, 1995, the Court of Appeal held in Lotus v. Borlan that the Lotus menu command
hierachy is uncopyrightable subject matter, see Lotus Development Co. v. Borland International Inc.,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4618. On July 2, 1990, a district court held that the Lotus 1-2-3 "menu
structure, taken as a whole - including the choice of command terms [and] the structure and order of
those terms" was protected expression covered by Lotus's copyrights, see Lotus Dev. Corp v
Parperback Software Int'l, 740 F.Supp. 37, 68, 70 (D.Mass.1990). Moreover, in "Feist the Supreme
Court adds to the constitutional text a requirement of creativity" which in effect considers that
industrious labour is not enough to attract copyright and thus getting away from instrumentalist
grounds based upon the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, see Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright
and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist V. Rural Telephone, 92 Columbia Law
Review 1992, at 367-68; see also the constitutional debate posed by CONTU, [CONTU, 1979], at 14-15.
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investment as well as his subjective creativity, and because difficulties arise in
differentiating ideas from expression in electronic milieu, many people are convinced
of the copyrightability of computer programs. More importantly, U.S. copyright fails
to secure the value of works in electronic form.35 Also, combined with commercial
pressure emerging from the computer industry, U.S. copyright has taken force as
precedent for other legislation.
Similarly, the gradual expansion of the subject to European national laws
succeeded in imposing copyright protection on computer programs, following a
combination of factors which have already been argued. Moreover, the European
Community acted directly on 14 May 1992 to eliminate any doubts on the subject by
introducing a Directive to that effect.36 The British Parliament had already introduced
changes to bring programs within the scope of copyright before the 1992 European
Council Directive required member states to incorporate its provisions. Parliament's
intention was to catch up with technological change as well as to afford protection to
new forms of expression.37 Nonetheless, I would stress the fact that the new Act has
not been reformed but simply rejuvenated to be typical of an "old strain of common
law thought which sees no difference of kind between true creators and investors in
3:5 Jane C. Ginsburgh, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of
Information in the United States, in Protecting Works of Fact, Copyright, Freedom of Expression and
Information Law (Kluwer, 1991), at 43; Bradford P. Lyerla, Copyrightability of Software User
interfaces: The Natural Law Versus the Social Utilitarian Approach, 10 The Computer Lawyer 1993,
at 21.
36 The Council Directive announced its intention "to harmonize Member States legislation
regarding the protection of computer programs in order to create a legal environment which will afford
a degree of security against unauthorised reproduction of such programs", Council Directive of 14
May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs (91/250/EEC), Official Journal 1991,
LI 22/42.
37 "An Act to restate the law, with amendments; ... to make provision with respect to devices
designed to circumvent copy-protection of works in electronic form". CDPA 1988, c.48; see also
"Computers, databases and related technology", Department of Trade and Industry, (While Paper)
Intellectual Property and Innovation, Cmnd 9712, (London, April 1986), 50-51
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the creations of others; and which is inclined to prefer the latter to the former."38 This
move has been of importance, since the distinction between the copyright of creators
of traditional forms of expression and that of entrepreneurial forms has been
eliminated in order to open the Act to more commercial endeavours. Furthermore, the
Act ought to be defined as a more conventional instrumentalist act than its U.S.
counterpart, which lists works and subject matter governed by copyright
indiscriminately. As a result, any creative intellectual activities may secure copyright
protection so long as such creations satisfy a minimum standard of effort defined as
"skill", "selection", "judgement", "experience", "labour", or "capital" produced by the
creator.39 Following this line of thinking, it would seem an easy task to include
computer programs within the list of literary works and let UK court determine what
is an infringement of copyright in a computer program.
Because copyright evolves from the printing press, expression of literary
works covers any works expressed in material form, print or writing, whether or not
the quality or style is high.40 Since computer programs reach electronic forms and are
written directly on computer, there is no tangible form of expression. Therefore it
could be held that copyright is not a suitable form of protection for the subject matter.
Such argumentation does not hold. It is not because copyright protects tangible forms
of expression that programs cannot be protected. For instance, music recorded on a
digital disk is protected by copyright.41 Moreover, the problem of tangibility is a
38 W.R. Cornish, Intellectual Property Rights, (London, 1989), at 265, Hereafter: [Cornish, 1989]
39 ibid, at 268.
40 Peterson J, University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch. 601 at 608
cited in [Cornish, 1989], at 268
41 The Act hold that storage of works on any electronic medium shall be protectible: "... This
includes storing the work in any medium by electronic means", Art. 17(2), 1988 CDPA.
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separate issue referring to the fundamental principle whereby copyright protects
investment in commodities which need to be tangible in form. Here the central issue
is not the mode of communication in electronic milieu but the quality of literary work
applied to computer programs. Thus, difficult questions arise not only on the
application of copyright to either source or object code but also in respect of the
doctrine of an idea-expression dichotomy.42 A minimum degree of "literary"
composition or "skill, judgement and labour" is necessary as proof of originality. The
expression does not need to be of a novel form but simply not a copy of another work
or originate from the author himself.43 Skill, judgement and labour may certainly be
required to develop computer programs, but programming languages are far from
representing forms of cultural originality. In practice, early U.K. courts decisions
embraced a U.S. approach to the question of copyright infringement.44 As a result,
such complacency, I venture to say, either reflects the difficulties in applying
42 Alan Bundy & Hector MacQueen, The New Software Copyright Law, 37 The Computer Journal
1994, at 82.
43 The intent is to reduce to a minimum the element of subjective judgment in deciding what
qualifies for protection to allow protection of investement of labour or capital in literary works, see
[Cornish, 1989], at 271.
44 "Lord Reay, the minister responsible, wrote to one of us (AB) in July 1991 that '[the exclusion
of the ideas and principles underlying an interface] is already the case in the UK copyright law' so that
'We have therefore no intention of amending UK legislation in this respect'. However, Lord Reay
accepted that some courts 'have taken a very broad view as to what constitutes an infringement of the
copyright in a computer programme'. He had no reason to believe that UK courts would follow that
reasoning'." "A view, which in the light of "the case John Richardson Computers Ltd. v. Flanders,
[1993] F.S.R. 497 decided under the old law, "now appears to be mistaken.", see Alan Bundy and
Hector MacQueen, The New Software Copyright Law, 37 The Computer Journal 1994, at 81; The
recent case IBCOS Computers Ltd v. Barclays Mercantile Highland Finace Ltd, [1994] F.S.R 275, has,
on the contrary, rejected the "look and feel" approach to the question of infringement under the 1988
Copyright Act incorporating the European Directive provisions on computer programs.
"(12) The United States test of abstraction and filtration of the core of protectable expression is
not helpful in English law [...] John Richardson Computers Ltd v Flanders [1993] F.S.R. 497,
Considered.
(13) When deciding whether a substantial part of the work has been reproduced, consideration is
not restricted to the text of the code," IBCOS at 277.
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copyright to the subject matter or questions the ability of courts to resist commercial
pressure.
As regards the French droit d'auteur, the introduction of computer programs
under the scope of copyright was an arduous task since it did not correspond to the
French approach.45 The revolutionary decrees of 1791 and 1793 had been already
revised in 1957 in order to codify an increasing jurisprudence defining the personality
concept of authorship as well as to facilitate application of international provisions
contained in the Berne and Geneva conventions.46 Thus, the current French copyright
law established in March 1957 responded to technical and economic pressure. Like its
British counterpart, the Act was revised in 1985 in order to modernise it according to
technological change and society's needs as a deliberate move putting culture in the
hands of the state and capital.47 Thus the 1985 copyright law deals directly with the
legal protection of logiciels "according to the conditions set out in Title V".48 It has to
be mentioned that the 1968 Patent Law rejects computer programs as un-patentable.
45 Andre Lucas, The Council Directive of 14 May 1991 concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs and its Implication in French Law, I European Intellectual Property Review
1992, at 28, Hereafter: [Lucas, 1992]
46 Claude Colombet, Propriete litteraire et artistique et droits voisins, 7e ed., (Paris, 1994), at 7-8,
Hereafter: [Colombet, 1994]
47 "Guardian of the cultural patrimony, promoter of recognized, traditional culture (opera,
museum, classical music, dance, theatre), the Ministry of Culture suddenly saw itself taken by the
emergence of the new movements (song, rock, jazz, but also advertising, fashion, design) in the new
technologies (computer, cable) and assumed a strategic role in the renewal of French industry. At this
point, the Ministry of Culture becomes a sort of "Ministry of the Culture Industry" in which its politics
becomes integrated into global strategy of the French government.", ministerial communique "Culture
et industries culturelles" delivered by Dominique Wallonin in June 1984 at the Rencontres franco-
quebecoises, cited in Bernard Miege, Patrick Pajon, Jean-Michel Salatin, L'industrialisation de
I'audiovisuel. Des programmes pour les nouveaux medias, (Paris, 1986), at 23.
48 French law 11th March 1957, Sur la propriete litteraire et artistique (n° 57-298), and law 3rd
July 1985 "les logiciels, selon les modalites definies au titre V de la loi n° 85-660 du 3 juillet 1985",
Art. 3 1957 French Copyright law, Relative aux droits d'auteur et aux droits des artistes-interpretes,
des producteurs de phonogrammes et de videogrammes et des entreprises de communication
audiovisuelle (n° 85-660), inforceable since 1st January 1986.
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By principle droit d'auteur provides no definition of works subject to copyright.
Accordingly:
"[t]he provisions of this law shall protect the right of authors of all intellectual works,
regardless of their kind, form of expression, merit of purpose".49
Therefore, it could be argued that protection of computer programs should not pose
any problem.50 Opinions were divided whether Parlement should emulate a new form
of protection or adapt the current droit d'auteur. According to reports drafted for
consultation by the Assemblee Nationale and the Senat a system of protection
modelled upon design protection was under study.51 The finalised project chose the
droit d'auteur approach in order to protect computer programs. Undoubtedly,
commercial pressure from the computer industry had a positive effect on the final
decision. Some voices criticised such a choice arguing the lack of originality and of
expression of the personality of the author.52 As a matter of fact "programs are not
simply 'equivalent' to literary works but they are protected 'as literary works'."53
As a result, French copyright law modified its provisions according to the
special character of computer programs. It should be observed that the 1985 law
attributes the right expressly to the employer unless otherwise stipulated.54
49 "Les dispositions de la presente loi protegent les droits des auteurs sur toutes les oeuvres de
1'esprit, quels qu'en soient le genre, la forme d'expression, le merite ou la destination", Art.2, 1957
French Copyright Law.
50 An early decision of the Paris Court recognised that a program was a original work of the
intellect going beyond stringent and automatic logic and requiring choices, see [Colombet, 1994], at
78.
51 M. Richard, Assemblee Nationale report, n° 2235 (annex to the minutes of the 26 June 1984
session), and M. Jolibois, Senate report, n°212 (annex to the minutes of the 24 January 1985 session).
52 R. Plaisant, La protection du locigiel par le droit d'auteur. Gazette du Palais 1983 n° 2, Doc
348.
53 [Lucas, 1992], at 28.
54 "Sauf stipulation contraire, le logiciel cree par un ou des employes dans l'exercice de leurs
fonctions appartient a l'employeur auquel sont devolus tous les droits reconnus aux auteurs", Art.45,
1985 French Copyright Law.
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Accordingly, French droit moral has been restricted not only due to the commercial
character of computer programs but also to the exceptional protection attributed by
Parlement.55 In principle, no limitation in duration of these rights can be imposed,56
but "unless otherwise stipulated, the author may not oppose adaptation of the software
within the limits of the rights he has assigned nor exercise his right to correct or to
retract".57 Clearly, this measure prevents authors from exercising rights which could
in practice impede the normal commercial exploitation of computer programs. The
author has a right which is entirely in his discretion, but the law requires express
provisions in return if it happens. As a result, the author may only claim the right to
respect of his name or to prevent false attribution. Moreover, the 1985 law lays down
explicitly a special exception to restricted acts:
"Notwithstanding item 2° in Article 41 of the above mentioned law n° 57-298 of 11
March 1957, any reproduction other than the making of a back-up copy by the user
or any use of software not expressly authorised by the author or his successors in
title, shall be subject to the sanctions laid down by the said law."58
The legislator intended to fight piracies and curtailed another basic principle of
French copyright law which allows the making of copies for private use.59 Moreover,
55 "Sauf stipulation contraire, l'auteur ne peut s'opposer a l'adaptation du logiciel dans la limite des
droits qu'il a cedes, ni exercer son droit de repentir ou de retrait". Art 46, Title V, 1985 French Law.
56 "L'auteur jouit du droit au respect de son nom, de sa qualite et de son oeuvre. Ce droit est
attache a sa personne. II est perpetuel, inalienable et imprescriptible. II est transmissible a cause de
mort aux heritiers de l'auteur l'exercice peut en etre confere a un tiers en vertu de dispositions
testamentaires",("if shall be perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible. It may be transmitted 'mortis
causa' to the heirs of the authors. The exercise of this right may be conferred on third parties by
testamentary provisions") Art.6, French Copyright Law 1957.
57 Art.46, 1985 French Copyright Law. Compare with "The author shall enjoy the right to respect
for his name, his authorship, and his work", Art.6, 1957 French Copyright Law.
58 "Par derogation au 2° de 1'article 41 de la loi n°57-298 du 11 mars 1957 precitee, toute
reproduction autre que I'etablissement d'une copie de sauvegarde par l'utilisateur ainsi que toute
utilisation d'un logiciel non expressement autorise par I'auteur ou ses ayant droits, est passible des
sanctions prevues par ladite loi", Art.47, 1985 French Copyright Law.
59 "Lorsque l'oeuvre a ete divulguee, l'auteur ne peut interdire : [...] les copies ou reproductions
strictement reservees a I'usage prive du copiste et non destinenees a une utilisation collective [...]",
Art.41 (2), 1957 French Copyright Law.
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as for software, "ft]he rights afforded by this title shall lapse on expiry of a period of
twenty-five years from the date of the creation of the software".60 Such an exception
was based upon the short life expectancy of programs and the otherwise possible
long-term monopoly that an author could impose as to maintenance or evolution of
computer technology.
Clearly, the introduction of substantial derogations was necessary to open the
subject matter of copyright to computer programs, but the question remains whether
general principles of droit d'auteur can be applied to computer programs. Critics
highlight the inherent lack of originality and expression of the personality of the
author. Unlike its British and American counterparts, the French concept of
originality is viewed in a subjective and not an objective sense. Moreover, unlike
industrial property, the criterion of novelty is an objective concept which does not
look for originality of form. In my opinion, although droit d'auteur has been altered
in its principles, conflicts arise because courts have to apply the sense of subjectivity
to the fundamental idea-expression dichotomy doctrine in relation to the criterion of
novelty attached to industrial processes. It is of interest to cite an Arret of the Court
de Cassation in 7 March 1986 which reflects this strange association:
"Having correctly stated that the scientific character of computer programs is not an
obstacle to their protection by copyright, and properly held that the 'composition' of
a program may be found in the flow chart and its 'expression' in the instructions, in
whatever form they may be fixed, the Court of Appeal made it clear that a computer
program is not simply a method of working and that protection must be determined
by examining it as a whole. Secondly, in considering, as they were obliged to so,
whether M. Pachot's programs were original, the lower court judges decided that
60 "Les droits objets du present titre s'eteignent a I'expiration d'une periode de ving-cinq annees
comptee de la date de creation", Art.48, 1985 Title V., French Copyright Law. Also, in order to respect
the Berne Convention, the French legislator applied Art.7(4) of the Convention setting exceptions
related to applied arts and therefore reducing the normal period of protection of fifty year p.m.a.,
Art.21 (1 ),(2), 1957 French Copyright Law. Finally, Art.8 of the European Council Directive on the
Protection of Computer Programs imposed a 50 year period as from the date of creation of the
program, (91/250/EEC), Official Journal 1991, LI22/42.
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their author had proved that he had invested personal effort going beyond the simple
application of an automatic and constraining logic and that this effort was embodied
in the program's individualised structure In the light of these and its reasoning, the
Court of Appeal has legally justified its holding that the programs conceived by M.
Pachot bore the mark of his own intellectual contribution."61
The Court succeeded in establishing a synthesis between "originality", conceived as
personal intellectual effort, and "originality" envisaged as novelty of industrial form.
The Court in effect introduced a new approach whereby an intellectual creation may
be the result of its creator's intellectual effort and is not itself a copy, considering the
"intellectual input".62 Since then the Cow de Cassation, following a 1990 decision of
the Grenoble court, asserted in 1991 the fact that the sense of novelty should not as
such be taken into consideration.63 The interpretation insisted upon the fact that there
is not only one idea behind the structure of a computer programme but there are
several ways of writing a program and therefore each original. As a result, the French
legislator has created a new form of protection with the help of courts recognising that
the droit d'auteur as such is not applicable to the subject matter of computer
programs.
Moreover, "[t]he price of this cleverness is an irritating ambiguity",
notwithstanding that "[diplomatic texts do not necessarily make good legal texts."64
Consequently, I object to such a solution because it places the emphasis on the
expression of instructions and not upon the inherent value of computer programs.
Courts will have extreme difficulties, like their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, in
61 Court de Cassation, 7 March 1986, Assemblee Pleniere, Maillot Witt v. Pachot (three
decisions), D. 1986.405. cited in 9 European Intellectual Property Review 1986, at D160-61.
62 "effort intellectuel", Cass, civ., Ass. Plen., 7 March 1986 , conclusion Cabannes, note B.
Edelman, cited in [Colombet, 1994], at 83.
63 Grenoble, (l®re Ch. civ.), 19 Sept. 1989, R.T.D. [1990], comments A. Franipon, at 387; Ct.
Cassation l6reCh. civ., 16 April 1991, D. 1992.S.C.13, comments C. Colombet.
64 [Lucas, 1992], at 29.
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differentiating the innovative value of programs which look similar in presentation. It
should be stressed that the value of computer programs lies in their efficiency in
solving problems, not in the expression of instructions. Cleverness in the combination
of "originality" and "novelty" will not suffice to distinguish such a value, because
conflicts exist between the subjective sense of "originality" and the subjective sense
of "novelty". Nonetheless, what should be highlighted here is the strength of the droit
d'auteur which lies in its inherent capacity to recognise intellectual property rights out
of the simple act of human creation. Transposed to electronic milieu, this principle is
able to recognise authorship. In other words, the emergence of author's right is
feasible by the fact that droit d'auteur can place value on expression of ideas which
reflect the personality of their author, whatever is the material or immaterial form of
embodiment. Following this line of thinking, this is why the lack of proper definition
of computer programs in national legislation is no argument at all in demonstrating
that computer programs are not copyrightable. It should be clear that the problem
depends upon more fundamental grounds than mere description of what is
copyrightable. Because different levels of expression exist in computer programs
within a single electronic form of expression, computing principles and instructions
are difficult to dissociate. Nonetheless, it is not because digital form of expression
complicates the work of courts that authorship cannot be determined adequately.
Authorship is attributed to works irrespective to their form, merit or purpose,65 and
"where it is of an original character".66 Works of authorship are meant to
65 Art.2, 1957 French Copyright Law,
66 "Le titre d'une oeuvre de l'esprit, des lors qu'il represente un caractere original, est protege
comme l'oeuvre elle-meme", Art.5, 1957 French Copyright Law.
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communicate ideas and therefore to be accessible to the public either in printed or
electronic form. Computer programs are not forms of expression of ideas or
principles, and have no needs to be communicated to the public in order to work.
On 14 May 1991 the European Community gave its final approval to its
"Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs".67 The Directive aims to
provide consistency among Member States' national copyright laws, in areas such as
the classification of computer program as literary work, the definition of originality, a
common term of protection within the terms of the Berne Convention, and the
controversial permission for reverse engineering in certain circumstances. With the
ratification by the Member States' parliaments, there came also an end to a period of
very intensive debate not only within the European Community, but also in the
United States.68 In light of the active involvement of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office in the draft proposal for a Council Directive on the copyright protection of
computer programs, it could be argued also that the U.S.A. joined the Berne
Convention in 1989 for the purpose of imposing a closer control on its European
competitors.69 Understandably, the software industry was concerned with the
protection which was to be afforded to their product. As such the debate was limited
to the "copyright proposal" since the Commission chose to follow the accretion
67 (91/250/EEC), Official Journal 1991, LI22/42.
68 During the EEC software debate the U.S. Trade Representative and the major sofware
American companies lobbied to protect their interests, G. Gervaise Davis, III, Scope of Protection of
Computer-Based Works: Reverse Engineering, Clean Rooms and Decompilation, in Reverse
Engineering: Legal Business Strategies For Competitive Product Design in the 1990's, (Epstein &
Laurie, 1992), at 45.
69 The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 has been described as "'minimalist' -
amending U.S. law only where absolutely necessary to bring the United States into compliance with
Berne structures, and then limiting the amendment's scope to the extent possible", D. Nimmer in M.
Nimmer & Geler, International Copyright Law and Practice, at USA-8, cited in [Cornish, 1993], at 56.
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method most certainly to conform with the international trend which was, moreover
the choice of the U.S. Congress. Accordingly, during the consultation process owners
of rights and end-users presented their concerns. The most controversial debate raged
over the right to reverse-engineer programs notwithstanding written agreements to the
contrary when "indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the
interoperability of an independently created computer programme with other
programs".70 Fundamentally the subject of debate was whether copyright fitted the
needs of computer programs, but all this was argued as if that issue was not debatable
anymore and reverse engineering needed a formal consensual agreement from all
parties.71
In ratifying the Directive, national legislation had to be amended in order to
implement the Directive. Many Member Sates had already taken legislative action in
the domain. The primary areas of national legislation that EC Member States needed
to address included originality requirements, authorship or employee-written
programs and the special considerations attached to authors' exclusive rights. It
should be stressed that the European Community represents a fair sample of
"copyright systems" stemming from two different philosophical sets, namely,
common law and droit d'auteur. The emergence of author's rights in a large majority
70 Art.6, Council Directive of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs
(91/250/EEC). Official Journal 1991, LI22/42.
71 After the United States, Japan became the last major industrial nation to abandon its previously
declared preference for sui generis protection in favour of copyright protection. The 1977 Copyright
Act was amended in 1985 to make it more suitable to protect computer programmes and was further
amended in 1986 to extend the scope of protection to databases under the title "programmed works".
Also, article 2(1) defines the term "proroguramu" as "an expression of combined instructions given to a
computer so as to make it function and obtain a certain result", see Stephen M. Stewart, International
Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, (London, 1989), at 111 & 781.
264
of European countries respects personality principles which in effect pose problems.72
The Directive gives no definition of what computer programs are, maybe for the best,
leaving national Parliaments free in dealing with the issue. The Directive insists that
computer programs include "preparatory design material."73 Moreover, the Directive
does not govern moral rights, not only because the European Community is composed
of different sets of legal tradition, but also because their handling is rendered
impossible by the manner in which property rights vest. Thus, programs are simply
denied any moral rights unless specifically stated in national legislation. Unless a
creator of program acts as a freelance programmer, rights vest by contract to
employers; also, programs are designed by more than one person. Co-authorship not
only complicates attribution of economic rights but also renders management of
moral rights highly difficult.74 Thus, moral rights may be reserved to the employee in
the absence of any contractual waiver. In fact, the French legislation itself has
restricted substantially the "inalienable" moral rights of author-programmers.
Moreover, because the Directive provisions respect the terms of the Berne
Convention, computer programs are not required to be protected as such as literary
works. According to the Convention, "artistic and literary works" represent "every
production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain whatever may be the mode or
form of its expression [...I".75 Clearly, the Berne definition can accommodate
computer programs as literary works in order to attract copyright protection.
72 [Lucas, 1992], at 28.
73 Art. 1, Council Directive of 14 May 199! on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs
(91/250/EEC). Official Journal 1991. LI22/42.
74 By contrast, Arthur Miller contends that "programming entails a significant degree of
individuality". The whole issue remains whether that degree of individuality represents non-obvious or
mechanical choices to any other programmer, see [Miller, 1993], at 984.
75 Berne Convention, 1971 revision, Art. 2(1).
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I would insist upon the fact that analysing intellectual property through the
prism of commercial interests does not meet society's best interests. What I am
concerned with here is not only that commercial interests influence in an excessive
manner decisions in the realm of intellectual property, but also that "industrial
property" takes precedence over intellectual property.76 In my opinion, this poses a
definite problem for the future of intellectual property, especially in the perception of
intellectual property of works of authorship in electronic milieu. There is established
case law in the sense here indicated. In Musik Vertrieb Memhran, a judgement of
1981, the European Court of Justice had already defined its perception of intellectual
property. In a reply to the French Government's argument that copyright was not
comparable to other industrial and commercial property rights, such as patent or
trade-marks, since it aims at preventing distortion, mutilation or other alteration of the
author's work, the Court declared:
"It is true that copyright comprises moral rights of the kind indicated by the French
government. However, it also comprises other rights, notably the right to exploit
commercially the marketing of the protected work, particularly in the form of
licenses granted in return of payment of royalties. It is this economic aspect of
copyright which is the subject of the question submitted by the national court and. in
this regard, ... there is no reason to make a distinction between copyright and other
industrial commercial property rights"77
Without any doubt the European Community rightly looks at intellectual property as a
possible means for distortion of competition, and especially possible formation of
monopolies in information.78 Nevertheless, emphasis should be placed on the moral
76 Valentine Korah, An Introduction Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice Law and
Practice, 5th ed., (London, 1994), at 204; Johannes Hartmut, Industrial Property and Copyright in
European Community Law, trans. Franck Dorman, (Neitherlands, 1976), at 55.
77 Joined cases 55 and 57/80, Musik Vertried Membran and K'tel v. GEMA, 1981 E.C.R. at 147,
cited in Thijmen Koopmans, Information Monopolies in European Community Law, in Protecting
Works ofFact, Copyright, Freedom ofExpression and Information Law (Kluwer 1991), at 83-84.
78 ibid, at 87-88.
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as well as economic rights of creators. In looking at intellectual property rights solely
as an instrumentalist system, the chances are that in electronic milieu intellectual
property will lose its purpose, which is the enlightenment of society. I would
therefore question Professor Miller's contention that "copyright principles are flexible
enough that it is not necessary to fabricate an entirely different legal regime".79 Legal
regimes such as copyright law, and droit d'auteur alike, have their purpose defined by
certain principles which define a consistent mechanism. Only the rules which apply
these principles may be changed, and ought to change with society's needs. In
reference to the economics of intellectual property, it can be intuitively understood
that in protecting source code as well as object code, chances to gain knowledge from
discovery are reduced to nil. In other words, application of copyright establishes
monopoly barriers, annihilating future social benefits. Following this line of thinking,
because differentiation between knowledge, data and processes is blurred in electronic
milieu, it is of importance to examine the true value of the subject matter in order to
determine the appropriate intellectual property regime.
Placing Value on Computer Programs
As we have seen, no definition of computer program has been given. Two relevant
problems have impeded such clarification. Not only is it difficult to associate
computer programs with literary works, but also the inherent value of computer
programs has not been adequately defined. Because the legislator has decided that
programs are eligible for copyright protection, a presumption of "originality" exists.
79 [Miller, 1993], at 981.
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resulting in the false assumption that their value lies in their form of expression. As I
have argued already, whether expression of ideas is in tangible or intangible form is
of no importance. Authorship places value on the manner in which ideas are
expressed as opposed to computer programs in which standards functions are
arranged in the most efficient manner but not integrated in any form of expression. As
a result the criterion of originality refers to the personality mirrored in the work of the
mind. What I will be concerned here with is in determining the value of computer
programs.
Many definitions attempt to appraise the value of computer programs. In 1977
wipo offered several definitions for the interpretation of the terms "computer
program".80 It has been defined as a set of instructions capable, when incorporated in
a machine-readable medium, of causing a machine having information-processing
capabilities to indicate, perform or achieve a particular function, task or result. Also, a
"program description" means a complete procedural representation in verbal,
schematic or other form, in sufficient detail to determine a set of instructions
constituting a corresponding computer program. Thus, "supporting material" means
any material, other than a computer program or a program description, created for
aiding the understanding or application of a computer program, for example problem
descriptions and user instructions. Finally, "computer software" means any or several
of the items referred to as computer program and program description. Such
definitions are widely accepted at the international level.81 Clearly, the ground
80 W1PO, Model Provisions on the Protection ofComputer Software, (Geneva: WIPO, 1977), S.l.
81 Kinderman. The InternationaI Copyright of Computer Software: History, Status and
Developments, Copyright 1988, at 201 -203.
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covered refers directly to legal terms and especially to legal doctrine which in effect
loses perspective of the inherent value of computer programs because its looks at the
external aspects. Another approach has been, to analogise computer programs with
electronic forms of expression attracting copyright protection. For instance, CONTU
adopted the view that computer programs, like music recorded on a record, are stored
on a diskette. According to the report:
"Both recorded music and computer programs are sets of information in a form
which, when passed over a magnetized head, cause minute currents to flow in such a
way that desired physical work gets done."82
Furthermore, "the instructions that make up a program can be read, understood, and
followed by human beings" and "are capable of communicating with humans".83
Such arguments confuse content with support. Copyright seeks to protect the written
content of a book and not the supporting material.84 For instance, music is in itself
meaningful to human reasoning whereas computer programs do not query any
judgement of value.
At national level the most influential definition is provided by the U.S.
Copyright Act of 1980. Accordingly, a computer programs is:
"a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result."85
Again, this definition attempts to appraise a computer program in legal terms in order
to associate its "forms" with copyright. The European Council Directive did not make
any attempt to define the term but has simply required national legislatures to bring
computer programs under the scope of copyright law as literary works. Nonetheless,
82 [CONTU, 1979], at 10, and Dissent ofComnnssionner Hersey, at 28-29.
83 [CONTU, 1979], at 10 & 21, and Dissent ofCommissionner Hersey, at 30.
84 On that specific issue much would need to be said between copyright law and droit d'auteur,
see chapter 2 and 4.
85 17 U.S.C. § 101
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an important distinction may be drawn from these definitions between computer
"program" and computer "software".86 The latter has in recent years broadened the
scope to include supporting materials which accompany the sale of computer
programs and even the content of technologically based communications. In essence
"software" combines the complete set of programs and the accompanying
documentation explaining how to use them. Therefore, it should be clear that what I
am aiming at is defining the value of a "program" and not the accompanying printed
documentation. The issue is to appraise the specific executable code modules which
operate machines.
All these definitions are simply "based on a simplistic and incomplete
understanding of computer technology".87 Moreover, the wording of the U.S.
definition seems to draw from a definition of an "algorithm" but in a simplified
version which tries to fit the essence of a program in legal terms. For instance, a
dictionary definition of an "algorithm" may be:
"A set of rules or procedures that must be followed in solving a particular
problem."88
An expert definition would be:
"An unambiguous specification of a conditional sequence of steps or operations for
solving a class of problems."89
Two key elements appear to form an algorithm. A defined function is to be performed
and the logic structuring the functions is predictable in its final result.90 Therefore,
86 Both terms are used generally interchangeably, see Chris Reed ed., Computer Law, 2nd ed.,
(London, 1993), at 10.
87 Andy Johnson-Laird, Technical Demonstration of 'Decompilation', in Reverse Engineering:
Legal Business Strategies for Competitive Product Design in the 1990's, (Michael A. Epstein & Ronald
S. Laurie ed., 1992), at 104, Hereafter: [Johnson-Laird, 1992]
88 Oxford Dictionary, 1995.
89 Allen Newell, The Models are Broken, The Models are Broken/, 47 University of Pittsburgh
Law Review 1986, at 1024, Hereafter: [Newell, 1986]
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what is in fact the value of a computer program is the algorithm. As such, the term
"algorithm" is possibly more abstract in terms than "computer program" but more
precise in its utility, because it is directly integrated to an element called a computer.
Thus, no confusion in the nature and purpose of algorithm occurs. Following this line
of thinking, it is clear that confusion is brought in the legal arena by the use of
numerous terms describing what may or may not fall under copyright protection.
From software to computer program to algorithm, there is no lack of words in
describing in more or less arbitrary fashion what is a "computer program". If
intellectual property, and especially copyright and droit d'auteur are meant to protect
intellectual forms of expression one should refer to algorithms not as a form of
expression but as a sequence of steps designed to conduct a define task.
Consequently, in determining what is the value of computer programs one should
look at the aim as well as the design of algorithms.
It is necessary to draw an outline of the overall process of computer program
development in order to appreciate that value fully. The creative process starts in
defining the specifications embodying all of the ideas that form the program. The
reasons for creating it, time and space requirements, and the general algorithms are
defined in high levels of abstraction.91 Each of these functions are analysed in detail
in order fully to understand step by step all operations or functions to be carried out
by the machine. A detailed analysis of different functions may be expressed on paper
by flowcharts. Once this analytical step has been completed a programmer will codify
90 In "logic", I wish to express the set of rules or principles used in preparing a computer to
perform a particular task, see Oxford Dictionary, 1995.
91 [Johnson-Laird, 1992], at 105 Hereafter: [Johnson-Laird, 1992]
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these functions in a computer language called "source code" by carefully choosing
symbolic names representing the various functions of the program and sometimes add
some personal comments. At this stage of development, a program is encoded as
marks on an electronic medium.92 The value or utility for higher level information is
to explain the flow of logic in order to make it possible for humans to understand how
the functions are put together and how the program will run. In order to complete this
analysis, a programmer has the option to use directly an "assembly language" or low-
level of instructions, as opposed to high level language, which corresponds to pure
instructions to the central processing unit.93 With some exceptions, only trained
programmers may understand such a language; therefore "copying", in copyright
literary terms, is impossible.
In practice, a computer cannot run a programme in "source code".
Consequently, a special program is used to translate the "source code file", in text
form, in an "object code file" that contains only instructions. The task of translating
high-level language to machine language called low-level language is left to a
compiler. As a matter of fact, a compiler will not only translate but also re-arrange the
source code in order to optimise the efficiency of the program. At that level, all
comments and symbolic names used by the programmer have been stripped out since
they are irrelevant to the computer.94 Consequently, it is of importance to understand
that the compiler discards all original literary aspects of the source code to add to the
programmer's work some object code functions stored in its "internal libraries" in
92 [Newell, 1986], at 1028.
93 [Johnson-Laird, 1992], at 106.
94 ibid, at 107.
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order to optimise the program. This remarkable process is called "transfer of
creativity".95 Ultimately, the compiled language corresponds to instructions which
form a file in binary modes, corresponding to certain discrete levels of electrical
impulses to be executed by the machine. The program is then ready to be run by the
machine. Inputs will then be required by the machine in order to run the program.
Similarly all information given to the machine will be compiled and coded in sets of
digits impossible to understand by human standard. The chain of command is applied
by the central processing unit, which calls the "operations-machine" which passively
waits for sequential signals to perform instructions held in micro codes.96 Clearly, the
program need not to be "original" in expression to be executed.
Therefore, the design of any computer program is defined by an algorithm.
The latter is a mathematical object, numerical and non-numerical, which models the
human brain in computational steps equivalents to sequences of mental steps. As a
result, any attempt "to distinguish algorithms as one sort of thing and mental steps as
another, will ultimately end up in a quagmire".97 This is what happens in trying to
apply copyright in separating ideas from expression. No distinction can be drawn
between mental steps and algorithms, as well as between non-numerical and
numerical. Humans think in sequential mental steps and reproduce such thinking in
algorithms. Thus, if copyright is applied, the doctrine of fair use should be invoked
since one cannot prevent people from producing thoughts or using ideas.98 Here lies a
95 [Newell, 1986], at 1029.
96 Chris Reed ed., Computer Law, 2nd ed. (London, 1993), at 11.
97 [Newell, 1986], at 1025.
98 This theory has come "before a tribunal prejudiced against it by the 2,300-year-old Aristotelian
dichotomy" and by its direct application in the idea-expression dichotomy, see Daniel McNeil & Paul
Freiberger, Fuzzy Logic (London. 1994), at 60; and see Amaury Cruz, What's the Big Idea Behind the
273
fundamental dilemma. The question is whether algorithms belong to the realm of
natural laws, and thus no property right ought to emerge, or whether they are
applications of these truths, and therefore may be appropriated in order to provide
incentives for their creation. Natural laws, fundamental truth or mathematical
concepts do not bear in themselves any practical application and accordingly cannot
be protected by any intellectual property rights. In contrast, inventions or applications
of these concepts may be protected. It has already been argued that no great intrinsic
motivation exists for creating or inventing practical inventions. Natural curiosity and
possible fame may be the origin of such acts, but investments are necessary and ought
to be compensated. An algorithm at the centre of the basic theoretical structure of
computer science fundamentally describes what to do to perform a task. Scientific
knowledge in computer science is in the form of means-end relationship which
"control electronic impulses in such a particular way as to carry out a prescribed task
or operation" as an intermediary between machine and user." Because no dissociation
is possible between machine and program, the value of a program is purely functional
as opposed, for instance, to maps and charts, which may be qualified as functional but
above all inform readers in an original expressive manner.100 An algorithm is just an
abstract form of a program or abstract specifications of the necessary steps to convey
the essentials of what the operations-machine has to do. They work on a given
representation of routine matters to accomplish primitive steps which are common
Idea-Expression Dichotomy? - Modern Ramification of the Tree of Porphyry in Copyright Law, 18
Florida State University Law Review 1990, at 221.
" John Hersey, Dissent From CONTU's Software Recommendation, in Technology and Copyright,
Georges P. Bush & Robert H. Dreyfus eds., (Maryland, 1979), at 248.
100 In associating the case of maps and charts to computer programs Arthur Miller argues "that
functionality poses no per se bar on copyrightability.", see [Miller, 1993], at 986.
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ways of accomplishing certain effects. As such, they cannot be protected, but the
practical effect they initiate in terms of efficiency is of value and deserves protection.
In other words, the efficiency of the algorithm in producing technical effects is the
value which needs to be protected.
The specific character lies in the efficiency of carrying out orders, which has
no inherent aesthetic value as a form of expression. Given an algorithm, it is possible
to code it in several ways or programming languages. For any such representation
there are only a finite number of relevant algorithms that are of any reasonable form
of efficiency. Algorithms have the character of a mathematical truth. Allowing
intellectual property rights to cover algorithms as such puts at risks computer science
itself, as it permits a few to have not only a monopoly "but a stranglehold on a basic
behaviour".101 The problem seems to be more elaborate, since algorithms are
embodied in programs whereby programs are codified versions in programming
language. Nonetheless, a program is only a general specification for actions
interpreted by an interpreter, which is modified by the latter to add some efficiency
and missing links to the procedure. As result, a program does not implement in
detailed steps the task to be accomplished; it only gives a general specification for
action that is interpreted for a particular occasion by the interpreter.102 It reads directly
from the specification of the algorithm even though programs are designed in high-
level representation as an embodiment of algorithms. Consequently, in the formation
of computer programs creativity occurs only in the search for efficient means to
produce technical effects. This search involves human creativity because only human
101 [Newell, 1986], at 1027.
102 ibid, at 1029.
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beings look for better ways to improve their weaknesses or go beyond their natural
limitations. In other words, the value of computer programs is represented by the
instrumentalist purpose of achieving tasks in a more efficient manner. As a matter of
fact, developments in the field artificial intelligence may pose problem to intellectual
property in recognising creativity when it leaves the scope of human nature.
As a result, programs are human readable expressions of fundamental
principles which have the character of mathematical truth. This form is a continuum
where there is no "hard and fast line between systems to design algorithms and
systems to design programs."103 Programs inherently express fundamental truth by
means of algorithms which intend only to run a machine. Because intellectual
property looks for differentiation in order to attribute rights, it becomes difficult to
determine what ought to be protectible in a computer program. Arthur Miller
contends that "programming entails a significant degree of individuality" since "no
two programmers independently would design a program that enabled the computer
to solve highly intricate problems with the same structural details".104 His perception
is blinded by the belief that individuality is expressed in terms of expression. On the
contrary, differentiation in the field of computer science arises from the sense of a
purpose or task to be accomplished and not "design". Accordingly, Allen Newell, as a
computer scientist, perceives individuality in different terms. He concludes that:
"The computer field maintains a distinction [...], but it is more the distinction
between what specifications to write to do tasks of interest versus the details of
particular schemes for writing the specifications."105
103 ibid, at 1030.
104 [Miller, 1993], at 984.
105 [Newell, 1986], at 1030
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Moreover, advances in computing technology have shown that new programming
systems provide only a set of constraints that are to be satisfied by the ultimate
actions. The interpreter has to determine what actions are needed to satisfy the
constraints and execute them. So much for human creativity in the computing field in
terms of literary expression.106 Programmers need only tell the machine what has to
be achieved and the machine determines the necessary actions to perform the task.
For instance, the form ofmany expert systems, such as PROLOG, is simply a collection
of if-then rules that provides the knowledge needed to perform a task. Also in the near
future "some areas of technology will end up with all of the inventive activity in
terms of algorithms."107 The important part is the logic and not the way it is
expressed, as there is no clear distinction between data and procedure and the overall
symbolic expression which determines the ultimate behaviour of the machine.108
What gives meaning to knowledge, data and overall structure is the purpose of its
task. Using the "behaviour" of a program does not "exhaust" the program itself. Thus,
access to previously invented programs allows new inventions to occur. Motivations
to create are partly that one benefits from the inventions themselves by using the
enhanced system. If copyright protection is given, it may be either broad or narrow.
Therefore the problem remains to define the proper scope of industrial property as
distinct from copyright, in order to provide adequate incentives and let people learn
from previous programs.109
106 Advances in artificial intelligence in speech and related computer-generated works have
already initiated a more fundamental debate on the fundamental concept of "human" authorship, see
[Miller, 1993], at 1044-72.
107 [Newell, 1986], at 1030.
108 ibid, at 1033.
109 [Cornish. 1993], at 60.
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As regards information technology, the case of computer programs shows that
there is a need to enlarge the scope of intellectual property as information technology
advances. Computer programs may certainly be categorised as works of function but
certainly not as literary works. The former category regroups works that use
information in symbolic form to describe and implement a process, procedure or
algorithm.110 Traditionally, works of function were to be written works, directly
accessible by the public. For instance, recipes are manuals of instructions which
describe a procedure to be implemented manually. In principle, functional aspects of
recipes cannot be protected by copyright; however, the descriptive aspects of a recipe
are protectable. Computer programs do not contain any descriptive elements but
represent a task of technical effect. Accordingly any argument contending that "with
computer programs the difficulty is protecting their descriptive aspect without
protecting their functional aspect" is irrelevant in the electronic milieu.1" Further, as
technology advances, information is reduced to a digital form to become integrated in
physical objects such as a computer chip or a diskette and then hidden from the
human eye. A clear distinction between works of function, such as computer
programs, and works of the mind, must be drawn according to their inherent value.
Works of authorship are valued for their intrinsic aesthetic qualities of expressing
knowledge and adding differentiation. They suffice in themselves to communicate
concepts or ideas whereas works of function, such as programmes, need a computer to
110 Dictionary ofNew Information Technology, (New York, 1982)
111 O.T.A., Intellectual Property Rights in an Age ofElectronics and Information (Washington DC,
1986), at 78, Hereafter: [O.T.A., 1986]
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be of any value.112 It may be argued that a computer screen is the equivalent to the
pages of a book. Similarly to the pages, a computer screen is a passive carrier
although it allow users to interface with a machine for multiple purposes.113
Protecting the Value of Computer Programs
Reverse engineering poses directly the problem of the appropriate form of protection
of computer programs, and especially the right of access to algorithms. The act of
reverse engineering is a controversial subject among members of the computer
industry, not only because it is an established practice within the industry, but also
because it involves powerful national economic and political interests.114 Most
software of market significance is written or at least designed in the U.S.A. and a
large part of the hardware that uses this software comes from American based
companies.115 Thus, it should be of no surprise that the public position of the U.S.
Trade Representative during the debate on the European Directive on computer
program criticised the Commission's position whereby "decompilation" should be
allowed for the purpose of study or compatibility since it opens Pandora's box. At this
112 See the opposing view of Arthur Miller: "computer programs, like other literary works, are
expressive. The imagination, originality, and creativity involved in writing a program is comparable to
that involved in more time-honored literary works and far exceeds various efforts that have long
enjoyed protection under the copyright rubric Indeed, interface programmers have taken to calling
themselves "interface designers," and describing their mission as attaining "aesthetic functionality",
[Miller, 1993], at 983-84.
113 [O.T.A., 1986], at 78.
114 G. Gervaise Davis III. Scope of Protection ofComputer-Based Works: Reverse Engineering,
Clean Rooms and Decompilation, in Reverse Engineering: Legal and Business Strategies for
Competitive Product Design in the I990's, (Michael A. Epstein and Ronald S. Laurie, 1992), at 44
Hereafter: [Davis III, 1992]
115 In 1991, nearly 80% of the world packaged-software market is supplied by U.S. companies for
a total market of $52bn. In 1993, out of 30 top software firms in Europe - European sales only - almost
20 of them are U.S. (source IDC: INPUT), see "American big byte", The Economist 12th November
1994, at 102.
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point of discussion, it is of interest to notice that two different terms have been used,
"reverse engineering" and "decompilation". The latter is simply an abuse of
language.116 The act of "decompilation" is purely a myth since it cannot be done
technically. As Andy Johnson-Laird simply put it:
"You cannot decompile a programme any more than you can make eggs from an
omelette."117
Therefore, I will use the term "reverse engineering" which may be defined as:
"the process by which one analyses a product or item in order to learn a process
associated with that product or item such as its composition or the process by which
it was made."118
A few considerations may already be given. This is an act which cannot involve
copying for the purpose of direct sale, and imposes active reasoning and analysis in
order to extract the logic of the program. In the U.S. as well as the European Union, it
is a restricted act which in practice is not necessarily illegal. As a matter of fact, it is
permissible for any party to purchase and analyse a program from its object code in
order to determine its composition. For instance, contu analyses "reverse
engineering" as an "essential step" which includes the copying of a work in the
process of loading a program into the machine.119 Nonetheless, national copyright
legislations have provisions to curtail the process and have left courts to resolve
116 The term "decompilation" is widely used and Arthur Miller defines it it as "the process of
analysing a machine-language computer program (a format comparatively few people can read and
comprehend) and re-rendering it in human-readable form", see [Miller, 1993], at 1013; The term
"decompilation" has been essentially used during the drafting of the European Council Directive and
adopted as a synonym for reverse engineering because there is no word in the French language for the
word disassembly, [O.T.A., 1986], at 84.
117 [Johnson-Laird. 1992], at 104.
118 Michael A. Epstein, Fair Use of Copyright Law, in Reverse Engineering: Legal Business
Strategies for Competitive Product Design in the 1990's, (Michael A. Epstein & Ronald S. Laurie ed.,
1992), at 12.
119 The Commission recommended that section 117 as enacted in the 1976 Act be repealed and
replaced accordingly, [contu, 1979], at 12.
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conflicts of interests among software providers. 120 The European Directive provides
that decompilation is not illegal if necessary to achieve interoperability between
programs.121
The commercial value of programs has dominated the copyright debate to
impose legal as well as economic consequences. As Gervaise Davis argued:
"The public position of the U.S. Trade Representative [...] during the EEC Software
Directive debate [...] that reverse engineering is illegal under U.S. law is not only
wrong on legal grounds, but can also be dangerous to the economic health of the
U.S. computer industry in future years."122
Moreover, this position, encouraged and supported by international companies like
IBM and Apple for commercial reasons, is simply insupportable on technical
grounds. Arguments proliferate as to whether or not reverse engineering should be
allowed. On the one hand, it is a process which in essence ought to promote
innovation by allowing analysts, or "reverse engineers", to learn from existing works
in order to create new works, eliminating redundancies in R&D. It also allows
abstract knowledge and specifications to be disseminated while promoting
competition. On the other hand, the analyst is accused of copying the program from
its original storage medium by reverse engineering it into source code form in order to
read and learn from the work. The term "copying" misleads, since it characterises the
act of reverse engineering as a form of wrongdoing. Not only is "copying" a restricted
120 Difficulties arise in differenciating performance of the same functions and similarity in
expression. Most often they have been looking at the "paper trail" left by reverse engineers in the
research and development process to rule whether or not the initial step of copying has produced an
infringing final work, see [Davis, 1992], at 45.
121 However, the Directive expressly prohibits decompilation if the act of reverse engineering
intends "to be used for the development, production or marketing of a programme substantially similar
in its expression [to the reverse engineered work] or for any other act which infringes copyright.",
Art.6, Council Directive of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs
(Q1/9S0/EEO. Official Journal 1991, L122/42.
122 [Davis, 1992], at 45.
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act which does not accurately describe what reverse engineering involves, but also the
act involved does not interfere with the market value of the "copied" program.
Moreover, opponents of reverse engineering, mainly lawyers or representatives of
large software companies, claim that to avoid making an infringing copy of the
program, reverse engineers should look at the binary data as it is stored in the
computer's memory.123 Because loading into memory does not constitute a permanent
fixation of the program and as such an infringement of copyright, their argument
would seem convincing legally. Nonetheless, it is simply impossible in practice to
learn from the binary forms. Thus, two opposite interpretations of copying may be
given.124 A broader interpretation may be accepted but would conflict with the
copyright owner's exclusive right to prepare derivative works. A narrow one could be
found under the doctrine of fair use because it permits copying for scholarship or
research. Nevertheless, such an argument cannot stand, as copying is made in a
context of a commercial nature; also the whole work needs to be downloaded.125
Further, opponents of reverse engineering claim that simple observation of the
behaviour of a computer, combined with the documentation provided, suffices to get
all the information needed. In fact, the documentation provided is sparse and
inaccurate in technical terms since computer programs exist only in form of object
code.126
Technically the act of reverse engineering may employ three strategies, more
or less efficient in their approach according to the aim targeted. These are described
■23 [Johnson-Laird, 1992], at 129.
124 [CONTU, 1979], at 13&22.
125 [O.T.A., 1986], at 84.
126 [Johnson-Laird. 1992], at 129.
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as the "bird-watcher approach", the "book-worm strategy", and finally the "anatomist
strategy".127 The first one refers to the observation of the results obtained, how the
program runs, and understanding what happens inside the machine by interfering with
the results. Programmers need plenty of analytical and guessing skills to understand
the "what", "why", and "where" which give the computer results observed. The
second approach is based upon reading all the written information on the program in
order to determine how it ought to work. Both approaches are extremely limited
because the documentation provided with the software is incomplete, inaccurate or
out of date. Also, simple observation of what happens on the screen does not provide
the internal fundamental functions explaining how results are achieved. Moreover, the
documentation advertises what the program should be and does not explain what it is
exactly. Finally, the "anatomist strategy" characterises what really is reverse
engineering. This approach runs the program in an experimental environment so that
the analyst can observe from the inside what are exactly the tasks accomplished by
the machine. Only this method allows the analyst to attempt to figure out what the
millions of instructions mean in terms of a higher level of abstraction.
This analytical process starts by loading the object code into the computer's
memory. At first, the object code is observed with the help of a program which
visualises step by step on a screen what tasks are ordered to the central processing
unit and other memory locations. This representation is in binary system or a
combination system formed only of "0"s and "l"s. The combination starts numbering
from "0" and is stored in memory locations which are very limited in amount of
127 [Johnson-Laird, 1992], at 104; [Davis, 1992], at 56.
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information. This means that each memory location can only ever store one value at
any one moment in time. These binary digits are traditionally abbreviated to "bits"
and are stored in groups known as "bytes". Each is assigned an "address" in order to
be identified in the memory. Thus, the whole program is transferred in object code
and stored in the computer with thousands of unrelenting "0"s and "l"s produced by
the compiler and combined with the necessary modules from object code libraries.
One can see the awkwardness of such a form. Virtually no information can be directly
extracted from that form of "expression". Therefore programmers do not attempt to
analyse such a form. The next step is to separate instructions from data. Since the
contents of any memory can be either of instructions or data and "expressed" in "0"s
and "l"s, the compiler, or assembler, has to tell the analyst where it expects the
computer to start ordering tasks. The analyst has to observe the central processing unit
executing from the first instruction of the program to the last, in order to determine
which particular address contains instructions. It should be noticeable that reasoning
skills are required to "disassemble" object code in order to convert it in to something
more meaningful which can tell the analyst what instructions the central processing
unit is ordered to do.
The term "disassembly" is used because the process takes a small step
backwards towards assembly language.128 What an analyst-programmer does is to
define from object code the individual instructions that were generated by the
compiler. No comments and no symbolic variable names are present to guide the
programmer. It should be remembered that all he has is the raw low-level instructions
128 [Johnson-Laird, 1992], at 118
284
that are executed by the central processing unit. In order to make his life a little easier,
computers have a disassembler program just as they have compilers or assemblers.
Conversion of all information in the object code contained in the assembler is time
consuming and repetitive. The use of instinct is necessary as much as logic, adjusting
where the disassembler starts and stops disassembling instructions, and where it skips
over code. No information is added since provided information comes from binary
patterns memorised in compiled form. This is an absolute one-to-one relationship
between the instructions that the disassembler outputs and the binary patterns stored
in memory. The latter will be used in order to recreate the original source code.
Again, skills are necessary to define what the code does and what is the processing
sequence. Right from the beginning, the analyst needs to decode from disassembly
form the source code which is intermixed with code and data. Consequently, the
analyst will need to add his own comments to the disassembled listing in order to
guess what the program might be doing. Only the combination of gained knowledge
of the process and reasoning skills gives meaning to the code. Thus the analyst needs
to add his own ideas to the process since he has to guess in a reasoned manner what
the computer program does internally The final task will be able to create in high
level of abstraction a flow-chart of the functions of the program in order to explain its
overall structure or algorithm. It is then possible from the flow-chart to write in higher
language a program following the general idea of the shape of the analysed program.
From all this, the first question which needs to be answered is whether the
source code established by the analyst is a "copy" or an "original" in its own right?
The only way to find out is to compare the first source code with the second one. In
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practice such comparison is simply denied to those who reverse-engineer programs,
and only courts may have access to sources for the purpose of determining infringing
acts.129 Therefore, analysts cannot determine whether they have infringed copyright
unless the source code has been stolen from a competitor. As regards the initial
program all comments and general formats are lost at the very moment when the
compiler translates the source code in to object code. Therefore, a program which has
been fashioned from a reverse engineered object code cannot be identical in design to
the source code of that reverse engineered object code. This difference is strengthened
by the fact that analysts actively participate in the translation of the object code,
notwithstanding that errors from the initial program have been corrected, missing
links added and the overall structure re-organised in order to make the program more
efficient. Nonetheless, the final product may have identical instructions, since there
are standard functions to produce certain results. Thus, any similarities resulting from
the exercise, represent only fundamental functions which can be found in any
programs, and of course in the reversed engineered program. Consequently, the
resulting program is a direct product of the constraints under which the initial
program was developed, and both programs are equally efficient in function in their
own right.130 The next question which arises is whether the resulting program should
be considered a derivative work. Derivative works are those in which someone else's
creation is recast, transformed or adapted. Ultimately, any program that functions in a
similar way to another may be held to be a derivative work so long as similarities
between functions are not due to literal copying of all the program. A reasonable
129 ibid, at 126.
130 ibid, at 131.
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interpretation of a derivative work would contend that parts of the first program are
included in the second one. Nonetheless, the problem is that many parts are identical
because they are standard functions which are commonly used by programmers.131
Therefore, these cannot be taken into account since they are not protectable by
copyright.132 Because reverse engineering involves reasoning skills, personal
judgement, and expertise, because the documentation provided is inaccurate, and
because the program reconstituting from an initial object code stripped of any original
comments, the reconstructed program cannot be considered a derivative work.
Therefore, claims advocating that, with the ability to observe a program and to
read its documentation, there is no need to reverse engineer, do not hold. Only the
object code can answer every question about the program. Only from the object code
is it possible to recapture the value of programs, in other words their efficiency, or
their manner of producing a technical effect. The object code does what it does
regardless of what the documentation says. Moreover, no documentation will reveal
inadvertent errors which are corrected by the compiler. Thus, what is seen from
external observation is only a fraction of what the program actually does. The inner
secrets of a program are embodied in the higher levels of abstraction material such as
the source code commentary and specifications. This material never survives the
process of being converted into object code. Also, it is clear that almost all
information on the program comes from the mind of the analyst. The process of
131 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft, Inc. et al., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1081 (N.D. Cal 1992).
132 In 1987 it was reaffirmed that "courts should deny protection to everything that is necessary to
the purpose or function of a computer program", see Whelan Associates, Inc. v Jaslow Dental
Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. (1987), at 1236; In 1991 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that industrious labour itself was not enough and that some "spark of
creativity" is needed and even constitutionally required, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., Ill S.Ct. 1282 (1991).
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reverse engineering is almost entirely an additive process. It is impossible to reverse
engineer a program by looking at object code on the screen or at the binary
presentation, since there are in practice thousands of binary combinations which
contain instructions as well as data. "Reverse guesswork" is the reality of reverse
engineering with a lot of creativity.133
The application of copyright principles to computer programs has corrupted
and eroded the essential purpose of intellectual property regimes. Because distortion
of language and certain euphemisms have been required in order to apply copyright to
programs, the true value of programs has been lost to sight. For instance the use of the
terms "derivative work" and "copy" is distorted. A derivative work refers to printed
translations, dramatisation, anthologies which deserve copyright protection separate
from the original work. Also, a copy refers to one form or another of reproduction of
an original work, for the purpose of dissemination to, and perception by human
beings. This involves perception by human senses or reasoning of images, sounds, or
logic of the original work. Therefore, making copies of original works is restricted in
order to protect the knowledge value of the work, but making a derivative work out of
previous works is not restricted since the value of original work is built from previous
work. Copyright seeks to protect the sphere of cultural and scientific resources. By
contrast the value of computer programs rests on a different basis. The algorithm is
the valuable part of a program and protecting access to it is of no interest because it
does not threaten its functionality. Access to its abstract principles ought to be open to
others for progress of its efficiency.
133 [Johnson-Laird, 1992], at 131.
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In restraining reverse engineering, commercial entities, I venture to say, have
the definite purpose of legalising monopoly powers over industrial processes.134 The
industry has a legitimate claim which is to protect their investment, but the use of
copyright is illegitimate since it endangers future applications of the law. As regards
works of the mind in electronic milieu, it teaches us to ensure that access to ideas and
principles is free of any encumbrance exogenous to intellectual property. For
instance, there are many reasons to reverse engineer programs which respect
intellectual property doctrines.135 Some are non-commercial applications such as
teaching, and writing for educational purposes. In the commercial field, intellectual
property is not meant to prevent competition among producers of programs for the
greater benefit of society. Reverse engineering fixes errors when an existing program
does not work properly. It stimulates people because there is a major public benefit to
encourage inventors and businesses to devise competitive replacements, or substitute
products. It serves to encourage the original inventor to keep improving his products
and advance technology.136 It permits interoperability in order to add and customise
existing programs to other ones.137
The application of copyright as a form of protection for computer programs
has brought some confusion over the purpose of intellectual property. In an
134 "granting copyright protection to things like operating system software [...] is in effect granting
a long-term patent like monopoly in the machine itself', see [Strong, 1993], at 27.
135 [Davis, 1992], at 50.
136 Some examples of learning from the results of others in software industry include: the
Macintosh interface based on ideas tried previously by Xerox and SRI and before by the Stanford
Artificial Intelligence Laboratories; the Lotus 1-2-3 interface based on the interface of VIsicalc an
other spreadsheet; DBase was based on a programme previously developed at the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, exemples cited in Bradford P. Lyerla, Copyrightability of Software User interfaces: The
Natural Law Versus the Social Utilitarian Approach, 10 The Computer Lawyer 1993, at 21.
137 kr\.5bis, Council Directive of 14 May 199Ion the Legal Protection of Computer Programs
(91/250/EEC), Official Journal 1991, LI22/42.
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information technology society, and especially with the development of a global
information infrastructure, proper understanding of intellectual property principles,
and especially copyright, should prevail. There is an urgent need to reconsider the
perceptions that legislature and courts hold on the subject. A balance must be ensured
between incentives in terms of limited monopolies, access to knowledge, and freedom
of expression. Each intellectual property regime has a define purpose and should
apply as intended, and the creation of sui generis regimes should be sought in order to
respond adequately to society's needs.
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Chapter VI
Are Copyright and DroitcI'Auteur Viable
in the Light o/Information Technology?
"Copyright is the Cinderella of the law. Her rich older sisters, Franchises and Patents,
long crowded her into the chimney-corner. Suddenly the Fairy Godmother, Invention,
endowed her with mechanical and electrical devices as magical as the pumpkin coach
and the mice footmen. Now she swirls through the mad mazes ofa glamorous ball"
- Zechariah Chafee, Jr.*
Technological change is driven by a constantly fluctuating debate about the extent to
which intellectual property regimes ought to serve the over-riding needs of society. As
such, information technology affects society to become a dominant and justified
concern. What are the stakes? Given the rising importance of information in society,
there are economic, political and social implications. In effect, information
technology, and especially the information infrastructure, fosters dissemination of
information and brings unprecedented opportunities for discourse.
Given the pivotal role that information plays in the information age, new
competing claims will rise along with new opportunities. Intellectual property, and
especially copyright institutions, have served the purpose of balancing competing
claims as an mediator between users and providers of information. With the rise of
information technology, this balance is lost. Therefore, it is essential to realise that in
analysing the effects of information technology on copyright protection, one is
making judgements about the very nature of the society we live in, and especially the
*
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law ofCopyright, 45 Columbia Law Review 1945, at
503.
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purpose of copyright in that society. Consequently, this final chapter will address the
question whether the goals towards which copyright institutions are directed mirror
the goals of society in an information age. Moreover, these goals take shape in a
defined mechanism which produces certain incentives and rewards integrated within a
system of operating rules in order to reach the goals. Consequently, as the goals
change other parts of the system are likely to change in response. Above all,
intellectual property is the product of certain social interactions which determine the
position of each player taking part in the system. As such the concept of authorship
plays a consequential role in the determination of the goals, since it is a reflection of
the very nature of the society.
In order to to examine the viability of copyright law and droit d'auteur in an
information age, attention will given to the impact of information technology on
society and the creative environment in order to determine the implications for the
current copyright institutions. Finally, a new approach to the concept of authoship will
be given in electronic milieu.
Impact of Information Technology on Society
The rise of information technology brings unprecedented opportunities in the realm of
creativity. For instance, the Internet represents a high capacity digital multi-media
carrier where broadcast, messaging and database communication models converge.1
With a few million people on the Internet, the infrastucture has reached a critical mass
that governments, businesses, and society as a whole cannot afford to ignore. It is a
1 Financial Times Review: Information Technology, Financial Times Wednesday, March lsr,
1995,
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unique means to produce and process information with unprecedented ease. Gone is
the industrial revolution society and rising is the information age society where people
and technology merge. The product of this association is an environment full of
people and ideas called cyberspace.2 In this electronic environment, freedom of
association is total. Also communities of the like minded are formed entirely by
consent to express themselves with the help of human processes. As a result, I would
certainly agree with Peter Huber that traditional limits on freedom of speech cannot be
justified by traditional constitutional provisions.3 Encompassing all societal activities,
cyberspace must be analysed in a broad sense incorporating all transactions between
information providers and users, notwithstanding that people may be creators,
publishers, distributors, as well as users, all at the same time. Furthermore, this
environment postulates interactivity among participants. As a result, "[a]s our
personal understanding and relationships expand to include our human,
environmental, global universal relationships, our understanding and appreciation of
the possibilities that information [technology] offers will also increase and expand."4
In sum, information technology must be considered as a critical factor which
2 "We are mutating into another species-from Aquaria to the Terrarium, and now we're moving
into Cyberia. We are creatures crawling to the center of the cybernatic world. But cybernetics are the
stuff of which the world is made. Matter is simply frozen information. ... The critics of the information
age see everything in the negative, as if the quantity of information can lead to a loss of meaning. They
said the dame thing about Gutenberg. ... Never before has the individual been so empowered. But in
the information age you do have to get the signals out. Popularization means making it available to the
people.", see Timothy Leary, Chaos & Cyber Culture, (California: Ronin Publishing, Inc, 1994), at vii.
3 " "Deviance" loses its meaning when communities of the like-minded are formed entirely by
consent. Freedom of association is so complete in cyberspace that traditional limits on freedom of
speech become almost impossible to justify constitutionally. ... In this environment, no centralized
government authority is going to stop wither purveyors of electronic pigs or consumers. Yet most
people, most of the time, will keep expressive pigs out of their own, private spaces, if they can, often
with the help of intermediaries. ... Public censorship is dead, but private censors are just beginning to
market their services electronically.", see Peter Huber, Electronic smut, Forbes July 31, 1995, at 110.
4 Robert K. Heldman et al., Future Telecommunications Information Applications, Services and
Infrastructure, (McGraw-Hill Inc, 1992), at 13.
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influences society while society itself effects its development through its established
political and legal institutions, and practices. To that effect, as the use of information
technology expands, society is faced with new challenges, especially in relation to the
field of intellectual property.
A clear understanding of the power of information technology is necessary in
order to grasp its far-reaching implications for society, and therefore intellectual
property. It has already been noted that intellectual property has been established and
developed in the public interest.5 Also, technology is a critical factor in the subject
matter. For instance, there is no need to emphasise the differences between the press
and mechanical print, on the one hand, and the Internet, on the other; however, it has
to be clear that electronic milieu is not the intrinsic issue in investigating the
suitability of copyright law and droit d'auteur. More importantly, it is the inherent
idea supporting the technology which it is crucial to determine in relation to
intellectual property. With the press, the original idea is to disseminate tangible means
of expression. By contrast, the purpose of information technology is to eradicate the
tangible aspect in order to concentrate on the dissemination of information and to
"allow mankind to transform data into information, which means that the data get a
certain meaning, answer certain questions."6 Consequently, progress is not based any
more on making better use of physical matter, and other physical natural resources,
but on the disseminaton of unlimited information without any significant cost. Thus,
5 For a complete review of the relation through history between British, American, French and
German copyright law and the notion of public interest see, Gillian Davies, Copyright and the Public
Interest, (Munich, 1994), at 19, 49, & 73.
6 G.P.V. Vandenberg (ed.). Advanced Topics of Law and Information Technology, (The
Netherlands, 1989), at I.
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the collection and processing of data into information, and access to that information,
become fundamental aspects in analysing the emergence of intellectual property rights
because information dominates each sphere of human activity by playing a dynamic
role.7 Black observes with much truth:
"Few phenomena are more remarkable yet few have been less remarked than the
degree in which material civilization, the progress of mankind in all those
contrivances which oil the wheels and promote the comforts of daily life, have been
concentrated in the last century [...] It is the three momentous matters of light,
locomotion, and communication that the progress effected in this generation
contrasts surprisingly with the aggregate of the progress effected in all the
generations put together since the earliest dawn of authentic history."8
As a matter of fact, it should be stressed that the level of exchange of ideas has been
the prime factor in determining the rate of progress in terms of cultural and scientific
creations.
Such progress shows at the same time a certain decline of the nation state to be
replaced by more individualistic entities. Accordingly, new ways of creating wealth
arise. New communities with different values are being created around the new
technology. In other words, these wired communities compose the information age
society. The industrial revolution has permitted mass-production with the creation of
linear product lines and producing linear declination of products. Moreover, this
societal approach has involved mass education, mass-media, mass-entertainment, and
even mass-destruction weaponry. By contrast, the information age society is gearing
toward a totally different societal organisation where the concept of besoj^e against
generic goods will prevail : the design of customised products with highly specialised
7 "si I'informatique provoque a long terme une mutation decisive dans la langue et dans le savoir,
elle entrainera des changements de la pensee, des concepts et du raisnonnement. qui effaceront peu a
peu les outils utilises pour les deviner. Que faire? Sinon poser des questions sans reponse et donner des
reponses sans autre ambition que de soulever de nouvelles questions.", Simon Nora & Alain Mine,
L'informatisation de la societe (Paris, 1978). at 116.
8 T. Black, Intellectual Property in Industry, (London, 1989), at 177
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units of production. For instance, CDs may be bought as a generic good with pre¬
selected tracks ; information technology may allow consumers to chose the tracks and
produced their own CDs. Similarly, information technology produces many different
channels of communication where digitisation allows simultaneity, where people may
use at the same time different materials, and real time information, where people may
get information directly as they happen. Concepts such as time, space and distance
become irrelevant. In other words, up-to-date and real-time information may be
provided regardless of the physical and time position of the user. All this implies a
decentralisation in the production towards individuals. More importantly, more
information will be needed in order to solve more complex problems, resulting in an
implosion of information needs. Therefore, many conflicts over the use of information
will arise and will need to be resolved in order to preserve social stability in the
realms of politics, economics, and culture.
It may be claimed that conflicts over the use of information will impede the
emergence of intellectual property rights. For instance, decision-making in
management such as determining adequate levels of production will depend on the
availability of information. However, works which place greater emphasis on
differentiation and analysis, and forge opinions, will most certainly be just as
important for success as factual information. Moreover, in many other social
activities, society will gain from scholarly, scientific or artistic works. In electronic
milieu, tangible differentiation between raw data and intellectual creations is blurred.
In other words, information has been freed from its tangible yoke. Consequently, I
venture to say that conflicts which act as impediments to adequate emergence of
295
intellectual property rights arise in essence out of confusion in distinguishing works of
authorship from works with low or no authorship value at all. Thus, adequate
determination of authorship would permit appropriate emergence of property rights.
For instance, if the military or business companies want to secure property rights on
confidential information, the appropriate rights ought to restrict access to that
information. By contrast, works of authorship are delivered to the public at large and
ought to be free of access. Property rights are intended to protect works of the mind
and to reward creators of such contributions adequately. Above all, what needs to be
noted is that proper recognition of the value of each type of information available on
the information infrastructure will resolve conflicts of interests. For our purpose,
works of authorship ought to be recognisable for their inherent quality which puts
value on differentiation by means of the intellect as well as their free access to the
public. Moreover, it has also been noted that proper recognition should avoid one
pitfall: a correct determination of the value of information in digital form should
prevent commercial interests from dictating the intellectual property regime which
ought to be afforded.
In a digital environment, progress may be assessed by the quality of exchanges
of information, in terms of value placed on differentiation. An outcome of this
differentiation will be the production and availability of creative works on the
Internet. Accordingly, the term "information age society" contrary to the common
understanding, ought to place greater value on information by means in terms of
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knowledge.9 In that sense, the traditional concept of knowledge has moved from cause
to configuration due to the information technology environment. In other words, this
shift implies innovation and creativity leading to political, economic and cultural
empowerment. Information technology provides new tools, new methods, and new
distributive systems to further that creativity. As a result, new opportunities have
arisen with different approaches as to the foundation of creativity. This phenomenon
encourages competition over the use of information resources and explains the sudden
proprietary attention given to works of the mind in the electronic milieu. From the
earliest days, human-kind has always searched for knowledge and the means to
control it. As a social construct, intellectual property has been established and tailored
to achieve the purposes society has for it. It is not some predestined static law of
human-kind which ought to evolve according to individual claims as a dynamic legal
system within the new digital environment.10 In other words, information needs to be
free from any state or social constraint which may encroach its transmission. This
transfer of power may be noted as the empowerment of people and may be observed
in many aspects of human activities, such as the realm of economics, polititcs, and
culture.
Rational economic decisions are made on the basis of cost and benefit analysis
in order to use scarce resources most efficiently. Such analysis depends on the
information available to decision-makers, who are always in search for the most
9 I would refer the reader to chapter 4 and especially to Peter Drucker who argued that knowledge
is the only meaningful economic resource. Peter F. Drucker, The Landmark of Tomorrow, (London,
1959), at 18.
10 "If other cost-effective means exist means exist for assuring the availability of adequate
supplies of information to the public, copyright might not be needed. It may be, for example, that
contracts will prove to be more flexible and satisfactory alternative.", Pamela Samuelson, Copyright
and Digital Libraries, 38 Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery 1995, at 17.
298
updated and accurate information. It can be said that factual information has been
crucial in decision-making processes. As such, there is an implosion of information as
well as complex systems in need of information. In that respect, during the industrial
revolution, technology was mainly applied to substitute more efficient processes for
less efficient ones in order to compensate for the scarcity of resources along with
imperfect means of information. By contrast, the information revolution has changed
the whole economic environment because information technology provides numerous
ways of accessing and appropriating information, where information becomes a
primary resource for efficient gains and supplants technical substitutes. For instance,
the changing economic role of information can be seen in examining the use of
information in the industry and service sectors. Further, the rationalisation of
decision-making processes is made possible by the increased use of computer
technology and its applications in information systems and technical processes. Allen
Newell, a former researcher at the Rand Corporation, foresees future industrial
applications which depend upon information resources. Taking the case of casting
iron, plastics, or powder metal, he explains:
"Suppose, now, we get the construction of forms for the medium under suitable
computer control. That is, from a data structure in the computer, an automatic,
essentially robotic, device constructs the form or mold from which routine art
produces the physical objects. This is a special version of our operated-machine.
This is only done currently in crude ways and in part, but it is an active area of
research."11
Moreover, economic decisions will not only be made by human beings but also by
intelligent machines which automatically respond to information systems and external
queries with the appropriate action. Consequently, an information-age society is
11 Allen Newell, The Models are Broken, The Models are Broken/, 47 University of Pittsburgh
Law Review 1986, at 1030, Hereafter: [Newell, 1986]
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dependent upon information of all provenances for potential economic gains.
Economic decision-makers, private or public, are willing to appropriate any kind of
information to gain comparative advantages. As a result, the largest economic
opportunities will be in organising and co-ordinating productive activity through the
process of information handling. The number of information providers will not only
increase in the form of tailor-made services, but also respond to the phenomena of
empowerment by means of interactive services.12
New opportunities also arise in the realm of politics. These will foster a sense
of national interest on political issues leading to direct participation in the political
decision-making process. Accordingly, informed citizens will ensure that institutions
remain within the democratic mandate attributed to them. For instance, the Clinton
administration has initiated a progam for civic networking using information
infrastructure to provide civic and community services.13 This program has already
allowed every U.S. citizen who owns the proper computing facilities to access freely
any information pertaining to the work of the Federal administration as well as
Congress. Citizens may analyse, comment and make their own informed opinions on
political issues as well as contact their own representive at Congress. They may act
individually or in concert with others to voice their concerns, strengthening a sense of
common interest on issues which are generally overlooked. As a consequence, direct
and active involvement of citizens in politics redefines the nature of political
practices. The empowerment of people in state and federal levels increases where the
12 Richard Tomkins, Enter the Bespoke Newspaper, Financial Times Monday, March 13, 1995 at
13.
13 Center for Civic Networking, A National Strategy for Civic Networking: A Vision of Change,
(Washington D.C., October 6, 1993).
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focus of attention may be given to the politics of information, and not to
sensationalism. Here lies an important issue. Who owns the information produced by
public institutions? For instance, in the United States information provided by the
Federal State and its agencies does not attract copyright protection.14 By contrast, in
the U.K. Crown copyright exists.15 Publications emanating from the French State
would be at least protected not only by economic rights but also moral rights.16 Such
an issue needs to be addressed in correlation with the determination of what composes
the public domain.
As a result, opportunities in the political arena will influence practices in the
use of public domain materials. On the one hand, citizens want to be able to supervise
more closely the work of their representatives and political institutions. On the other
hand, elected representatives need to receive direct feed-back from their constituency
as well as to involve their electors in participating directly in democratic debates.
Clearly access to as well as protection of that information is crucial. The right to
obtain and distribute information determines people's adherence to democracies and
respect for their institutions.17 Technically, information technology facilitates access
as well as manipulation of information. Problems arise in determining what level of
copyright protection should be afforded to works of authorship in the political arena
just as much as in the public domain. Both neutral as well as politicised information is
14 US voir perrit
15 "The Crown has a special copyright in works made by an officer or servant of the Crown in the
course of his duties, and Ats and Measures.", see W.R. Cornish, Intellectual Property (London, 1989),
at 285.
16 Affair of the Dictionary of the Academie Frangai.se, the court hupheld the Commissaire du
gouvernement that the plaintiffs were the lawful grantees of the State and the State was copyright
owner of the Dictionary, Judgement of 28 flo. an 12, Cass.Civ. [1791] 1 Dev. & Car. 1.971, 3 Journal
du Palais, at 747, confd Trib. d'appel [1808] 2 Dev. & Car. 1.103, 4 Journal du Palais, at 505.
17 Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions ofCapitalism. (New York, 1976), at 1.
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needed in order to ensure a democratic debate. Thus, partisan ideas need to be freely
accessible to the extent that they do not contravene healthy democratic debate, which
ought to ensure that all citizens can engage on orderly arguement. Such discourse
ought to develop a sense of community to share values, which legitimises democratic
authorities. Consequently, society not only needs free access to public materials
relevant to public debate but also needs to rely on accurate information. In other
words, a monitoring legal system ought to ensure that citizens may make informed,
reasoned, and sensible decisions.
All aspects of social, scientific and cultural life will be permeated by
information technology. Works of art express peoples' unconscious and their search to
understand their own nature and the world they live in.18 By increasing the amount of
cultural and scientific works, more creative opportunities are open to individuals. New
art forms and ideas do not replace old ones but instead become part of an ever
expanding resource on which individuals can build, re-create, and re-interpret their
own aesthetic experiences. Culture needs to be governed by the principle of
communal sharing and exchange of information where external forces shape peoples'
creativity. Information technology reduces constraints and gives people the
opportunity to have a greater control and choice over what they want to create and
enjoy. For instance, they are able to receive information specifically tailored to their
needs at the most convenient time and manner. As a result, greater emphasis is given
to the interactive aspect of getting information as freely as possible. Conceivably
everyone can be a creator and a publisher. Determination of authorship may be
18 ibid, at 12.
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difficult to ascertain since many people may contribute in different ways to one single
work. In academia. it has already been recognised that:
"Each day about 20.000 e-mail messages carry to more than 60 countries the
abstracts of new academic papers, which readers can develop by gaining access to
the full papers. And every day, about 45,000 physicists worldwide access [Hewlett-
Packard's] electronic archive to find or to contribute new items."19
Appropriate protection ought to take into account these new needs as well as ensuring
that the integrity of such contributions is assured. The question remains whether all
types of contribution can be freely available. It has already been noted that access to
works of the mind may be determined by the mode of production. In a marketing
mode, access would be subject to a fee. By contrast, public production of works of
the mind, especially in academia, may be subsidised by public institutions to allow
sustained production of and free access to contributions.
Each person will be able to actively contribute to the creation of works of the
intellect since more interactive tools and resources will be at the disposal of the public
at large. Libraries, educational institutions and museums are already able to provide
information and cultural works to those who would otherwise not have access to them.
For instance private and restricted collections of works of art can be made available to
the public at large and not only for the eyes of their owners or art experts. Universities
have also opened themselves to the outside world to widen the scope of their research
and teaching facilities.20 As a result, information technologies allow better self-
fulfilment and self-realisation to people in providing greater independence from
19 Martin Mulligan, Speeding up the appliance of science. Financial Times Monday, March 13,
1995, at A-13.
20 The Houston Community College System has a program called "College Without Walls" which
allows students to take classes by computer, Edward A. Cavazos & Gavino Morin, Cyberspace and the
Law: Your Rights and Duties in the On-line World, (The MIT Press, 1994), at 9.
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traditional information providers. The dynamic exchange of information also liberates
people from traditional means of communication to challenge traditional forms of
intellectual protection. However, interaction means greater potential for conflicts over
the use of information in the realms of economics, politics and culture. Undoubtedly
information technology frees information from society's control by empowering
people; however, it should be noted that that control has been transferred into the
hands of individuals. Clearly it is not exactly the same as saying "information wants
to be free" since works of the mind originate from human creativity.21
Impact of Information Technology on the Creative Environment
The development of information technology has changed the creative environment in
a number of ways, many of which have significant implications for copyright. Among
many concerns, questions arise as to who creators are, what motivates them, what
kind of tools and materials they use, how they gain access to these tools, which skills
and knowledge they need to pursue their work, what is their role in society. The
creative environment is a complex social process composed of many elements where
technology influences all social activities, and therefore the creative environment.22
Creativity embraces many areas like the arts, sciences, and scholarship, where the
influence of information technology is likely to take several forms. Primarily new
types of intellectual tools will be used in these areas, not only for the creation of
21 Jim McClellan, Can Information be Free?, "Life" Section, The Observer Magazine 29 Jan. 95,
at 75
22 Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and
Cultural Transformations in Early Modem Europe, Vol.1, (Cambridge University Press, 1979), at 31.
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works but also for their performance. Moreover, since creativity builds on works
previously created by others, information technology will expand access to existing
intellectual resources to develop new material in digital form. Clearly, all these factors
will have a pronounced effect on those who participate in the creative process,
especially in the manner they perceive copyright institutions.
Information technology provides many new tools which may be described as
primarily intellectual. Because tools are designed to be at the service of human
creativity, the intellect finds endless possibilities for self-expression. Moreover,
information technology is an outcome of computational steps equivalent to sequences
of mental steps.23 In other words, it models the human brain which in turn duplicates
its creative abilities by form of transfer of creativity. As a result, more opportunities
are offered in science and scholarship, and also in the creation of works of art.24 For
instance, creators and researchers may access a much broader range of works. As
Ithiel de Sola Pool remarked:
"The technologies used for self-expression, human intercourse, and recording of
knowledge are in unprecedented flux. A panoply of electronic devices far beyond
anything that the printing press could offer. Machines that think, that bring great
libraries into anybody's study, that allow discourse among persons a half-world
apart, are expanders of human culture."25
Not only may people carry out their work but they may also expand and interrelate
with other fields of interests. Obviously, the chief feature of the technology is to allow
interaction on an unprecedented scale whatever the form of expression might be text,
music, or graphic. Also, production of works of the mind reduces itself to an easy, fast
23 [Newell, 1986], at 1025
24 Martin Mulligan, Speeding up the appliance of science, Financial Times Monday March 13,
1995, at 13.
2:> Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies ofFreedom, (England, 1986), at 226.
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and cheap process giving creators more room to concentrate on their creativity, As
such, the power of creation resides in the technology as a subordinate and
complementary means to the intellect.
Beyond the form of expression itself, the substance of the creative process
changes. For instance, word processors have changed the manner in which writers
may produce, edit and publish novels. Editions of final drafts may be postponed until
the last minute giving authors greater control over the final products. Moreover, in
expanding the boundaries of creativity the very nature of science, scholarship and the
arts is transformed. For instance, advances in computer animation have enlarged the
themes exploitable by the movie industry. Clearly, movies such as Star Wars and
Terminator would have never been filmed or given viewers such a sense of profound
reality to the plot without any of their special effects. In science, researchers may
simulate experimentation or make fast calculations in the symbolic world before
testing their discoveries in the real world.26 Most of all, information technology
empowers people to adapt and create their own tools in order to respond to their own
needs and personality. Consequently, greater emphasis is given to self-expression
which in turn heightens expression of personality. In other words, expansion of human
culture is made possible because information technology renders information more
accurate, timely and accessible, to make it more valuable for each individual.
In particular the information infrastructure, and especially the Internet, has
facilitated resource-sharing between individuals, private and public organisations,
educational institutions and government agencies. Beyond national boundaries, the
26 [Newell, 1986], at 1031.
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system generally referred as the "network of networks", covers North America,
Europe and Asia to bring people and information resources closer.27 This truly cross-
national communication system facilitates instant communication between users
situated a world apart. Especially popular among scientists, the Internet has become
probably the most important communication instrument of the late twentieth century.
Still more has to come, since national and international projects intend to create a
super-highway capable of sustaining world-wide exchange of information
encompassing multi-media forms of communication.28 Thus, problems related to
intellectual property leave the simple national arena to become cross-national. With
the trips agreement of 1993/94, certain steps have already been taken to tackle
problems related to copyright infringement; however, the agreement has taken a
narrow view to concentrate exclusively on trade-related issues, by the same token
disregarding problems of authorship For instance, on 19 July 1995 the European
Commission published a Green Paper which examines the impact of new technologies
and the information society on copyright and related rights.29 Close analysis of the
report would be necessary to determine in which terms it addresses the issues. If the
27 John Quarterman, The Matrix: Computer Networks and Conferencing Systems Worldwide,
(Bedford, 1990), at 278, Hereafter: [Quarterman, 1990]
28 Preliminary Draft Report on the Intellectual Property Rights and the Nil, Working Group on
Intellectual Property Rights, U.S. Patent and Trademarks Office, (Washington D.C., September 1994);
Information Infrastructure Task Force Telecommunications and Information Administration, "The Nil
Agenda for Action", 15 September 1993; "Info Euro Access IMPACT.2 Information Market Policy
Actions - Work Programme 1994", Doc. IMPACT 42/93 (EN) final, European Commission,
Directorate General XIII-Telecommunications, Information market and exploitation of research (2nd
December 1993); [Quarterman, 1990], at 189
29 "The Commission examines the impact of new technologies and the Information Society on
copyright and related rights, in a Green Paper published yesterday. [...] The paper considers the need
for EU-level measures to address issues related to digitisation, on-line services and the acquisition and
protection of rights not covered by the database protection Directive or the other Directives on
copyright and related rights.", The Week in Europe. The European Commission, Copyright in the
Information Society, 20 July 1995.
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position of the Commission is based upon the commercial valuation of works of the
mind in electronic milieu, future developments of authorship in the field of copyright
will be compromised. Emphasis on the personal bond which links the work to its
creator needs to be reflected by copyright institutions in electronic milieu.
Indeed, direct implications for resources and materials may be observed. The
creative process nourishes itself from other people's works and ideas. Society has
found numerous ways to keep records of scientific knowledge, art and other cultural
traditions. For centuries, societies entrusted storytellers with the memorisation of their
knowledge and traditions. Moving away from oral tradition societies, the printed
world placed its knowledge in books along with libraries as the repository of culture.
With the rise of information technology, accumulated knowledge has found new
repositories such as CD Roms and on-line databases. Digital devices have not
replaced printed forms of expression but they have been taking precedence for their
storage ability as well as their easy use. Ultimately it may be said that in the near
future all forms of information will have their digital version in addition to existing
material forms of expression. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that a new era has
begun since many works are stored or expressed exclusively in digital form. Because
some works originate from information technology, access is limited to the digital
environment. For instance, because the public may wish to freely access any types
works, digital access may represent the only means to make available these materials.
Moreover, digital reproduction of unique collections, available only in certain
libraries, will allow researchers to gain direct access at the click of their mouse. As a
result, the amount of information available will grow exponentially as well as its use
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in all spheres of human activity.30 Criteria such as location and physical form of the
materials are no longer determinant to access information.
Increase in availability has been made possible by the creation of a variety of
sophisticated information services. The scope of these services widens public use as
well as public access. First, traditional providers of information, such as libraries,
have followed the digital trend. Gone are the days when card catalogues used to be the
only method of searching for information Computerised catalogue services have been
developed for library users as well as on-line users. For instance, access to the
catalogue of the Library of Congress is available through the Internet. Moreover, I
have used the term 'catalogue services' since hypertext databases and other interactive
multi-media services are available for the search of materials on a national as well as
worldwide basis. These new indexes, based upon hypertext systems, combine ideas to
allow multi-media searches. Information available can be found in full text, abstract or
compounded form. Problems of references, and especially of authorship, arise. As it
stands, our current copyright institutions do not provide answers as to how to quote or
refer to any works provided on the Internet. Fundamentally, copyright has dictated the
way in which people conduct research and position themselves towards knowledge.
In substance, the new facilities transform the way people perform their
creative activities. Compared with the centralisation of bookmaking and publishing,
which led to the development of copyright, electronic networking speeds up the
decentralisation of information distribution and in turn influences the process by
which research and art is produced. It should be clear that the technology of mass
30 O.T.A., Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics and Information (Washington
D C., 1986), at 146. Hereafter: [O TA., 1986]
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printing and publishing changed the process of conducting scientific research and
scholarship by imposing certain standards for publication. In medieval times, libraries
were created to store canonical copies of books for record. They developed systems to
classify books in order to facilitate research and duplication of manuscripts.
Consequently, validation of knowledge followed a certain system adequate to the
research methods of the time.31 Copyright has departed from that tradition to impose
an individualistic form of validation, namely by reference to authorship. With the rise
of information technology these traditional methods of recording as well as
conducting research are no longer sustainable. Steven Gilbert and Franck Connolly
argue in that sense:
"Since nearly every scientific and technical field is growing and changing much
faster than the print publication process can reflect, the real exchange of knowledge
occurs long before the publication process. Most scientists must actively seek
"preprints" in order to find out the current state of research in their field; the actual
publication in printed form only validates the contribution for historical reasons and
creates an archive"32
Therefore, intellectual property systems, and especially copyright institutions, validate
scholarship as well as authorship following certain forms of mechanisms suitable to
the printing technology.
It may be contended that copyright has furthered the advancement of
knowledge, and therefore its mechanism suits the creative environment. Moreover, an
31 In medieval time, anonymity in literature was ignored because the value of literary works was
based upon their circulation and regular use as a form of guaranty of authenticity and authority.
Scientific works, by contrasts, bore the name of their author as a form of reference which expressed
the authority in the field, see Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and
Sherry Simon, in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice (Cornell University Press, 1977), at 126,
Hereafter: [Foucault, 1977]
32 Steven W Gilbert and Franck W. Connolly, A Wealth ofNotions: Regaining Balance as New
Information Technologies Collide With Traditional Controls and Incentives for Intellectual Work, in
O.T.A., Finding a Balance: Computer Software, Intellectual Property and the Challenge of
Technological Change, (Washington D.C., 1992), at 167, Hereafter: [O.T.A., 1992]
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observer may remark that information technology poses problem for that progress. As
Ithiel de Sola Pool rightly noted:
"The proliferation of texts in multiple forms, with no clear line between early drafts
and final printed versions, will overwhelm any identification of what is the world's
literature"33
For instance, interactive computing allows creativity in which a preliminary or final
version of a work can be the product of interactions not only between persons but
programmed machines.34 Individualisation and localisation of non-static digital works
is made difficult, giving rise to problems of identification. Traditional methods of
scholarship require a clear record of each contribution. Research is a personal
endeavour, but scientific results need to be made public in order to judge the validity
of the work accomplished. Only then can the work be truly validated and made
available for others to build upon it. Clearly such a process takes more time than
sending electronic messages. Nonetheless, validation as well as securing public
records of intellectual materials should pose no technical problems. Truly validation is
a matter of recognition among peers, which obeys its own established rules
independently of copyright protection. By contrast, claims of authorship are a legal
matter which aim at securing protection under copyright. Identification of works of
the mind does not necessarily imply authority in knowledge. This is a perception
unique to copyright institutions. Protection is either economic or moral. Recognition
of authorship may well go along with recognition by peers in the sense that respect of
the accuracy and integrity of works are key elements in recognising the commercial
33 Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies ofFreedom, (England, 1986), at 212.
34 Interactive computing include computer-aided design, interactive computer graphics or music,
see Globalization, Technolog)', and Competition. The Fusion of Computers and Telecommunications
in the 1990s, Stephen P. Bradley, Jerry A. Hausman & Richard L. Nolan ed.. (Mass.:Harvard Business
School Press, 1993), at 88 [Thereafter: Bradley (1993)]; see [O.T.A., 1986], at 69-70
311
value of works of the mind. As such, I venture to say that reliability of these elements
is crucial for the survival of on-line services publishing works of scholarly and
scientific research. Also, any publishing service which wants to be considered of
cultural and commercial interest will regard these elements with the same
consideration independently of copyright protection. As opposed to traditional
publishing enterprises, the advantage of digital information systems is to facilitate the
constant up-dating process of information to the current state of affairs.35 From all
this, it follows that information technology would in fact impose more stringent
standards for publication. Above all respect for authorship, under a new form, will be
crucial in the emergence of intellectual property rights in electronic milieu. Because
research as well as any other creative endeavour is personal, authorship ought to be
recognised as an individual and protectable value.
Further consideration needs to be given to the creators themselves. The act of
creation or invention can be seen as a complex social process rather than a simple
isolated incident. Scholars, poets, writers, artists, and inventors need tools, materials
and information resources to perform their act of creation. Any impact observed on
these particular elements has a direct effect on the people who are the prime movers in
the creative environment. It should be stressed that until recently computer technology
was the exclusive field of a technological elite. Certain skills and training as well as
expensive computing materials were needed. Nowadays, with the democratisation of
computer technology, everyone can have access to computing facilities. Advances in
software and hardware have increased access by making computers cheaper and
3:1 Richard Tomkins, Enter the bespoke newspaper, Financial Times Monday March 13, 1995, at
E-13.
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software more comprehensible for the non-computer-literate. Moreover,
improvements in the design of interfaces have led to the emergence of networks,
fostering the use of computers in all areas of human activities.
Nonetheless, there should be no illusions about the need for training and
education in using information technologies, which will be constantly required.
Creators will need to learn to use these tools to their fullest capabilities to understand
how to find and use information. Training is needed all the more, since these
technologies impose their way in all fields of research and in the arts. Incidentally, the
necessity to be in possession of all these technical variables will determine and
influence greatly the artist's inspiration and motivation to create. As technology
becomes more integral to the arts, artists need to be not only creative but also
technicians before they can create.
In itself technology is one external factor which has always had a significant
impact because it restructures the creative environment in which it is to be used. Some
people might find themselves excluded, whereas others might discover latent creative
skills. As such, information technology promotes self-expression. Education, training,
and reference to previous works as a source of ideas or information, all added to
personal thoughts and personal skills, are necessary to perform such acts. Also,
interaction with peers and recognition from society favours creativity. Moreover, it
should be noticed that information technology affects those involved in the arts or
scientific and scholarly pursuits not only on their technical skills but also on how they
perceive themselves and what motivates them. Before the press, a manuscript was
treated more or less as a sacred text whose author was as much irrelevant as too
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difficult to name. By contrast, the printing press gave rise to the concept of the
individual creator affecting by the same token how creators were motivated. In
enhancing the economic value of their writings, authors became also more concerned
about their self-image which in effect conflicted with the stationers' perception of
what ought to be writers. In other words, from simple labourers paid by lump sum,
authors claimed protection for their authorship. The issue was to determine not only
who should benefit from the economic value of their writings but also who ought to
be protected for their creative skills.
Information technology poses identical problems but on a larger scale. The
new technology influences creators' self-esteem as well as their perception of their
own work. Moreover, computers are intrusive as well as projective media. This is an
ideal medium in which to create a private world for self-exportation. Not all
individuals create in the privacy of their home with the intent to make their work
public. Nonetheless, creators need to be aware of who they are, what they want to
create, and how they define their relationship with their creations and the remainder of
the world. As such, intellectual property ought to recognise such consciousness by
rights expressed in terms of authorship balanced by a right of access attributed to
society. Expectations from users must balance expectations from creators in order to
keep that interaction going between creators and users. From all this it follows that
claims over works of the mind need to be reconciled not only in terms of individual
claims but also according to society's best interest. The sense of purpose is generally
strong among artists and scientists. For instance, scientists generally wish to
contribute to the advancement of science and knowledge, and do not try to maintain
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exclusive rights on their work. However, such personal motivation needs to be
recognised by society. Creators are as concerned about the respect for their creations
as about their place in society. Also, commercial pressure affects scientists on how
they feel about their work and the reasons they pursue their work and what rewards
they expect to gain from it. For instance, problems may arise as to the
commercialisation of scholarly results. Universities may benefit financially; however
this may conflict with ethics and the public interest. In other words, immediate
personal gains may not benefit society in the long run, since it may impede research
and scientific progress by means of future gains or applications.
From all this, it follows that there are changes in the ways creators and
investors in works of the mind carry out their work. Many powerful new tools
combined with new resources enlarge the boundaries of creativity. More importantly
information technology opens the way to more people participating in the creative
process. The emergence of new opportunities and the changes of players in the
creative environment radically transform the environment in which intellectual
property, and especially copyright institutions, has hitherto evolved.
Implications for Copyright Institutions
Intellectual property regimes evolve in the political arena. Their goals and
mechanisms have taken shape according to society's needs, from historical
circumstances as well as political compromises. As a result, copyright may be
described as a feedback mechanism which is intended to reach certain goals. In order
to help reach these goals, the system produces certain incentives and rewards which
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are integrated within a system of operating rules enforced by mechanisms. More
importantly,
"[pjolicy goals are the ends towards which the intellectual property system is
directed; they mirror the goals of society. ...time and social change may alter
intellectual property goals. As the goals change, other parts of the system are likely
to change in response."36
The greatest amount of change seems to be taking place in the copyright arena, more
than any other intellectual property field.37 As a matter of fact, copyright has been on
the front line because certain industries have sought copyright protection rather than
other intellectual property. With the magnitude of the pressure exercised by new
technologies, and especially information technology, the goals are ambiguously
shifting, according to commercial or political pressure questioning copyright
institutions. Moreover, with the rise of the information age more copyright problems
are to come. As a response to these changes, the subject matter of copyright regimes
has been revised in most developed countries in order to render national legislation
technologically neutral. In other words, national legislation has been designed to
protect works of the mind regardless of the technology involved in its creation.
However, revising copyright in such a manner is forgetting that the subject matter is
nonetheless the product of one technology, the printing press.
Moreover, the consensus on which copyright has traditionally rested is deeply
affected because society's values have changed along with technological development.
Many of the new players, not parties to the agreements of the past, hold different
values about who should have access, about what materials should be covered, and
36 [O.T.A., 1986], at 21.
37 Hector L. MacQueen, Extending Intellectual Property: Producers v. Users, 45 Northern Ireland
Law Quarterly 1994, at 31; Hector L. MacQueen, Copyright, Competition and Industrial Design,
(David Hume Institute Paper, 1989), at 8.
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who should be rewarded for their work. For instance, cross-national exchanges of
knowledge among scholars occur daily on computer networks. These exchanges serve
the function of a "gift", creating social bonds for the advancement of knowledge
without any intention of profitable gains and often by-passing what may be considered
national interests.38 On that specific subject, copyright would then fail to fulfil its role
if its goal is to protect cultural and scientific as national interests. This exchange
illustrates the emergence of a new sense of privacy among users, as well as a more
liberal approach to information access. This new approach is in direct conflict with
copyright's mechanisms. As has already been contended, copyright plays the role of
an intermediary system which seeks to reconcile divergent private claims to works of
the mind in order to facilitate bargaining. Since the invention of reprographic
technology, copyright's success in controlling access to tangible media of embodiment
has been reduced. Incidentally, information technology has contributed to a greater
extent because copyright has simply lost the ability to control access. Accordingly,
change in the public's attitude towards copyright has shaken its legitimacy. More
freedom is sought to access a wider range of information not only because the value of
information in decision-making has increased but also because more people are
willing to get informed. With the rise of information technology, more people
participate in the creative process, which forges a new attitude towards the use of
information and creators of works. People who engage in infringing acts in the
38 It has to be observed that this "gift culture" is possible only because the rewards of sholarly
research are not given by a market. Nonetheless, economic incentives exist in the award of promotion.
What must be emphasised is that exchanges occur on a spontaneous and deliberate basis, see Steven
W. Gilbert and Franck W. Conelly, A Wealth of Notions: Regaining Balance as New Information
Technologies Collide With Traditional Controls and Incentives for Intellectual Work, contractor report
prepared for Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, in [O.T.A., 1992], at 167
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privacy of their home do so mainly for their personal use. For instance, tape-recording
for "time shifting" reflects the need for people to enjoy movies and others programes
at more convenient times. Similarly, downloading and possibly printing pictures and
texts originating from the Internet are common acts. These acts convey a general
acceptance among the public that so long as no profit-making is involved they are not
harmful. Also, these acts lead to a greater dissemination of works of the mind. I
venture to say that the legitimacy of copyright institutions will most probably rest on a
more liberal policy allowing people to access at will any kind of information.
Therefore, constraints imposed by copyright will need to be relaxed in order to satisfy
society's needs.
In parallel, copyright issues have become a commercial concern, and
especially among industries and right owners who depend on intellectual property
revenues. As a result, the case for dissemination of products of the intellect and the
increase of the public domain have been supplanted by immediate economic interests.
Intellectual property, and especially copyright, has been an important public policy
tool in balancing creators' economic interests for the greater benefit of society. In an
age of information, access to global information resources is a determinant factor for
success. The concept of reward and incentive must match the motivations of the
people they are designed to influence. They must also accurately reflect the kinds of
activities creators pursue. In the light of the effects of information technology on
society and the creative environment, particular attention should be given to the scope
of protection afforded by copyright. In doing so, what society must be concerned with
is the amount, quality and diversity of works produced. Fundamentally, the out-put
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generated by the intellectual property system reveals how well the system works.
Clearly in discussing intellectual property issues we are discussing the very choices
society makes about its cultural and scientific resources as well as its economic future.
Therefore, society ought to redefine what are the goals which copyright intends to
support in a digital environment. In this fight for property rights, I venture to say that
the public is likely to lend support to the intellectual property system which will fit its
values, independently of concerns voiced by publishers and creators.39
Further, the decision to render the subject matter of copyright technologically
neutral may be simply questioned on the ground og its lack of effectiveness. Modern
copyright law evolves out of technology. In similar fashion, it can also be claimed that
the rise of information technology should evolve new principles as well as a new
copyright institution. Moreover, in adapting copyright mechanisms, legislatures have
not fundamentally changed the principles which have inspired the mechanisms
themselves. As such, these principles are inspired by the goals to act as a
constitutional mandate. Any changes to these principles would contravene to that
supreme mandate. Prevailing views suggest that copyright principles have proven
their flexibility over time and that the current copyright institution can be adapted to
encompass new forms of expression in electronic milieu.40 However, one cannot elude
the point that the printing press has given rise to the modern copyright system, and
where printing technology is no longer the prime source of communication, then
39 [O.T.A., 1986], at 122.
40 It has been argued that the information superstructure is consistent with traditional copyright
concepts and that "issues implicated by the information infrastructure are thus not fundamentally
different from those already faced by authors and rightholders [...] in the software arena", see Allen N.
Dixon & Laurie C. Self, Copyright Protection for the Information Superhighway, 11 European
Intellectual Property Review 1994, at 465; [Cavadoz & Morin (1994)] at 47
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copyright should be reconsidered. As Tom Palmer remarked on the relationship
between intellectual property rights and technology:
"If laws are dependent for their emergence and validation upon technological
innovations, might not succeeding innovations require that those very laws pass back
out of existence?"41
The fact of the matter is that copyright is the brainchild of certain political and social
conditions dependent on one form of technology. Information technology is
fundamentally different from the printing press.
To illustrate the truth of this, it is necessary to consider the technical
characteristics of information technologies as opposed to mechanical print in relation
to copyright mechanisms. The critical feature of information technology is that
information is processed in digital form. This means that information is freed from
any tangible medium to become electronically fluid. In other words, perfect
reproduction may be carried out very easily and at very low cost once in digital form.
As a result, possession of canonical works is unnecessary because copies are as good
as the original work, so long as they have not been altered beforehand. Therefore
possession, even ownership, of the canonical work is irrelevant in order to enjoy the
work in its completeness. Paper may well continue to be an important temporary
medium, because people tend to prefer the higher contrast in printed form that video
screens lack. It is foreseeable, however, that "flat-screen tablets that can be turned
over like the pages of a magazine" will probably change this perception.42 Also,
beyond the simple enjoyment of the work, digital modes are more attractive for
permanent storage because storage volume is reduced to a minimum along with a
41 [Palmer T, 1989], at 273
42 Richard Tomkins, Enter the bespoke newspaper, Financial Times Monday, March 13, 1995, at
E-13
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superior convenience of access. Consequently, manipulation, storage, processing and
on-demand printing can be done with complete accuracy by any owner of a personal
computer.
So far I have confined my analysis to copyright law. Nonetheless, that analysis
can be partially extended to droit d'auteur. What I have contended is that the
fundamental principles upon which droit d'auteur has been elaborated are independent
from any form of technology However, the mechanisms, and especially most
applicable doctrines, have been influenced by the printing press. Accordingly, droit
d'auteur recognises authors as such, and especially authorship as inherent from the act
of creation. Therefore, authorship needs no economic as well as technological excuses
to be recognised. Nonetheless, since the fruition of authorship allows society to
further its own intellectual development, it is necessary to balance the rights which
evolve from that function by the prinicple of public domain. Such principles,
authorship and public domain, permit society to recognise itself in its authors since
the creative process evolves from a certain societal environment and guaranty to each
individual the possibility to participate in creative process. As a matter of fact,
authorship is society reflected in its authors. Since authorship gives rise to special
rights attributed directly to authors or individuals, it has been necessary to create a
boundary such as intellectual property in the form of the public domain. This principle
guarantees that authorship remains a principle which comes from society even though
society let individuals hold intellectual property rights on their creation. What needs
to be emphasised is that without society, authors cannot create but society itself could
not further its intellectual development without recognising people, who more than
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others, are the cultural and scientific voice of society. In that sense, copyright as a
direct descendent of a certain technological and economic environment cannot in its
principles survive in the new creative environment as defined by Peter Drucker as a
collectivist community limited by individual claims. I argue that only the substance of
droit d'auteur is valid in electronic environment as opposed to its current application.
I believe that the substance of droit d'auteur as elaborated by Lakanal and Le
Chapelier gives solid grounds for a new definition of authorship.
The technical consequences of the facts I have just mentioned imply that
information in digital form is much harder to control. That capacity along with the
private nature of possible infringements poses problems as to the enforcement of
copyright against the derivation of single or multi-media works. Digital forms keep
the content but not the physical form of the work. Thus, the use of the information
contained is facilitated. Copyright enforcement in the early print environment was
relatively easy. Copy by hand was not a major problem because it was not a viable
means of competing with copyright holders' commercial interests. New technologies
have made it easier to reproduce works and harder to monitor use. The critical aspect
of copying is whether it displaces a sale of a copy or not. It is difficult to assess the
economic impact of unauthorised copying of text, graphic, audio and video work by
xerographic and taping technologies. Nevertheless, it does not seem to represent a
serious threat to the economic viability of general interest book, magazines, or
newspapers.43 It has already been argued that certain industries more than others have
43 In Scotsman Publications Ltd. v. John Edwards Advertising Ltd., Edwards Ltd distributed a
daily service of cutting services of articles which has appeared in the Scotsman newspaper. "The
service was distributed inter alia to an airline which made it available to passengers flying between the
U.K. and North Sea Oil installations.". Session Cases 1980, at 308-3 11; see also court report, Hector L.
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a desperate need for copyright protection, solely for revenue purposes, not for
authorship concerns. For my part, concerns have mainly to be expressed about
scholarly and artistic endeavours. Moreover, the case of access to works of the mind is
highlighted in particular by the creation of derivative works. A short extract or
segment of a work without any alteration or addition may well be considered an
infringement depending on the circumstances or context in which they are reproduced.
Moreover, derivative works may look different from canonical works because their
format or other features look different; however, they could be disguised derivative
works since digital technologies make it easy to manipulate works. There are
difficulties in defining the skills, labour, and judgement involved in the collation of
information and the creation of the new work.
Like the printing press, information technology brings not only economic
changes but also social, cultural and political changes. Indeed, "[t]he fact that identical
images, maps, and diagrams could be viewed simultaneously by scattered readers
constituted a kind of communications revolution itself."44 Similarly, as I have already
argued, information technology brings many more opportunities. Nonetheless, the
most striking aspect of such a revolution is that information technology supports some
of the qualities of an oral culture.45 Clearly, it breaks away from printed materials to
MacQueen, Copyright in future publications, 30 Journal of the Law of Scotland 1985, at 198-199; At a
larger scale, Chinese and U.S. trade official averted a trade war with an agreement, early in February
1995, on stopping Chinese piracy of U.S. movies, music and other goods. Although the $1 billion
represents a small fraction of the $45 billion worth of goods the two countries trade between
themselves in 1994, Agence Press.
44 Elizabeth L. Eisentein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and
Cultural Transformation in Early Modern Europe, Vol.1,(Cambridge University Press, 1979), at 36.
45 Steven W. Gilbert & Franck W Conelly, A Wealth of Notions: Regaining Balance as New
Information Technologies Collide With Traditional Controls and Incentives for Intellectual Work,
contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment (Washington D.C., 1991), cited in
[O.T.A., 1992], at 167.
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favour direct electronic communications in a manner similar to oral discourse as
observed in Ancient Greece. Modern copyright conveys the principle that the market
place is allowed to define information solely as a monopolised commodity. This
means that the system of dissemination of ideas and subsequent intellectual
innovation would simply break down without any monopolised commodities to trade.
By contrast, information technology recreates an environment where instant
communication facilitates exchange of ideas among people and consequently furthers
progress. As a result, markets depending on copyright protection have become
directly affected since digital form of expression threatens printed commodities,
namely the products of the printing press.
Clearly, copyright institutions are not fit to respond to the needs of society in
electronic milieu. Beyond the mechanisms, the goals need first to be redefined by
society, in order then to define proper mechanisms. The inescapable conclusion which
emerges is that the concepts of authorship and ownership in products of the intellect
have lost legal support. Ultimately, then, it could mean the "death of the author" along
with copyright.46 Furthermore, in discussing the future of copyright one is clearly
faced with two positions. A romantic approach presents copyright as a means to
protect freedom of expression traduced by greater creation and dissemination of new
ideas. This is what Mark Rose characterised as "[t]he eigtheenth-century discourse of
original genius [which] can be understood as an anticipation of romantic doctrines of
creativity."47 A second one looks at copyright in a more pragmatic fashion as a form
46 Lionel Bently, Copyright and the Death of the Author in Literature and Law, 57 The Modern
Law Review 1994, at 973-986.
47 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners. The Invention of Copyright, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1993), at 131.
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of protection within the industry Both approaches refer to authorship as a means of
appropriation. Here lies the dilemma. The problem is to determine what authorship
ought to refer to in an age of information technology in order to determine adequate
rules for intellectual property. In characterising authorship, one is actually setting the
track for policy goals towards which the intellectual property system is directed. They
will mirror the goals of society in the information age.
The Great Question of Authorship
Copyright law, and especially droit d'auteur, substantiates a certain concept of
authorship. Without it, no proprietary rights on works of the mind can be sustained.
Because intellectual property is the product of social interaction, the concept is
determined according to the perception held by society on the role of creators and
their contributions in society. The invention of the press in the fifteenth century
established a transitional step in society's perception of authorship. Before, no
individual responsibilities or initiatives were to be recognised; therefore literary
responsibility or creativity could not be assumed by authors as single individuals.48
For instance the tapestry of Bayeux, as well as the stained glass of a medieval
cathedral, embody the values and conceptions not of individuals but of an entire
community. The printing press gave an intellectual impulse, breaking away from a
48 "As Elizabeth Eisenstein has demonstrated '[s]cribal culture could not sustain the patenting of
inventions or the copyrighting of literary compositions. It worked against the concept of intellectual
property rights.' With the typographical fixity and attribution made possible by printing, authorship
became a matter of personal responsibility, and respect for the 'wisdom of the ages' correspondingly
declined", see Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A non Posnerian Law and Economics Approach,
12 Hamline Law Review 1989, at 272.
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sense of community which embraced cultural and scientific endeavours.49 In parallel,
intervention from political authorities was sought by printers and booksellers to
legitimate their ownership in copies in order to prevent piracies, and because copies
represented considerable investments. Intervention was two-fold. Authority decided to
intervene in economic affairs to support the new technology and protect the
developing book trade by means of book privileges; but soon it became interested in
controlling the printing press as a means of censorship. Moreover, as has been
contended, the printing press brought altogether economic, political, and social
changes. As a result, authorship is a reflection of these changes whereby the term is
associated with respect for individual property rights vested in creators on a special
kind of commodity, creators being the source of this commodity. Clearly, "we are the
heirs of the institution of literary property created in the eighteenth century".50
The early institution of literary property expanded to give rise to other forms
of property, like charts and maps. Similarly the concept of authorship embraces many
forms of expression. As a matter of fact, two modern concepts of authorship should be
recognised. As I have already argued, both concepts look similar in vesting
ownership on their work, but in authors they support two fundamentally different
approaches to intellectual property rights. In 1774 the House of Lords, court of final
appeal in the United Kingdom, heard the great question of literary property, the case
Donaldson v. Becket which was to become the underlying principle ofmodern Anglo-
49 Robert K. Heldman, T.F. Madison & T.A. Bystrzycki, Future Telecommunications.
Information Applications Services. & Infrastructure, (McGraw-Hill, 1993), at 7-15.
50 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners. The Invention of Copyright, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1993), at 130.
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American copyright law.51 The Lords decided that authors, and their assigns, have a
temporary privilege established by the 1710 Statute of Anne (8 Anne c.21) of printing
and disposing of copies. The simple act of granting a privilege of ownership
institutionalised creators as owners or investors in their own creative labour. By
contrast, the 1793 French declaration des droits du genie conceptualises authorship as
a recognition of creators' ownership in the expression of their personality.52 Both
systems intend in their own way to encourage "Learned Men to Compose and Write
useful Books" or further the citizens' enlightenment in terms of education and
encouragement of knowledge.53 Even though creators are the centre of attention in
both systems, they are conceptually constructed on different grounds to represent two
different legal traditions. This is of fundamental importance in analysing the viability
of copyright law and droit d'auteur in electronic milieu.
The concept of authorship was prompted into existence by the emergence of
the printing press, enabling a central authority to support authorship. Not only did the
development of the printing press lead to the creation of copyright, but it led people to
think of creative expressions as property. In other words, the printing press gave us
the opportunity to initiate the creation of copyright as a legal institution and to
establish by the same token the very substance of the doctrines on intellectual
property. Property right, whether tangible or intangible, needs boundaries. Ownership
in intellectual property is defined in terms of intangible characteristics. Unfortunately,
51 Alexander Donalson, and another v. Thomas Becket and others, II Brown 133, I Eng.Rep. 846.
52 Lakanal, La declaration des droit du genie, Le Moniteur Universel 21 July 1793.
53 "An Act for the Encouragement of Learing, by vesting the Copies of printed Books on the
Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned", 8 Anne c.21. Statutes At
Large, at 417.
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information technology has disrupted these traditional proprietary boundaries and
control over them. These observations are reflected in legal theory by the idea-
expression dichotomy, rationalised by the concept of originality which moulded the
doctrine in copyright law,54 Ideas, as such, are neither patentable or copyrightable.
Monopoly in ideas is against the very purpose intellectual property rights seek to
promote. Authorship has become a matter of personal responsibility, initiated with
fixed mediums of original expression made possible by printing technology, and
rewarded by the copyright regime in relation to its dependence with the technology
that makes creation possible. As a direct successor of the licensing mechanism,
copyright institutions still represent a form of state and societal constraint. It may be
argued that copyright allows the suppression of freedom of speech as a whole. As
Reichman observed:
"In practice, the exclusive rights of copyright law provide a successful reward only to
those authors and artists who successfully explore the public's taste."55
Certain works of the mind succeed in capturing society's attention. Some scholars
advocate that people do what comes naturally and then invent some theory to make
their effort plausible.56 What would come naturally to copyright is the deliberate or
selective suppression and advancement of speech. For instance, copyright limits the
essence of the creative process by penalising unconscious infringement, or simply
inhibits creation of derivative works or inventions which rely on deliberate imitation
54 Amaury Cruz, What is the Big Idea Behind the Idea-Expression Dichotomy - Modern
Ramifications of the Tree of Porphyry in Copyright Law, 18 Florida State University Law Review
1990, at 221-249.
J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paragigms, 94 Columbia
Law Review Dec. 1994, at 2438.
56 David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the World: Copyright and the Construction ofAuthorship
in the Post-Millenum, 55 Law and Comtemporarv Problems 1992, at 142.
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or improvement of previous works. The mechanism of suppression has relied on the
concept of authorship.
In his seminal 1969 essay, "What is an Author?", Michel Foucault
characterised authors as "author-function".57 An "author" represents a particular type
of legal codification as a form of appropriation. This situation allows the
determination of what is "lawful" and "unlawful" as well as control of the use of
appropriated forms of expression.58 Authors represent ideological figures by which
one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning. The assignment
of an "author" as a name contributes to the valorisation of intellectual materials by
means of individualisation. In other words, elements composing intellectual materials
traduce the personality of the "named" author. Foucault argues that authors are "tied to
the legal and institutional systems".59
It has been contended that intellectual property, as an institutional system, is
the creation of one technical culture, the printing press. Accordingly, the rise of new
communication technologies, such as information technology, may be considered as a
death warrant for authors. The institutional as well as the technical connection
between copyright law and authorship would then support the opinion that "authors",
as a function, could not be sustained in the electronic milieu. By contrast, droit
d'auteur represents a fundamental right recognised by law, independently of any form
of technology or specific form of expression, as long as it fulfils the test of
"personality". Following this line of thinking, authorship is free from any technical
57 [Foucault, 1977], at 124.
58 Determination of "religious" or "blasphemous", "sacred" or "profane" is greatly facilitated by
assignment of an "author", [Foucault, 1977], at 124.
59 ibid, at 130.
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form of communication. Although this specific concept of authorship may be
applicable in electronic milieu, its current application, as has been explained (see chap
3 at 114-115), respond to a certain technology, the printing press. Consequently, it is
not under a similar form that authorship will survive. Also, intellectual property is
established as a form of constraint by the state; its disappearance would signify a new
era where "authorship" and thus creativity are beyond the reach of constraint. This
means that creativity will play a key role in the determination of authorship away
from any function of production or transformation and form of appropriation.60
Authorship will then survive in a more personal manner, away from the state's
authority. Since the current intellectual property system may vanish, we need to
understand how the goals defined by society will be reached. Is there a need for
incentives? It has already been contended that publication in the information
infrastructure will be met by direct economic claims. Therefore it may be the death of
"authors" as a determined function which pertains to a form of intellectual property,
but certainly not the death of creators. On the contrary, I would insist upon the fact
that, having more tools and resources to build upon, creators will enhance their
creativity. Also, authorship will survive in a more personal form, away from any
constraining figure of societal or state authority. Nonetheless, I venture to say that
personal authorship does not exclude anonymity as perceived in medieval times,
because information technology sweeps away all resistance to meaning and all
constraints beyond the individual authorship. In De Viris Illustribus, Saint Jerome
60 Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emorv Law Journal 1990, at 1023, cited in Mark Rose.
Authors and Owners. The Invention ofCopyright, (Harvard University Press, 1993), at 133.
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maintains that homonymy is not proof of common authorship.61 Similarly criteria
such as quality, theoretical coherence, and style may define a new form of discourse
whereby authorship does not refer as such to an author's name. Creators of all kind
will therefore not be "flatly equated in the law, as an equation of rights."62 Emphasis
is put on differentiation among contributions where names becomes incidental. Only
imprints of creators will remain. Molly Nesbit questioned whether culture in a printed
world is flat as a book.63 As such, the printed work may have been flat in that sense
that authorship has been a reflection of a certain legal framework emerging from one
culture. Authorship has been simultaneously an artefact of the market place where
books as cultural commodities are exchanged and authors have a function in society.
In that sense, culture may have been flat or at least constrained by society to the open
exploitation of "culture'1 by an industry. A new definition of authorship ought to
detache itself from such economic influence to let the many different creative
experiences emerge. Economic variables become consequently secondary points to
the act of creation. Culture is not expressed anymore in terms of marginal units of
production but in terms of freedom of creativity and expression which ought to be
protected for their knowledge or cultural value.
61 St. Jerome, De Viris Illustribus, cited in [Foucault, 1977], at 130.
62 Molly Nesbit, What Was an Author?, 73 Yale French Studies 1987, at 230.
63 ibid, at 235.
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Conclusion
The intention of this research has been to determine the fundamental rationales and
subsequent principles of copyright law and droit d'auteur in order to demonstrate that
both mechanisms are not viable in the light of information technology. Moreover, the
analysis is directed towards the determination of the emergence of intellectual
property rights as a social construct in relation to technological change. To that effect,
the real purpose of the exercise has been to analyse the interrelation between the
different elements which compose intellectual property systems, in order to define
what is the future of intellectual property , or authorship, in electronic milieu.
In order to conclude on that specific issue, it is worth citing Neil Turkewitz'
view on the subject matter. Careful attention should be given to the fact that Tirkewitz
refers to "authors' rights" as the natural and inalienable rights of natural persons to
control the uses of the fruits of their creative processes In other words, Turkewitz
looks at the fate of droit d'auteur in the light of technological change.
"Authors' rights are dead. This is a radical and controversial observation on today's
environment but a necessary starting point. Author's rights are a product of 18th and
19th Century romanticism and should now only serve as an indication of how far we
have come. Our views of the place of art in society, of creativity in the marketplace,
and ultimately of the value of freedom of expression, require us to reject the elitism
inherent in copyright systems based on the natural rights of authors.
I am drawn to this conclusion by two somewhat unconnected lines of
thought. The first is that protection based on the natural rights of authors fails to
consider the interests of society with respect to access to creative works. It is amoral
and asocial. The second thought is that author-based protection has failed to provide
an adequate legal structure for dealing with the strains on copyright resulting from
advances in technology. Authors' rights are premised on the ability of the author to
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control reproduction and distribution. Modern technology has rendered such a
premise untenable.
What is presently required is a radical reassessment of societal objectives in
the protection of intellectual property - to directly address the fact that our copyright
laws are a statement of our social policies. The debate has for too long taken place
in the darkness ofmuseums instead of the light of the market place."1
Clearly, in the light of the findings of the thesis, such contention show complete
misunderstanding of the rationales as well as the principles of droit d'auteur and their
relationship with technical change.
The rationales of copyright law evolved from one specific technology, the
mechanical press. More generally, authors are perceived as investors in their own
works in the form of commodities. As a result, two principles have been developed.
Since works of the mind have the particularity to be non-appropriable, copyright law
grants monopoly rights in order for individuals to invest in such works. Rationally it
can be understood that property rights cannot arise without the existence of a public
domain from which people can draw new works. Such principles mirror society's goal,
which is the dissemination of works of the mind, towards which the mechanism is
directed but in compliance within a defined technological environment. As such the
doctrines of the idea-expression dichotomy as well as originality ensure that the goal
is reached. For instance, the doctrine of idea-expression dichotomy ensures that no-
one can restrict access to ideas, blocking by the same token free markets as well as the
dissemination of ideas under the form of oligopolies. Consequently, it may be
contended that copyright as a form of property has simply replaced the term privilege.
In other words, in granting property rights to authors the state confers upon creators of
1 Neil Turkewitz, Authors' Rights are Dead, 38 Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A.
1990, at 41, cited in Adolf Dietz, Copyright in the Modern Technological worls: A Mere Industrial
Properly Right?, 39 Journal. Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 1991, at 84.
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works of the mind the right to put their creations on the market first. Further this
property right takes the form of a temporary monopoly determining a bundle of rights
vested in the copyright owner Inherently, copyright protects commercial value in
order to pursue society's goal, and not any personal bond which may exist between an
author and his creation.
By contrast, droit d'auteur seeks to protect the educative value of works of the
mind. Droit d'auteur rests upon the recognition of authors' contribution in society in
order to further the republican enlightenment. Moreover, the purpose is to protect
authors for the greater benefit of society's cultural and scientific wealth, analysed in
terms of public domain. Therefore, droit d'auteur recognises authors as proprietors in
the expression of their creativity. As a matter of fact, in recognising authors, society
recognises what belongs to human kind and ought to be in the public domain, Thus,
authors cannot be investors in their own work but society itself. Proprietary rights vest
in authors as the repository for society's cultural and scientific future. This link
between society and creators cannot be founded upon commercial interests rather than
the intimate bond which links the author to his creation. This principle does not
contradict society's claims on works of the mind. On the contrary, it reinforces it,
since the creative process evolves from the interaction which exists between creators
and the public. As Lakanal contended, attribution of proprietary rights to authors in
works of the mind could not harm the goals that the new Republican society set itself.
Thus, the public domain has its importance. From these rationales evolve two main
principles, joined by another one due to the technological environment. Proprietary
rights spring from the principle of authorship and are balanced by the principle of
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public domain. Since publishers meet the same difficulties in appropriating the value
of publications a third principle of a monopolistic nature is added. Here lies the two
fundamental sets of droit d'auteur. The first two principles generate inalienable rights,
called moral rights, which are attributed to creators on behalf of society. The last
principle which is balanced by the principle of the public domain represents the
economic rights attributed to copyright owners. It should be clear that such
monopolistic rights evolve from the press and not from the fundamental rationales of
droit d'auteur. This simply proves the inherent flexibility of droit d'auteur rationales
to mirror the technological requirements in which works of the mind are processed.
Nonetheless, introduction of monopolistic economic rights produces negative
effects if not properly balanced by the principle of public domain. As such, the
dilemmas of the U.S. copyright system as well as computer programs illustrate clearly
the problems which face both copyright systems. Commercial value tends to pervert
intellectual property systems, and especially copyright protection, when economic
forces become stronger than the goals towards which both systems aim. Accordingly,
technological change, and especially information technology, has simply exposed in a
more direct fashion the limits of the current copyright institutions. Both systems have
been set up to espouse the needs of the one specific technology. The time has come to
adapt intellectual property to the information age. In recognising the rationales as well
as the principles which direct the mechanisms, adequate mechanisms may be
developed to respond to technological change. However, as opposed to droit d'auteur,
the rationales as well as the principles of copyright law are directly exposed to
technological change. By contrast, the fundamental rationale of French author's rights,
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and to a large extent its following principles, can originate mechanisms which may fit
information technology. Moreover, as technology changes, society's expectations
change. The general goal has been to further enlightenment, in other words to increase
the public domain. Society is asking the legislators to open more widely access to the
public domain.
Accordingly, the concept of authorship will need to change. Its current usage
as an author, or one single individual, who is solely responsible for the production of a
unique work needs to be reassessed. As such, droit d'auteur rationales are able to
bring answers to the problem. As contended, authorship is a reflection of society's
needs to entrust individuals with the cultural and scientific future of society. With the
rise of information technology, the concept of authorship which regarded an author as
a distinct entity personally responsible for his creations is giving way to a more
communal conception of the term. As a matter of fact, since society is asking for more
room to express itself, and thus access works of the mind, it is logical that the current
restrictive and economic concept of authorship enlarges itself to embrace creativity in
a more dynamic way. Also, this new concept of authorship goes along with a new
economic approach, namely a return to the dynamic emergence of intellectual
property rights. In such a fashion, intellectual property liberates itself from direct
economic concerns to concentrate on the protection of works as form of expression.
As a result, it is within the realms of authorship, as defended by Le Chapelier and
Lakanal. that the future of intellectual property right lies. Intellectual property rights
can be neither substitutes for consensual markets nor market guardians of the cultural
and scientific domain. Both ought to work together without impeding each other.
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Therefore, in the light of information technology, a broader view ought to be taken in
approaching the concept of authorship in order to let markets do their magic in the
privacy of people's home as well as guarantee access to a larger public domain.
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ARPANet (Advanced Research Projects Administration Network)
The precursor to the Internet. Conceptualised by the Rand Corporation and developed in the late 60's
and early 70's by the US Department of Defense as an experiment in wide-area-networking that would
survive a nuclear war. See Also: Internet
Backbone
A high-speed line or series of connections that forms a major pathway within a network. The term is
relative as a backbone in a small network will likely be much smaller than many non-backbone lines in
a large network. See Also: Network
BBS (Bulletin Board System)
A computerized meeting and announcement system that allows people to carry on discussions, upload
and download files, and make announcements without the people being connected to the computer at
the same time. There are many thousands (millions?) of BBS's around the world, most are very small,
running on a single IBM clone PC with 1 or 2 phone lines. Some are very large and the line between a
BBS and a system like CompuServe gets crossed at some point, but it is not clearly drawn.
Client
A software program that is used to contact and obtain data from a Server software program on another
computer, often across a great distance. Each Client program is designed to work with one or more
specific kinds of Server programs, and each Server requires a specific kind of Client. See Also: Server
Cyberspace
Term originated by author William Gibson in his novel "Neuromancer", the word Cyberspace is
currently used to describe the whole range of information and multi-media resources available through
computer networks.
E-mail (Electronic Mail)
Messages, usually text, sent from one person to another via computer. E-mail can also be sent
automatically to a large number of addresses (Mailing List). See Also:, Maillist
Ethernet
A very common method of networking computers in a LAN. Ethernet will handle about 10.000,000
bits-per-second and can be used with almost any kind of computer. See Also:, LAN
FTP (File Transfer Protocol)
A very common method of moving files between two Internet sites. FTP is a special way to login to
another Internet site for the purposes of retrieving and/or sending files. There are many Internet sites
that have established pubicly accessible repositories of material that can be obtained using FTP, by
logging in using the account name "anonymous", thus these sites are called "anonymous ftp servers".
Gateway
The technical meaning is a hardware or software set-up that translates between two dissimilar
protocols, for example Prodigy has a gateway that translates between its internal, proprietary e-mail
format and Internet e-mail format. Another, sloppier meaning of gateway is to describe any mechanism
for providing access to another system, e.g. AOL might be called a gateway to the Internet.
Gopher
A widely successful method of making menus of material available over the Internet. Gopher is a
Client and Server style program, which requires that the user have a Gopher Client program. Although
Gopher spread rapidly across the globe in only a couple of years, it is being largely supplanted to
Hypertext, also known as WWW (World Wide Web), there are still thousands of Gopher Servers on
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the Internet and we can expect they will remain for a while. See Also: Client , Server , WWW ,
Hypertext
Host
Any computer on a network that is a repository for services available to other computers on the
network. It is quite common to have one host machine provide several services, such as WWW and
USENET. See Also: Node , Network
HTML (HyperText Markup Language)
The coding language used to create Hypertext documents for use on the World Wide Web. HTML
looks a lot like old-fashioned typesetting code, where you surround a block of text with codes that
indicate how it should appear, additionally, in HTML you can specify that a block of text, or a word, is
"linked " to another file on the Internet. HTML files are meant to be viewed using a World Wide Web
Client Program, such as Mosaic. See Also: Client, Server , WWW
HTTP (HyperText Transport Protocol)
The protocol for moving hypertext files across the Internet. Requires a HTTP client program on one
end, and an HTTP server program on the other end. HTTP is the most important protocol used in the
World Wide Web (WWW). See Also: Client, Server , WWW
Hypertext
Generally, any text that contains "links" to other documents - words or phrases in the document that
can be chosen by a reader and which cause another document to be retrieved and displayed.
Internet (Upper case I)
The vast collection of inter-connected networks that all use the TCP/IP protocols and that evolved from
the ARPANET of the late 60's and early 70's. The Internet now (July 1995) connects roughly 60,000
independant networks into a vast global internet. See Also: internet
internet (Lower case I)
Any time you connect 2 or more networks together, you have an internet - as in inter-national or inter¬
state. See Also: Internet
IP Number
Sometimes called a "dotted quad". A unique number consisting of 4 parts separated by dots, e.g.
165.113.245.2 . Every machine that is on the Internet has a unique IP number - if a machine does not
have an IP number, it is not really on the Internet. Most machines also have one or more Domain
Names that are easier for people to remember. See Also: Internet
LAN (Local Area Network)
A computer network limited to the immediate area, usually the same building or floor of a building.
See Also: Ethernet
Maillist (or Mailing List)
A (usually automated) system that allows people to send e-mail to one address, whereupon their
message is copied and sent to all of the other subscribers to the maillist. In this way, people who have
many different kinds of e-mail access can participate in discussions together.
Modem (MOdulator, DEModulator)
A device that you connect to your computer and to a phone line, that allows the computer to talk to
other computers through the phone system. Basically, modems do for computers what a telephone does
for humans.
Network
Any time you connect 2 or more computers together so that they can share resources, you have a
computer network. Connect 2 or more networks together and you have an internet. See Also: Internet
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Newsgroup
The name for discussion groups on. See Also: Usenet
Node
Any single computer connected to a network. See Also: Network . Internet, internet
TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol)
This is the suite of protocols that defines the Internet. Originally designed for the UNIX operating
system, TCP/IP software is now available for every major kind of computer operating system. To be
truly on the Internet, your computer must have TCP/IP software. See Also: IP Number , Internet
Terminal
A device that allows you to send commands to a computer somewhere else. At a minimum, this usually
means a keyboard and a display screen and some simple circuitry. Usually you will use terminal
software in a personal computer - the software pretends to be ("emulates") a physical terminal and
allows you to type commands to a computer somewhere else.
Terminal Server
A special purpose computer that has places to plug in many modems on one side, and a connection to a
LAN or host machine on the other side. Thus the terminal server does the work of answering the calls
and passes the connections on to the appropriate node. Most terminal servers can provide PPP or SLIP
services if connected to the Internet.
URL (Uniform Resource Locator)
The standard way to give the address of any resource on the Internet that is part of the World Wide
Web (WWW). A URL looks like this:
http://www.matisse.net/seminars.html
or news:new.newusers.questions, etc.
The most common way to use a URL is to enter into a WWW browser program, such as Netscape, or
Lynx. See Also:, WWW
Usenet
A world-wide system of discussion groups, with comments passed among hundreds of thousands of
machines. Not all Usenet machines are on the Internet, maybe half. Usenet is completely decentralized,
with over 10,000 discussion areas, called newsgroups. See Also: Newsgroup
WAIS (Wide Area Information Servers)
A commercial software package that allows the indexing of huge quantities of information, and then
making those indices searchable across networks such as the Internet. A prominent feature of WAIS is
that the search results are ranked ('scored") according to how relevant the "hits" are, and that
subsequent searches can find "more stuff like that last batch" and thus refine the search process.
WWW (World Wide Web)
Two meanings - First, loosely used: the whole constellation of resources that can be accessed using
Gopher, FTP, HTTP, telnet, Usenet, WAIS and some other tools. Second, the universe of hypertext
servers (HTTP servers) which are the servers that allow text, graphics, sound files, etc. to be mixed
together. See Also:, FTP , Gopher , HTTP , URL , WAIS
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